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Errata.

Page 6, paragraph 3, line 3, for 1827 read 1727.

Page 29, note 59, line 3, for Whiston read Whiton.

Page 419, the first 7 lines belong at the top of page 418.

Page 585, lines 7 and 8, for imperious read imperative.

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE NEW ENGLAND DIVINES.

BY THE REV. FRANK H. FOSTER, PH.D. (LEIPZIG), PROFESSOR OF CHURCH
HISTORY, OBERLIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

It is proposed in a series of articles to sketch somewhat fully the history of certain doctrines among the New England divines.¹

Histories of Doctrine are now generally confessed to hold an important place both in the general culture of the theologian, and in the material from which, in his more careful studies, he has to draw his system of divine truth. It is now seen that the Christian system has a history. It was not built up at once, nor erected by any one man. It grew by slow accessions through many centuries, as the cathedral grows. And the conclusion is so easy that many have already made it, and said that Christian truth will never be attained except by this same process. Whoever tears himself loose from his historical antecedents, and endeavors to build anew from the foundations, will be predestined to certain failure.

In its broadest statement we do not accept this view.¹ But it is evident on the most superficial examination, that we are all formed largely by our antecedents, and are thus entangled, whether we will or not, in the meshes of the net of history. We cannot tear ourselves loose from it.

¹ This phrase used as in BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, IX. 174.
VOL. XLIII. No. 169.—JAN. 1886. 1

entirely, and we may as well submit cordially to the inevitable, and see whether we cannot draw profit from our situation.

New England Congregationalists may, we think, congratulate themselves on the character of the theological history that lies behind them. When earnest men have been seriously engaged in the investigation of great truths through a long series of years, it is exceedingly improbable that their successors will not find many valuable results of permanent worth as the product of such labors. To neglect them, would be to invite failure in further pursuit of truth. It would be to run the risk of laboriously rediscovering things already made perfectly plain, or even of suffering defeat at some point near which the fathers had erected an impregnable fortress. But the studies of our fathers were prolonged, deep, and earnest. There are certain doctrines of theology upon which they labored in the closest sympathy with, and dependence on one another for a century. Their labors cannot be ignored with safety. They were great men. Not great, we must admit, in mere erudition, for they were far from libraries, and thrown upon the resources of their own minds; but these minds were powerful, and well-trained. They lacked many of the tools which the modern scholar regards as indispensable to his task; but they were not weighed down with the impediments which his very advantages cast around him. They concentrated their attention very largely upon one great theme, that of Anthropology. It is within bounds to say that it had never received so concentrated and careful study from any set of men from the days of Augustine down. They arrived at results which are already, and will be, we believe, more and more, esteemed as a great contribution to the Theology of the Church. They have sometimes been accused of being provincial.'

them the best minds in all America and in Calvinistic Europe. They were surrounded and oppressed by the same great problem of religious deadness that perplexed the whole Protestant world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In warm sympathy with their Westminster training, and in constant conference with their friends,³ they attacked their task. Earlier by more than fifty years than Schleiermacher and his friends in Germany, they overcame in America the results of a dead orthodoxy, and performed their work vastly better than he. Their revivals, and those of their successors, who were trained by them, and who confessedly owed their power to the peculiar doctrines of their teachers, created the missionary, revival church which we, their children, enjoy. Because they lived in New England they are not, therefore, provincial. Augustine lived in Africa, Calvin in Geneva, and Schleiermacher in Brandenburg. The methods, the spirit, and the tangible results of the labors of the New England divines raise them above any such charge as provincialism. And we think that the ultimate acceptance of their speculations is at least as likely to help in this as that of the three great divines just mentioned.

It has often been emphasized of late that we need a living theology. A merely traditional faith, petrified and encrusted in the lapse of time, no longer touching the heart of any believer, because having no single rootlet drawing life from real experience, is indeed a useless encumbrance, when not a positive bar to progress. The theology of our fathers was not such a one. They took nothing upon human authority alone. They proved all things and held fast that which was true. And with many disadvantages as to the technical form in which they were

³The correspondence of Edwards with Scotch clergymen is well known. In the "Advertisement" to the Treatise on Original Sin we read: "Several Professors of Divinity in the Dutch Universities very lately sent him their thanks for the assistance he had given them in their enquiry into some controverted points; having carried his own further than any author they had ever seen." Works, Dwight edit. II. 306.

able to prosecute and finish their work, they had many great advantages in the line of the topic under consideration for investigating or presenting theological truth. They touched the life of their age at very many points. They were pastors, acquainted with men, and working always under the sense of the real wants and actual condition of living men and women whom they desired personally to help. Thus their theology was wrought out, and it manifestly possessed in great abundance the elements of life. (Contact with life begets life. We can perhaps in no better way gain a living apprehension of the theology they handed down to us, and make our theology alive, than by watching it in its original genesis) While, if we turn away from it with contempt,* we may find to our sorrow that the material we have brought from foreign shores for the rising structure of our regenerated and living theology is, after all, untempered mortar.

(One element, at least, we can gain from the study of the theology of Edwards and his followers. They were men of mighty spiritual earnestness. They seemed to see the truth by direct intuition) and if they spoke of the peril of lost men, it was because they realized it with exceeding vividness. (The consistency of their systems each with itself is a marvel) but it springs from this characteristic. Their unflinching belief in and their faithfulness in preaching upon hard and unpopular doctrines was because of the same trait. Here we have only to learn, and shall scarcely venture to criticise them, if indeed we believe there is such a thing as systematic truth.

We begin these studies with the topic of Eschatology for a variety of reasons. It might at first sight seem preferable to begin with those departments of Theology where the New England divines have laid out their full strength,

* Such expressions as "obsolescent" and "moribund" frequently applied in certain quarters to New England Theology, notably in the Andover Review, are a pain and grief to every loyal son of New England. But they are as unscientific as they are unfilial.

and done their best work. But our choice may be justified. Eschatology is the topic at present exciting the most attention in the theological world, and here the utterances of the fathers will be read in many circles with the greatest interest. Our early divines, again, preached and wrote upon this topic with unusual earnestness and frequency, and passed through one prolonged controversy over it. True, there is one element of attractiveness wanting for the more superficial reader. There will be no very novel conclusions arrived at, and no decided departure from the orthodoxy of that day. Yet many elements provocative of thought will be found; many attempts at the solution of difficulties still felt; and some suggestive anticipations and refutations of speculations and argumentations of the recent past.

At any rate, having recently gone through the matter again, the writer feels confident that the labor has not proved an empty or fruitless one, and respectfully begs the attention of the thoughtful reader, trusting that the history itself will vindicate its claims to be heard.

Generally speaking, the New England doctrine as to the fate of the wicked may be defined as in the Westminster Confession upon which historically the theological thinking of these fathers rests. We may compress the language of the confession into the following statement: "The souls of men after death pass immediately into a state of reward or punishment, the souls of the wicked being cast into hell, where they remain reserved to the judgment of the great day, when they shall receive according to what they have done in the body, shall be cast into eternal torments, and punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord."

We shall begin with the great leader of this school of thought,

¹The Confession adopted at Boston, May 12, 1680, does not vary here from the Westminster. See Mather's *Magnalia*, Hartford edit., 1820, vol. ii. p. 178 f.

I. JONATHAN EDWARDS.

Edwards, though a great theologian, was first of all a great preacher and pastor. We must commence our study of him, therefore, from the practical side, and consider

1. *His Practical Point of View.*

This arose both from his personal character, and the circumstances in which he was placed. Edwards was pre-eminently a holy man. He had a very vivid realization of the wickedness of sin. His own heart looked to him, as he says, "like an abyss, infinitely deeper than hell." "And it appears to me," he continues, "that were it not for free grace, exalted and raised up to the infinite height of all the fullness and glory of the great Jehovah, and the arm of his power and grace stretched forth in all the majesty of his power, and in all the glory of his sovereignty, I should appear sunk down in my sins below hell itself; far beyond the sight of everything but the eye of sovereign grace that can pierce even down to such a depth. And yet it seems to me that my conviction of sin is exceeding small and faint."

His circumstances intensified these feelings. The state of religion in Northampton when he was installed pastor in 1727 was very low. He saw sin at work among his people, and his heart and mind were both busy to provide and apply a remedy. He contemplated their prospective fearful fate with great anguish of spirit. He preached unto them faithfully and with the poetic vividness of a Dante. And the result was a great revival, 1734-5, which spread far and wide.

It is of the greater importance for us to pause over this topic, that this same Dante-like poetic and imaginative literalness of Edwards' preaching has been made the ground

on Future Punishment exclusively, or even chiefly. The "Five Sermons" preached in the first revival, and published in 1738 are entitled: Justification by Faith alone, (a treatise rather than a sermon); Pressing into the Kingdom of God; Ruth's Resolution; The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners; and The Excellency of Jesus Christ;—certainly a wide range and a well-proportioned selection of subjects. When he did preach on this dreadful theme, it was with such tenderness as well as plainness, that it melted and subdued the hearts of his listeners. Edwards himself says: "When ministers preach of hell and warn sinners to avoid it in a cold manner—though they may say in words that it is infinitely terrible—they contradict themselves. For actions have a language as well as words. . . . The gospel is to be preached as well as the law, and the law is to be preached only to make way for the gospel, and in order that it may be preached more effectually. The main work of ministers is to preach the gospel." And so it was that that sermon whose simple title has called out so many reproaches,—*"Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,"*—preached at Enfield, resulted in a great revival. In it occurs a passage, the suppressed emotion and deep tenderness of which is as remarkable as its directness. We can almost see the awe-struck face of the preacher, and hear the pathos of his voice,* as he says: "There is reason to think that there are many in this congregation, now hearing this discourse, that will actually be the subjects of this very misery to all eternity. We know not who they are, or in what seats they sit, or what thoughts they now have. It may be they are now at ease, and hear all these things *without much disturbance*, and are now flattering them-

* Works iii. 537.

selves that they are not the persons, promising themselves that they shall escape. If we knew that there was one person, and but one, in the whole congregation, that was to be the subject of this misery, what an awful thing would it be to think of! If we knew who it was, what an awful sight would it be to see such a person! How might all the rest of the congregation lift up a lamentable and bitter cry over him! But, alas! instead of one, how many is it likely will remember this discourse in hell!"

Thus, on the practical side, Edwards' conviction as to the reality of eternal punishment had its origin not in the callousness of an unfeeling heart, but in the extreme sensitiveness of his soul to sin, and his profound conviction of the utter inexcusableness and vileness of the sinner." We are not prepared to understand his reasonings on this subject unless we bear in mind that he is a pastor, tenderly concerned for souls, who could say of himself when leaving Northampton: "I have not only endeavored to awaken you, that you might be moved with fear, but I have used my utmost endeavors to win you; I have sought out acceptable words that, if possible, I might prevail upon you to forsake sin and turn to God, and accept of Christ as your Saviour and Lord. I have spent my strength very much in these things."

Passing now to the theoretical reasonings, we consider

2. *Edwards' Positive Argument.*

The one main argument, presented in a great variety of ways, is that *eternal punishment is just*.

He attempts to prove this by showing that sin is an infinite evil, and hence demands an infinite or eternal punishment." Punishment, he says, should be proportioned

⁹vii. 174.

to the greatness of the crime. But a crime is more or less heinous in proportion to the obligation it has broken. Our obligation to love, honor, and obey any being is in proportion to his loveliness, honorableness, and authority. But God is infinitely lovely and honorable, and possesses infinite authority. Hence our obligation to him is infinite; sin is infinite as a rupture of this; and deserves an infinite, *i. e.*, an eternal punishment.

This argument is somewhat vulnerable, and is now generally given up.¹³ It suffers from too great rigidity, and from its mathematical exactness. The first premise is evidently incorrect, inasmuch as punishment should be proportioned to the person of the offender as well as to the abstract greatness of the crime. A child would not be punished for shooting a man dead, as a man would be. To reply by saying that inasmuch as the distance between God and any of his creatures is infinite, the guilt of any creature will be infinite, and all distinctions between individuals will be infinitesimally small in the comparison, is to sharpen the mathematics, but to increase the absurdity of the argument. And then to press the infinity of guilt as the cause of the un-ending duration of the punishment, is to commit an altogether inappropriate play upon words. Yet in one sense, at least, sin is an infinite, or unending evil, in that it has a tendency to produce unending harm. To this indefinite evil a punishment strictly unending may be no more than proportional. This is probably the real meaning of Edwards, when not too much under the influence of logical modes of expression.¹⁴ But his strenuous argument is at least unfortunate. Later divines have therefore followed Edwards' general rather than his special argument, and admitted that, in justice, sin deserves an unending punishment.

Edwards renders this point more luminous by insisting on *the amount of sin*. Here we see again his moral con-

¹³ Dr. W. G. T. Shedd (No. American Review, 1885, p. 167) still maintains it.

¹⁴ See v. 504 f.

victions and conscience at work. "Sinful men are full of sin; principles and acts of sin; their guilt is like great mountains, heaped one upon another, till the pile is grown up to heaven. They are totally corrupt, in every part, in all their faculties; in all the principles of their nature, their understandings, and wills; and in all their dispositions and affections. Their heads, their hearts, are totally depraved; all the members of their bodies are only instruments of sin; and all their senses, seeing, hearing, tasting, etc., are only inlets and outlets of sin, channels of corruption. There is nothing but sin, no good at all"—Here again we might pause to criticise expressions which put sin in the nature of man; but by such corrections the argumentative force of the passage is not impaired.

The argument that *the vindication of God's honor*¹⁸ as a righteous law-giver requires punishment, recurs repeatedly. The negative argument that eternal punishment is *not inconsistent with the mercy of God*¹⁹ is presented again positively under a slightly different form, that *the divine perfections absolutely demand*²⁰ it. Eternal punishment is suitable and proper, says Edwards. The divine perfections demand that what is proper to be done, be done. It is suitable that God should hate sin, inasmuch as it is an infinite evil, with an infinite hatred. And it is suitable that he should express this hatred, *i. e.*, punish forever. Therefore this will be done. Understood, as it undoubtedly should be; viz., of what is proper *on the whole, and after the atonement*, this argument seems unanswerable. Like another, that drawn from *the good results which will be secured*²¹ by eternal punishment, it is, however, much less strongly stated than Edwards would have stated it, had he had in mind his own theory of virtue. He mentions as these *good results*, the vindication of God's majesty, the glory of his justice and of his grace, and the effect of

course to a God who cares more for the promotion of holiness in a universe than for the infliction of pain on the rebellious.

Thus when in Edwards' mind the justice of the punishment is made plain, there remains no answer for the sinner to make against its infliction. The *sovereignty of God*, — that attribute before which Edwards bowed in deepest humility and awe²⁰ — was sufficient explanation for mind and heart.

We must now consider

3. *Edwards' Refutation of Errors.*

Of these two are considered formally, that of *Annihilation*, and of *Final Restoration*.

The argument against final *annihilation* is as follows."

The proposition maintained is that "*the eternal death which God threatens is not annihilation, but an abiding, sensible punishment or misery.*"

(1) The Scriptures everywhere represent the punishment of the wicked as implying very extreme pains and sufferings. Whereas annihilation is no state of suffering at all, but the cessation of the same.

(2) The wicked will be punished in such a manner that they will be sensible of the punishment they are under. This is necessary from the ends which punishment is to serve. It is also necessary to satisfy the expressions of Scripture. But if the punishment is annihilation, the sinners will have no knowledge that it is inflicted.

(3) The Scriptures teach that there will be *degrees* of punishment. This is impossible if the punishment is annihilation.

(4) The forms of expression adopted by the Scriptures militate strongly against the theory. "It were good

²⁰ "God's sovereignty has ever appeared to me a great part of his glory. It has often been my delight to approach God and adore him as a sovereign God and ask sovereign mercy of him." Edwards, quoted in his *Life, Works*, i. 132.

²¹ vi. 110 ff.

for that man if he had not been born," says the Saviour. That is, the existence of the wicked is worse than non-existence, or than annihilation. "The wicked will weep and gnash their teeth." The rich man "in hell lifting up his eyes, was not annihilated, hence annihilation can at best come only *after* the judgment. Before it, he and others will be "spirits in prison." In the intermediate state the wicked will be in torments, much more in the eternal state.

Again punishment is a *calamity*; annihilation is *not*, it is a *relief*. Some have chosen it rather than misery which befell them in this life, like Job.

The term "second death" is inappropriate to annihilation, since it is something *worse* than the first death, whereas annihilation is something *better*. Besides the *second* death can be so called only by reference to the first death. Hence it must imply suffering, etc., which are ordinarily connected with the first death. But it is also said that men suffer *the same* punishment with devils. Therefore the second death must be consistent with those expressions which represent the devil as trembling before torment, and anticipating it for himself (Luke viii. 28.)

The argument against *final restoration*, and the involved conception of a *probation after the judgment* is conducted with greater logical subtlety, and at greater length." The principal arguments are the following.

(1) The punishment of the wicked is represented as everlasting. Hence it cannot be medicinal, or for the good of those who suffer. If it were so, there must be a *probation* in hell. This involves the idea that the damned may repent; this of their being received immediately to God's favor; and hence of the *cessation* of the "everlasting" punishment,—which is absurd.

(2) Edwards notices almost incidentally the supposition of a probation between death and the judgment. We must give a disproportionate amount of space to this, inasmuch as the discussions of the present day so largely gather

²² vii. 374-404.

about the same point. It has been suggested recently in several quarters that our fathers had never come to any definite conclusion as to certain questions of eschatology, and had never had occasion to consider them. The particular point meant is the necessity to a complete probation of a presentation of the historic Christ. The remark has so much truth as this, that in the *precise form* in which the question is now presented, it was never before our fathers. But we think it will be seen that every essential element of the problem was before them and that they would have regarded the modern question already decided by their investigations, had it been presented to them. The obvious importance of this fact is sufficient reason for our calling especial attention to the following, and still later discussions.

The argument is entirely a scriptural one. It might be summed up in the proposition that the Scriptures, by their direct statements and their natural implications, render the doctrine of a probation between death and the judgment impossible.

(a) As to the devil, the prophecies of Revelation that he will oppose the church of Christ so constantly, from age to age, were impossible on the philosophical theories of Edwards' opponents, if it were true that he was in a state of probation. He and his angels "in a state of probation, and having liberty of will, and under the last and most extreme means to bring them to repentance, may be reclaimed by those extreme means." Then, that opposition would cease, and the prophecy fail. But

(b) He is cast into the lake of fire and brimstone (Rev. xx. 10) and is reserved under chains of darkness unto judgment (Jude 6). This is not consistent with the appointment of another time of trial and opportunity to escape the judgment and condemnation.

(c) 2 Cor. v. 10 is inconsistent with the idea of probation between death and judgment. "We must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may re-

ceive the things done in his body, whether good or bad." This judgment-seat is evidently the judgment day. (See Acts xvii. 31). But if some repent, and are delivered before the day of judgment, then the assertion of the text is false.

(*d*) Christ declares of certain distinct classes of men (Matt. x. 14, 15; Mark viii. 38), and of certain cities mentioned by name, that their sentence in the day of judgment would be condemnation. This is inconsistent with the idea of an antecedent probation, under new motives to repentance.

(*e*) This declaration, furthermore, is accompanied by the solemn form of address: *I say unto you*; making its sentence, if possible, more certain.

(*f*) The inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah were to be condemned to misery at the day of judgment, although they had already been in their purifying flames and in a state of probation,—a testimony to the ineffectiveness of such flames in producing repentance.

(*g*) Many texts can only be interpreted consistently when probation is understood to be limited to this world; *c. g.*,

Rom. ii. 16. The wicked will receive their retribution "in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel." The whole context shuts the reader up to the conclusion that the sins referred to are committed in this world.

2 Thes. i. 5-9. "Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord." etc. These statements undoubtedly refer to the

So it is apparent, Matt. xxv., that none will be found at the right hand but they that have done such good works as can be done only in this world.

Gen. vi. 6. "My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh; yet his days shall be one hundred and twenty years." "It is as much as to say that it is not fit that this day of trial and opportunity should last always to obstinate perverse sinners Wherefore I will fix a certain limit; I will set their bounds to one hundred and twenty years; when, if they repent not, I will put an end to all their lives, and with their lives shall be an end of my striving and waiting."

"Those words of Christ: 'I must work the works of him that sent me while it is day, the night cometh wherein no man can work,' (John ix. 4.) prove that there is no other day of trial after this life. Christ could not obtain eternal life and happiness for himself in any other way, than by doing that work in this life, which was the time of his probation for eternity as well as ours And doubtless to the same purpose is that in Eccl. ix. 10. 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might: for there is no work, (or no man can work) nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave, whither thou goest.'"²⁸

Recurring now to the main course of the argument, which we have left; viz., to the refutation of a probation subsequent to the judgment, we find it remarked:

(3) If sinners are punished in a future world while in a state of probation, they are sinners while they are punished. Hence their guilt is increasing under their punishment. Hence when the period of their punishment for past sins is over, there will be still other sins, for which they

²⁸ With reference to the modern speculations as to the opportunity of a continued probation for the heathen, I find no hint in Edwards that he ever considered the idea. Doubtless he viewed them, as did most of his successors, as left to their sin and its punishment. The above shows that he recognized no essential defect in their opportunity of repentance.

must be punished. But if punished, they are still unrepentant, for it is inconceivable that God should punish a repentant soul. Then, when this second period is elapsed, there will be still sins to be punished for, and so on forever."

Edwards thus shuts up the defender of future probation to a denial of any reference in punishment to *past* sins. All must have reference only to the guilt, or rebellious state of the present moment, or else the idea of probation refutes itself. But

(4) The tendency of punishment is not to soften but to harden the heart. If the sinner remain impenitent for any length of time under the tremendous motives brought to bear upon him, he will acquire thereby greater fixedness in wickedness from the greater strength of his resistance against God. Hence, as time advances, he will grow continually worse rather than approach nearer to God."

(5) Some men's probation ceases *even in this world*; that is, God "gives them up to sin because of their incorrigibility, and perverse, obstinate continuance in rebellion."

(6) It is evident from certain passages pertaining to the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, and to the sin unto death (Matt. xii. 31, 32; 1 John v. 16) that some men will suffer a punishment strictly eternal. Hence all condemned in the same sentence, will also suffer strictly eternal punishment.

(7) If the damned in hell shall be finally saved, it will be without Christ, because at the judgment, he will give up his mediatorial kingdom, and will be no more the Saviour of men.

(8) The whole idea of another dispensation of grace (and such that of punishment for merely disciplinary purposes must be) after this, is inconsistent with the perfection of the

present system.—This remark applies evidently as well to the modern idea of a continued probation, as to the probation before Edwards' eye.

(9) The idea of probation in the future state supposes the continuance of the scheme of divine benevolence. But God is under no *necessity* of using torments to lead man to repentance, and hence his benevolence would find some other way. He is under no necessity because (a) in the nature of things it is not the tendency of punishment to produce repentance. It may lead a man to *fear to commit sin*, but *not to hate it, or to love holiness*. And even less torments than those threatened in the Scriptures would answer that end equally well. (b) God has converted just as bad men by other means than torments as these men are who are thus subjected to torments. (c) For the purpose of the purgation of the soul, the punishments threatened are out of proportion to the degree of wickedness.

(10) The sufferings of hell are represented in the Scriptures as vindictive, and not disciplinary.* Men are left under punishment without any positive means, such as the preaching of the gospel, adapted to bring them to repentance.

(11) It is unreasonable to suppose that God would leave souls to be thus hardened in sin for ages, if he had purposes of ultimate mercy.

(12) The objections to future punishment apply also to the course of things in this world. They are really only objections to the existence of evil.

Having finished our review of his formal arguments on this subject we must now consider

4. *Edwards' Contributions towards a Future Development of the Doctrine.*

This consists in the proposal of his Theory of Virtue. Our limits will forbid a discussion of this at present, and

* Edwards anticipates and replies to Chauncy's idea that sinners would be punished till their punishment *satisfied justice*, and then released. p. 401.

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indeed it is scarcely necessary to discuss it. It is generally understood, and is as generally regarded as the great contribution made by Edwards to the theology of our churches. Indeed it may be said to be the prolific root from which all that is good in that theology has sprung. It may be summarily stated, so far as it bears upon our theme as follows.

The essence of virtue and vice lies in the *nature* of the choice." When any choice is either a primary choice of the good of being in general, or a secondary choice, embodying and effectuating the former, it is virtuous." There is in such virtue an inherent *beauty*, since it is the consent of being to being, as Edwards styles it, and as such it is the establishment of a certain equality between the beings concerned, which equality in the ultimate analysis is the constitutive element of all beauty." Any other choice possesses an inherent deformity. A right choice is essentially love, and as such is lovely, and excites the returning love of all holy beings. So a wrong choice is essentially hate, and as such is *hateful*, abhorrent to every pure soul, and must call forth his disapproval. This is true of men, but it is no less true of God. His holiness consists in love to being in general, and he too must love holiness and abhor evil.

Now, it is at once evident that in this root-idea lies the foundation of the justice of punishment. God must, in conformity to his holiness, disapprove sin, and hence the necessary expression of this disapproval is both just and right. But so far as we have been able to find, Edwards nowhere makes any such analysis. Justice is always a simple, ultimate idea with him, unadjusted to the funda-

when the atonement has been provided and rejected, it is evident that the sinner has no claim for mercy." God is under no obligation to grant it should such a sinner come to his senses and beg it." Clear and unanswerable as these statements are, they lack the force which might easily have been given them from the premises already mentioned. Sometimes he seems to be just on the point of showing how the holiness of God,—his virtue, if we may use the term,—creates a demand for the punishment of the wicked. "The glorification of the justice of God is the glorification of God himself. But His glory is the greatest good—the chief end of creation—of greater importance than anything else." Hence it is virtue for him to secure it. But Pres't Edwards does not reach the point, as his successors do. In their hands this thought, however unused by him, will be employed skilfully and triumphantly.

The reason of this cannot be, as one might at first think, that the theory was developed by him after the work now under our review was done. True, he did not write "The Nature of True Virtue" until three years before his death, 1755, and it was not published till some time after his death. But from his "Notes on The Mind," written when he was at most nineteen, we see that the main ideas of his later treatise were then clearly and fully in his mind. For some reason he never followed this line of investigation so as to gain its full results. But it was nevertheless a mighty force which he finally put in motion, the benefits of which his followers did not suffer to be lost.

We have dwelt so long upon Edwards because in him

II. JOSEPH BELLAMY.

Bellamy was a pupil of Edwards in the year 1736," and seems to have derived from him the determining elements of his theological system. We do not find, therefore, any great additions in his writings to the arguments, or departures from the views of Edwards. He possessed more power of condensed, vivid statement than the latter, and many of his sentences contain volumes of argument. He never discussed future punishment formally, but only incidentally in his delineation of True Religion, or other treatises on Permission of Sin, The Glory of the Gospel, etc. As to the infinite evil of sin, he held the same views, and supported them by the same arguments as Edwards." On two points only, by the greater fulness of his treatment, or the application of Edwards' Theory of Virtue did he contribute to the development of the doctrine. These are

1. *Vindictive Justice.*

This he declares to be an amiable perfection of the Deity. "God," he says, "is love; love to being in general; chiefly to the first, the great, the infinite Being, the fountain and source of all being; and, secondarily, to finite beings; and love to virtue, to order, to harmony in the intellectual system. And so all his nature is summed up in this edict *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself* To break this fundamental law of his kingdom is implicitly to turn enemy to being in general; to God, the infinitely great and glorious Being, to the system, to virtue, to order, to harmony, in a word to all good. Love itself, therefore, as it exists in the Deity, who is at the head of the universe, *and whose office it is to govern the world, is a consuming fire* with respect to

sin This curse to the sinner, is love to being in general, *i. e.* love to God, and to the best good of the universe. As when a wise and righteous monarch puts a traitor to death, it is not because he delights in the death of his subjects, or takes pleasure in their pain simply considered; but it is because he delights in the safety and honor of his crown, and the general good of his kingdom. And all his loyal subjects, who are affected towards his crown and kingdom as he is, will see a beauty in his conduct. It can be owing to nothing but criminal blindness, to the spirit of a rebel, of an enemy, in any of God's subjects, that the glory of his character as thus exhibited, does not shine into their hearts."

2. *The Probation of the Heathen.*

This topic is discussed incidentally in Bellamy's treatise on True Religion Delineated. After maintaining that all men "are wholly to *blame* for not *perfectly* conforming to" the law, he introduces as an objection the condition of the heathen: "If the heathen, who have no other outward advantage whereby to gain the true knowledge of God, than the works of creation and providence, do but honestly improve what they have, shall they not be accepted, although they fall short of sinless perfection?" His reply brings out clearly his views of the fullness of their opportunity of salvation, the fairness of their probation, and the utter inexcusability of their sin.

(1) "It is plain that the heathen . . . are, by the law of nature, obliged to the same perfect holiness which is required, in God's written word, of the rest of mankind."²⁷

(2) "It is plain St. Paul looked upon them as enjoying sufficient means of knowledge, and so to be without excuse. Rom. i. 18. *For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness.* 'Who hold the truth is unrighteousness, *i. e.*, who, instead of heartily receiving

²⁷ i. 106 ff.

²⁸ i. 107.

and loving, and conforming to the truth, do, from love to their lusts, hate and wickedly suppress all right notions of God, of truth, and duty, stifling their consciences.' But how do the Gentiles discover this aversion to the truth, who are under no advantages to know it? 'I answer,' says the apostle, 'their advantages are sufficient; for (verse 19) *That which may be known of God is manifest in them*; i. e., the perfections of God, which is all that is knowable of God, are discovered to them,' as he adds, '*For God hath showed it unto them.*' But were not the perfections of God discovered to them so darkly as not to be sufficiently evident and perceivable? 'No,' says he, 'for (verse 20) *the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are CLEARLY SEEN, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse*; i. e., ever since the creation of the world, the perfections of God are clearly to be seen in his works, the things which he has made manifesting plainly what a God he is: so that those who see not his perfections, and are not sensible of his infinite glory, cannot plead their want of sufficient outward advantages, in excuse for their ignorance and insensibility; and therefore the heathen, who have this advantage, are without excuse.' And, still further to clear up the point, the apostle seems to go on, as it were, to say — 'Yea, it is evident that the present ignorance of the Gentile nations is affected and so inexcusable, not only from the sufficiency of their present outward advantages, but also from their *former* misimprovement of the advantages which they *heretofore* did enjoy." Because (verse 21) when *they knew God*, i. e. when the heathen nations formerly had right notions of God instilled into them, being instructed in the knowledge of the true God by Noah and his sons, from whom they descended. yet then *they glorified him not as God. neither*

them to make them holy ; *but they became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened* ; i. e., they soon fell off to idolatry, and lost that knowledge of the true God, in which they had been instructed and educated ; *For* (verse 28) *they did not like to retain God in their knowledge* ; i. e., to remember those instructions which had been given them concerning the nature and perfections of God ; but they abandoned themselves to idolatry (ver. 23, 25) ; *For which cause*, (ver. 24, 26) for which contempt cast on God, *God gave them up* to all manner of wickedness ; so that the present extreme ignorance, blindness, and wickedness of the Gentile nations, they have, through their aversion to God and love to sin, brought themselves into ; so that it is manifest they do not desire the knowledge of God, but evidently hate all right notions of him, and so are, beyond dispute, *without excuse* ; which was the point to be proved.'

We shall obtain a better understanding of the meaning of Dr. Bellamy, if we compare his expressions with the Savoy Declaration. In general, he accepted this confession.⁴⁰ The Savoy reads (chap. xx. Art. ii.): "This promise of Christ and salvation by him, is revealed only in and by the word of God ; neither do the works of creation or providence, with the light of nature, make discovery of Christ, or of grace by him, so much as in a general or obscure way ; much less that men destitute of the revelation of him by the promise or gospel, should be enabled thereby to attain saving faith or repentance." The word "thereby" is to be understood, as we think, of "the works of creation and providence, with the light of nature." The whole is only a more rigid statement of what is found in the first chapter of the same confession: "Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave men inexcusable ; yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of his will, which

⁴⁰ Life, in Works, i. p. xxvii.

is necessary unto salvation." As we understand it, this is the position taken in our own day by the advocates of the necessity to salvation of knowing the historical Christ. But Dr. Bellamy had advanced beyond this position. He says: "Thus [from Paul's argument] we see how all mankind have not only sufficient natural powers, but also sufficient outward advantages to know God, and perfectly conform to his law, even the heathen themselves; and that the very reason they do not, is their want of such a temper as they ought to have, and their voluntary, rooted enmity to God, and love to sin." Even "if they have no hopes of finding favor in his sight" they are "under no inability [to love God] but what *must arise from a bad heart.*" The heathen of our own time are still resisting the gospel.

It is thus evident that, though Bellamy did not differ from the confessions as to the practical necessity of preaching the gospel to the heathen, if they are to be saved, he occupied a totally different ground as to the theory of the matter. The New England doctrine of ability appears here in clear and precise application. The heathen have no claim in justice for indulgence on account of their sins. And if their fate be awful, the responsibility is their own. It is sometimes said in these days that the same love which leads God to send his gospel to us in this world though we do not *deserve* any such favor, will lead him to present it to the heathen in another world. But Bellamy has anticipated and replied to this objection. God has *given them up*. How incongruous to suppose that after grace has once been *punitively withdrawn*, it will again be bestowed! The supposition implicitly denies the true punitive character of the reprobation, and hence denies Scripture. Thus the question of the sufficient probation of the heathen in the present world is answered from the words of Paul. It is not depreciated first, and its

of which runs counter to the whole tenor of Scripture."

Among Bellamy's pupils was one whose place naturally comes next in this review of the history of New England thought, the son of the great Edwards,

III. DR. JONATHAN EDWARDS.

The occasion of the work contributed by this divine to the discussion of our topic, was the appearance in 1784 of an anonymous work, soon, however, acknowledged by its author, *Rev. Charles Chauncy, D.D.*, pastor of the First Church, Boston, which was entitled: *The Salvation of All Men the Grand Thing Aimed at in the Scheme of God.*" Dr. Chauncy was a man of wide reading, and of considerable scholarship in the classical and Hebrew languages. He must have been, if we may use the word, an elegant man. He was originally a Calvinist, though one averse to excitement, and new measures. He wrote a book in 1743 against the revivals, and partially in opposition to Edwards' *Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God.*" His position in his later work will be best given in his own words (pp. 12 and 13):

" Upon the whole therefore, what I mean to prove, in the following essay, is, that the scheme of revelation has the happiness of all mankind lying at bottom, as its great and ultimate end; that it gradually tends to this end; and will not fail of its accomplishment, when fully completed. Some, in

⁴³ We retain this statement in spite of some declarations to the contrary since it was written, proposing in due time to justify it.

⁴⁴ Full title is: *The Mystery hid from Ages and Generations made manifest by the Gospel Revelation: or, The Salvation of All Men the grand thing aimed at in the Scheme of God, as opened in the New Testament Writings, and entrusted with Jesus Christ to bring into effect. In three Chapters. The First exhibiting a General Explanation of this gloriously benevolent Plan of God.—The Second proving it to be the Truth of Scripture that Mankind universally, in the Final Issue of this Scheme, shall reign in happy Life forever.—The Third largely answering Objections. By One who wishes well to the whole Human Race. [Greek motto, Rom. v. 21.] London, printed for Charles Dilly, in the poultry. MDCCCLXIV.*

⁴⁵ Title is: *Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England, etc., etc., by Charles Chauncy, D.D., Boston, 1743, (pp. xxx, 424, 8vo.)*

consequence of its operation, as conducted by the Son of God, will be disposed and enabled in this present state, to make such improvements in virtue, the only rational preparative for happiness, as that they shall enter upon the enjoyment of it in the next state. Others, who have proved incurable under the means which have been used with them in this state, instead of being happy in the next, will be awfully miserable; not to continue so finally, but that they may be convinced of their folly, and recovered to a virtuous frame of mind; and this, as I suppose, will be the effect of the future torments upon many; the consequence whereof will be their salvation, they being thus fitted for it. And there may be yet other states, before the scheme of God may be perfected, and mankind universally cured of their moral disorders, and in this way, qualified for, and finally instated in, eternal happiness. But whether there are any other such states besides the next, or not; or however many states some of the individuals of the human species may pass through, and of however long continuance they may be;—the whole is intended to subserve the grand design of universal happiness, and will finally terminate in it: insomuch that the Son of God, and Saviour of men, will not deliver up his trust into the hands of the Father, who committed it to him, till he has fully discharged his obligations in virtue of it; having finally fixed all men in heaven, when God will be all in all."

This doctrine rests upon the postulate, which Dr. Chauncy thinks too evident to need proof, that God in bringing man into the world intended definitely to make every individual of the race finally happy. The proof of the doctrine is presented as a purely scriptural one. "I had no idea of the sentiments expressed in the following pages," he says, "till I had been gradually and insensibly let into them by a long and diligent comparing of Scripture with Scripture." "He will not argue from some isolated text. "What I rely on as proof in the present argument," he says, "is the result of all these texts, not considered singly, but in one conjunct view." "

His proof opens with a statement in several propositions. "Christ is the person through whom happiness is attainable by any of the human race." "The

versally and without exception or limitation.”⁴⁹ Then comes the main point of the matter, in the proposition that “it is the purpose of God according to his good pleasure that mankind, universally, in consequence of the death of his son Jesus Christ, should certainly and finally be saved.”⁵⁰ The scriptural argument begins here, and treats in order the following texts: Rom. v. 12 to end; Rom. viii. 19-24. He treats each by means of a paraphrase, extended notes, and inferences.

We cannot stop to draw out at full length his exegetical argument. As to Rom. v. 12, etc., the whole may be summarily expressed in Dr. Chauncy's own words as follows (pp. 59, 60):

“In the fifteenth verse, the apostle declares more generally, that the gift by grace hath *abounded* to the *same many*, or all men, who had sustained damage by the lapse of the one man Adam; and with like certainty too, for the same peremptory language is used in both branches of the verse. It is as strongly affirmed, on Christ's side of the comparison, *the gift hath abounded*, as, on Adam's side, *through the offence, many are dead*. In the sixteenth verse, the apostle proceeds to say more particularly wherein the *abounding* of the gift consisted, namely in this, that the judgment took rise from *one offence only*, and terminated in *condemnation*, that is, the whole damage of the lapse: whereas the gift takes rise from *many offences*, and as certainly terminates, notwithstanding them all, in *justification*, that is, a glorious reign in life conformably to a rule of righteousness. With respect to whom? Indisputably mankind universally. The antithesis will otherwise be lost. For mankind universally are the object of condemnation; the same mankind must universally be the object of the opposite justification.”

The strictness of the parallel thus assumed in the face of so many passages which condition salvation on faith; we do not see anywhere proved.

On Rom. viii. 19-24 the argument may be summed up in a single sentence from the paraphrase: “This very creature, the self-same mankind, should be delivered from its slavery through the influence of a frail, mortal, corruptible body, into the freedom of those who, as the sons of God, shall in proper time be clothed with immortal, in-

⁴⁹ Ib. p. 20.

⁵⁰ Ib. p. 22.

corruptible bodies."⁵¹ Creature, *κτίσις*, is thus taken to mean mankind, or at any rate the whole creation, including preeminently mankind," and the argument for universal salvation is then easy."

A number of other texts are more or less carefully examined, as, *e. g.*, Col. i. 19, 20. The meaning of such concepts as "reconciliation" and "the restoration of all things" is canvassed. Dr. Chauncy then advances to his next proposition; viz., that "God, by Jesus Christ will, sooner or later, in this state, or another, reduce all men under a willing and obedient subjection to his moral government."⁵² He concedes that "if any of the race of men have so corrupted their minds, and vitiated their tempers, as that they are really incurable by any *moral* means that can be used with them in order to their recovery, their state must be hopeless."⁵³ Hence the proof of the proposition

⁵¹ *Ib.* p. 92 f.

⁵² *Ib.* p. 97 f.

⁵³ Dr. Chauncy says that if *κτίσις* means the *inanimate* part of creation, it is more to his point than if it means the *animate*, because "if *πᾶσα κτίσις* is extended in its meaning so as to take in the *inanimate* part of creation, the rational, or moral part, ought *much more* to be comprehended. . . . It would be highly incongruous . . . to give this style to the inferior or less valuable part, wholly leaving out the most excellent." (p. 98.) Again the subjection of the *inanimate* creation would be only a means to the end, and so the deliverance must be also a means, that is, mankind must primarily be delivered, and the *inanimate*, secondarily, as a means to this.

But Chauncy understands that *κτίσις* is here applied to the *animate* creation for the following reasons:

(1) This interpretation agrees better with the phrases "earnest expectation," "groaning," etc., etc.

(2) *οὐχ ἑκοῦσα* means, according to him, "not through any fault of its own," and this agrees only with the interpretation referring to the *animate* creation.

(3) The *κτίσις* is to be delivered "into the glorious liberty of the sons of God," which is only applicable to the *animate* creation.

(4) The comparison of the twenty-third verse between *ourselves* and the *creation* is only intelligible when understood of the *animate* creation.

must be drawn from the Scripture statement of the fact of final restoration.

The first text is Ps. viii. 5, 6, "as explained and argued from, Heb. ii. 6-9": [Thou hast put all things under his feet.] The question *how* this subjection is to be understood is, however, answered entirely on rational grounds. "Sin is *an* enemy, yea, a *principal* enemy; emphatically *that* enemy which Christ came into the world to destroy;" * and hence the truth of the proposition.

The next text is 1 Cor. xv. 24-29: [Then cometh the end when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God.] "This," he says, "I should esteem decisive of itself, was there no other text in all the Bible of like import. It was this, indeed, which first opened to me the present scheme."** The argumentation is substantially that of the previous division.

We need not dwell longer on this part of the work. In his third chapter Dr. Chauncy proceeds to state and answer certain objections. The first is that "endless, never-ceasing misery is, according to the Scriptures, the portion of wicked men beyond the grave."** Dr. Chauncy replies by discussing several texts, and particularly the words *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*.** These words *may* signify a limited duration, and hence, we are not compelled, in any given case, to understand them of absolute eternity. Again, they are

** Ib. p. 179.

** Ib. p. 197.

** Ib. p. 256.

** It is interesting to note how completely the ground was covered by this old discussion. Compare Chauncy with the arguments of such writers, for example, as Rev. J. M. Whiton, Ph.D., in his book *Is "Eternal" Punishment Endless?* The only point of Whiton's discussion which we have not found substantially anticipated in Chauncy is the supposition that *αἰώνιος* is *qualitative* rather than *quantitative*. Chauncy defines *αἰών* age; gives the same canon for determining the meaning of *αἰώνιος* as Whiton; adduces in his support the word *αἰών* (p. 299); discusses the LXX. (p. 264); comments on the same texts; but has the advantage of vastly clearer ideas, and a less disingenuous method. To his credit, as we think, Chauncy does not pretend that any more definite words than *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* could, and would have been used to express the idea of endless punishment. Comp. Whiton, p. 8.

evidently used in a more loose and general way in the Greek Testament than are the words which have been employed to translate them in our English Bibles. And lastly, the true meaning of *αἰών* is *age*, "whether shorter or longer."⁶⁰ This discussion is unnecessarily prolix, and wearisome. Of the more important points mentioned in it we cite the following: "The precise duration intended by the words cannot with certainty be collected from the force of the words themselves simply considered; but must be determined either by the nature of the thing spoken of, or other passages of Scripture that explain it."⁶¹ This canon is correct but is applied by Chauncy in a way really to beg the question in dispute. The argument is made wholly to turn on the proof of universal salvation already given. "When it is affirmed of the wicked," he says, "that they shall go away *εἰς κόλασιν αἰώνιον*, into everlasting punishment, the certain meaning of this word *αἰώνιον*, everlasting, is clearly and fully settled by the above proof of the final salvation of all men."⁶² That is, the independent testimony of the word is ruled out. This style of argument reaches its highest point, as well as its best illustration, in another method of treating such antithetical texts as Matt. xxv. 46. "There is a wide difference," he says, "between happiness and misery, reward and punishment; which may make it proper to understand the word everlasting in a different sense with respect to these different subjects."⁶³ "In Matt. xxv. 46, . . . we should understand this word [*αἰώνιος*] as applied to the righteous in one sense, and as applied to the wicked in another."⁶⁴

We will delay the reader on only one point more. Re-

⁶⁰ Ib. p. 264.

⁶¹ Ib. p. 268.

⁶² Ib. p. 270.

⁶³ Ib. p. 285.

⁶⁴ Ib. p. 288 f. As parallel cases of the use of *αἰώνιος* in different senses in the same sentence he alleges Rom. xvi. 25, 26; Tit. i. 2. The quibble that the *fire* of Mark ix. 44, 46, 48, may not cease, but the *use* of it in punishment may, is not uncharacteristic (ib. p. 311) and is another anticipation of modern arguments.

ferring to a supposition of Mr. Whiston's in his *Hell Torments Considered*, that in Hades "sinners, (those excepted who have been guilty of blasphemy) will have all possible means used with them to bring them to repentance and salvation," which that writer supported by referring to 1 Pet. iii. 18, 19; iv. 16; Chauncy says: "Neither am I satisfied from the two passages in Peter's first epistle that this apostle intended to insinuate, as though the gospel was preached in Hades in order to bring men to repentance."⁶⁵ This may be taken as his contribution to the discussions of the present day.

We have thus endeavored to give the main course of this work as the writer meant it to be received. We see that it is largely exegetical in its character,—in fact, principally so.⁶⁶ When, therefore, we turn to Dr. Edwards' reply—*The Salvation of All Men Strictly Examined*,⁶⁷—we may be surprised to see that it is for the most part conducted upon rational grounds. There is an exegetical reply which we shall pause upon long enough to learn to admire it; but for the most part the work is linked argument. The reason is not far to seek, and we are compelled to admit the justice and necessity of the procedure. Chauncy's reasons for receiving the doctrine of the final salvation of all men were not exegetical, but rational; and his exegesis, as already repeatedly suggested, was only a cloak, and a thin one at that, for rationalism.⁶⁸ We venture

⁶⁵ Ib. p. 339 f.

⁶⁶ There is a discussion of Rev. xx. 4 ff. in elaborate paraphrase, notes, and application, in the appendix.

⁶⁷ Works of Jonathan Edwards, D.D., Andover, 1842, pp. 1-278.

⁶⁸ As an illustration of the truth of this charge, compare the following passage, which is selected at random from a great number of similar passages: "But if the foregoing scheme," viz., that the second death is a mere transition to a further stage of existence, "should be found to have no truth in it, and the wicked are sent to hell as so many *absolute incurables*, the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an *end* to their *existence*, both in *soul* and *body*, so as that they shall be NO MORE in the creation of God." p. 282. No *reasons* have been assigned for the annihilation thus dragged in to support the denial of evangelical doctrine.

to suggest that the great lesson of this history lies in this fact. Universalism and every kindred error is fundamentally rationalism. Ultimately it will throw the Bible overboard ; or itself succumb to the biblical authority.

We must, however, break off at this point, and defer the consideration of the reply to Dr. Chauncy till a subsequent time.

ARTICLE II.

QUERIES ABOUT FUTURE PROBATION.

BY I. E. DWINELL, D.D., PROFESSOR IN PACIFIC THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
OAKLAND, CAL.

IT IS held by those who make the hypothesis of probation beyond this life, that the essential elements of a moral trial, in a redeemed world, cannot exist unless the historical Christ is distinctly presented to the soul. It is not enough that Christ has died for all, made an atonement for all, changed the standing of all before God in respect to the possibility of salvation, given the means of repentance and spiritual knowledge to all in the teachings of nature and conscience and in the drawings of the Divine Spirit; and that the providence and love and grace of God invest all, to win them to welcome the light offered. Something more is needed. The historical Christ must be brought consciously before the mind and heart in the supreme form of moral appeal. Without this, they affirm, Christian consciousness is not satisfied; and if such a trial as this is not enjoyed during life, it demands that the opportunity should be presented in the world to come.

This is not regarded as another probation, but a part of the one begun on a lower plane here, carried up to its higher, decisive stage. It is hoped, and sometimes intimated, that this future presentation of the historical Christ, amid the changed scenes and new and transcendent motives of the eternal world, will be effective in the salvation of almost all.

This hypothesis suggests many grave queries, some of which we wish to call attention to in this article.

1. The first relates to the supposed *necessity* of a hypothesis to satisfy Christian consciousness on this subject.

Is this a proper subject to come into the field of Christian consciousness at all?

It relates to the administration of the government of God, and to a section of that administration—the completeness and finality of a moral trial—of which we have no experience and no observation. It can only be brought within the range of Christian consciousness through the ethical principles involved. And, in fact, this is the way in which it is done. The subject is viewed simply in an ethical light. Newman Smyth says of Dörner: “His system might almost be said to have its being in pure Christian ethics” (Int. Dörner on “The Future State,” p. 9). Specially are ethical considerations made the basis of Dörner’s suggestions about future probation, and this is true also of his followers. The “New Theology” assumes that we must have a theory on probation that satisfies the ethical sense, and that we cannot rest in any dogmatic proposition on this subject based on authority, unless it harmonizes also with our moral convictions.

But why should we have a theory on probation that is levelled to our ethical approval, more than one, of this kind, on other portions of the administration of the government of God? There are many things in the divine government, in its current movements, that must ever defy our ethical solution. There are inequalities of lot under divine providence that stagger us,—multitudes born to wretchedness, degradation, vice; sufferings of the good; prosperity of the wicked; the death of those whose life seems essential to the comfort and welfare of those dependent on them; and the continued life of those whose existence is a curse and a sorrow to others. If, then, we can have no belief about the present government of God over such dark facts,—no belief based on Scripture, no belief but what resolves itself into our ethical insight,—we must either drive divine providence off from a large part of the field of life,—and the most important part, as it regards our comfort and peace,—or we must break down

the ethical difference in human lives and deny the reality of moral distinctions.

The natural tendency of the "New Theology," if it succeeds in eschatology, will be to apply the same method to the present divine government. If we can believe nothing but what has our ethical sanction in reference to the future world, we shall not be slow to regulate our belief about God's connection with this world in the same way. If our interpretation of the ethical demand presides over probation, it will be quick to prescribe the methods of Providence on earth also, even if it is obliged to take us into deism, or materialism, or pantheism, in order to do it.

The trouble is in assuming that we must have a theory on this subject that is limited to our ethical approval. Christians do not hesitate to admit facts, which they cannot ethically resolve and explain, into their belief of the present government of God—that portion of the divine government which they are most familiar with and actually witness. Why should they expect to be able to settle ethically the dark questions of its supreme application and final results, of which they have witnessed and know nothing?

2. Another grave inquiry relates to the *method* of maintaining this hypothesis. It is largely the subjective method.

Maurice somewhere contrasts the characteristic spirit of German theologians and philosophers with that of the English. He says the English base their theories on authority outside of themselves; the Germans deduce theirs from within; and hence that there is no common ground for a mutual understanding between the two parties. The "New Theologians" seem to have this spirit of the Germans. Scripture, indeed, plays a prominent part in their theories; but it is Scripture subjectively interpreted.

By some mysterious process they are carried along the hints of Scripture to a conception of God as revealed in Christ, or absolute Christianity, ethically conceived and

defined. This they consider the supreme factor of faith and its regulative principle. Having gained this idea, and resolved and sanctioned it ethically, they take this, in turn, as the interpreting light with which to go back to Scripture and decide in detail what its passages mean, and to what use to put them. The method is largely the circle. They go, under the guidance of the internal ethical light, often trippingly through Scripture, taking their selected passages, up to absolute Christianity; and then, taking this, they go laboriously down to exegetics, and bring other passages into accord. Newman Smyth says: "Since in Christianity there is realized a supreme ethical idea of God, which faith may apprehend, for which, indeed, faith is the spiritual eye, it follows—so Dorner would assume—that we must determine what is Scripture, and interpret God's word, and also construct Christian theology, in harmony with, and under the supreme influence of, this real, absolute Christianity, or God manifest in Christ. Christianity can be read scientifically only in its own pure light" (Int. to Dorner on "The Future State," p. 11). Dorner himself says, as quoted by Smyth: for dogmatic and propositional theology, "the subject is faith with its contents appropriated from the sacred Scripture, by which it has continually to show itself Christian. The supreme fact in this (*sic*) contents of faith is the Christian idea of God. From it, as the highest unity and truth, are all statements of faith, and all Christian truth, immediately or mediately derived" (*idem*, p. 9).

In perfect consistency with this subjective method, Dorner uses these significant words: "That some are damned rests on *preponderant* exegetical grounds (but that gives no dogmatic proposition, because this must be derived also from the principle of faith)" ("The Future State," p. 127).

Thus the exegetical method of the "New Theologians" on this subject amounts to this: They take their ethical generalization, or—which means about the same thing—

their ethical postulates,—often mistaking for these their ethical sentiments, and often mistaking for these mere ethical sentimentality,—and therewith form a scourge with which to drive from the witness-stand all passages of Scripture that imply that probation is confined to this life, and all antagonistic demands of conscience or reason, and then frame a verdict on the testimony that is left. It virtually becomes a process of chasing off sacred testimony with personal ethics. The whole system bears the personal color, and unconsciously blushes with the real wrong.

Having gone through the Word in this way, and brought its teachings into harmony with their hypothesis, having themselves a system that does not need to have a revelation, they very naturally speak disparagingly and superciliously of a text-theology, and especially of a doctrine of probation that is unfortunate enough to lean on inspiration, and is not able to go alone. Yet, if they chance to find a text, like that in Peter, which they can interpret so as to have it favor their view, there are none others who make a more vigorous use of a slender staff.

We do not deny that it is proper for theologians to make use of a general deduction from Scripture to assist them in interpreting difficult passages. By a full and fair study of revelation they may form a conception of the system taught in it; and then it is right for them to use this system in considering the obscure parts. This principle is well understood and admitted. It is the old truth of the influence of the analogy of faith in interpretation. Nor is it denied that in forming the general conception the individuality of the theologian will have great influence; and that it will play an active part in every system of theology and interpretation. But great care must be taken to keep it subordinate, and to have the general conception, when reached, the ideal of revelation, and not merely the ideal of the theologian. The objection to the course of the "New Divines" is, that they recognize the

subjective element as having a *right* to act a prominent part in deciding what the absolute Christianity, the ideal of revelation, is. The internal factor becomes, from the start, an authorized master-power. It calls up "the spirits from the vasty deep," and sets them over the Word. Instead of being kept in the background and regarded as an unavoidable blemish of human work, it is clothed with authority and put on the throne as joint ruler with Scripture—and practically not second. Professor Harris says: "The Christian consciousness does not create Christianity, but it is capable of distinguishing that which is not and that which is Christianity. It therefore has a kind of authority. Its authority is co-ordinate, but not the less real. Its function, then, may be considered both the development and the testing of progressive theology" (*Andover Review*, Oct. 1884, p. 345).

Now, as we see the eagerness, of which we have spoken, to abate, by an ethical process, the opposition of revelation to a future probation, the question arises: How did the apostles and other sacred writers give the dogmatic evidence which we find in their teachings, on the side of a greater limitation of probation? Did they utter such sentiments from a clear insight of their truth, out of their own spiritual consciousness, or on a basis of revelation and divine authority? If they were not merely speculating and conjecturing; if they stated what they knew, either of their own knowledge or from inspiration, in the intimations which they give of their dogmatic belief on this subject; is not this, in either case, sufficient ground for us to stand on for holding the same dogmatic belief?

If their deeper insight enabled them to see the ethical necessity and reality of an earth-limited trial, or a trial within the bounds of life somewhere, and if we believe they had this insight and uttered it, this certainly justifies us for occupying the same dogmatic position. It, in fact, compels us to do it, or we impeach the integrity and unity of our mental operations. On the other hand, if we be-

lieve they uttered these dogmatic sentiments on divine authority, receiving them and resting in them on the basis of revelation, we cannot hesitate to accept them in the same way on authority, without impeaching the sacred writers for doing it, and arrogating to ourselves superior insight or inspiration. If they did not wait to have the doctrine of the last things resolved to their ethical or Christian consciousness, before they accepted it, made it a working-basis of their faith, and proclaimed it, and wrote it down in Evangel and Epistle for all future ages, under the direction of the Holy Spirit, there is no justifiable reason why we should hold it in suspense till we can resolve it into our ethical consciousness, or why we should modify and transform it to make it suit our ethical approval.

In either case, the method of the "New Theology," as applied to this subject, throws discredit on Scripture. It impeaches the method of the sacred writers. It puts psychology in the place of inspiration. It substitutes philosophy for divine authority. It gives us subjective convictions instead of exegesis. It builds up a human system in the place of the biblical doctrine.

3. Another query relates to the *persons* who shall have the advantage of the future probation. Shall a few only have it—those who have had next to no light and opportunity in this world? Shall all who die unsaved have it?

If we start on the probationary extension at the demand of ethical convictions, where shall we stop to satisfy them? Putting Scripture aside, looking at the subject purely in the light of ethics, the interpreting principle of the "New Theology," we may ask: Is not the whole future existence of all souls probationary? Can we conceive, on the basis of ethical thought alone, of a free finite spirit, human or angelic, in this world or the next, that is not, in a sense, on trial? Must it not have the metaphysical power both of sinning and of right-willing throughout eternity? not the moral power, but the metaphysical power,—and, in this sense, be on trial? The conception of the arrest of

probation carries us beyond our ethical experience and insight into a realm of which we have in ourselves no measuring lines and no tests. Yet Scripture so plainly and emphatically teaches that probation has limits, that the advocates of its extension do not presume to say that it is universal and unlimited. They do not follow the native ethical light absolutely, nor the scriptural light absolutely, but make a compromise between the two. Dorner, enlarging on the scriptural intimations and retrenching on the ethical, finds the limit in the absolute choice of evil by the rejection of Christ,—that is, in the sin against the Holy Ghost. Newman Smyth, representing his view, says: "No man will be finally judged until he shall have definitely rejected the manifestation of God's love in the offer of Christ, or, in other words, shall have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost" ("The Future State," p. 14). But Dorner refuses to recognize the liberty which the soul has when it has made sin its final choice as a human freedom. He says: "Some may be eternally damned, so far as the abuse of freedom continues eternally: but without the possibility of the restoration of freedom, man has passed into another class of beings, and, regarded from the stand-point of the idea of man, is a mere ruin" (*idem*, p. 135). As if a degradation in classification were any relief!

Dr. Munger also argues for a probation that is boundless, and unlimited by any thing short of fixedness of character. He says: "It is simpler and more scientific to say that man has but one probation; but, by its nature, it cannot have any bounds in time, whether of worldly life or of world-age. It may, indeed, synchronize with world-age, but only because that goal of time is postponed till the problem of existence has been solved by every human

sible to attach any other bound or limit to it. And character is fixed in evil when all the possibilities of the universe are exhausted that would alter the character" ("The Freedom of Faith," pp. 42, 43).

Thus the more pronounced theorists do not venture on an absolute denial of a limit, while the more moderate ones restrict the limits within much narrower compass, but without any common restricting principle.

Ethically, they find great practical difficulty in telling what the limits shall be. The tendency is to open the doors ever more widely, and enlarge the area of probation. The theory generally begins with the ethical demand that the doors shall be open so that those who die without ever having heard of Christ shall enter; and then enlarges itself thus: and if these may enter, then those who have merely heard his name; and if these, then those who have heard much about him, but with minds clouded with invincible prejudice or ignorance; and if these, then those who have heard and been convinced, but have deferred accepting him till overtaken with death; and if these, then those who have resisted the Spirit and rejected Christ, but without intending it to be a final and absolute rejection; and if these, then why not open the doors for all who, in the weakness and ignorance of an earthly decision, die with a rejected Saviour on their hands, unless, perchance, all the persuasions of the universe have been previously exhausted on them, and they have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost, and have thereby dropped down into another rank of beings?

The consequence is, the advocates of this hypothesis hold the doors of future probation ajar at every possible angle. There is no unity in the doctrine. There is no common standard of probationary appeal or thought in the system. The moment they undertake to settle the question of the persons to have the advantage of the hereafter of trial, infinite diversity reigns. No two have the same theory. Each lets in those whom it suits him to let in.

It will not do to seek relief from this human confusion by resorting to the omniscience and wisdom of God, and remanding the perplexity of deciding on the persons to him. For the whole hypothesis is the creature of subjective ethics; and this ethical demand, having discovered the necessity of the theory, having asserted what is necessary in order to meet that want, and having taken the whole problem into its hands, cannot now, just as it gets into perplexity, abandon its own internal light and call on God for help. If the subject is one that clearly comes within the range of ethical insight, ethical insight must declare the principles on which the thing is to be carried out, and it will have no occasion to avoid its difficulties by taking refuge suddenly in supernatural insight.

4. A fourth query is whether such an opening of the doors does not *disparage* the earthly probation.

So far as we know, comparatively few persons consciously encounter the historical Christ on earth and come to an absolute decision in reference to him. The great proportion of mankind, up to the present age of the world, have not heard of him. Very few of those who have heard of him have met the tests of a full opportunity laid down by the theorists we are considering. Does not this practically quite shift the principal theatre of probation from this world to the next? As the bulk of mankind — all the pagan world, all the unevangelized masses in Christian lands, all the human beings in conditions in which the apprehension of the historical Christ is impossible — pass over into the future world to have the decisive trial there, few are left to have it here. Such a meagre number out of the whole is hardly enough to make an exception, or to give a color to the system. Of the two ends of the trial period that balances across death, that which reaches over into the future world is so much more heavily weighted with human beings than that which runs back into this world, that it goes quickly down, and throws this up in the air as if there were nothing on it. If we accept the

theory, either we must be indifferent to the arithmetic of the subject and to the relative moral gravity of the consequences of the two periods, or we shall totally reverse the estimate of Scripture, and, instead of regarding the present as the period of supreme importance, we shall look to the future as the one around which every thing decisive and final centres. We shall feel that the sacred writers were quite mistaken in the emphasis, the tragical and supreme concern, with which they looked upon the present unapplied, undeveloped, insignificant probationary span,—a mere prophecy, in the case of here and there a person, of the abounding rich probation that is waiting to overtake the race in the world to come. This bright prospect banishes the words of warning and entreaty of Christ and the apostles, and makes one rest confidently in the promise of the future opportunity.

5. But a fifth inquiry arises: What right have the advocates of this theory to *assume* that probation cannot end with the godless till they have had the highest light and the fullest persuasions possible for man? How do they know that the resources of the universe must be exhausted on them, the historical Christ be presented to them, and they commit the sin against the Holy Ghost, before they can have settled the question of their standing at the judgment? This is a great assumption. It is a remarkable assumption. Is it an ethical intuition? Is it a fact of Christian consciousness? Is it derived from the principle of faith? Where does it come from?

We see many persons in this life with whom the question of probation is apparently settled on a much lower basis. There are those who change their course of life radically at the utterance of a sentence, on finding a fragment of Scripture, upon the recollection of a scene of childhood. There are those who grow up into Christian character without remembering that they ever made a definitive choice to that effect. On the other hand, there are multitudes who seem to be settled in sinful character

who give no evidence of having ever consciously made a definitive choice in that direction, with Christ present to their thought at the time, and under his supreme persuasions. They deny that they ever passed through such a crisis. They have simply lived on in sin, adding sin to sin, and neglected the offered Christ. Nothing now moves them from their sinful drift. No persuasions are effective. There is no weakening in their chosen way. They seem imbedded in sinful character. And they die, to all appearance, in this state. We do not know, indeed, as this is so. We do not know their hearts, nor what their experiences have been. That does not matter. That is not the point. But can we assume that all such persons, who *seem* to have fixed characters when they die, have either had all the persuasions of the gospel exhausted on them and have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost, or that they have not had a full and sufficient trial? Can we assume that probation, to be complete, must have, in addition to the moral elements of the trial investing them here, certain other definite external factors? How do we know what facts, or truths, or light, must be present to the soul, to enable it to define its position spiritually? How do we know it cannot do it, unless the decision turn on the historical Christ presented in a supreme appeal? How do we know the soul may not as well define itself spiritually by its decisions on questions of duty and truth and spiritual light, as by the attitude it takes towards an historical person? The soul is spiritual; and it is quite as much in accordance with its nature that it should define its character by its choices in reference to spiritual realities, as by its attitude towards a definite concrete reality or an historical person.

The "New Theologians" are near giving us a probation which turns on external and arbitrary factors, according to which all the soul's relations to the spiritual influences about it, all its tendencies to fixedness of character in those relations, all its choices and seeming finalities of choice in them, go for naught in determining the bounds of its trial; but it

must have, in addition to all this spiritual regimen, a new and supreme object of choice, the historical Christ, before the question of its destiny can be settled. And this is urged in the interest of an ethical system!

But it overlooks the spiritual nature of the soul, and the fact that it is inevitably defining its place in the spiritual world from the start, without waiting for contingent or particular external conditions. The spiritual nature of man, the will, till imbedded in character by its own choice, is the most sensitive and susceptible power imaginable. A breath may furnish the occasion on which it settles its destiny for life, and decides the angle at which it goes out of this world into the next. It does not wait for the historical Christ or any other definite historical factor before, so far as we can see, it closes in with the finalities of character and is held in the meshes which it has woven about itself. All this the "New Theologians" ignore, and make the stupendous assumption that the presentation of the historical Christ is the indispensable condition of a full probation and of ripeness for the judgment. They give up what we see and know about the swift tendency to fixedness of character here, and resort to the arbitrary supposition that the soul must define itself in the moral world, not morally and spiritually only, but in reference to an historical person, with all the glow of supreme demonstration, before its moral destiny can be fixed. Can all this be assumed?

6. Another inquiry is, whether there is any real *unity* or *continuity* between the two proposed probationary eras. Can they, in any proper sense, be said to be parts of the same system, and be employed, indifferently, in the training of the race under the same method of salvation?

It is said that, during the one era or the other, the historical Christ must be presented with all possible persuasive powers of the Spirit and the love of God, so that there shall be nothing standing in the way of salvation but the soul's own supreme choice, before it can be ripe for

the judgment. And it is claimed that the future probationary era is but a part and continuation of the probationary process, or state, begun here,—so that the question whether there is one probation or more is an impertinence.

Let us look at this. It is clear that there are some very marked differences in the elements entering into the two processes.

There is good reason to believe that the good and the bad are separated in the intermediate state. The fact that Judas "went to his own place;" that the penitent thief was to be with Christ in Paradise on the day of the crucifixion, while our Lord said to the unbelieving Jews, "I go my way, and ye shall seek me, and die in your sins: whither I go ye cannot come;" and that an impassable gulf is represented as existing between the rich man and Lazarus in Hades,—is conclusive biblical evidence on this point. This, however, is conceded. Dorner, speaking of those in the intermediate state, remarks: "They are not all in the same state or realm—a view which must follow from the theory of a sleep of the soul. As for the pious, intercourse with the ungodly, to which they were subject on earth, ceases after death; they suffer nothing from them, not even temptation" ("The Future State," p. 106). Equally removed, of course, are the ungodly from the approaches of the pious.

There must also be a great difference between the two states by the absence of the body, or, what Dorner calls the "relatively bodiless state, the soul having neither the earthly body nor the resurrection body." In this state, Dorner thinks, "a still life begins, a sinking of the soul within itself and into the ground of its life—what Steffens calls Involution, and Martensen, Self-brooding" (*idem*,

existences resting on immediate evidence (*idem*, p. 107).

Furthermore, the historical Christ is in our world presented in connection with an historical process, out of the midst of the actual earthly unfoldings of his kingdom. As the good and the evil are in the same community, the appeal is made to the individual,—the Christ comes to him, veiled and hidden,—out of the midst of the complex concrete relations of life, making a moral choice possible, and furnishing the conditions necessary for moral training. In the intermediate state, on the contrary, Christ cannot come forth to the individual out of the midst of the historical process. The appeal is not made from the ONGOINGS of the mingled and uncertain influences which mark the earthly development of the kingdom. Christ does not come “as a root out of a dry ground,” having no form nor comeliness, and no beauty that we should desire him. He does not appear as a king in disguise, *wooing* his bride, but as a king coming in his majesty, the disguise thrown off, in the midst of his regal glory and power. It is not the strange dawning of the historical Christ, changing for those welcoming him a night of blackness into serene and beautiful day, but the irruption and glare of the celestial Christ, leaving no room for moral election. He comes down upon the scene with a supernal atmosphere about him. He does not come up out of the earthly kingdom of God trailing its atmosphere. And though he may show the print of the nails in his hands and feet and the scar in his side, and may recite the incidents of Gethsemane and Calvary, it is rather as a theophany that he comes, as the victorious Lord, as the glorified Son of God, than as the historical Son of Man.

Now, can these two methods of probation touch each other and be continuous parts of one system? Is there a real unity between them?

In the first place, the absence, in the future state, of the body, the organ of action on material things,—to which reference has been made,—the absence of its appetites,

passions, sufferings, limitations, occupations,—this alone, with the consequent unloosening of the internal factors of thought, and the rioting of the hitherto restrained soul-forces in guilty natures, is enough to constitute a new kind of probationary action and life. This takes us into a realm and method of trial that is unthinkable to us. We have nothing in our experience or observation that can interpret it or give it reality.

Secondly, the different social influences investing the soul in the intermediate state,—the absolute separation of the good and the bad, and the consequent complete putting apart of the blended moral forces working in society and playing around individuals in this life, leaving the unbelieving with only their kind, save as Christ may come in upon them with a heavenly retinue from afar, or as he may devise for them some other new and special angelic or celestial ministry,—this is a method of trial of which we have no analogy and no suggestion on earth.

Then the third fact, which we have mentioned, that the probationary appeal, if there be one in the other world, can not be along the historical line, out of the midst of the complex concrete forces of earthly history, but must be a new and independent approach from another quarter and with other agencies, shows that we are altogether out of the probationary system revealed by Christ and described by the sacred writers as within the scope of the redemptive plan.

It is probable, indeed, that the advocates of this hypothesis secretly rejoice in the difference between the future probation and that here, because they hope the difference will greatly enlarge the area of salvation, and be the means of bringing next to all to the acceptance of Christ. It is only when they are defending the theory or making it plausible that they say they do not speak of another probation, or two probations, but only of one full probation. But the fact is, the two eras, or states, or systems, —by whatever term they are known,—have no points of

identity in common but the name. The advocates retain the name *probation*, but they spirit away the distinctive elements of probation, as we know any thing about them, and substitute others different in kind. The probationary subject, in his bodiless, brooding, soul-quickenened condition, is different. The probationary circumstances, with the total separation of the godly and the wicked, and of good and bad influences in the same social atmosphere, are different. The object of the probationary appeal, the glorified Christ, not the historical Christ historically presented, is different. And the probationary method, not the historical process, but some new process, of which we know nothing, applied by baffled and despairing love on the other side, is different.

Thus the two systems do not touch each other so as to be continuous parts of one system. They are no more alike than we might suppose a training *régime* designed for the inhabitants of Mars might be like the one God has given to those on the earth.

If the hypothesis were true, we should have this strange condition of things: a method of trial, of one kind, for a part of the race, and a radically different one for another part. Those whose trial is here have the evidence come to them through an historical process, in a way that does not compel conviction of its truth, but admits of it, and appeals to the moral sympathies, and harmonizes with a moral system. Those whose trial is there, if they have, as is imagined, the insight of spiritual beings in a bodiless world, and the undisguised play of their faculties, and if the divine Christ with his transcendent evidences and glory is presented to them, will show no option and no virtue in being convinced and accepting the evidence, and nothing can keep them from yielding but their own absolute choice of sin under circumstances when such choice would be morally impossible. It is unthinkable that such different systems can be adopted by God in the salvation of the same race, under one common redemp-

tion, bound to the same judgment, and with one heaven for the saved.

The different methods of approach to individuals in this world,—as under the Old Testament economy and under the New, in Christian lands and in heathen lands, in pious homes and in ungodly homes, in the case of the intelligent and of the ignorant, of the strong-minded and the weak-minded, of the old and the young,—all these diversities of the probationary appeal, issuing from an historical process, as they do, in the midst of commingling diverse moral influences, leaving the question of destiny to be settled by each one, under the brooding and drawing power of the law and Spirit of God and the agencies of redemption, which slumber nowhere on the earth, by his own chosen moral relation to what has been pregnantly and expressively called “the essential Christ,”—*these* diversities are only different forms of the same probationary system, compared with the total disconnection and violent antagonism between the earthly probation and a probation in the intermediate state.

If, however, the advocates of future probation, wishing to retain the theory, should attempt to minimize these differences, the question would then arise, What would be the advantage of such a probation? If the glorified celestial Christ is not to come down with overwhelming conviction upon the intermediate soul, and if the evidence is to come in a way to make it a test of moral sympathy and a means of moral training,—if, in other words, the trial is to have a genuine ethical character, connecting it in kind with that here, of what use practically would such a trial be?

torical kingdom. But the soul is there with its own psychological and moral laws and tendencies; and one of these evidently is the strong drift towards fixedness of character, together with spiritual blindness, the spirit of self-justification, a supreme interest in its sinful occupations, however spiritual they may be. If we reason ethically, from what we know of ethical laws, the soul, going on in sin through life, and going out into the other world in sin, must in a short time, if left to itself, be so immovably fixed in its own chosen way that no dubious word appeal would be effective. For Christ to come to it so as to make the choice of him ethical would be useless. The identity of the system there with the one here, even at a single point, that of a truly moral appeal, deprives it of saving power. Its advocates must regard it as a radically different probation, or they must make it a mockery to human hopes. They stand between the two horns of the dilemma: a new, unique, un-moral probation, or one that is worthless for salvation.

Practically, then, the value of the hypothesis to satisfy the longings of the human heart, or the ethical demand, or, if you choose so to call it, Christian consciousness, consists in supposing that there will be an opportunity of salvation in the other world that is altogether unique in kind, not joining on to the present probation in quality at all, only connecting with it endwise, so to speak,—not taking up the principles and methods which this leaves off, but going by a bound into a new system with unknown and unimaginable methods and possibilities. And this is, doubtless, what is secretly hoped. This is what is to remove the dark cloud hanging over the earthly history of the race. This is what is to clear up the question of theodicy. This is what is to sustain the law and goodness of God in full-orbed glory.

But the question yet remains, whether we have a right to construct a new and unique probation and connect it with the redemptive scheme of this life, in order to escape

our ethical difficulties. Can we suppose Christ thus doubles on his methods? On earth, however diversified the conditions of men,—whether before the coming of Christ or after it, whether in Christian countries or outside of them, whether having a full presentation of Christ or the most obscure and rudimentary knowledge of him,—with all there is comparatively the same method of moral appeal. With all the same willing and trustful spirit is the condition of salvation. With all there is the same mingling of good and bad influences in society. With all there is a commingling of proofs and difficulties in the evidence, causing it to turn largely on the moral sympathies and personal choice of the individual. Will Christ dispense with this method at death, and adopt a totally different one, when he has given no intimation of it, when holy Scripture does not suggest it, when the whole urgency and trend of the words of Christ and inspired men imply the opposite?

After all, some of the “New Divines” seem to have misgivings. The aim with them is to placate the higher ethics, to have a system that satisfies the Christian consciousness, a theodicy that harmonizes with faith. They elaborate a system that shall agree with the internal light as purified by Christian experience,—that shall answer, as an echo, to the profoundest human cry. But something is wrong. It is not satisfactory to them when produced. It comes out a speculation, not a child of insight. It does not throb with ethical and spiritual life, able to make its own way, not only in their convictions, but through the world. It is cold and intellectual. Its friends, while not giving up the supposition and the hope of a future probation, accept the prepared theory coldly and tentatively, unless driven into love of it by the peculiar

deem this subject, I am free to acknowledge, even in the act of giving Dorner's fresh discussion of it to the press, that it does not seem to me to belong to the essence of faith, and is chiefly of interest to my own mind as it bears upon the more general and primary questions of our theodicy—of our whole endeavor, in the midst of modern unbelief, to make sure of the facts of a divine education and redemption of the world, and of a supreme revelation of God in the Word made flesh" ("The Future State," p. 38).

So at last the system, as a system, topples, in the judgment of some of its warmest advocates and friends.

Since the foregoing was written, an editorial has appeared in the *Andover Review* for August, on eschatology, in which the writer argues for a future probation. The idea runs through the article that the saving power of Christ is dependent on a knowledge of Christ. This crops out in many places and in some curious forms. In speaking of the doctrine that saving influences may reach those in pagan lands who have not heard of Christ, through channels and agencies which have been called "essential Christianity," he says: "We consider it unevangelical and rationalistic, for it disparages the importance and denies the necessity of historical Christianity. It is perilously akin, in its postulates, to the Deism of the last century, which maintained that the knowledge of reason and the commands of conscience are sufficient, and which held Christianity to be not a supernatural redemption, but only a superior system of moral teaching" (p. 153). But *does* the doctrine criticised disparage the importance and deny the necessity of historical Christianity? At most it could only be said, from the stand-point of the critic, to undervalue the necessity of the *knowledge* of historical Christianity. The advocates of "essential Christianity," hold that historical Christianity and supernatural redemption, are absolutely essential, back of it or under it, as its ground. The difference between this system and Deism is radical and world-wide, except on a most superficial view, involving

great confusion of ideas, this being a doctrine of thorough supernaturalism, while Deism is a naturalistic religion.

Again he says: "This dangerous theory puts the gospel on a level with other religions, and gives it a precarious position. Reduced to a syllogism, the theory may be summarized thus: Men cannot be saved except through Christ and his gospel; men can be saved who never heard of Christ and his gospel; therefore, the knowledge men have by nature is really the gospel of which they never heard. . . . But the proposition which has been slipped in under the guise of a minor premise is really a flat contradiction of the major, while the conclusion is far out on the road in company with forms of unbelief which were long ago driven out in defeat and shame" (p. 154). We agree with the critic that the conclusion which he *has drawn* expresses a form of unbelief long since "driven out in defeat and shame." But what is the conclusion drawn from? Not, logically, from the premises stated, nor from any summary of the belief criticised. It can only be drawn from the premises by foisting into the major, in the interpretation of it, a clause that is not there, changing it from "Men cannot be saved except through *Christ and his gospel*" to "Men cannot be saved except through the *knowledge* of Christ and his gospel," which is a radically different proposition, and begs the question at issue. It is this unwitting change of the major premise that makes "the flat contradiction." The only logical inference from the premises, as originally stated—which fairly enough, perhaps, summarizes, in this particular, the views of those who believe in the possibility of the salvation of persons outside the proclamation of the gospel—is this: "Therefore, men may be saved through Christ and his gospel who never heard of Christ and his gospel"—an inference which yet remains to be demolished, and which involves a moral, still supernatural and divine

Christ with that of the saving power of the *knowledge* of Christ is a great impeachment of Christ's grace and of the largeness and efficacy of the powers of the gospel. It leads the writer of the article to hesitate and demur, and almost question the rounded and perfect salvation of the Old Testament saints in this life, regarding them, concessively, as "recipients of that which was preparatory to the gospel and directly predictive of it. . . . For the completeness of their redemption, they had clearer knowledge, after death, of God's love revealed in Christ" (p. 151). Was this for the *completeness of their redemption*? It leads him to hold, also, the virtuous heathen as "only receptive of salvation but not actually regenerate." It causes him to undervalue the spiritual evidences of regeneration in the character, by the side of the intellectual one, of having a certain kind of historical knowledge. It exalts a specific knowledge—helpful as that knowledge confessedly is, and at the head of all kinds of mere knowledge—above its strict ethical value, as is shown in every revival of religion by actual spiritual results, which in many cases seem quite independent of the amount of the true knowledge of the historical Christ possessed by the converts. It delays salvation, when the penitent soul, ignorant of the gospel, is, according to its knowledge, ripe for it, till the lacking intellectual element is supplied. It arrests the saving power of Christ when both he and the needy one are ready, till the slower agencies of an historical process can come and open the way for Him to do the work. It restricts the freedom and the flow of divine grace, designed to reach the ends of the earth by the coming of Christ, till man, or angel, or glorified Christ, can come, in this world or the next, and explain the central chapter of the world's history to those who have not heard it or understood it.

All this is done to maintain the theory of future probation. Yet the writer seems to look on the hypothesis, after all, as practically almost a barren and unprofitable one, even if true. He well says: "There is much reason

to believe that this present life is the most favorable opportunity for moral renewal in Christ. The gospel is an earthly, historical religion, wrought out in the deeds and sacrifices of the man Christ Jesus, who lived under the conditions of a human, earthly life, who dwelt in the cities and villages of Judea, who walked in the valleys and on the mountains of Galilee, and who died on a hill-side of this earth. Our bodily life is the acceptable time to be saved by Him who in the days of his flesh offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears" (p. 147). Again, he well says: "Those who have the gospel while they are in the body are in the decisive period. Neither Scripture, nor the observed tendency of character to become permanently fixed, especially under the gospel, afford any reason to hope that a more favorable, or, indeed, any opportunity will be given after death." To this he adds: "But for those who do not know God in Christ during the earthly life, it seems to us probable that the knowledge they need will be given after death" (p. 160).

Thus the writer concedes that this life is the best time for moral renewal, and doubts whether any who have the knowledge of Christ in this life will have any other opportunity. Yet he knows that multitudes who have a knowledge of the historical Christ here die, giving no evidence of having accepted him as their Saviour. Of what value, then, can a future probation be to those who have not heard of him, unless he comes in altogether another and a new way? Does not this show that the theorist himself holds his hypothesis from sentimental reasons, while regarding it as of little practical worth? For such reasons, is it worth while for robust, self-centred natures to accept an hypothesis for which diligent search does not discover a particle of proof in the Scriptures, which is contrary to the traditions and faith of our churches, which is revolutionary in theology, which by swift logical and natural tendencies hastens to a Niagara plunge into Universalism, and for which that and other errors stand with outstretched arms beckoning it on?

ARTICLE III.

THE BOOK OF JUBILEES.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ETHIOPIC BY PROFESSOR GEO. H. SCHODDE, PH.D.,
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY, COLUMBUS, O.

CHAP. III. 1. And in the sixth day of the second sabbath we brought, by the command of the Lord, to Adam all the animals and all the beasts and all the birds and every thing that moves on the earth and every thing that moves in the water, each according to their kind, and each according to their similarity: on the first day the animals; the beasts on the second day; the birds on the third day; every thing-that moves on the earth the fourth day; whatever moves in the water on the fifth day. 2. And Adam gave unto each its name; and as he called them, this was their name. And on these five days Adam saw this: a male and a female in each kind that is on the earth, but that he was alone and could not find a companion who could be an aid to such as he. 3. And God said to me: 'It is not good that man should be alone: let us make for him a helpmeet like unto him.' 4. And the Lord our God caused a stupor to fall upon him and he slept, and he took for a wife one rib from amongst his ribs, and this rib was made into a woman from amongst his ribs, and he built flesh there in its place, and built a woman. 5. And he awakened Adam out of his sleep, and awakening he arose on the sixth day and came to her and knew her and said unto her: 'This is now bone from my bone and flesh from my flesh: this one shall be called my wife, for she came and originated from man. 6. For this reason man and wife shall be one, and for this reason a man shall leave his father and his mother and will connect himself with his wife, and they shall be one flesh. 7. And in the first sev-

¹ I. e., to the angel who is narrating these matters to Moses.

enth was Adam created, and his wife in his side, and in the second seventh he showed her to him,⁵ and on that account the command was given to observe in their defilement seven days for a male and twice seven days for a female.⁶

8. And when Adam had completed forty days in the land where he had been created, we brought him into the garden of Eden, that he should work it and watch it; but his wife they brought in on the eightieth day, and after this she entered the garden; and on this account the commandment is written on the tablets of heaven⁷ in reference to her that gives birth, that "if she brings forth a male, she shall remain in her uncleanness seven days according to the first week of days, and thirty days shall she abide in the blood of purifying, and she shall touch nothing holy and shall not enter into the sanctuary- until these days are completed for her who has a male child. 9. But she who has a female child shall remain in her uncleanness two weeks, according to the first two weeks, and sixty-six days in the blood of purifying, and all the days for her shall be eighty."⁸ 10. And she having completed these eighty days we brought her into the garden of Eden, for it is holy above the whole earth, and every tree that is planted in it is holy. And on this account was ordained concerning her that gives birth to a male or female this law for these days, that they shall touch nothing holy nor enter a sanctuary until these days for a male or a female are completed.⁹ 11. This law and testimony was given

⁵ I. e., she was created at the same time with Adam, but in and within him, and it was only in the second week that she became a separate creature.

⁶ Cf. Lev. xii.

⁷ Throughout this and similar works the laws of God and his ordinances are looked upon as taken from the tablets of heaven; especially is this idea and expression found in the Testamentum XII. Patriarcharum.

⁸ Cf. Lev. xv.

⁹ To the present day yet this law is preserved in the Church of Abyssinia. Cf. Thiersch's elaborate articles on Abyssinia in the July and August numbers of the Allgm. Conservat. Monatschrift for 1884.

and written for the children of Israel that they should observe it all the days. 12. And in the first week of the first jubilee Adam and his wife were in the garden of Eden seven years working and watching it; and we gave them work and taught them to work every thing that offered itself for work. 13. And he labored and was naked and did not know it and was not ashamed, and he watched the garden against the birds and the animals and the beasts,¹ and gathered its fruits and ate and laid aside the rest for himself and his wife, and laid aside that which he had guarded for himself. 14. And having ended the completion of seven years which he completed there, in the seventh year exactly, and in the second month, on the seventeenth of the month, the serpent came and approached the woman, and the serpent said to the woman: "Has God commanded that you shall not eat of any of the fruit of the tree in the garden?" 15. And she said to it. "He has told us, 'Eat from all the fruit of the trees in the garden, but from the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden ye shall not eat, nor shall ye touch it, that ye die not!'" 16. And the serpent said to the woman: "Ye will surely not die, but because God knows that on which day ye eat of it your eyes shall be opened and ye shall be like gods and will know good and evil." 17. And the woman saw the tree that it was pleasant and it pleased the eye, and that its fruit was good to eat; she took from it and ate. 18. And she first covered her shame with fig leaves, and gave to her husband, and he ate, and his eyes were opened and he saw that he was naked. 19. And he took fig leaves and sewed them together and made for himself an apron and covered his shame. 20. And God cursed the serpent and was enraged at it forever; and he was enraged at the woman also, because she had obeyed the voice of the serpent, and he said to her: "I shall surely increase thy pains and thy trouble; in thy

¹ On this point our book differs from other apocalypses where the animals before the fall are represented as harmless.

pains bear children, and to thy husband be thy refuge, and he shall be thy lord." 21. And to Adam he said: "Because thou didst obey the voice of thy wife and didst eat from this tree of which I had commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat, let the earth be cursed on account of thy deed; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth for thee; and eat thou thy bread in the sweat of thy brow until thou returnest to the earth from which thou hast been taken; for earth thou art, and to earth thou shalt return." 22. And he made for them garments of skin and clothed them, and sent them from the garden. 23. And on that day on which Adam came out of the garden of Eden he offered, as a sweet savour, a burnt offering: frankincense and galbanum and myrrh spices, in the morning with the rising of the sun, on the day when he covered his shame. 24. And on that day was closed the mouth of all the animals and of the beasts and of the birds and of whatever walks and of whatever moves, so that they could not speak; for they all had spoken with each other one lip and one tongue." 25. And he sent out of the garden of Eden all flesh that was in the garden of Eden, and all flesh was scattered according to its kinds and according to its natures to the places which had been created for them. 26. And to Adam alone did he give to cover his shame, of all the animals and beasts. 27. On this account it is commanded in the tablets of heaven concerning all who know the judgment of the law, that they shall cover their shame and shall not uncover themselves as the gentiles uncover themselves. 28. And at the new moon of the fourth month Adam and his wife came out of the garden of Eden and dwelt in the land of Eldâ, in the land of their creation. 29. And Adam called the name of his wife Eve. 30. And they did not have a son until the

CHAP. IV. 1. And in the third week of the second jubilee she gave birth to Cain, and in the fourth she gave birth to Abel, and in the fifth she gave birth to her daughter Awân.⁹ 2. And in the first [week] of the third jubilee Cain slew Abel, because [God] accepted an offering from his hands, but did not receive a fruit offering from the hands of Cain. 3. And he slew him on the field; and his blood cried aloud from earth to heaven lamenting that he had slain him, and God punished Cain, because he had slain Abel. 4. And he made him a refugee over the earth, on account of the blood of his brother, and he cursed him upon the earth. 5. And on this account it is written in the tablets of heaven: "Cursed be he who slays his neighbor in wickedness, and all who hear shall say, 'So be it!' and the man who sees it and does not announce it, cursed be he like the other." 6. And on this account we hearing come to announce before the Lord our God all the sins which take place in heaven and earth, and in light and in darkness, and everywhere. 7. And Adam and his wife mourned for Abel four weeks of years; and in the fourth year of the fifth week he became joyful and knew his wife again, and she brought forth for him a son, and they called his name Seth; for he said: "The Lord has raised up for us a second seed on the earth in the place of Abel; for Cain slew him." 8. In the sixth week he begat his daughter Azûrâ. 9. And Cain took Awân his sister to himself as wife, and she brought forth for him Enoch at the end of the fourth jubilee. And in the first year of the first week of the fifth jubilee houses were built on the earth, and Cain built a city, and called it by the name of his son Enoch. 10. And Adam knew Eve, his wife, and

⁹ Who invented this and the other non-biblical names that are found in this and the following chapters is not known. As in the whole known literature of that day and kind there is no other book that contains so many of them as does the one before us, it may not be incorrect to think that the author himself invented many. But he is certainly not the originator of the idea of inventing such names. Indications abound that the popular Jewish faith of the day had many such names.

she brought forth yet nine sons. 11. And in the fifth week of this jubilee Seth took Azûrâ his sister to himself as wife, and in the fourth [year] she brought forth for him Enos. 12. And he began first to call upon the name of the Lord on the earth. 13. And in the seventh jubilee, in the fifth week, Enos took Nôêm his sister to himself as wife, and she brought forth for him a son in the third year of the fifth week, and called his name Cainan. 14. And at the end of the eighth jubilee Cainan took to himself as wife Mûalêt his sister, and she bore for him a son in the ninth jubilee, in the first week, in the third year of this week, and he called his name Malâlêl. 15. And in the second week of the tenth jubilee Malâlêl took unto himself as wife Sinâ, the daughter of Barâkhêl, the daughter of the sister of his father, and she bore him a son in the third week, in the sixth year, and he called his name Jârêd; for in his days the angels of the Lord descended upon the earth, those that are called Watchmen," that they should teach the children of men to do judgment and right over the earth. 16. And in the eleventh jubilee Jârêd took to himself a wife, and her name was Barâkâ, a daughter of Râsûjêl, a daughter of the sister of his father, in the fourth week of this jubilee; and she bore for him a son in the fifth week, in the fourth year, of this jubilee, and he called his name Enoch. 17. He was the first one from among the children of men that are born on the earth to learn writing and knowledge and wisdom. 18. And he wrote the signs of heaven" according to the

¹⁰ The name by which the angels of Gen. vi. 1 sqq. are known in apocalyptic literature. Their evil deeds and the consequences thereof form the burden of the oldest portion of the book of Enoch. All that is here related

order of their months in a book, that the sons of men might know the time of the year according to their separate months. 19. He was the first to write a testimony, and he testified to the children of men concerning the generations of the earth, and explained the weeks of the jubilees, and made known to them the days of the years, and arranged the months and explained the sabbaths of the years as we made them known to him. 20. And what was and what will be he saw in a vision of the night in a dream, and as it will happen to the children of men in their generations until the day of judgment; he saw and learned every thing and wrote it as a testimony and laid the testimony on the earth over all the children of men and for their generations. 21. And in the twelfth jubilee, in the seventh week thereof, he took to himself a wife, and her name was Ednâ, the daughter of Daniel, the daughter of the sister of his father; and in the sixth year in this week she bore him a son, and he called his name Methusaleh. 22. And then he was with the angels of God six years of this jubilee, and they showed him all things on earth and in heaven, the rule of the sun, and he wrote down all things. 23. And he testified to the Watchmen, those that sinned with the daughters of men; for they had commenced to mix with the daughters of the earth, so that they were defiled; and Enoch testified against them all. 24. And he was removed from the midst of the children of men, and we conducted him into the garden of Eden¹² for greatness and for honor, and behold here he was engaged in writing down the judgment and the eternal condemnation and all the wickedness of the sons of the children of men. 25. And on his account [God] brought the deluge over the whole land of Eden; for there he was set as a sign and that he should testify over all the

¹² This is a somewhat strange statement, and the text may be corrupt. The term "land of Eden" generally is the same as simply Eden. The connection might lead to the thought that all but Eden was then destroyed, as it was no longer inhabited since Adam's expulsion. A negative particle of some sort may have dropped out.

sons of the children of men, that he should declare all the deeds of the generations until the day of judgment. 26. And he offered a burnt offering on the west side of the sanctuary [?] which was pleasing before the Lord on the hill of the south; for there are four places to the Lord on earth: the garden of Eden and the hill of the east in it,"¹⁸ and this hill on which thou art to-day, the hill of Sinai, and the hill of Zion, which will be sanctified in the new creation for a sanctification of the earth: through it the earth will be sanctified from all its sin and its uncleanness to the generation of eternity." 27. And in the fourteenth jubilee Methusaleh took unto himself as his wife Ednâ, the daughter of Ezrâêl, the daughter of the sister of his father, in the third week in first year of this week, and he begat a son and called his name Lâmêch. And in the fifteenth jubilee, in the third week, Lâmêch took to himself a wife, and her name was Bilanôs, the daughter of Barâkêl, the daughter of the sister of his father; and in this week she bore him a son, and he called his name Noah, saying: "This one will comfort me on account of all my work and on account of the earth which the Lord has cursed." 28. And at the end of the nineteenth jubilee, in the seventh week, in the sixth year thereof, Adam died, and all of his sons buried him in the land of the creation of Adam, and he was the first to be buried in the earth, and he lacked seventy years of one thousand years; for one thousand years are like one day in the testimony of heaven," and therefore it was written concerning the tree of knowledge: "On the day on which ye eat thereof ye shall die." 29. And for this reason he did not com-

¹⁸ Naturally the locality of the first two of these sacred places cannot be ascertained; it may be that the writer himself had no accurate idea on this matter.

¹⁹ Referring to the hope of all writers of Jewish apocalypses that God would establish Israel as his ruling people on Zion, and from that centre spread his blessings over all nations. This is one of the most fixed hopes of this and similar works.

¹⁵ A somewhat peculiar commentary on Ps. xc. 4.

plete the years of this day; for in it he died. 30. At the end of this jubilee Cain was killed, after him, in the same year; and his house fell upon him, and he died in the midst of the house, and he was killed with his stones, for with a stone he had killed Abel, and with a stone he was killed by a judgment of righteousness. 31. On this account it is ordained in the tablets of heaven: "With the instrument with which a man kills his neighbor, he shall be killed; as he wounded him, shall thus they do to him."¹⁶ 32. And in the fifty-fifth jubilee Noah took to himself a wife, and her name was Emzarâh, the daughter of Râkêl the daughter of his sister [sic] in the first year, in the fifth week; and in the third year thereof she bore him Shem, in the fifth year thereof she bore him Ham, and in the first year in the sixth week she bore him Japhet.

CHAP. V. 1. And it happened, when the sons of the children of men commenced to increase over the face of the whole earth and daughters were born to them, that the angels of the Lord saw them in one year of this jubilee, that they were beautiful to look upon; and they took unto themselves wives from all of them whomever they chose, and they bore them sons, and these were giants." 2. And injustice increased over the earth and all flesh corrupted its way, from men to animals and to beasts and to birds and to all that walks upon the earth; all corrupted their ways and their orders¹⁷ and began to devour each other, and unrighteousness increased over the earth, and all the thoughts of the knowledge of all the sons of men were thus wicked all the days. 3. And the Lord looked upon the earth, and behold it was corrupt, and all flesh corrupted its order and they all did evil before his eyes, all that were on the earth. 4. And he said: "I shall destroy mankind and all flesh that has been created above the face of the earth." And Noah alone found grace

¹⁶ The *lex talionis*, based partly on Lev. xxiv. 19, 20.

¹⁷ Cf. note on iv. 15.

¹⁸ I. e., the spheres to which the Creator had assigned them.

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before the eyes of the Lord. 5. And concerning the angels whom he had sent upon the earth, he was greatly enraged, that he would root them out of all their power; and he said to us that we should bind them in the depths of the earth; and behold they are bound in the midst of them [depths] and separate. 6. And against their children came a word from before the face of the Lord, that they should be slain with a sword and be removed from under heaven. 7. And he said: "My spirit shall not abide over men forever, for they are flesh; and let their days be one hundred and twenty years." 8. And he sent into their midst his sword that each should slay his neighbor; and they began to slay one the other until they all fell upon the sword and were destroyed from the earth. 9. And their fathers witnessed it; and after this these were bound in the depths of the earth, until the day of the great judgment for the coming of punishment unto eternity over all those who have corrupted their ways and their works before the Lord. 10. And he destroyed all their places, and there was not left a single one of them who was not judged according to all their wickedness. 11. And he made for all of his works a new and righteous nature, so that they did not sin in their entire nature unto eternity and were righteous each in his generation all the days. 12. And the judgment of all is ordained and written on the tablets of the heaven and without injustice; and all who depart from the path which is ordained for them to walk in, and if they do not walk in it, then is written down a judgment for every creature and every generation; and nothing that is in heaven, or on earth, or in the light, or in the darkness, or in Sheol, or in the depth, or in the dark place [can escape]; all their judgments are ordained and written and engraved

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ment over each one: if one gives him all things on earth, he will have no regard for his person and will not receive any thing from his hands, for he is the judge. 15. And of the children of Israel it has been written and ordained, if they shall turn to him in righteousness, he will remove all their guilt and pardon all their sins. 16. It is ordained and written that he will show mercy to all who turn from all their errors, once each year. 17. And concerning all those who corrupted their ways and works before the flood, he had no regard for their persons, with the exception of Noah alone; for he had regard for his person on account of the sons whom he saved from the water of the flood for his sake;¹⁹ for his heart was righteous in all his ways, as had been commanded concerning it, and he had not transgressed any thing that had been ordained for him. 18. And the Lord said: "Every thing that is on the dry land and every thing that is created, from men to animals and to beasts and to birds and to whatever moves upon the earth, shall be destroyed." 19. And he commanded Noah to build an ark for himself that he might save him from the water of the flood. 20. And Noah made an ark in every thing as he had commanded him in the [twenty-seventh] jubilee, in the fifth week, in the fifth year. 21. And he entered on the sixth [year] thereof, in the second month, in the new moon of the second month: until the sixteenth thereof he entered and all that we brought to him into the ark, and the Lord locked it from without on the seventeenth, at eve. 22. And the Lord opened seven flood-gates of heaven and the mouths of the fountains of the great deep, seven mouths in number. 23. And the flood-gates began to pour down water from heaven forty days and forty nights, and the fountains of the deep also sent up waters, until the whole world was full of water. 24. And the water increased upon the earth: fifteen ells the waters were raised over all the high

¹⁹I. e., Noah's sons were not themselves worthy of being saved, but escaped death for their father's sake.

mountains, and the ark was lifted above the earth and moved upon the face of the waters. 25. And the water remained standing upon the face of the earth five months, one hundred and fifty days. 26. And the ark proceeded and rested upon the top of Lûbâr, one of the mountains of Ararat. 17. And in the fourth month the fountains of the great deep were closed, and the flood-gates of heaven were restrained, and in the new moon of the seventh month all the mouths of the deep of the earth were opened, and the water began to descend into the deep below. 28. And in the new moon of the tenth month the tops of the mountains became visible, and in the new moon of the first month the earth became visible. 29. And the waters disappeared from above the earth in the fifth week, in the seventh year thereof, and on the seventeenth day in the second month the earth became dry. 30. And on the twenty-seventh thereof he opened the ark and sent out of it the animals and the beasts and the birds and whatever moves.

CHAP. VI. 1. And at the new moon of the third month he came out of the ark and built an altar on that hill. 2. And he appeared on the earth, and he took a young goat and atoned by its blood for all the guilt of the earth, because every thing that had been on it was destroyed except those that were in the ark with Noah; and he placed the fat on the altar, and he took an ox and a goat and a sheep and young goats and salt and a turtle dove and the young of a dove and brought a burnt sacrifice upon the altar and scattered over them fruit offerings baked in oil and sprinkled the blood and wine, and placed upon it frankincense, and a sweet savour arose which was acceptable before the Lord. 3. And the Lord smelt the

shall not cease forever. 4. "And ye, grow and increase on the earth and increase over it, and be for a blessing in its midst: your fear and your terror I will put upon every thing that is on the earth and in the sea. 5. And, behold, I have given you all the animals and all the beasts and every thing that flies and every thing that moves on the earth and the fish in the waters and all things for food; like the herbs of grass, I have given them all to you to eat. 6. Only flesh in which is its life with blood ye shall not eat: for the blood is the soul of all flesh, so that your blood in your souls be not demanded of you. 7. From the hands of each one I will demand the blood of a man; every one that sheddeth the blood of a man, by the hand of a man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God did he create Adam. 8. But ye, grow and increase upon the earth." 9. And Noah and his sons swore that they would not eat any blood that is in any flesh, and they made a covenant before the Lord God for ever, in all the generations of the world, in this month. 10. On this account he spoke to thee that thou shouldst make a covenant with the children of Israel in this month upon the mountain, with an oath, and shouldst sprinkle blood over them on account of all the words of the covenant which the Lord has made with them for all days." 11. And this testimony is written concerning you, that you observe it in all days, that ye do not in all days eat any blood of animals and birds and beasts in all the days of the earth; and the man who eats the blood of an animal or of beasts or of birds in all the days of the earth, he and his seed shall be rooted out of the land. 12. And thou command the children of Israel that they shall not eat any blood, so that their names and their seed may be before the Lord our God all the days. 13. And for this law there is no limit of days, for it is for eternity; and they shall observe it to generation and generation, so that they may continue supplicating in their behalf with blood before the Lord on the altar on each

²⁰ The covenant of Sinai is regarded as a renewal of the Noachic covenant.

day and day; mornings and evenings they shall supplicate in their behalf perpetually before the Lord, that they may observe this and not be rooted out. 14. And he gave to Noah and his sons a sign that there should not again be a deluge over the earth; he placed his bow in the clouds as the sign of the eternal covenant that no water of the deluge should again come over the earth to destroy it all the days of the earth. 15. On this account it is ordained and written on the tablets of heaven that the celebration of the festival of weeks should be in this month, once a year, for a renewed covenant in each year and year." 16. And during the time this festival was being celebrated in heaven, from the days of creation to the days of Noah, it was twenty-six jubilees and five weeks of years; and Noah and his sons observed it seven jubilees and one week of years until the time when Noah died. 17. But his children violated it until the days of Abraham, and they ate blood. But Abraham alone observed it, and Isaac and Jacob observed it, for these are his children, up to thy day; and in thy day the children of Israel forgot it until I renewed it for them on this mountain. 18. And thou command the children of Israel that they should observe this festival in all their generations as a commandment for them: one day in the year, in this month, they shall celebrate this festival. 19. For it is the festival of weeks and is a festival of first fruits; for this festival is of a double nature and double kind, as is written and engraved concerning its celebration. 20. For I have written it in the book of the first law in which I wrote to thee that thou shouldst observe it in its time one day a year; and I have explained to thee the offerings on that day, that they

new moon of the first month, and in the new moon of the fourth month, and in the new moon of the seventh month, and in the new moon of the tenth month are the days of remembrance and the days of the festivals in the four divisions of the years: written and ordained they are for a testimony until eternity. 22. And Noah ordained them for himself as festivals for future generations, for on them there was to him a remembrance. 23. At the new moon of the first month it was said to him that he should make for himself an ark, and on it the earth became dry, and he opened [the ark] and saw the earth. And at the new moon of the fourth month the mouth of the flood-gates of the lowest deep was closed. 24. And at the new moon of the seventh month all the mouths of the flood-gates of the earth were opened and the waters began to descend into the depth beneath. 25. And at the new moon of the tenth month the tops of the mountains appeared, and Noah became glad. 26. And on this account he ordained them as festivals of remembrance unto himself unto eternity, and thus they are ordained. 27. And they were raised into the tablets of heaven: thirteen sabbaths to each, from one to another their remembrance, from the first to the second, from the second to the third, from the third to the fourth. 28. And all the days of this commandment are fifty-two sabbaths of days, and the whole year is completed. 29. Thus it is engraved and ordained in the tablets of heaven, and there is no transgression from one year to another. And thou command the children of Israel that they should observe the years in this number, three hundred and sixty-four days, and the year shall be complete and the fixed date of their days and their festivals shall not be corrupted, for every thing transpires in them according to their testimony, and they [Israel] shall not miss a day or corrupt a festival. 31. But if they do transgress and do not observe them according to his commandment, then will be corrupted all their fixed dates, and the years will waver in consequence, and

also their times and their years, and they will transgress their ordinances. 32. And all the children of Israel will forget and will not find the paths of the years, and will forget the new moon and the sabbaths and the festivals, and in all the order of the years they will err. 33. For I know, and from now on I shall make it known to thee, and not from my heart, but thus is written in a book before me and is ordained in the tablets of heaven, the division of the days, that they forget not the festivals of my covenant and walk according to the festivals of the gentiles, after their errors and after their ignorance. 34. And there will be those who will make observations of the moon, for this one [the moon] corrupts the stated times and comes out earlier each year by ten days. 35. And in this way they will corrupt the years and will observe a wrong day as the day of testimony and a corrupted festival day, and every one will mix holy days with unclean ones and unclean with holy; for they will err as to months and sabbaths and festivals and jubilees. 36. And on this account I command thee and testify to thee that thou shouldst testify to them, for after thy death thy children will corrupt, so that they make a year only three hundred and sixty-four days," and on this account they will err as to new moons and sabbaths and fixed times and festivals and will ever eat blood with all kinds of flesh.

" How this statement is to be reconciled with verse 30 is not clear.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

BY THE REV. EDWIN C. BISSELL, D.D., PROFESSOR IN HARTFORD
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE Greek word for canon (*κανών*) has an interesting history. Its original meaning was a straight rod or ruler. Then, as being itself straight, it came to mean something that measured or tested straightness in other things, both material and immaterial. It stood, especially, for the norm, or regulating principle. Grammatical rules, for example, were called "canons." The monochord used as the basis of musical intervals was styled their "canon." Great epochs in history, made to serve in the determination of intermediate dates, were entitled "chronological canons." And in a still more pertinent sense, a certain higher class of Greek authors, taken collectively, were spoken of as forming a literary canon, that is, as furnishing a worthy model of good taste in composition. This last usage marks the final stage in one line of development, the word going over at this point from an active into a passive sense. From being used to measure something, it was used for something that had been itself measured and so had passed into the category of approved standards.¹

Now, if our information ceased here, we should infer that the present somewhat extraordinary technical use of the term canon arose in this way. But it is not at all probable, since the word, even in its Greek form, has gone through almost precisely the same series of changes in biblical and ecclesiastical literature. In the original of the apocryphal book of Judith,² for instance, where we first find it, it is employed in its primitive sense of a

¹ See Liddell & Scott's Greek Lex. s. v.

² xiii. 6. Cf. textual note in my Apocrypha, New York, 1880, p. 191.

straight rod, improperly rendered in the common version "pillar." In the New Testament it twice occurs with the meaning of measure or norm,³ and in the second of the two passages (2 Cor. x. 13) there is already a foreshadowing of the later patristic usage. Clement of Rome⁴ still adheres, in general, to the New Testament definition; but Clement of Alexandria,⁵ who speaks of the "canon of truth," and others of his contemporaries we find broadening it to signify, not a single rule alone, but the leading, fundamental principles governing the church of Christ. So, little by little, the word took on the higher meaning of a rule of doctrine, a certain correct type of teaching as over against that which was erroneous or heretical. From this point the transfer of the title from the doctrine itself to the collection of books supposed to contain it was not far off.

At first parts of books only, such as came frequently into use at church festivals, were referred to as "canonized." That is, they were understood to form a part of the established law and order of the discipleship. The term canon as applied to the Bible as a whole to designate its proper contents, we first meet with about the middle of the fourth century, nearly simultaneously in Athanasius⁶ and in one of the utterances of the council of Laodicea (A. D. 363).⁷ Uncanonical books, by which were meant those outside the current catalogue of the sacred Scriptures, were declared to have no authority within the church. Near the same time Amphilochius, Bishop of Iconium (from A. D. 375), in a list of biblical books imputed to him remarks towards its close: "This should be the most correct canon of the divinely inspired Scrip-

³ Gal. vi. 16, "as many as walk by this rule."

⁴ Ad Cor. i. vii. xli.

⁵ Strom. i. c. xxi. § 1.

tures."* Shortly after this period numerous witnesses testify to the common adoption of the term in this technical sense, namely, as indicating the proper measure of the contents of the Bible and since then, to the present day, it has been well-nigh universal.

By the canon of the Old Testament, then, we desire to be understood as meaning those books which, in their collective form, properly make up the Old Testament. It should be said however, by way of limitation, that, in this paper, we shall use that most significant word "properly" almost exclusively in an historical sense. We propose to treat the subject, as far as is well possible, from a purely historical point of view. It would be perfectly legitimate, of course, and is far more common, to discuss it on a much broader platform. There are many persons, indeed, who carelessly employ the epithet canonical as though it were necessarily identical with genuine and authentic, or with inspired and authoritative. But this is really confounding two very dissimilar things, and the confusion is to be the more regretted, because it is so likely to bring what might be a calm, historical inquiry largely under the influence of dogmatic considerations. The questions we now propose to ourselves are much simpler. What books, historically considered, formed the Old Testament collection of the Jews? How and when did that collection originate? When, especially, was it concluded? Was there more than one such final collection? Did it, if but one, include within itself the sum of the Hebrew literature of its time? It would be, it is true, a quite fair, and very practical question to debate among other related questions, on what principle books were admitted to the Jewish canon or excluded from it, and so what kind of authority and how much of it is to be allowed to a book we find embraced within the Old Testament collection? But we must insist, in the face of a very prevalent habit to the contrary, that such questions are by no means logically

* See Westcott, l. c., p. 497.

involved in the others. They would certainly greatly complicate an inquiry which will be found none too easy when carried on purely as an historical one.

It is admitted on all sides that the Jews had a canon of Scriptures a collection of books, definitely segregated by them from all others and held in peculiar esteem. In seeking to answer the question what this canon was, and how it arose, two natural and justifiable courses are open to us. We may start with the books themselves, and the very distant period which the earliest of them represent, carefully tracing, within themselves, or in contemporaneous literature, any indications presupposing or demanding such a collection, and from there move downward to the time when there is no longer any doubt concerning either the existence, or the completed contents of it. Or we may begin with a completed and acknowledged canon, and from that point move backward along the whole course of its development in pursuit of the same object. The one method, if consistently and thoroughly applied, is as practicable, and for all that we can see, as scientific, as the other. The special advantages of the latter, which we adopt, would seem to be that there is more likelihood of one's learning the exact truth in proceeding from the clear to the less clear than by reversing the process. The best way to discover the actual sources of a river is to follow the channel upward till those sources are reached and identified. Nor need that hinder the explorer from carefully noting the river's course, whether straight or tortuous, the incoming streams which here and there increase its volume, or any supposable uncertainty there may be about its real starting point. It might be expected, rather, in comparison with other methods, to be the one best adapted to facilitate correct conclusions in all these respects.

We will, accordingly, make the first century of the Christian era our point of departure. It is generally agreed that the canon of the Old Testament was closed

from a hundred and fifty to two hundred and fifty years before this time. Dissentients from this view among biblical scholars and critics may be truthfully said to be somewhat rare. Nevertheless they shall not be overlooked. We do not wish to leave any thing to mere assumption. It can be shown from three wholly independent, though mutually complementary witnesses, that before the year one of our era there was a fixed collection, a definite *corpus*, of highly sacred Old Testament books and that there is every reason to suppose that it included all the Old Testament literature now regarded by us, Protestants, as canonical and that it included only that. Let us begin the investigation with the New Testament, which, without prejudice to our possibly varying theories of inspiration, may here be cited simply as credible history on the point under review.

The statement is indubitable, and would be universally admitted, that the Old Testament is continually referred to in the New as an established and generally recognized body of sacred ancient writings. The Master charged his countrymen with disobeying what he called the "Scriptures," nullifying and bringing them into disrepute by their traditions; but we do not discover that he ever so much as hinted that they did not possess them or had shown any want of care in their preservation or transmission. As well to justify his own extraordinary claims, as to confound the machinations of his enemies, he made his appeal, severally and collectively to them. Nor do we learn that any objection ever arose in his time to such a practice, or that there was any dispute whatever among those who immediately surrounded him, touching either the latitude or the limitation of the list of books so referred to. It was with him and with them, if we may judge from their common attitude and usage, not something that was in process, but already an entity and an entirety, mutually acknowledged as a revered standard of conduct beyond which there was no appeal. Besides naming these writings

"the Scriptures," he also called them "the Law," "the Law and the Prophets," and once "the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms" (Luke xxiv. 44), employing terms to designate the books in their collective form which seem to have been common both in his day and much earlier, and actually representing the natural and historical division and sequence of their several constituent parts. It is the same peculiar, threefold distribution—I do not say title,—of the books that we find in the earliest extra-biblical reference to the Old Testament collection about two centuries before.⁹

What was true of the recorded words of the Master, was no less true of all New Testament writers. The Old Testament was almost their sole literary dependence. There is no principal phase of its teachings, ceremonial, ethical, or spiritual, which they do not take up and adapt to their new conditions. There is scarcely one of its great characters who is not vividly reproduced in person or doctrine. One of the most recent books treating of the subject of Old Testament quotations in the New reckons their number at about six hundred.¹⁰ But this makes no account of a multitude of passages which have simply taken on the familiar coloring of the ancient Scriptures without directly citing them. It is not too much to say that the whole warp of the New Testament is borrowed from the Old. The golden woof only is Christian. "*Novum in vetere latet: vetus in novo patet.*" Jesus, it will be remembered, said: "Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy but to fulfill" (Matt. v. 17).

The only books of the Old Testament not expressly quoted in the New seem to be Judges, Ruth, Chronicles,

⁹ Eccles. Prologue. It is surprising that so good a scholar as our friend, Dr. Briggs, should translate the τῶν ἄλλων πατρίων βιβλίων here, afterwards changed by the writer himself to τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν βιβλίων, by "other books of our fathers," and then proceed to draw the inference from it that an *indefinite* number of writings is referred to. Biblical Study, p 131, foot note.

¹⁰ Toy, Quotations in the New Testament, New York, 1884.

Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Canticles, Lamentations, Obadiah, and Jonah. To the contents of several of these, moreover, there are such specific allusions as to lead us to suppose that they were not only well known, but held in equal honor with the rest." The only reason, probably, why they are not more particularly mentioned is, that it did not fall in with any writer's special line of thought to refer to them. There is certainly no evidence that a single book of our present list was intentionally omitted by New Testament writers, or that they were in the least influenced in their actions by the discussions that, to a limited extent, were going on among the rabbins of their time respecting the ethical character of some of them. This is sufficiently shown by the fact that, while in the very small number of books they do not quote there are some that never came into such discussion, there are others, like Ecclesiastes," cited, it would appear, in both Gospel and Epistles that were most hotly discussed. Their whole treatment of the matter, in short, is thoroughly informal. No attempt is ever made by them to catalogue the sacred writings. It is extremely doubtful whether they even knew that they had failed to notice some of them, to say nothing of colluding to do so. If, accordingly, it can be proved from other sources that certain books not cited by them actually formed a part of the collection of their day, the most of which they do cite, then their simple failure informally to cite these few cannot fairly be used to prove that they rejected them from the list, or that they considered the canon of the Old Testament to be in a state of flux.

But this is not all. There is positive evidence from another quarter that the New Testament writers looked

¹¹ This is at least true of Judges (cf. Heb. xi. 32 f.); of Ruth, (the genealogy, Matt. i.); of Jonah (Matt. xii. 39-41); of Chronicles (Luke xi. 51), and possibly of Esther (? Rev. xi. 10); while Lamentations may well have been included in the many clear references to Jeremiah.

¹² Cf. Rom. iii. 10; Matt. xxiv. 29.

upon their collection of Scriptures as a unique, and for the time complete, collection. It is well known that the Bible of their time was no longer the Hebrew. More than two centuries before, Hebrew had altogether ceased to be vernacular in Palestine. Nor was their Bible Aramaic, although a few scholars have recently risked such an hypothesis." There were, it is true, oral targums in Aramaic current in these times. They were employed in the synagogues and were absolutely necessary to an intelligent popular participation in the synagogue services. But there is no evidence that any targum existed in a written form, before that of Onkelos on the Pentateuch, which arose about the year A. D. 150. The written Bible of the first century and for a considerable period before and after was in the Greek language: that is, it was the translation of the Old Testament known as the Septuagint. By far the largest portion of the six hundred quotations made from the ancient Scriptures by New Testament writers were made directly, *verbatim et literaliter*, from this Alexandrian version. It had been in circulation already two centuries when Christ was born, and had come to be held in high esteem by the Jews of Palestine, and of the wide dispersion, as, from the first, it had been so esteemed by those of the Egyptian metropolis. To such an extent was it employed by the early Christians in their debates with their Jewish neighbors, that the latter became singularly suspicious of it, as though, somehow, it had been unfairly won over to the Christian side of the argument. They accordingly had a new version made, the slavishly literal one of Aquila, to take its place (cir. A. D. 150). Now, in connection with this Septuagint version of the Old Testament which, practically, was

canonical books but, side by side with them, quite a number of others which we term "apocryphal." They were religious works by Jewish authors of repute, some of them, like *Ecclesiasticus*, the *Book of Wisdom*, and the *First Book of Maccabees*, of a very high order of merit, approaching in some parts so near to the biblical in their general style and spirit, that many persons, even in our own day, fail to discover much difference between them. These works, as we have no reason to doubt, were uniformly bound up with the canonical, circulated just as freely as they, were well known in their contents, and must have been held in no little regard by the ordinary Bible reader and expounder of that day. Judging from extant manuscripts and editions of the Septuagint, there was nothing whatever to distinguish, externally, a canonical book from a so-called uncanonical in this Bible of the first century. First Esdras, it is likely, preceded, as it now does, the Book of Ezra, and the Wisdom of Solomon and of Sirach followed, in a natural order, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon. This being the case, it is to be noted as a remarkable fact, a fact, moreover, which is admitted to be such on all sides, that not one of these dozen or more books, or parts of books, is ever quoted by our Lord or his disciples, or the least notice taken of them as standard Jewish literature.

It is admitted that in the Epistle of Jude there is a statement concerning Enoch and a certain prophecy of his which harmonizes with what is said of him in the *pseudepigraphical* Book of Enoch, although, for aught we know, both Jude and the Book of Enoch—which do not differ so very much from one another in age—may have been alike dependent for it on a common oral tradition.¹⁴ And in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews the thought has such a coloring as to lead some to suppose that the thrilling history of the Maccabæan heroes is floating vaguely before

¹⁴ See my *Apocrypha*, p. 665 f.; and cf. Gardiner, *The Old and New Testaments*, etc. (New York, 1885) p. 276 ff.

the mind of the writer. But it must not be overlooked that the Book of Enoch did not at that time, or ever afterward, form any part of the *apocryphal* books of the Old Testament, properly speaking, much less of the Alexandrian version of the Old Testament. Nor will any one assert that the reference to the Maccabees, if there be one, is any thing more than an obscure recognition of their sufferings and heroism, which, as matters of actual occurrence, no one would be supposed to call in question, then or since. There is no history of the distant past better accredited than that of the First Book of Maccabees. Still, of this history, there is no actual citation; whether there be any allusion to it, is extremely questionable.

Moreover, this peculiar attitude of the New Testament writers toward their Greek Bible, and their nice discrimination among the books of which it was made up, attracts our attention the more from the fact that it was far enough from being that of the apostolic and early church fathers. No sooner do we pass beyond the bounds of the New Testament than we discover, at once, a wide-spread recognition and citation of the apocryphal books, and that without much reference to their relative value. Not only so, but we find men of the highest standing in the church applying to them terms which otherwise were especially reserved for what they, *par excellence*, styled "Holy Scriptures."

How is this attitude of the New Testament writers toward the apocryphal literature of their times, so conspicuous by contrast with even the Christian writers who immediately followed them, to be accounted for? Certainly on no theory of expurgation. From the men to whom we should look for such expurgation, had it taken place, that is, the early church fathers, we might expect something very different, if they had ventured to give any coloring of their own to the New Testament books.

There is but one fair conclusion, consequently, to be drawn from this noteworthy fact: the New Testament

writers, one and all, regarded those books of the Old Testament which we call canonical as being in a different category from the apocryphal with which they were associated. To what degree and in what precise sense they so regarded them, it is not necessary for our purpose to determine. The acknowledged fact is sufficient. They freely quoted the one class, treated them, as we have said, as the very warp which made with their golden woof one fabric; while from the other, in a mere literary respect scarcely less attractive, list they selected, they accepted, nothing. It is clear, although as a mere technical term it could have had no force for them, that the idea of a canon, at least historically considered, must have been already operative.

There existed for them an evident line of demarcation separating into two classes their national literature. They had no disposition to transgress even here the ancient statute which forbade the removal of landmarks which they of old time had set in their inheritance (Deut. xix. 14). We say nothing now of the bearing of this circumstance on questions of inspiration, of genuineness, or of authenticity. But on the question of the contents of the so-called canon of the Old Testament, what it included, when it was concluded, it has a most important bearing. It must never be overlooked that the broad current of history which floated down such masses of literary stuff, good and bad, from pre-christian times parted at this point, and through the clear-cut channel of the New Testament books, a channel as definitely marked as that of its own Jordan, there set alone this single and unique stream from Palestine.

A second witness whom we would cite for the fact of the completion of the Old Testament collection before the first century, A. D., is Philo, a contemporary of Christ and his apostles. He was born of priestly ancestry at Alexandria, in Egypt, about B. C. 20, and made that city ever afterward his home. He was a representative character among his countrymen there, brother of their presi-

dent, and himself honored by them with important trusts. He was also a voluminous author and his works were mostly on biblical topics. In fact, his one great aim in life seems to have been to discover and emphasize any points of harmony there might be between the Scriptures and Greek philosophy. Unfortunately, in his case, it was an unfair effort to make the Scriptures what they were not, in order to accommodate them to current opinions and theories, and, like all such compromises in human history, proved a signal failure. On the Greeks, whom his reasoning was especially intended to affect, its influence was inconsiderable; on thinking Jews who adopted his views, it was disastrous. If, for example, the Mosaic law could, with Philo, be *understood and interpreted* allegorically, why could it not, with the luxurious Greeks, be *kept* allegorically?

Philo nowhere refers to the Old Testament collection as a whole, a work heretofore ascribed to him, in which this is done, having been recently shown, with great probability, to be from another and a considerably later pen.¹⁵ His citations of individual books, however, and his other less direct references to them, under titles and in terms showing that he regarded them as forming a distinct and peculiarly sacred class, are most abundant. The only books not so referred to are claimed to be Ezekiel, Daniel, and the five so-called megilloth (*i. e.*, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, and Esther).¹⁶ By comparing this list with those found to be apparently unrecognized

¹⁵ De Vita Contemplativa. Cf. Lucius, Die Therapeuten, etc., Strassb., 1880.

¹⁶ We are still largely dependent for a searching examination of Philo's works, with respect to this matter, on Hornemann (Observationes ad Illustrationem Doctrinae de Canone V. T. ex Philone. Copenhagen, 1775), a

in the informal references of the New Testament writers, we find that only two of them, Lamentations and Esther, are the same, and the former of these may, in both instances, well have been tacitly included in the frequent citations of Jeremiah's prophecy.

It is to be borne in mind, moreover, that Philo's citations, like those of the New Testament, are quite incidental and made solely with the purpose of gaining support from them for his own positions. He never sets out to give a complete list, or even a general description, of the books of which the Old Testament was in his day composed. Consequently, we have no right to say that his simple failure to adduce a book is proof that he was not acquainted with it, or rejected it from the list, especially if it can be shown that such book did actually form a part of this unique collection in his day. Siegfried, of whom Professor Strack says that he is the scholar most thoroughly acquainted with Philo ("bedeutendste Philo-kenner") in our day, declares that the canon of this Alexandrian writer was essentially the same as our own."

But this is only the positive side of the argument. Philo, as we have said, was an Alexandrian Jew. His Bible, like that of the New Testament writers, was, in form, the Septuagint. It was from this that he uniformly quoted. It has been seriously questioned whether he knew Hebrew at all. He was indubitably well acquainted with the apocryphal literature which formed no inconsiderable part of the current Alexandrian roll of the Scriptures. He occasionally appropriates single thoughts and expressions from them. But quote them, allegorize them as he was accustomed to allegorize the Scriptures proper, or attempt to maintain his peculiar views by them, he never does. One would suppose that no books were better suited to his purpose than were, for example, Ecclesiasticus, or the Book of Wisdom. Some have even

¹¹ See s. v. "Kanon d. Alten Testaments" in Herzog's Encyk., 2te Aufl. Cf. Siegfried, Philo, als Ausleger d. A. T., Halle, 1875. p 161.

maintained, though without finding wide acceptance for the theory, that Philo himself wrote the Book of Wisdom. Still, so far from ascribing to these books the least authority, he does not even pay them the honor which he accords to a Plato, Solon, Hippocrates, and other Greek authors, from whom he often borrows long passages." To the other Scriptures, however, he habitually applied such terms as the "Oracles," the "Sacred Writings," the "Prophetic Word." Their writers he styled "Prophets," "Hierophants."

Such epithets, whatever else they may indicate as to Philo's estimate of the authority of the Scriptures, do certainly show, what is more important for our present purpose, that he regarded them as a peculiarly distinct class, an exclusive, an already old, and a highly revered library of works to which, by universal consent, appeal might be taken in reasoning on the topics of which they treated. This collection was with him, as with the writers of the New Testament, nothing new, but a sacred inheritance from the past. To both alike, if we have any right to draw inferences from their uniform conduct, it was so fixed in its limits, and so far recognized as an authoritative standard, that these things had long since ceased to be *with them*, matters of discussion. They were the "Holy Scriptures" to the Jews not only of Palestine, but of the wide dispersion: the highest ethical and religious resource and the unquestioned arbiter in debate.

Our third witness to the Jewish canon in the first century is Flavius Josephus. He was born of wealthy and distinguished parentage in Jerusalem, A. D. 37 or 38. While still a youth he joined the sect of the Pharisees and in his twenty-sixth year was sent by his countrymen on an embassy to Rome. Two years later being drawn, contrary to his better judgment, into a revolt against the Romans, and appointed governor of Galilee, he was made prisoner by Vespasian. A little later, however, on the

¹⁸ So Hornemann quoted by Eichhorn as above.

latter's becoming Emperor, he was set at liberty and, taking up his residence at Rome, he devoted himself to literary pursuits under the especial patronage of the Flavian dynasty.

The language in which Josephus wrote was Greek, though not exclusively so. His work on the Jewish Wars first appeared in Aramaic and was afterwards translated into Greek by its author. The Jewish Antiquities, a history of the Jewish people down to the year A. D. 66, was, for the most part, culled from the Old Testament together with the additions of the Septuagint, and appeared about A. D. 94. Six years later appeared his Autobiography in which, with considerable haste and heat, he sought to justify, against the accusations of one Justus, of Tiberias, his attitude towards the Romans in the rebellion of 66. A fourth work, and, most probably, the only other authentic production of Josephus, was his apology for Judaism, published under the title, *Against Apion*. According to so competent an authority as Emil Schürer,¹⁹ it is a "careful and conscientious work:" and it is here that we find by far the most important testimony of this century to the Jewish canon. It is all the more valuable that it is spontaneously given, and, as we have reason to believe, unaffected by any peculiar coloring of dogma or passion.

His object is to set forth the trustworthiness of the Hebrew history, as documentarily supported, in contrast with the works of Greek authors. He affirms that the Hebrews had, what the Greeks had not, public records, and that they had taken special pains to make these records correct. The Greeks, on the other hand, were behind even the Egyptians and Babylonians in this respect. "We must yield," he says (i. 5), "as it regards language and eloquence of composition; but we shall give them no such preference as it respects the truthfulness of ancient history, and, least of all, as to that part which concerns the affairs of our several countries." He states,

¹⁹ Herzog's *Encyk.* 2te Aufl. s. v. "Josephus."

what we all know to be true, that among the Hebrews, as also among the Babylonians and Phoenicians, the matter of recording and perpetuating a correct history had been committed to the prophets and priests of the nation, by whom, he declares, such history had been written "with the utmost accuracy." Then occurs, two sections later (i. 8), the famous passage, which, although so familiar, is worthy of being quoted in full.

"For we have not myriads of books among us, contradicting and out of harmony with one another, but twenty-two books only, containing the records of all past times and justly confided in as divine. . . . Moreover, of these, five are from Moses, containing his laws together with what had been handed down concerning the origin of mankind as far as to his own decease. This interval of time was little short of three thousand years. But as it concerns the time from Moses' decease to the reign of Artaxerxes, king of Persia, who reigned after Xerxes, the prophets who followed Moses wrote what took place in their times in thirteen books; while the four remaining books contain hymns to God and precepts for the conduct of human life. True it is, that since the time of Artaxerxes, our history has been recorded in detail, but it has not been thought worthy of a like confidence with the former, because there has been no exact succession of prophets. Now, it is evident from what we do, how trustworthy we hold our own writings. For albeit so many ages have already passed, no man has ventured to either add anything to them, take anything from them, or to make any change in them. It has been implanted rather in all Jews, as soon as ever they are born, both to regard them as teachings of God, and to abide by them, yea, if need be, gladly to die in their behalf."

Now, one of the first things that occurs to us as we read this testimony is, that it fixes, by positive statement, that which, from the attitude of New Testament writers, and of Philo, we had all along been led to infer,

that the Old Testament collection at this time was not only a peculiarly unique and carefully limited one, but that it had been brought to a formal conclusion a long time previous to the period we have been considering. A second thing that is especially noticeable is that Josephus is engaged in no dispute concerning the canon. What he has to say upon it is introduced as a matter of secondary importance in a plain narrative of events which he assumes to be well-known and universally admitted among his compatriots in all lands. So little concerned is he lest his statement on this point should be called in question, that he does not even pause to *name* the canonical books, but thinks it sufficient to indicate them by their number. Is it possible for us to determine what those books were? By far the larger proportion of them, certainly, from his own use of them as authorities in other works of his which, as we have said, are almost exclusively based on these very Scriptures. Along with Moses, he especially names Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Jonah, Nahum, Haggai, Zechariah as prophets, says Joshua was kept amongst the temple archives: puts the Book of Kings on a level in authority with the first of Moses, and calls the psalms as well "psalms of God" as "psalms of David." The only books of our present list, in short, which he fails to indicate specifically, either by name or contents, are these four: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, and Job. Two of them, it will be noticed, are books that are directly ascribed in the Bible to Solomon. Josephus knows and speaks of Solomon as a writer, though without indicating what he wrote."

On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that the only two books of our present canon to which no reference is made in either Philo or the New Testament, Lamentations and Esther, are expressly adduced by Josephus (*Antiq.* x. 5, 1), the latter even marking for him the *terminus ad quem* of the sacred literature. The testimony of

²⁰ Cf. Hornemann or Eichhorn as cited above.

the two preceding witnesses is thus nicely supplemented and made formally complete. Mark that these witnesses are conspicuously independent of one another. They represent as many great religious and social classes among the Jews of the first century. Their testimony is evidently incidental and perfectly free. Collusion among them was impossible, yet they one and all hold the same attitude towards the ancient Scriptures. They all evidently look upon the collection as one long before finished, two of them directly stating that this was the case, and declaring that nothing had been since added to it. Among them they make use in the way of *incidental* quotation only, and with no polemic aim, as far as the canon is concerned, of every book of our present list without exception.

Are we at liberty then to question that they mean just those books, and that those, and those only, made up what they understood by the "Holy Scriptures," the "Oracles" of God, which are "justly confided in as divine"? The great mass of biblical critics and scholars, old and new, and of all shades of theological belief promptly answer—No! Eichhorn, Bertholdt, Oehler, Dillmann, and Strack are one, in this respect, with Ewald, DeWette, Bleek, Herzfeld, Bloch, and a host of others almost equally well known as representatives of biblical learning in modern times. To so large an extent is this the case that such exceptions as those of Oeder, Corrodi, and Semler, among the earlier, and Haneberg, Graetz, and some others" among the later

²¹ It was scarcely to be expected that we should find Dr. Briggs giving his influence in favor of so extraordinary and poorly supported a theory (Bib. Study, p. 129). But Graetz seems to him "to come nearer the mark in excluding the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes from the list of Josephus." On the following page Dr. Briggs cites Zunz also as saying: "Neither Philo nor Josephus impart to us an authentic list of the sacred writings." From the connection in Dr. Briggs' book in which this citation is made, the impression is carried that Zunz did not regard the lists of Philo and Josephus as *trustworthy*. Nothing is further, however, from the thought of this "eminent Jewish scholar." He meant to say, simply, that neither of these men attempted an exact *list* of the sacred writings (Gottesdienstliche Vorträge der Juden, p. 18 f.), which is certainly quite true and serves

critics, may be looked upon as comparatively solitary. Let us look, by way of example, at the objections of Graetz and how he supports them. He has been overwhelmingly refuted, among others by Bloch²² and Dr. C. H. H. Wright.²³

Josephus reckons the number of Old Testament books at twenty-two, that is, as most suppose, counting the Pentateuch (5), Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, the Minor Prophets, Daniel, Ezra, Chronicles, Esther, Job (the 13 historical), Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Canticles (4), Ruth, it is inferred, was reckoned as one with Judges, Lamentations with Jeremiah, and Nehemiah with Ezra. These combinations are common, as in Origen's catalogue, and others,²⁴ the last one reaching even to the twelfth century of our era. Ruth and Lamentations, however, in other lists, as that of the Talmud, which followed doubtless the oldest tradition, were put among the Hagiography as separate books, so making the whole number twenty-four instead of twenty-two as Josephus does. As Strack and others have shown, the peculiar *order* of the Old Testament books as given by Josephus was probably due, first, to the influence of the Septuagint version; but, secondly, and, perhaps, chiefly, judging from the context in which the passage stands, to his desire to emphasize and establish the high character of

to enhance, rather than to diminish, the value of their incidental references. When Dr. Briggs admits, a little further on: "We doubt not that the canon of the Palestinian Jews received its latest addition, by common consent, not later than the time of Judas Maccabeus, and no books of later composition were added afterward," he practically admits what he seems to dispute just before. It is that canon to which we understand that Philo, the New Testament writers, and Josephus refer, since it was, unquestionably to them, a *closed* collection and which had the no less clear, though indirect, support of the Talmud and the most important witnesses of sub-apostolic times.

²² Studien zur Geschichte d. Sammlung d. althebräischen Literatur (Erste Aufl. Leipz., 1875), pp. 21-36.

²³ The Book of Koheleth (Lond. 1883), pp. 458-462.

²⁴ Cf. Jerome's Prologus Galeatus in Libros Regum.

the *historical* writings of the Jews. He classifies the prophets among the historians, as it was, and is, usual with the Jews, *vice versa*, to regard their historians as prophets.

Graetz, now," disputes the position that Josephus reckoned Job among the historical books. His trouble, however, is evidently less with Job than with Ecclesiastes and Canticles, which, according to him, were not fully admitted to the canon at all, until the second synod of Jamnia, A. D. 118. Hence, he denies that Josephus in his list of twenty-two books included these two. Hence, also, he is obliged to say, to find some ground for his position, that Josephus could not have reckoned Job among the historical books, but among the Hagiography. Ruth he regarded as history and this book, as well as Lamentations, was separately counted, thus making out the full number he gives, without the two disputed and later canonized.

It is not strange that Graetz stands almost entirely isolated in this hypothesis. He has no more reason for excluding Job from Josephus' list of historical books than some others which he admits to that list, and even less reason. He has no reason, except his own theory, for classing it among the books said by Josephus to contain "hymns to God and precepts for the conduct of human life." It does not answer the description. Either the Book of Job, which is quoted by Philo as one of the sacred collection, forms one of the thirteen historical books enumerated by Josephus, or else it found no place in his list at all. Both Ecclesiastes and Canticles do answer to his description of what was contained in the third division of the canon; Job, most emphatically, does not. But.

the Hebrew name of each book, and makes out his twenty-two by uniting Ruth to Judges, and Lamentations to Jeremiah, as we have supposed Josephus did. It was the enumeration and the precise combination of Jerome, who, be it observed, avowedly followed, in so doing, the authority of the Septuagint. As far as the position of Ruth, next to Judges, and Lamentations next to Jeremiah, is concerned, it has, too, the support of the catalogue of Melito, Bishop of Sardis, who, during his residence in Palestine, had the best of opportunities for learning the contents of the Palestinian canon. There need be, consequently, no hesitation in accepting what is acknowledged to be a very general consensus of biblical scholars, that Josephus, in his twenty-two books, had in mind the books which now make up the Old Testament of our Protestant Bibles."

" Bloch, (l. c., p. 29 f.) has sufficiently shown the untenableness of the theory of the Roman Catholic bishop, Dr. Haneberg, who maintains that Chronicles, Esther, Ezra, and Nehemiah formed no part of the canon of Josephus, as Müller (Belehrungen vom Kanon d. A. T. (Leipz., 1774, p. 12) refuted the same hypothesis when advanced by Oeder, (Halle, 1771, Freye Untersuchungen, etc.) a hundred years ago. It has been said by some, however, that Josephus in this famous passage expresses merely his own private opinion on the subject of the Old Testament books. But this is just what Josephus disclaims doing. He testifies to what was generally credited or discredited by his countrymen, had become, in fact, a sort of second nature with them. Samuel Davidson (The Canon of the Bible, Lond., 1877, p. 57), while admitting (p. 34) that the list of Josephus agrees with our present canon and that Josephus is *not* giving his own private opinions merely, still seeks to depreciate the importance of his testimony by saying that it is "probably expressed in exaggerated terms and hardly tallies with his use of Third Esdras in preference to the canonical Ezra." And still further, he goes on to say that Josephus' "authority is small;" that "one who believed that Esther was the youngest book in the canon, who looked upon Ecclesiastes as Solomon's [this seems to be unfairly charged against Josephus] and Daniel as an exile production, cannot be trusted implicitly." We are far from trusting Josephus implicitly. His false view of the time when Esther was composed appears to have been shared by the Septuagint. It is true that he largely used our first book of Esdras in his *Antiquities* and as I have elsewhere shown (in my Apocrypha, p. 69 f.), probably, because it was written in much smoother Greek. This did not hinder him, however, from sometimes correcting its errors or occasionally leaving it for the more accu-

But what of certain disputed books, concerning which so much is heard in some quarters," and what of an Alexandrian canon in distinction from the Palestinian? It is admitted that there was a controversy in the Jewish rabbinical schools of the first century concerning three books, Esther, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, and, to a limited extent, Proverbs. But the character and the limits of it have been greatly exaggerated and even misrepresented. No one thoroughly acquainted with the subject will be disposed to call in question the statement of Wright, who says: "The matter in dispute was, not whether these books should be received for the first time into the canon of Scripture, but whether, having been admitted into the canon at an earlier date, they had properly been so admitted, and whether there was not sufficient proof from internal evidence to justify their exclusion from the canon."

Or the even more explicit statement of Strack: "Objections to the canon of the twenty-four holy books [that is, of the Talmud list, the twenty-two of Josephus] were never made in sober earnest in ancient Judaism. Nor were books once adopted honestly called in question, or any effort whatever made subsequently to adopt a book not already adopted." In all their discussions, "the question was not concerning the reception of new books, nor the enlargement of the canon, nor even concerning the exclusion of a book on the ground of any *critical* question at all; but simply because some individual scholar gave reasons, derived from their contents, for the exclusion of one book or another, already long before

rate narrative of the canonical book. Besides, none of these things affect, in the least, the competence of Josephus to testify on the current opinions

adopted, but without any practical result following from it. On many accounts these discussions make the impression that objections were raised for the sole purpose of having them refuted; in other words, to exercise themselves, on the one hand, in hair-splitting; on the other, to show that the authority of the holy books was absolutely secure. It follows from no passage that there was ever any uncertainty in the religious consciousness of the people concerning the canonicity of a single one of the twenty-four books."

Quite too much, accordingly, has been made of these intellectual conflicts of the finical rabbis. They justify no such conclusions as have been based upon them. If such discussions served to show that there was no generally recognized canon of Old Testament books at that time, it would equally show that there never has been one; since there never has been a time when such discussions were not rife concerning individual books of the Bible, especially some of those impugned in the rabbinical schools of the first century.

But did the Alexandrian Jews recognize the same books as canonical which were so regarded by their Palestinian brethren? It has been disputed by some, but on grounds which can be shown to be wholly insufficient. Davidson, for example, says: "The Alexandrian canon differed from the Palestinian. The Greek translation commonly called the Septuagint contains some later productions which the Palestinian Jews did not adopt, not only from their aversion to Greek literature generally, but also the recent origin of the books, perhaps also their want of prophetic sanction. The closing line of the third part " in the Alexandrian canon was more or less fluctuating—capable of admitting recent writings under the garb of old names and histories, or embracing religious subjects; while the

Palestinian collection was pretty well determined, and all but finally settled. The judgment of the Alexandrians was freer than that of their brethren in the mother country. They had even separated in a measure from the latter, by erecting a temple at Leontopolis; and their enlargement of the canon was another step of divergence." "

But this, as far as the canon is concerned, is pure hypothesis, for which not a shadow of valid reason is given, except one, proving on closer examination to be only a shadow. The Alexandrian Jews did compose and publish quite a number of semi-religious books which they unhesitatingly joined to their Greek translation of the Bible and put in circulation with it; but that they ever regarded either the translation, or the books associated with it, as canonical in any proper sense, is wholly incapable of proof. It has been often asserted, and by constant repetition has gained a currency and *quasi* authority that are wholly undeserved. Such a thing as a distinctively Alexandrian canon of the Holy Scriptures never, in fact, existed. The first condition of such a canon is that it be of the nature of a close and strictly guarded collection, which this Greek library, of which the Septuagint translation of the canonical books was the nucleus, never was. It was not only open, but open, as far as we can see, to almost every thing that offered itself, from the Book of Wisdom to the Book of Tobit, Susanna, and the extravagant Additions to Esther and Daniel. That these productions were held in no little esteem is undeniable; that they were held in equal esteem with the Hebrew books of the Old Testament collection cannot be sustained by a single witness; on the contrary, can be disproved as well by several direct witnesses as by many other important considerations.

There is, for instance, the vacillation of manuscripts of the LXX. There is no one form in which they appear.

a number of books not found in the Vatican, as the four books of Maccabees and the Prayer of Manasses; but the books that are common to both are found in a different sequence. This fact, cited by Frankel," Strack," and others as evidence that the Alexandrian Jews did not look upon the Septuagint version as canonical, seems, in itself, well-nigh decisive. How could they have looked upon a list of books as canonical for which they neither offered, nor, as far we know, attempted to offer, any fixed recension? We might almost as well apply that term to a modern Sunday-school library. Divergence is one thing; independence is quite another. It is true that the Jews of Egypt built a temple of their own at Leontopolis, where, until the time of Vespasian, they continued to maintain services, had their own priests, Levites, and landed property. Their council of seventy elders was only second in influence to that of the Sanhedrin at Jerusalem; but it was second, and was always acknowledged to be so. From Jerusalem the regularly recurring national festivals were heralded with astronomical exactness. The high priest at Jerusalem ever remained, for the entire dispersion, the sovereign representative of Jewish national dignity and religion. The Sanhedrin at Jerusalem was the last court of appeal from supposed unjust decisions in the synagogues, whether on the Nile, the Euphrates, or the Tiber."

Then, notice the practice of prominent Alexandrians — and of all Alexandrians so far as we have information — when it came to the point of the comparative value of the Palestinian collection and their version with its additions. Philo, as we have seen, while well acquainted with the apocryphal literature, and while holding, as his works show, peculiar, and not strictly orthodox, views on the subject of inspiration, depends solely on the books of the

²³ Vorstudien zu der Septuaginta, p. 88.

²⁴ As above, Herzog, s. v. Kanon d. A. T.

²⁵ Cf. my Apocrypha, pp., 34, 40, 50.

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Palestinian canon for incidental proof-texts and to them alone applies such epithets as the "Oracles," the "Prophetic Word." The author of the Second Book of Esdras, himself doubtless an Alexandrian Jew, in the legend of Ezra, which he dresses up in Greek for the delectation of his countrymen of that metropolis, carefully discriminates between the twenty-four books of the Hebrew canon and the apocryphal ones accompanying them. The one class was to be published openly, that the worthy and unworthy alike might read. The others were to be given out with judgment, and only to such as had wisdom to use them aright."

Josephus, it would seem, made use almost entirely of the Septuagint, and, when he chose so to do, of some of the apocryphal books. But no modern writer on the canon could have distinguished between them more intelligently than he has done.

It is especially in place to cite here the translator of the Wisdom of Sirach, or Ecclesiasticus. He writes from Egypt and for Egyptian Jews. In making an apology in his preface for the imperfections of his work, a translation of a Hebrew book into the Greek language, which book in its Greek form was to take a prominent position in the current Bible, he incidentally expresses his comparative estimate of the Greek and Hebrew Scriptures. "Let me entreat you now," he says, "to read it [his translation] with favor and attention, and to be indulgent, in that where, perchance, with all the care bestowed on the translation, we may seem to have failed in some words. For what was originally uttered in Hebrew has not the same force when translated into another tongue. And not only this book, but the law also, and the prophecies, and the rest of the books, have no small difference, uttered in the original." It is clear that such language as this is not in harmony with the hypothesis that the Jews of

³⁶ See my *Apocrypha*, p. 664. Cf. *The Gospel of Nicodemus*, c. xxviii. on the seventy apocryphal books.

Alexandria put their translation of the Hebrew Scriptures, as it respects canonical rank and authority, on the same plane as the Scriptures themselves. This is admitted by Kuenen, who remarks on this passage: "Thus, either the whole of the Old Testament which we now possess, or, at any rate, by far the greater part of it, was then translated, but, as it also follows from the words just quoted, as yet had no manner of authority, and was *tested by the original* by any one who had the power and the inclination to do so." "

Here, then, we may conclude our investigations as it relates to this, by far the most important, period of biblical history. If any fact with respect to the Scripture may be looked upon as established, this is one: that to the great body of Jews of the first century of our era, learned and unlearned, of Palestine and of the wide dispersion, there existed a highly revered canon of Old Testament books. This collection had been received and was treasured as a *sacred inheritance* from the distant past. It was composed of exactly the books, and no others, that we now find within it. The fluctuations alleged to have existed in this respect are more phantasmagorial than real; are fluctuations in the theories of our critics far more than in the historical attitude of ancient Judaism toward their own Scriptures. We have, accordingly, yet to discover when this ancient canon was not, how it arose and came to take on its present form.

²¹ The Religion of Israel (Lond., 1875), iii. 173, 174.

ARTICLE V.

TEXT, SOURCES, AND CONTENTS OF "THE TWO WAYS" OR FIRST SECTION OF THE DIDACHE.¹

BY BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, D.D., PROFESSOR IN THE WESTERN
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, ALLEGHENY, PA.

THE first chapters of the Didache, including chapters i.—vi., are distinctly set apart as a complete whole by the Didachographer himself (vii. 1). Internally they form an entire treatise, with introduction, and conclusion, and symmetrically arranged members. They thus lend themselves to separate treatment. At the same time, in subjecting them to a special and separate study, the question of the unity of the Teaching must not be prejudged. The whole Didache apparently was known to Barnabas and Hermas and is very strongly articulated internally. And although the author in composing his Book of Church Order may have, as well as not, incorporated into it the charge to the catechumens and the prayers that preceded the Eucharist which he found already in use, just as he has incorporated the Lord's prayer in chapter vii.—yet it is not to be assumed, prior to investigation, that he did this. Just because, however, these first six chapters constitute the whole charge to the catechumens, and thus form a unity, recognized and intended by the Didachographer himself, they may be studied apart without prejudicing our judgment as to their authorship. When a chief object of our study concerns

¹ By the goodness of Dr. Schaff, the present writer was able to state the

itself with the textual transmission of the treatise, there arises a further obvious propriety and gain, not to say necessity, for studying the first six chapters apart. Why it is so does not seem to demand a pause here to explain,² but it is true that while the latter portion of the treatise passed early out of use, the section on The Two Ways remained the property of, and in the constant use of, the church. Barnabas repeated it; the Ecclesiastical Canons, as well as the Apostolical Constitutions, incorporated it into itself; Lactantius used it; and there are traces of it in several other writings of early Christianity. The textual problems of this first section of the treatise, then, are necessarily different from, and are to be settled on different conditions and by separate methods from, those applicable to the remaining chapters. We thus not only may, but for all textual problems must, treat the opening chapters separately from the rest of the treatise. On these grounds our purpose to confine ourselves in this paper to the study of The Two Ways as given us in the first six sections of the Didache, is justified.

Let us begin by taking stock of the sources of our information concerning this charge to catechumens which we may call, for convenience sake, The Two Ways. (1) We have, first of all, the Constantinople MS., published by Bryennios in 1883 and frequently reprinted since. This contains the whole treatise in a unique exemplar, including, of course, The Two Ways at its opening. The MS. seems to be carefully written and dates from the year 1056 A. D. (2) We have the fragment of a Latin translation, taken from a tenth century MS., knowledge of which was recovered by Dr. v. Gebhardt. This fragment unfortunately contains only the opening of the treatise, extending to the middle of ii. 6. (3) We have the reworking of the matter of the treatise in chapters xviii.-xx. of Barnabas,³

² Cf. Sabatier, *La Didachè*, etc., Paris, 1885, p. 81 sq.

³ We venture to assume without discussion (which would carry us too far) that Barnabas draws from the Two Ways and not *vice versa*. The still

—in which the matter is disarranged and very freely treated, but portions of all the chapters i.–vi. are borrowed, and the following verses are represented: i. 1, 2; ii. 2, 3, 4, 6; iii. 7, 8, 9, 10; iv. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; v. 1, 2 (vi. 2?). (4) The Ecclesiastical Canons (late third or early fourth century) incorporate most of the text from i. 1 to iv. 8 inclusive, but there break off suddenly. (5) The Apostolical Constitutions incorporate great portions of the text of the whole treatise, and among these, of our six chapters (fourth century). (6) The mention that is made by the fathers of, or silent quotations from, it constitute witness, not only to its existence, but also often to its text. Most important of the quotations are those of Hermas, Clement of Alexandria, the Sibylline Oracles, and (from the Latin version) Lactantius. We thus have quite adequate material to justify us in refusing to follow the Constantinople MS. *verbatim* until its readings have been tested by the witnesses.


MUTUAL RELATIONS AND RELATIVE VALUES OF THE WITNESSES.

Before these witnesses can be used in criticism of the text, it is necessary to examine into their mutual relations. Otherwise we should have no criterion for determining the value of the various combinations or of the separate documents on the one hand, and, on the other, should stand constantly in danger of allowing to collusive testimony the weight due only to combined witness of separate lines of transmission.

unconvinced may consult the considerations offered by Funk (Tübingen Theolog. Quartalschrift 1884, ii. p. 399 sq.); Zahn (Supplementum Clementinum, etc., p. 310 sq.); Massebieau (L'Enseignement des douze Apôtres, p. 16); Sabatier (La Didachè, etc., p. 82 sq.); E. L. H[icks] (The Guardian, June 26, 1884); J. W[ordsworth] (The Guardian, March 19, 1884); Schaff (The Oldest Church Manual, p. 19 sq.); Brown (The Teaching, etc., p. xxi sq.); etc. The most recent writers nearly all hold to the adoption of

On subjecting the texts witnessed to by the various documents to careful comparison it becomes apparent first of all that, with a single exception,⁴ they are independent in their testimony. This exception is the Ecclesiastical Canons which appears to have made direct use of Barnabas in (for instance) the following passages: Canons, *Praef.* from Barn. i. 1; Canons c. 8 affected by Barn. ii. 10, iv. 9; Canons, c. 14, by Barn. xxi. 2-4, 6; xix. 11. As it is undeniable that the author had the Epistle of Barnabas before him, doubt is thrown upon his entire independence as a witness to the text of the Teaching, especially in such passages as those in which he and Barnabas stand alone, as e. g. in Didache i. 2, where this pair add [καὶ] *δοξάσεις τὸν λυτρωσάμενόν σε ἐκ θανάτου* against the Constantinople MS., the Latin version and the Constitutions; ii. 2, where against the same combination they desert the order in which the three sins of lust are named;⁵ iv. 1, where against the Constantinople MS., and the Constitutions, they alone add: [*ἀγαπήσεις*] *ὡς κόρην ὀφθαλμοῦ σου*; and iv. 3, where, against the same pair, they insert *τινά* after *ἐλέγξει*. No doubt it cannot be assumed out of hand that

⁴ In the arrangement wrought out by Krawutzcky in 1882 (Tübingen Theolog. Quartalschrift 1882, iii. p. 424 sq.) the Apostolical Constitutions were also made directly dependent on Barnabas, but on grounds that are now inoperative since the discovery of the Didache. The complications that have arisen from clinging to his old scheme are painfully apparent in his paper in the same journal for 1884 (iv. pp. 547-606) where he makes the Constitutions only secondarily derived from the Two Ways — through the Didache. His two schemes may be thus graphically given: —



How much easier to put The Two Ways at the root of all and Barnabas among the reworkings: by this act moreover the problem sinks from the sphere of the higher to that of the lower criticism.

⁵ Observe, however, that Clem. Alex. Paed ii. 89 follows them so far as the post-positing of Paederasty is concerned.

the community of the two in these striking readings proves that the Canons borrowed them directly of Barnabas; and the less so that the Canons have entirely escaped the confusion into which Barnabas has brought the arrangement of the matter.⁶ Nevertheless the fact that the author of the Canons certainly drew from Barnabas elsewhere, combines with the inherent suspiciousness of these readings in so damaging the character of the Canons as an independent witness as to prevent our confidently counting the combined testimony of the two as that of two independent authorities.

Next, it is noticed that the witnesses divide themselves into two recensions or classes as to their texts, the Constantinople MS. and the Constitutions on the one side, and the Latin version, Barnabas, and the Canons on the other. The kinship of the fragment of the Latin version with Barnabas is exceedingly close, while yet such as to forbid our assuming direct dependence. Each contains readings against which the other ranges its testimony with the other witnesses. For example, the Latin inserts at i. 1, *in sacculo*, and at i. 2, *æternum*. And Barnabas reads at i. 2, τοῦ φωτός, for τῆς ζωῆς; adds at i. 2, (with Canons) *δοξάσεις, κ.τ.λ.*, and alters at ii. 2 (with Canons) the order of the lusts. That the Latin has not borrowed from Barnabas is strikingly illustrated in i. 1, where its words: "*In his constituti sunt angeli duo, unus æquitatis, alter iniquitatis,*" could scarcely have been derived from, but must rather underlie, the long and involved sentence of Barnabas, who has dealt with this simple statement, according to his wont, by multiplying the angels, confusedly describing their characters, and then, at the end of an awkwardly added clause, drop-

⁶ Bickel, in 1843, suggested that the Canons might be independent of Barnabas; and Holtzmann (*Jahrbücher für Protestantische Theologie*, 1885, i. pp. 155, 158, 159) feels still justified in denying such dependence for the parts of the Teaching incorporated in the Canons: "A simpler solution is furnished . . . by the assumption that even the Didache, i.-vi. gives the common matter only in relatively its oldest form" (p. 159).

ping a hint of the neglected *iniquitatis*. That the type of text that lies behind both, however, is the same, is proved by the very characteristic readings which they have in common, such as, e. g., i. 1, insertion of the notion of light and darkness, and of the angel clause just quoted, (which occurs also in *Hermas*, *Mandate ii.*); i. 2, omission (with *Bryennios'* MS.) of "with all thy heart;" i. 3, omission (with *Canons*) of "Bless ye, etc."


In like manner the *Constantinople MS.* and the *Constitutions* draw together as independent co-witnesses to another rather marked recension. The sameness of the type of text represented by them lies on the surface of their transmission; such striking items as their common support of the insertion i. 3-ii. 1, inclusive, of the omission of *οὗς δὲ ἐλεήσεις* in ii. 7, of the plural form *μοιχείαι γεννῶνται* in iii. 3, and of the omission of *τινά* in iv. 3, will quicken our memory concerning it. On the other hand, the independence of their witness-bearing appears to be placed above suspicion by their divergencies from one another. The *Constitutions* desert the *Constantinople MS.* and adequate support in such readings of the latter as: iii. 1, *πον-αροῦ* (*Constt.*, *κακοῦ*); iii. 3, *ὕψηλόφθαλμος* (*Constt.*, *ρίψόφθαλμος*); iv. 5, *τᾶς χειρὰς . . . συσπῶν* (*Constt.*, *τὴν χεῖρα . . . συστέλλων*); iv. 6, omit the clause about "working." The *Constantinople MS.*, on the other hand, deserts the *Constitutions*, although they are supported by adequate testimony, in such readings of the latter as: *θέλεις* (*MS.* *θελήσης*); ii. 5, order of the words "empty and false;" ii. 5, omission of *ἀλλὰ μεμεστωμένος πράξει*; iv. 1, insertion of additional verb; iv. 3, *ποιήσεις* (*MS.*, *ποθήσεις*); iv. 7, *ὁ* (*MS.*, *ῆ*).

The text preserved in the *Ecclesiastical Canons* stands somewhat between the recensions represented by these

¹ Cf. *Hilgenfeld Zeitschrift*, etc., 1885, i. pp. 97-9; and *Brown*, *The Teaching*, etc., p. xxii: "a different recension of the text, and one which already showed some of the striking peculiarities of *Barnabas* and the *Canons*, seems to underlie this [the Latin] version."

pairs; but is clearly most closely related to the pair, Barnabas-Latin.* No doubt the possibility of its mixture from Barnabas renders its exact classification somewhat difficult; yet we assign it to a group consisting of itself and the above-named pair with considerable confidence. It joins with them in the important omission of i. 3, *εὐλογεῖτε*—ii. 1, inclusive. And although it is found often in company with the other group, these seem not to be typical readings, and to be thoroughly consistent with the somewhat intermediate place that the Canons occupy between the two.

The results at which we have arrived may be represented to the eye by some such table as the following:—



An important means of establishing the text of The Two Ways is already in our hands when this classification is attained. The union of the two classes which we have ventured to name the Egyptian and the Syrian will give us the best attestation; and this suggests to us the best groups at a glance. Genealogically considered, readings supported only by Barnabas and the Latin, or only by Barnabas and the Canons, or only by the Constitutions and the Constantinople MS. should be suspicious. The

the Constitutions) should give certainty; and any three-fold attestation should be good—even if it be the Latin, Barnabas, and the Canons.

In this last case we should have the two classes arrayed against each other, and the very important question would arise of the relative soundness of the two transmissions. Unfortunately, the briefness of the Latin fragment, the extremely scattered nature of Barnabas' attestation, the possible mixture from Barnabas which the text transmitted by the Canons has suffered, and the early failure of the Canons, combine to prevent our obtaining any body of readings which we can confidently treat as fair representatives of the Egyptian text. Internal evidence of classes cannot, therefore, be interrogated on any broad scale. If it were just to stake every thing on a single important reading, the sharp division between the classes as to the omission or insertion of the long passage from i. 3, *εὐλογεῖτε*, to ii. 1, inclusive, would furnish us with an ideal test case. And here internal evidence most decisively throws its weight in the scale of the Egyptian text,⁹ which thus, so far as a single case can go in such a matter, is declared to be—when unanimous—the best and soundest, as well as oldest-attested (Barnabas) transmission.

If now we call in the process which Dr. Hort has appropriately named Internal Evidence of Groups to decide for us the probable value of each possible group, the results that were indicated by the genealogical considerations are in general fully confirmed. There are very few readings in which four witnesses array themselves against one; all of these commend themselves." All trinary groups approve themselves by internal evidence as

⁹ See this shown in full., below, p. 115.

usually right." Among the binary groups the internal evidence approves in general the three, MS. and Canons," MS. and Barnabas," and Constitutions and Barnabas." The brevity of the Latin version is doubtless the reason that it does not appear in any binary combination with either the Constantinople MS. or the Constitutions. The following binary groups on the other hand are discredited by internal evidence; viz., Barnabas and Canons," MS.

¹¹ (1) Canons, Constt., and MS.: I. 1, insert *μία . . . μία* against (Latin), Barn.; omit "light and darkness," against Latin, (Lact.); omit *angel* clause, against Latin; Barn.. Hermas; II. 3, place "false witnessing," here against Latin; III. 10, read *σοι*, against Barn.; IV. 1, retain last clause, against Barn.; IV. 2, read *τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν*, against Barn.; IV. 8, read *ἐστίν*, against Barn.; retain first clause against Barn. (2) Canons, Constt., and Barn., IV. 1, insert an additional verb against MS.; IV. 3, read *ποιήσεις*, against MS. (*ποθήσεις*); IV. 7, read *ὁ*, against MS. (*ῆ*). (3) Canons, Constt., and Latin; I. 2, read *θέλεις*, against MS. (*θελήσῃς*); and *ποιήσεις*, against MS. (*ποιεῖ*); II. 5, give the order "empty and false," against the MS.; and omit *ἀλλὰ μεμεστωμένος πράξει*, against the MS. (4) Canons, MS., and Barn.: IV. 5, read *τὰς χεῖρας . . . συσπῶν*, against Constt. (5) Constt., MS., and Barn.: III. 7, *τῇ ψυχῇ*, against Canons (*τὴν ψυχὴν*). (6) Constt., MS., and Latin: I. 2, omit [*καὶ*] *δοξάσεις τὸν σε λυτρωσάμενον ὁ ἐκ θανάτου*, against Canons and Barn.; II. 2 order of lusts, against Barn., Canons, Clem.-Alex. (7) MS., Barn., and Latin: I. 2, omit "with thy whole heart," against Canons and Constt. (8) Barn., Canons, and Latin omit I. 3, (*εὐλογεῖτε*)—II. 1, inclusive against Constt., MS., and some fathers.

¹² The chief of these are: I. 1, insert *μεταξὺ*, against Barn., [Lat.]; III. 1, *πονηροῦ*, against Constt. (*κακοῦ*); *αὐτοῦ*, against Constt., (*αὐτῷ*); III. 3, *ἰψηλόφθαλμος*, against Constt. (*ριψόφθαλμος*); III. 9, order, *δικαιῶν καὶ ταπεινῶν*, against Barn.; III. 10, *ἄτερ*, against Barn. (*ἀνευ*); IV. 2, *δέ*, against Barn. (*καί*); IV. 6, *ἐχῃς*, against Constt. (*ἐχεις*); omit clause concerning "working," against Constt. (Barn).

¹³ Such as: IV. 1, omit the *αἷτιον* clause, against Canons (Constt.); IV. 2, *πρόσωπα*, against Cons., Constt. (*πρόσωπον*); IV. 3, *σχίσμα*, against same (*σχίσματα*); IV. 4, omit *ἐν προσευχῇ*, against same; *διψυχῆς*, against Canons (—*σῃς*); IV. 9, omit *αὐτοῖς* after *δίδαξ*, against Constt.; IV. 10, *ἐλπίζουσιν*, against Constt., (*πεποιθόσιν*); IV. 11, *ὡς τύπῳ*, against Constt.; *αἰσχύνῃ*, against Constt. (*προσοχῇ*); IV. 13, omit *παρ' αὐτοῦ* (several times) against Constt.

¹⁴ Such as: IV. 8, *κοινωνήσεις*, against MS., Canons (*συγκοιν.*); IV. 14, omit

and Constitutions," and Canons and Constitutions." It is somewhat unexpected to find the last of these combinations discredited; but it is observable that the readings which it furnishes are not such as will prove collusion between the two,—the insertion of a clause speaking of an "αἵτιον" in iv. 1, alone suggesting it; but are rather such readings as two documents might readily fall into accidentally in common, such, e. g., as the addition in i. 2., drawn from the Gospels, the plural "schisms" in iv. 3, the very natural explanatory addition "in prayer," iv. 4, etc. When we subtract such readings and those in which their only opponent is the Constantinople MS. standing in individual error (iii. 3, iv. 8, etc.), there is nothing left to suggest closer relationship than the genealogical table attributes to these two documents. On the other hand internal evidence approves many of the readings of the group, MS. + Constitutions, but it is observable that this is so only when they oppose singular readings of Barnabas or the Canons, that is, only in places where we have only three witnesses. The excellence of the general transmission of the Syrian group is thus no doubt indicated; but not as against any other than singular testimony. The only case in which the two groups are pitted against each other is

¹⁶ They unite in such readings as: insert, i. 3, εὐλογεῖτε . . . II. 1, against Lat., Barn., Cans.; [II. 7, omit οὐς δὲ ἐλεήσει, against Cans.]; III. 3, μοιχεῖαι γεννῶνται, against Cans. (singular); III. 6, ὁδηγεῖ, against Cans. (ἄγε); III. 7, insert οἱ, against Canons; III. 7, γῆν, against Canons (kingdom of heaven); IV. 1, omit "as the apple of thy eye," against Canons and Barn.; IV. 2, omit τινά, against Cans., Barn.; IV. 9, ἀρεῖς, against Barn. (ἀργς); omit τῆς before νεότητος, against Barn.; IV. 10, οὐκ, against Barn. (οὐ μή); omit σον after παιδείκη, against Barn.; IV. 11, insert τοῖς . . . ὑμῶν, against Barn.; IV. 12, τῆς ζωῆς, against Barn. (τοῦ φωτός); v. 1, τοῦ θανάτου, against Barn. (τοῦ μέλανος); order of list in general against Barn.

¹⁷ These are such as: i. 2 add "with thy whole heart" against MS..

loudly proclaimed by internal evidence in favor of the Egyptian transmission.

On the basis of these investigations we may venture to subject the text of "The Two Ways" to detailed examination:—

DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT OF "THE TWO WAYS."

The *title* of the treatise comes to us by direct transmission in two forms: *Διδαχὴ τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων* as it stands in the MS. and *Doctrina Apostolorum* as it stands in the Latin version. In no case where the treatise is mentioned by the Fathers do they specify the number twelve in the title; and although in the absence of the Latin version it might be held doubtful whether we should not explain the failure of the "twelve" in their citations by the lateness of the times, and the passing away of the need of distinguishing the original twelve from the other less authoritative apostles (Did. c.xi.), yet the absence of the word from the Latin version, which also is a direct witness, quite alters the balance of evidence and forces us on textual grounds to omit it. Indeed, a glance at the transmitted forms as given in tabular shape below, is enough to give decision as a mere matter of textual probability in favor of the form *Διδαχὴ [τῶν] ἀποστόλων*:

Διδαχὴ ἀποστόλων, [Lat., Ruf.], Niceph., Stich., Syn., Athan.

Διδαχὴ τῶν ἀποστόλων, [Lat., Ruf.], Athan., Anast., Zonaras.

Διδαχαὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων, (Eus.), [Pseudo-Cyprian].

Διδαχὴ τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων, Constantinople MS.

Διδαχὴ τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων, Blastares.

To those accustomed to observe the growth of titles in descriptiveness, the addition of the *δώδεκα* will, as a matter

Its absence from the Latin version throws grave doubt also on the second title,—which, if genuine, must certainly be taken as the special title of the section on the Two Ways (chapters i.–vi.) and not as an alternative or more original title of the whole treatise. No trace of it is discoverable in any of the patristic citations of the work. Even though we should judge that it is hinted at and paraphrased in Constt. App. i. *Præf.*: οἱ ἀπόστολοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν πιστεύσασιν ἀκούσατε διδασκαλίαν ἐκ προσταγμάτων τοῦ σωτῆρος, ὁμοστοίχων ταῖς ἐνδόξοις φθογγαῖς αὐτοῦ,—the balance of probability would not be essentially altered. It would no doubt be otherwise if we could feel that it is implied in the Ecclesiastical Canons c. 2, where the apostles propose to communicate to their sons and daughters only ὡς ὁ κύριος ἀπεκάλυψε κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου. It is noticeable, however, that all reference fails here, on any theory, to the words “to the Gentiles,” which furnish the only justification for the co-existence of this second title with the first. There are no internal reasons to urge strongly one way or the other, except as against the naturalness or likelihood of these words, “to the Gentiles.”¹⁸ All that Harnack has said in favor of the primitiveness and originality of this title only goes to show that it has a certain appropriateness to the book, and in no wise distinguishes between the likelihood of its having been given by the first author and the likelihood of its having been added by a later scribe. Transcriptionally judged it presents all the characteristics of scribe's work,—a certain specious appropriateness conjoined with no

¹⁸ Cf., on these words, Sabatier, *La Didachè*, etc., p. 73: “To whom is it addressed? To the pagans, says the title; and yet, if we take this indication literally, we find ourselves met by more than one difficulty. How is it that the author when speaking to pagans did not commence by revealing to them the one, living, and true God? He speaks to them of the Law as if they knew it; of the pagans as if they were not ordinary pagans.” Few will, however, think that M. Sabatier has untied the knot by understanding the word in a narrowed sense of Syrian semi-proselytes, like, for instance, Cornelius.

actual inherent value. It is altogether too fully explanatory. Especially do its closing words "to the Gentiles" awaken suspicion. Were catechumens ever called "Gentiles?" Was this treatise not intended for the instruction of Jewish candidates for baptism also? Or are catechumens not intended at all? Was the treatise meant after all for the instruction of already baptized Christians? On what principle then are they "Gentiles"? Is the book a veritable missionary document directed by the Jewish element of the church to the Gentile brethren in the effort to convert them, not to their common Christianity, but—to its way of thinking? In any view, satisfactorily explanatory as the word seems at first sight, it explains nothing satisfactorily and raises curious difficulties. And especially, if, after all that Harnack has said, it stands fast that the first section is addressed to catechumens, as its whole content proves, and the next section openly declares (vii. 1, "having first taught all this, baptize"), the phrase "to the Gentiles" can have no proper meaning as an original part of the treatise and can only be explained as a later addition by a writer who neglected the primary purpose of the treatise. But if "to the Gentiles" is not genuine, there is small need for the rest of the second title, and although it cannot be so confidently pronounced against, it appears best to follow the Latin in omitting it."

¹⁹ Compare De Muralt, *Revue de Théol. et de Philos.*, 1884, p. 281: "sous-titre . . . ajouté plus tard"; Bonet-Maury, *La Doctrine des douze Apôtres*, Paris, 1884; Ajouté après coup pour rapprocher la *Didachè* des Constitutions; Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftl. Theologie*, 1885, I. p. 78, where we find the following:—"The essential agreement of the old witnesses confirms me in the opinion that the former title is the original one." Harnack (p. 24 f.) explains on the contrary the second title, which is otherwise entirely unattested, as the original one, and even assigns it to the whole tract, taking the *ἔθνη*, not of unbaptized, but of already baptized heathen. But we read in VII. 1: *ταῦτα πάντα προεπιόντες βαπτίσατε κ. τ. λ.* These words are, no doubt, addressed to baptized Christians, but presuppose that chapters I.-VI. are intended for the still unbaptized (heathen). Thus we are to apply 'The Teaching of the Lord through the twelve apostles for the heathen'—if the whole writing is to be so entitled,—in chapters

I. 1. The insertion by the Latin version of the two words "*in saeculo*" (Compare also Lactantius, *humanae vitae*, Epist. div. instit. c.lix., Divin. inst. vi. 3) has decisive external evidence against it and no internal evidence in its support. It is probably only an individualism of that translation. Whether the Latin follows Barnabas in omitting the *μία μία*, must remain doubtful, but in either case the words are supported by the decisive testimony of the Constantinople MS., the Canons, and the Constitutions. And exactly the same may be said of the omission of *μεταξύ* in Barnabas and perhaps the Latin.

Two important additions are made by the Latin and Barnabas in this verse which require careful consideration. After declaring that the two ways are those of life and death, the Latin adds in further appositional expansion: "*lucis et tenebrarum*," which is at once seen to be the parallel of what has hitherto been thought an individualism of Barnabas. The latter writer appears in his blundering way to witness to the fact that a double description underlies his matter, even in xviii. 1, and more plainly still in xx. 1. This double reading may be, with great probability, held to have been a part of the Barnabas-Latin subclass of the Didache. The union of the Egyptian document—the Canons—with the whole Syrian class, however, in excluding the second pair of words is decisive evidence against their originality. And the internal evidence casts its vote in the same direction.

The further addition by the Latin of the words: "*In his*

I.—VI. to unbaptized and in chapters VII.—XI. to baptized heathen; and thus the unity of the work is maintained at the cost of the unity of the sense of the expression in the title. Bryennios and Zahn (p. 286 f.) have therefore assigned the second title to the first part only, (chapters I.—VI.) which (they consider) was to be communicated to the candidates for baptism before they were baptized. Harnack (p. 29) objects: 'if this were so, it would be all up with the integrity of the *Διδαχή* as it lies in the MS. But are we to maintain the unity of this writing at every cost—even at the cost of assigning an unexampled double-sense to one and the same expression in its title?' Cf. also p. 97; and Nov. Test. extra canonem recept., 1884. iv. p. 94.

constituti sunt Angeli duo, unus æquitatis, alter, iniquitatis," although certainly not an individualism, and certainly supported by Barnabas, who has borrowed from them in his tell-tale blundering fashion (xviii. 1-2), and also by Hermas, who has quoted them almost verbatim (Mand. vi. 2), as well as by Lactantius (See v. Gebhardt in Harnack, op. c. p. 285), who seems dependent on the Latin version, yet shares the same fate. The internal evidence is strongly against its genuineness, and although it is the reading of the whole sub-class, yet the union of the Canons with the Constitutions and Constantinople MS. against it is decisive.

I. 2. The individualism of the Latin version which adds *æternum* after *Deum*, may be set aside at once, along with the individualism of Barnabas, who changes τῆς ζωῆς into τοῦ φωτός in accordance with his adoption in the preceding verse of the corresponding alternative of the text that lay before him. In two minor readings the Constantinople MS. may possibly need correction in this chapter by the combined evidence of the [Canons], Constt., and Latin, which give us θέλεις for its θελήσης, and ποιήσεις for its ποίει. As the internal evidence is not decisive for these cases, however, although faintly favoring the change,—and in order to adopt θέλεις an additional syntactical alteration would need to be made in the sentence, the correction cannot be said to be certain. Perhaps it would be best to read θέλης (Constantinople MS. —ησης by repetition) and ποιήσεις.

The addition to the command to love God of ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας σου, which the Canons and Constitutions make, is discredited by internal evidence of groups which represent this combination as of small authority,—by genealogical evidence which ascribes great authority to the opposing combination of Barnabas and the Latin version with

the Canons make, is more plausible, though discredited again by the apparent collusion of these two documents, the genealogical strength of the opposing group (Latin, Constantinople MS., and Constitutions) and the balance of the internal evidence. The words ἀγαπήσεις and δοξάσεις when applied to God had a tendency to suggest each other, as we shall see in a subsequent passage (Didache iv. 1, Canons, Barn., ἀγαπήσεις > Constt. δοξάσεις). While we adjudge the sentence an unauthorized addition, however, we cannot deny the possibility that it is a characteristic reading of the Egyptian recension which the Latin has passed over by accident; this is possible but not probable.

I. 3. In this section we are faced by the most important textual problem which meets us in the whole treatise on the Two Ways. The entire section from the word εὐλογεῖτε in this verse to and including ii. 1, is omitted by the Latin version, by Barnabas, and by the Ecclesiastical Canons. On the other hand it is found, not only in the Constantinople MS., but also, though not complete, in the Apostolic Constitutions. The portion transcribed in the Constitutions carries us through the first section of i. 5. Hermas, moreover, quotes from i. 5 (Mand. ii. 4-6). Clement of Alexandria (*Frag. ex Nicetae Catena in Matt.* v. 42) also quotes the same verse. And John Climacus (vi. saec.) appears to have had the same verse before him (Migne, vol. 88, p. 1029). The external evidence divides itself therefore into the whole Egyptian group *versus* the whole Syrian group supported by three patristic quotations. The patristic quotations are such as to witness to the very early—first half of the second century—and very widespread—Alexandria and Rome—circulation of the Syrian recension; but are not sufficient to determine the relative originality of the two classes into which the witnesses to the Didache text divide themselves. The use in this passage of the Syrian recension by Clement of Alexandria is indeed surprising but cannot be asserted to be decisive. We are thrown back on internal evidence, with

the feeling that we need a stronger probability than the external evidence furnishes for either side, before we can decide the matter with any confidence.

Internal evidence, however, casts its whole weight so clearly for omission as to leave little or no doubt in the matter. This was already seen by Krawutzcky in 1882, who declared our present section an interpolation which was moreover badly placed at the beginning of the discussion, where it violently breaks in upon the flow of thought, rather than at the end of the section on the Way of Life, where the disposition of the treatise might have made room for it. The matter has had new light thrown upon it since Krawutzcky wrote, not only in the great advance in the amount of external evidence which we now have in hand enabling us to see the value of the various supporting groups in clearer light, but also in the fulness and clearness of the internal evidence. The importance of the case will justify us in stating this somewhat fully.

(1) The section in question appears to be violently stuffed into its present place. As it stands, the commandments of i. 3-6 are enclosed between two headings. They follow the heading "But of these words the teaching is this," i. 3, which must refer back to the preceding context, i. 2,—either, then, to the whole of it, thus promising an elaboration of both commandments of love to God and to our neighbor,²⁰ or, far more naturally, to the last sentence of it, thus promising a negative treatment of the duties to our neighbor. It certainly cannot promise a special treatment of the command of love to God. Yet the heading with which chapter ii. opens commits its author to the theory that what had gone before was an elaboration of the command-

special title of this part of it. But it is plain that ii. 1 is framed with reference to i. 3, and the probability is very strong against so formal an introduction to the "second commandment," while the "first commandment" is left without any introduction at all. The objective form of the phrase "the teaching," too, in this second heading, "The second commandment of the teaching," suggests the hand of a reworker with the treatise before him, rather than of the original writer, who freely composed this admirably well-joined treatise in which there is nothing else at all similar to this phrase until vi. 1, after the whole discussion is finished. On the whole, the appearance is strong that the title of i. 3 originally stood immediately before ii. 2, which proceeds to give exactly what this title promises,—namely, a negative elaboration of the duties that we owe to others; and that i. 3-6, having been interpolated, a new title was needed for ii. 2, which the interpolator awkwardly invented from his objective stand-point.

(2) This appearance is strengthened by the serious interruption which the passage in question makes in the otherwise logically and admirably arranged sequence of thought. The title at ii. 1, "But the second commandment of the teaching [is this]," divides the treatise at this point necessarily into (a) an elaboration of the first commandment—"thou shalt love God who made thee," i. 3-6, and (b) an elaboration of the second commandment—"and thy neighbor as thyself," ii. 1 sq. But that the matter actually communicated will not run into these moulds is evident on the surface and is demonstrated by the difficulty, amounting to impossibility, of so framing any analysis of this part of the treatise as naturally to cover its divisions. Bryennios proposes two analyses, the one of which regards i. 3-6 as containing commandments growing out of love to God while ii. 1 sq. contains those which spring from love to our neighbor, and the other of which classes the two sections under the captions respectively of "Do the good," and "Abstain from evil." Harnack defends the former

view and argues that the primitive conception classed such duties as are given in i. 3-6 always under the rubric of love to God. Even were this sound, as it apparently is not, neither analysis is tenable. The same duties are treated under both heads (i. 5, and iv. 5 sq.). And Krautzky's criticisms (Tübingen Theolog. Quartalschrift 1884, iv. p. 560 sq.²¹) remain unanswered and unanswerable. Even if we should persuade ourselves (which we cannot do) that i. 3-6 contain only duties which might justly fall under love to God, it remains true that the subsequent portion of the treatise (ii. 1 sq.) does not confine itself to the *rôle* assigned it by either method of division; but busies itself, not only with the evil that we must abstain from, but also with the good that we must do,—not only with the lower duties that man owes to man as man, but also with the higher duties which he is to honor God by fulfilling toward his fellow. This might be a small matter with another treatise; but in so carefully ordered a tractate as this, it is much that a section will not submit to be included in its order.

(3) It is worth noticing, further, that our present passage, not only thus refuses to fall into the train of thought of the treatise, but is repetitious of matter which is found in its logically appropriate place, and in repeating mars it, almost contradicts it, nay scarcely saves itself from contradicting itself. The positive commands to charity find a fit place and expression in iv. 5 sq. in the midst of the section that is devoted to the positive duties of the Way of Life, and which treats in turn of the duties to one's self (iii. 7-10),—to the church (iv. 1-4),—to the poor (iv. 5-8),—to the household (iv. 9-11). The repetition of them at the beginning of the whole discussion is all the more startling that they find so just a place here. And that they are more justly set forth in iv. 5 sq. lies on the surface of the treatment, while the contradiction between the most likely meaning of the obscure i. 6 and iv. 7, or even

²¹ Cf also Hilgenfeld, Zeitschrift, etc., as above, p. 79 sq.

i. 5, has led the best critics to question whether some interpolation must not be assumed here. Certainly it is undeniable that i. 5-6 repeat in a surprising place and in a less appropriate manner what is better said and better placed in iv. 5 sq.

(4) It lies very near to what has already been urged to add that the manner and style of this section differences it from the rest of the Two Ways. Scripture is used differently; strange little additions are made to the quotations from it, such as, "for, indeed, thou canst not," "for he is guiltless," etc.; an unknown passage is adduced as Scripture; and a general lack of clearness, both in expression and ordering, is observable throughout this passage such as meets us nowhere else. This even goes so far that to all appearance the Scripture source that is drawn from by the author of this section differs from that used by the author of the rest of the treatise. Elsewhere there is no reason for suspecting that any thing other than our Synoptic Gospels has been used for the evangelical quotations, while the Diatessaron of Tatian seems to have furnished the quotations in our present section, as any one will suspect who will compare the quotations of i. 3, 4, with Tatian § 17." *It is from the quotations of this section that Harnack is led to doubt the direct use of our Gospels as we now have them by the author of the Didache.*

(5) It is not a mere repetition of what we have already said, but of independent value, to observe that when this passage is excised, the ordering of the whole section of the Two Ways becomes strict, logical, and even beautiful; so that the results obtained by omission become an argument for the omission. Every thing, then, falls properly into place and the section yields the following strongly concatenated analysis:—

I. Introduction to the whole section, i. 1.

II. The Way of Life, i. 2-iv. 14.

²² See Harnack, p. 78.; Zahn's Tatian's Diatessaron, p. 133 sq.

1. Introductory Statement of the Way of Life, ii. 2.
 2. Negative development of its duties, ii. 2-iii. 6.
 - A. Negative commandments of the Way of Life, ii. 2-ii. 7.
 - B. "What is forbidden in these commandments" (in the sense of the questions in the Westminster Catechism), iii. 1-6.
 3. Positive commandments of the Way of Life, iii. 7-iv. 11.
 - A. Duties to one's self (personal duties of temper), iii. 7-10.
 - B. Duties to the church (the church teachers — the church members — the church unity), iv. 1-4.
 - C. Duties to the poor, iv. 5-8.
 - D. Duties to the household (parents to children — masters to servants — servants to masters), iv. 9-11.
 4. Concluding exhortations to the Way of Life, iv. 12-14.
- III. The Way of Death, v. 1-2.
- IV. Concluding exhortations, vi. 1-3.

(6) Transcriptional evidence is always ambiguous in a passage of such extent. But it must be observed that the absence of the passage from a whole class of documents forbids the special explanations which have been offered of its absence from individual documents. Von Gebhardt's conjecture that a leaf may have fallen out of an early copy, which may have perpetuated itself in this mutilated form, and become the parent of the whole Egyptian recension, is possible but not at all likely, in as much as: 1. The treatise would have to begin in the middle of the *verso* page to bring this passage all on one leaf, and 2. This is to bring the transcriptional evidence into opposition to, not into harmony with, both the external and (what is far more important) the intrinsic. It may be safely asserted on the one hand, that the whole Egyptian group partake

of this omission by inheritance and not by accident and, on the other, that the insertion of the passage editorially is more easily explained than its omission editorially. It is not scribes' way to omit; and the feeling that the ethical teaching of the treatise fell short of the height demanded by the gospel may have early suggested an interpolation, especially as the twofold command of i. 2 gave excuse for it.

The internal evidence against the passage appears to us, when viewed by itself, sufficient to raise very grave doubts as to its genuineness, and, when conjoined with the external evidence which has already cast it in doubt, enough to set aside the passage as almost beyond question spurious. It may be added that the quotation of the spurious words by Hermas and Clement of Alexandria set the age of the interpolated *Didache* for us, in the first half of the second century; while the apparent use of Tatian's *Diatessaron* by it points to Syria as the place where the interpolating was done.

II. 2. The general order of the words in this verse appears to be satisfactorily transmitted in the Constantinople MS. That, at the opening, murder precedes adultery, the agreement of the Canons, *Constt.*, and Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 109, establishes against the defection of the Latin version alone. The transposition of false witness from the next verse by the Latin is only a curiosity of scribes' work. Question can arise only as regards the order of the three prohibitions of lustful deeds. The Latin and the Constitutions unite with the Constantinople MS. in arranging them thus: adultery, paederasty, fornication. Barnabas and the Canons depart from this in placing paederasty last, although they disagree in the relative order of the other two; and Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* ii. 8, 9, also gives this order. This would have strong claims to be considered the order of the Egyptian recension were it not for the possibility of collusion between both Clement and the Canons with Barna-

bas. The defection of the Latin version is, in this state of the case, decisive and we follow with confidence the Constantinople MS.

II. 5. This verse is remarkable in furnishing two clear cases in which the Constantinople MS. requires correction. That the order *ψευδής οὐ κενός* should be received, the testimony of the Latin, Canons, and Constt. against the Constantinople MS. alone, as well as strong internal probability, unite in demanding. The same witnesses unite in omitting the unnecessary and somewhat strange addition, *ἀλλὰ μεμεστωμένος πράξει*.

II. 6. The Latin adds *curidus* before *πλεονέκτης*—against the decisive witness of the Canons, Constt., and Constantinople MS. The omission of *οὐ λήψη βουλὴν πονηρὰν κατὰ τοῦ πλησίου σου* by the Constt. alone as against Barnabas, the Canons, and the Constantinople MS. is of no significance and the less so that the phrase is apparently hinted at in the Constt. themselves.

II. 7. A case of some difficulty is presented in this verse by the insertion of the words *οὗς δὲ ἐλεήσεις* after *ἐλέγξεις* by the Canons and their omission by the Constantinople MS. The Constitutions also omit the words but its testimony is of small value, since it has the passage only brokenly. Barnabas also is of small value here, as he has transmitted only the last clause and that in a changed form. Internally there is a balance of probabilities: on the one hand the words may have been dropped by homœoteleuton, *ἐλεήσεις* presenting a very similar mark for the eye to *ἐλέγξεις*, and on the other they may have been introduced from Jude 22, as Harnack suggests. On the whole the internal evidence tends to favor the words, and we venture to insert them in square brackets.²³

III. 1. Two unimportant cases occur in this verse, in which the Constitutions range themselves against the decisive witness of the Canons and the Constantinople

²³ They are inserted also by Hilgenfeld (text and Zeitschr., 1885, p. 80, note 1) and Zahn (Theol. Literaturblatt, 1884, no. 26).

MS. combined, reading *κακού*, instead of *πονηροῦ* and *αὐτῷ*, instead of *αὐτοῦ*.

III. 2. Quite an interesting textual question arises in the list of sins in this verse. The MS. reads *μηδὲ ζηλωτῆς μηδὲ ἐρισκακὸς μηδὲ θυμικός*. The Constt. substitute for the last two *μηδὲ μανικός μηδὲ θρασύς*. And the Canons, as edited by Harnack, changes the last item into *θυμώδης* which is the reading of Mosq., while Vind. reads *θυμαντικός* and Ottob. *μανικός*. These readings of other MSS. of the Canons may have been framed under the influence of a reminiscence of the Constitutions. But on the other hand they may preserve a reminiscence of the original text of the Canons and would thus hint at the presence in it of *μανικός*. The value of the combination of the Canons and Constitutions is shown by internal evidence of groups to be so small, however, that in any case it will be best to follow the reading of the MS.

We follow, without hesitation, the MS. also in retaining in this verse *ἀπάντων* and the plural form *φόνοι γεννῶνται* against the Canons. The parallelism of the other verses demands them,—although the testimony changes sides curiously at iii. 4.

III. 3. In this verse also we follow the MS. throughout although the other witnesses present some noteworthy variations from it. The Canons, for instance, divide the verse into two, repeating the *τέκνον, μὴ γίνου* instead of *μηδὲ* before *αἰσχρολόγος*: while the Constitutions omit the first half altogether—and transfer the second part to a place after iii. 4. The parallelism of the verses, and the parallelism of this section with the preceding one, ii. 2-7, thoroughly justify the form of the MS. The same parallelism vindicates the genuineness of *ἀπάντων* although the Constitutions unite with the Canons in omitting it here. The Canons stand alone again in reading the singular for *μοιχεΐαι γεννῶνται* of the MS. and the Constitutions. And the explanatory *ῥινόφθαλμος* of the Constitutions is set aside by the strong combination of the MS. and the Canons for

ὕψηλόφθαλμος, which is supported also by internal probability.

III. 4. The reading of the Canons *ιδεῖν μηδὲ ἀκούειν* may be confidently declared a later strengthening of the simple *βλέπειν* of the MS. On the other hand we adopt here on internal grounds (parallelism) the plural reading of the Canons, *εἰδολογατρίαι γεννῶνται* instead of the singular of the MS.

III. 5. We retain the *μου* of the MS. (Canons omitting) to satisfy the parallelism. The preposition before *τὴν κλοπὴν* is curiously variously transmitted: the MS. gives *εἰς*, the Canons *ἐπί*, and Clement of Alexandria (Strom. i. 20) *πρός*. Some variation also appears in some of the parallels: in iii. 2, the MS. reads *πρός*, which is supported by the Canons; in iii. 3, again both read *πρός*; in iii. 4, the MS. and Canons read *εἰς*, and the Constt. *πρός*; in iii. 5, here, the MS. *εἰς*, the Canons *ἐπί*, and Clement *πρός*; in iii. 6, the MS. reads *εἰς*, and the Canons and Constt. *πρός*. In every instance some witness or other gives us *πρός*. This seems certainly the true reading in 2 and 3; whereas *εἰς* is best supported in 4, and the other two cases are doubtful. Transcriptional evidence is ambiguous: either *πρός* was everywhere the original reading and the variants have arisen from the accidental substitution of a synonym, or *εἰς* was original in the last three cases and has been mechanically assimilated to the previous *πρός*. The latter is somewhat most likely; and we propose to edit *πρός* in iii. 2, 3, and *εἰς* in iv. 6, with an alternative *πρός* in the margin.

III. 6. Again we follow the MS. throughout:—rejecting the reading of the Canons both in its omission of *μου*, and its substitution of *ἄγει* for *ὁδηγεῖ*.

III. 7. We follow the MS. again and the more so that it

III. 8. The MS. is here also to be followed, both in its insertion of the *καί*'s, and in its rejection of certain words; both against the Canons.

III. 9. The combination of the MS., Barnabas, and the Constitutions for *τῇ ψυχῇ* far outweighs the Canons (*τὴν ψυχὴν*).

The Canons (cf. edition of Harnack) apparently lacked the phrase "*θράσος. Οὐ κολληθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ σου*" (omitted by homœoteleuton?) although it appears in Ottob., in a form which could scarcely be drawn from Barnabas. Whether we are to read it as it appears in the MS., or as Barnabas gives it: *οὐδὲ κολληθήσῃ ἐκ ψυχῆς σου* (omitting *θράσος*), and as it is repeated in the Canons (Ottob.), is hard to determine. Perhaps the conjunction of Barnabas and the Canons in a reading in which they do not seem in collusion will determine us to accept *οὐδὲ κολληθήσῃ* instead of *οὐ κολληθήσεται*. This appears best whether we judge the reading of Ottob. to be a survival of the original reading of the Canons, or subsequently introduced from the Didache; in either case it is an independent witness to the Didache.

The order *δικαίων καὶ ταπεινῶν* is established by the MS. and Canons, against Barnabas.

III. 10. We follow the MS. throughout here; in the omission of *δέ* (against Canons), the reading *σοι* (with Canons and Constt., against Barnabas' *σου*), and the reading *ἄτερ* (with Canons, against Barnabas' *ἄνευ*).

IV. 1. We retain as probably genuine the *τέκνον μου* of the MS. against the Canons, which omit *μου*; and in like manner omit *τόν* (Canons) before *κύριον*, with the MS.; and retain the last clause as given in the MS. and the Canons against the omission of Barnabas (?) and the alteration of the Constitutions.

It is more difficult to settle the complicated reading that affects the whole first part of the verse. It may be considered in three separate parts. (1) Ought we to insert another verb before *μνηθήσῃ*, dividing the sentence into two clauses? (2) Shall we insert a further qualifying

phrase? and (3) are we to insert another objective clause? The MS. reads simply: τοῦ λαλοῦντός σοι τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ μνηθῆσθαι νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας. In the Canons this is expanded into the following long sentence, in which the figures mark the parts affected by the above questions: τὸν λαλοῦντά σοι τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ (3) καὶ παραίτιόν σοι γινόμενον τῆς ζωῆς, καὶ δόντα σοι τὴν ἐν κυρίῳ σφραγίδα (1) ἀγαπήσεις (2) ὡς κόρην ὀφθαλμοῦ σου, μνησθήσῃ δὲ αὐτοῦ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν. Taking up the three questions in their order, we observe:—

(1) The insertion of a new verb is supported by Barnabas [and the Constitutions]. Barnabas reads: ἀγαπήσεις ὡς κόρην τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ σου πάντα τὸν λαλοῦντά σοι τὸν λόγον τοῦ κυρίου μνησθήσῃ ἡμέραν κρίσεως ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς. His blundering genius is here very apparent. Πάντα appears to be a strengthening addition. Ἡμέραν κρίσεως seems only a confusion of ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα,—nearly the form of adverb used by the Canons; so that Barnabas conflates the adverbial expressions of the Constantinople MS. and the Canons. It is clear that the Canons cannot have copied their statement from Barnabas, but it is not so clear that they may not have altered the Didache as it lay before them into closer accord with Barnabas. The union of Barnabas with the Canons is, therefore, here, as elsewhere, suspicious, and we dare not plead the pair as more than one witness. The Constitutions also, however, insert an additional verb, though no longer ἀγαπήσεις, but δοξάσεις; yet in so doing they support Barnabas and the Canons in the main point. Internally, the addition is faintly probable, and of the two verbs δοξάσεις is intrinsically the superior reading. It is not difficult to account for the falling out of a single word in the Constantinople MS. or for the subsequent adjustment of the syntax by changing the accusative into the genitive. On the whole, then, it appears best to insert here δοξάσεις, with adjustment of the syntax.

(2) The support (Barnabas and Canons) of the qualifying phrase ὡς κόρην ὀφθαλμοῦ σου is genealogically and by internal evidence of groups too suspicious to detain us

long, especially in the face of internal objections; and so we confidently reject this insertion.

(3) The second half of the objective clause inserted by the Canons, from *καὶ δόντα* to *σφραγίδα* inclusive has no claim whatever on our acceptance, external or internal. The former portion, however, may possibly be echoed in the Constitutions a little later in the words: *οὐχ ὡς γενέσεως αἴτιον, ἀλλ' ὡς τοῦ εὖ εἶναι σοι πρόξενον γινόμενον*, from which it might be inferred that the author of the Constt. had some such sentence as that which the Canons transmit before him and tried to guard it from misunderstanding. Although the combination of the Canons and Constt. is discredited by internal evidence of groups, this seems to be due to the number of petty cases of accidental union between them. Our present case is essentially different from them and we cannot help suspecting that we have here a genuine transmission from the common original on which the two works rest. It may be best to put it into the margin as a possible addition. But if we so conclude we are immediately faced by two difficulties—concerning the exact form in which to cast the addition, and the exact place into which to insert it. The form given in the Canons is the most original one transmitted to us, and we cannot do better than adopt it. We have the choice of inserting it as an appositional accusative to *τὸν λαλοῦντα* (following the Canons) or immediately after *δοξάσεις* connecting it with *μνηθήσῃ*. The latter is the more attractive disposition, but will be judged by many too conjectural.

IV. 2. In this verse we read *δέ* with the MS. and Canons, against Barnabas (*καί*); *καθ' ἡμέραν* without *ἐκάστην* with the MS. Canons, and Constitutions, against Barnabas; *τῶν ἁγίων* with the MS., Barn., and Constt., against the confused reading of the Canons; and *πρόσωπα* with Barnabas and the MS., against the Canons and Constt. (*—ον*). Whether we are to accept the form *ἐπαναπαῆς* (the Constantinople MS.) with Harnack and Hilgenfeld, or correct it into *ἐπαναπαύη* (Constt.) with Bryennios, Spence,

Sabatier, etc., or into *ἐπαναπαύση* (Canons) can scarcely be confidently decided. The correctness of the last words of the verse as given in the MS. is vouched for by the Constt. and Canons; Barnabas, however, adds an idea of labor and of saving the soul thereby which has left traces also in the Canons.

IV. 3. Very clearly the MS. reading *ποθήσεις* in this verse is wrong and should be supplanted by *ποιήσεις* (Barnabas, Canons, Constt.). The MS. *σχίσμα*, supported by Barnabas, is on both external and internal grounds superior to the *σχίσματα* of the Canons and Constt. Barnabas and Canons insert unnecessarily a *τινά* after *ἐλέγξει*, against the MS. and Constt. Decision is difficult here, though apparently the MS. has the best claim to be followed.

IV. 4. The addition of *ἐν προσευχῇ* by the Canons and Constitutions to this enigmatical verse, besides being discredited by the character of that combination, is condemned by its self-evident explanatory purpose. The parallelism with the preceding verses as well as the excellent character of the supporting group (MS. and Barnabas) establishes the future *διψυχήσεις* against the *διψυχήσης* of the Canons and the *γίνου δίψυχος* of the Constitutions. The negative varies in the documents from *μή* (Constt. Canons) and *οὐ* in the MS. to the plainly strengthened *οὐ μή* in Barnabas; we follow the MS."

IV. 5. Here we can, without hesitation, adopt the MS. reading *τὰς χεῖρας συσπῶν*, supported as it is by Barnabas and the Canons, against the *τὴν χεῖρα συστέλλων* of the Constitutions.

IV. 6. The Constantinople MS. presents in this verse two omissions, one of which—*τῶν* before *ἁμαρτιῶν*,—we can easily adopt without discussion, but in the other of which

give thy sins' ransoming." The Constitutions, instead of this, reads: "If thou have, through thy hands give, in order that thou mayest work out thy sins' ransoming." And Barnabas (xix. 10): "Through thy hands thou shalt work unto thy sins' ransom" (λύτρον). Now, if it is established, as seems to be done, that the Constitutions and Barnabas are independent, this addition deserves the deepest attention; it cannot be by accident that they agree in inserting ἐργάση εἰς before the "ransoming (ransom) of thy sins." Apparently, then, the Constitutions have preserved for us here the true text and are to be followed. We propose to insert—at least in brackets—ἵνα ἐργάση εἰς between δώσεις and λύτρωσιν. Otherwise we should have to count the Constt. a conflation of Barnabas and the Constantinople MS."

IV. 7. External evidence supported by intrinsic considerations decides in this verse for γάρ (MS., Canons, Constt.) against δέ (Barn.); ὁ (Barn., Canons., Constt.) against ἡ (MS.); and ἐστιν (MS., Canons., Constt.) against its omission by Barn. The πτωχῶ of the Const. is manifestly an explanatory addition.

IV. 8. We retain, though with some doubt, the τὸν before ἐνδεόμενον, with the MS., but against Canons and Constt. For the rest of the verse we follow the MS. although there are several minor variations, the only one of importance being the omission of the συγ— in συγκοινωνήσεις by Barnabas and the Constitutions,—a combination strong enough to throw doubt upon it. The rest are such as ἐν πᾶσι Barn., εἰς πάντα Constt., for πάντα; the interpretation πλησίον (Barn.) for ἀδελφός, and φθαρτοῖς (Barn.) for θνητοῖς.

IV. 9. The Ecclesiastical Canons fail at this point, taking from us one of our most important witnesses and leaving the whole Egyptian class to be represented by the sporadic and bungling excerpts of Barnabas alone. For-

²⁵ Cf. J. R. Harris as quoted in the N. Y. Independent, Sept. 24, 1885, p. 7.

tunately Barnabas quotes from every succeeding verse of the chapter and this is of value as against Krawutzcky's efforts to prove the spuriousness of iv. 9-14." That they are contained in Barnabas on the one side and the Constantinople MS. and the Constitutions on the other side is decisive for their genuineness on any other theory of the relations of the documents than that which Krawutzcky, and Krawutzcky alone, has adopted. His theory supposes that Barnabas is the original writing, and that in order to logically arrange and doctrinally correct what he had so wildly brought together in these last chapters of his epistle, the Two Ways was written early in the second century. All the other documents (including the Didache) came from this and it is this they represent. Even on this theory it is unnatural to suppose that two out of the three witnessing documents should have borrowed from Barnabas just the same supplements, and hence Krawutzcky is driven to make the Constitutions a secondary witness even to the Two Ways, drawing itself directly from the Didache. The internal evidence on which Krawutzcky relies against this section is as weak as the external, and turns wholly on his failure to grasp the train of thought in this part of the treatise. When we once see the principle of arrangement which apparently governed the writer himself, this portion of the chapter becomes not only a natural, but even a necessary, part of the treatise. Why the Canons desert their model here is another matter and of no great importance to us in the criticism of the Didache: for this purpose we only need to know that they did not stop here because the matter before them stopped. And this appears to be proved by the borrowing of the Canons in c. 12 from Didache, x. 3, xiii. 1, 2, thus showing that much more of the Didache

combined, as follows: οὐκ (Constantinople MS. and Constt.) against οὐ μή (Barn.), which is a manifest alteration for emphasis; ἀρεῖς (MS., Constt.) against ἀρῆς (Barn.) where again the internal evidence decides for the former; νεότητος (MS. Constt.), against τῆς νεότητος (Barn.); τὸν φόβον (MS. Constt.), against φόβον (Barn.). Although with doubt in the two latter cases, we follow the MS. in all four instances. When the Constt., standing alone, inserts αὐτοὺς after διδάξεις, while its omission by the MS. is supported also by Barnabas, it is the easier to decide in favor of the MS. that the external group is in this case a strong one and the internal evidence not ambiguous.

IV. 10. In this verse we reject the strengthened οὐ μή of Barn. in favor of the simple οὐκ of the MS. and the Constt.; accept on internal support the σου which Barnabas (against the MS. and Constt.) inserts after παιδίσκη; adopt the order of words of the MS. and Constt. against Barnabas; adopt the simple negative οὐ of Barnabas against the οὐ μή of the MS., and the φοβηθήσονται of the MS. against the φοβηθῶσι of Barnabas; and reject the πεποιθόσιν of the Constt. in favor of the ἐλπίζουσιν of the MS. and Barnabas.

A more important and difficult variation occurs in the last clause—where also the Constt. deserts us and we must decide between οὐ γὰρ ἔρχεται read by the MS. and ὅτι ἦλθεν οὐ by Barnabas. We must frankly confess that the latter reading appears to us internally very much the preferable one: and yet in a conflict between a MS. and so freely worked over a transmission as Barnabas gives us, we dare not follow the latter in so important a case. We content ourselves with placing, therefore, what seems intrinsically the better reading in the margin.

IV. 11. The δοῦλοι and ὑμῶν at the opening of this verse seem to be properly corrected by most of the editors into οἱ δοῦλοι and ἡμῶν from Constt. The omission of τοῖς and ὑμῶν (ἡμῶν) by Barnabas seems an individualism that may be justly neglected. Each of the three wit-

nesses gives a different form to the verb, but that given by the MS. appears most likely, from the forms used in the neighboring verses, to have been the original one. The combination, MS. + Barn., is enough to settle the readings *ὡς τύπῳ* (Constt. *τυποῖς*) and *αἰσχύνῃ* (Constt. *προσοχῇ*).

IV. 12. We venture to follow the MS. here, although Barnabas and the Constt. insert a verb, though diversely, apparently betraying independent correction by them.

IV. 13. It cannot be seriously questioned that the repeated *παρ' αὐτοῦ* in this verse is an insertion of the Constt. (omit: MS., Barn.).

IV. 14. The words *ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ*, with which this verse opens in the Constantinople MS., are omitted by both Barnabas and the Constt. Barnabas merely says: "Thou shalt confess thy sinfulness:" the Constt.: "Thou shalt confess to the Lord thy God, thy sins." Either the Constt. are a direct correction of the Didache (which, indeed, is not *per se* unlikely), or the original Didache lacked the words *ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ*. The latter seems to be most probable; and the internal evidence—for there is nothing apparent in the context to justify the emphatic prepositing of *ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ*—appears to support it. We relegate the words, therefore, to the margin.

The word for "sins" differs in each witness: we adopt *τὰ ἁμαρτήματά σου* of the Constt. supported in part by Barnabas. The same evidence more directly given, makes *καί* suspicious. The internal evidence supports the *προσελεύση* (MS. Constt.) against Barnabas's *προσῆξεις*; while, on the other hand, the variation of the Constt. in the last words of the discussion by which they are transmuted into *ἡμέρα πονηρίας σου* is plainly explanatory, and we follow the MS. and Barnabas. It goes without saying

p. 565) may be profitably consulted. His doubt whether the Constitutions may not give the original form rests on his underestimate of the union of Barnabas and the Constantinople MS., which is here not precise, indeed, but in the main opposes the Constitutions. The alteration by Barnabas of τοῦ θανάτου into τοῦ μέλανος ranks with his characteristic forms elsewhere. Possibly the omission of αὕτη . . . ἔστιν may be explained by accident due to homœoteleuton: the sentence thus resulting needed one word's insertion, and thus we get Barnabas's σκολιά instead of πονηρά.

The list of sins which follows, contains in this verse, as given in the Constantinople MS., twenty-two items. Every one of these is witnessed by the Constitutions also—although ἐπιθυμία is further explained by the adjective παράνομοι, and ὕψος takes the form ὑψηλοφροσύνη. Besides these the Constitutions add two, ἐπιорκίαι, which is given the third place, and ἀφοβία, which closes the list, thus increased to twenty-four items. Barnabas contains seventeen items, of which fifteen appear also in both the other witnesses, and two are added,—παράβασις in the middle, and ἀφοβία θεοῦ at the end, the last of which agrees with the final term of the Constitutions' list. Hermas, in Mandate viii. 3-5, plainly presents reminiscences of this passage, and in his list of sins includes eight (ten) that are found in our documents, grouped just sufficiently together to make connection with our passage certain: it is worth remarking that of these eight words five (πορνεία, ὑπόκρισις, ψευδομαρτυρία, ἐπιθυμία, ἀλαζονεία) are lacking in Barnabas. The type of the Didache used by Hermas seems to have been intermediate between the Egyptian and Syrian types, and included both the angel clause peculiar to the one (Didache i. 1 = Hermas, Mand. vi. 2) and the alms-giving clause peculiar to the other (Didache i.

The order in which these sins are arranged agrees perfectly in the MS. and the Constt., with these trivial exceptions: the third and fourth items (*ἐπιθυμῖαι, πορνεῖαι*) in the MS. are transposed in the Constt. and the additional word *ἐπιπορκῖαι* interposed between them. On the other hand, Barnabas presents an utterly different order. If we number the items in the MS., the different orders may be represented to the eye thus:—

Constt.: 1, 2, 4, *ἐπιπορκῖαι*, (3), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, (21, *ὑψηλοφροσύνη*), 22, *ἀφοβία*.

Barn.: 6, 20, 21, 11, 12, 2, 1, 9, 14, *παράβασις*, 13, 15, 16, 8, 7, 17, *ἀφοβία θεοῦ*.

So far as Hermas gives the same words, they stand in him: 2, 4, 14, 11, (15), (24), 10, 17, 3, 22.

Another difference in form is found in the fact that Barnabas throughout uses the singular number, in which, indeed, Hermas agrees with him, while the MS. and Constt. use the plural for the former moiety and the singular for the second part,—the MS. giving eleven plural names (down to and including *ὑποκρίσεις*) and eleven singular ones; and the Constitutions thirteen plural names down to and including *διπλοκαρδῖαι* = No. 12 in the MS. list) and eleven singular ones.

Internal considerations give us great confidence in the general trustworthiness of the text—both in its contents and order—as transmitted in the MS. and Constt. Barnabas here is confusion worse confounded. On the other hand, the other documents not only present an arrangement that can be traced, but one which was demonstrably the natural order for the author of this document. We have in Didache iii. 2 sq. a formal arrangement of sins in which they take this order: (1) murder, (2) sins of lust, (3) idolatries, including witchcraft, (4) thefts, including sins of pride, (5) blasphemies, including sins of the tongue and temper. The list in ii. 2 sq. takes essentially the same order: (a) murder, (b) lusts, (c) thefts, (d) magic, (e) child-murder, (f) coveting, (g) sins of speech. Now, in our

present list we have (1) murders, (2) adulteries, lusts, fornications, (3) thefts, (4) idolatries, witchcrafts, sorceries,—[robberies],—(5) false witnesses, hypocrisies, (double-heartedness). At this point the plurals break off and the list takes a new beginning. It cannot be accidental that the order is exactly that of iii. 2 sq. with the one difference of transposing thefts and idolatries,—a transposition which is supported by ii. 2 on the one hand, and not to be thought doubtful, on the other, on account of the "robberies" which come later. (See later p. 145.) The conjecture lies very close that "thefts" here originally occupied the eighth place, and has been transposed to the fifth under the influence of ii. 2 and the reminiscences—fresh in every scribe's mind—of the ten commandments (Ex. xx. 13; Deut. v. 17), as well as of our Lord's words in Matt. xix. 18, and the best MSS. of Mark x. 18. But the agreement of the order, as it stands in the MS., with that of ii. is sufficient to compel us to reject even so specious a conjecture. The insertion of *ἐπιτορκίαι* by the Constt. is also discredited by the parallelism;" but the parallelism apparently throws its weight for the plural form of *διπλοκαρδία*.

The last ten (eleven) names—from *δόλος* to *ἀλαζονεία* (*ἀφοβία* [θεοῦ])—have too close a relation to ii. 5 sq. to remain doubtful. As there, so here they follow upon and are attached to sins of speech, and include (1) guile, ii. 5 = *δόλος*, (2) pride and covetousness, ii. 6 = *ὑπερηφανία* . . . *ἀλαζονεία*. We confidently adopt this list also, then, and in the order in which the MS. gives it. Even *ἔψος* (Barnabas? and MS.) is preferable to the *ὑψηλοφροσύνη* of the Constt. At the end, however, the testimony of Barnabas and the Constt. induce us to insert a final term, *ἀφοβία* [θεοῦ], which stands as the final term in both witnesses, and could scarcely have been added independently. It is the climax, here, just as the next list ends climactically in *πανθαμάρτητοι*. And in this aspect of it, it looks as

¹¹ If it be genuine it should stand just before the tenth name. It is probably, however, inserted to accord with II. 3.

if we should probably retain also the *θεοῦ* which Barnabas alone transmits.

v. 2. In this section of the sin-list, the MS. gives us nineteen items, and the Constt. supports it throughout,—apart from some minor points of detail. Here, too, we have the general support of Barnabas, which was lacking to us in the previous verse, and the presence of which gives us an attesting group of great strength. Barnabas agrees with the MS. exactly in the first five items, with the exception that he inserts *τῶν* before *ἀγαθῶν* in the first. Between the fifth and sixth he inserts *χῆρα καὶ ὀρφανῷ οὐ προσέχοντες*, which is so plainly a further explanation of the previous sentence, "not cleaving to that which is good nor to righteous judgment," that it may be rejected out of hand. The slight changes which he introduces in the sixth and seventh items are opposed by internal evidence. The eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh, he supports exactly. Between the eleventh and twelfth he inserts *εὐχερεῖς ἐπὶ καταλαλιᾷ*, which apparently is condemned by its unfitness for this context. After this he supports the MS. to the end. The support of Barnabas in this detailed way suffices, not only to establish the general list as in the MS., but also its details even when the Constitutions desert it.

vi. 1. The sixth chapter of the Didache fails in Barnabas, except a trace, perhaps, of verse 2 in xix. 8, *ἔσονται δύνασαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς σου ἀγνεύσεις*, which is the more gratefully received because it is just this verse that is passed over by the Constitutions. The Constantinople MS., therefore, and the Constitutions are our sole witnesses to this chapter. This ought not to throw its genuineness into doubt, but it prevents us from placing implicit confidence in the details of the text. The Constitutions contain the first clause of verse 1, and imply some thing like the second clause; and so quote from verse 3 as to imply the whole of it. What concerns details:—in verse 1:

Instead of ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς διδαχῆς of the MS., the Constitutions reads ἀπὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας. The internal evidence is ambiguous: on the one hand, the statement of the MS. appears rather objective; on the other, it appears likely that "from this way" stood in the original document. We cannot do better than to follow doubtfully the MS.

VI. 3. The simple φεύγετε (φεῦγε) of the Constitutions has a more primitive flavor than the strong λίαν πρόσεχε of the MS. But, again, material for confident decision is wanting.

Reviewing this examination, we obtain the following list of changes, which, it appears, we should probably introduce into the text of the Constantinople MS., viz.:

Title: bracket τῶν and omit δώδεκα; omit second title.

I. 2. θέλης for θελήσης; ποιήσεις for ποίει.

I. 3. Omit from εὐλογεῖτε to ii. 1, inclusive.

II. 5. Reverse the order ψευδῆς, οὐ κενός; omit ἀλλὰ μεμεστωμένος πράξει.

II. 7. Insert [οὐς δὲ ἐλέησεις] after ἐλέγξεις.

III. 4. εἰδολολατρίαι γεννῶνται; place πρὸς in the margin opposite εἰς.

III. 5. Place πρὸς in the margin opposite εἰς.

III. 9. οὐδὲ κολληθήσῃ ἐκ ψυχῆς σου with οὐ κολληθήσεται ἡ ψυχῇ σου in the margin.

IV. 1. τὸν λαλοῦντά σοι instead of τοῦ λαλοῦντός σοι, with the latter in the margin; insert δοξάσεις after θεοῦ with omit opposite it in the margin; place "Add [καὶ παραίτιόν σοι γινόμενον τῆς ζωῆς]" in the margin opposite θεοῦ; add δὲ αὐτοῦ after μνησθήσῃ with "omit" opposite them in the margin.

IV. 2. Place ἐπαναπαύη in margin opposite to —παῆς.

IV. 3. ποιήσεις instead of ποθήσεις.

IV. 6. Insert between δώσεις and λύτρωσιν the words [ἵνα ἐργάσῃ εἰς].

IV. 7. ὁ instead of ἡ.

IV. 8. Place opposite τόν before ἐνδεόμενον, "omit" in the margin; place opposite συγκαινωήσεις, the word κοινωνήσεις in the margin.

IV. 9. Add τῆς in the margin before νεότητος and place omit in the margin opposite the τόν before φόβον.

IV. 10. Insert [σου] after παιδίσκη; bracket μή; place ὅτι ἦλθεν οὐ in the margin opposite οὐ γὰρ ἔρχεται.

IV. 11. Add οἱ before δοῦλοι; ὑμῶν for ἡμῶν.

IV. 14. Transfer ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ to the margin; ἁμαρτήματα instead of παραπτώματα, with the latter in the margin; bracket καί.

V. 1. Add at end, ἀφοβία [θεοῦ].

VI. 3. φεύγε with λίαν πρόσεχε in margin.

The result of such an examination of the text as we have made is certainly, first of all, to give us an increased confidence in the general purity of its transmission in the Constantinople MS. If we may venture to adopt the corrections of that MS. which it suggests, we have gained, further, a purer text on which to found our study of the contents and relations of the work. Feeling the ground grow thus firmer beneath our feet, it becomes possible to discuss with some satisfaction such problems as the following: The sources and composition of the treatise; the disposition of its matter; its theological and ethical teaching; the history of its use and abuse in the church; and many others which inevitably start themselves in the mind of the student. Sheer lack of space will compel us to postpone most of these pressing questions to a future occasion. Let it be only said that a beginning has been made by Krawutzcky²⁸ of a thorough study of the use made of the Two Ways by the Canons and Constitutions; Zahn may be profitably consulted on the use made of it by Barnabas; Harnack's remarks on the Canons and Constitutions deserve consultation; and now Professor J. R. Harris has given us some insight into its use by the Sibylline Oracles. For the rest, we must confine ourselves to

²⁸ Tübingen Theolog. Quartalschrift, 1882.

the two subjects of the composition of the treatise and its doctrinal and ethical teaching.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE TWO WAYS.

If the original title of the treatise can be attributed to its author, he appears to have undertaken his work with Acts ii. 42, "And they continued steadfastly in the teaching of the apostles" (τῇ διδαχῇ τῶν ἀποστόλων), in mind. At all events, he laid out his treatise on the lines of the Christian commonplace of the two ways, with conscious reference; no doubt, to the Scriptures, though, perhaps, not to any one definite passage. Jer. xxi. 8, "Behold, I have given before your face τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τοῦ θανάτου," may have been most sharply present in his mind. But the conception is spread over the face of the Scriptures, old and new, and is found in strikingly similar forms in Deuteronomy (xxx. 15), and Baruch (ii. 1), and in Matthew (vii. 13), and 2 Peter (ii. 2), alike. The constant use of the simple word "The Way" in the Book of Acts (cf. ii. 28; ix. 2; xiv. 27; xviii. 25; xix. 9, 23; xxii. 4; xxiv. 14, 22; also 1 Cor. iv. 17; xii. 31; Heb. x. 20) as a synonym of the Christian life, shows it already figuring as a sort of Christian "slang," if we may be pardoned the word. Clement of Alexandria (Strom. v. 5) is thoroughly justified in declaring: δύο ὁδοὺς ὑποτεθειμένου τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων, ὁμοίως τοῖς προφήταις ἅπασιν. And on this very account it is difficult to trace the phrase back to any one definite passage in the case of our author, just as it is in the cases of the Testt. XII. Patriarchs, Aser. 1 (Sinker, p. 183), or the writer in the Talmud, Berachoth 28 b.; both of which appear as independent of our Teaching as Dr. Charles Hodge's "Way of Life" or The Letters from Hell, p. 2: "It was true, awfully true, that I had not followed the *way of life*, but the *paths of death* since the days even of childhood."

In accordance with the obvious indications of this conception, our author divides his treatise into two parts, the

former and larger portion (i. 2—iv.) treating of the Way of Life, and the latter (v.) of the Way of Death, the whole closing (vi.) with some broad, concluding exhortations. In making his disposition of the matter to be included under the former of these two great divisions, it seems to be evident that the author was working under the influence of a strong reminiscence of either our Gospel of Matthew or some thing with much the same contents. In Matt. xxii. 35-40 all the commandments are summed up in the two of love to God and love to our neighbor. In Matt. vii. 12 the Golden Rule is brought into close connection with the two ways. In Matt. xix. 17 sq., it is declared to the young man that if he would enter into life he should keep the commandments, which are specified as: "Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not bear false witness; Honor thy father and thy mother; Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; . . . If thou wouldst be perfect, go, sell that thou hast and give to the poor." In like manner, the author of our tractate declares that the way of life consists in keeping the two commandments of love to God and our neighbor,—in avoiding all that is forbidden by the golden rule, which is (ii. 2) analyzed at once into the commandments of the second table of the decalogue. The collocation of these three things: the ways of life and death, the golden rule, and the decalogue, very strongly recalls the words of Jesus recorded in Matthew. So that the disposition of the treatise itself gives us very real grounds for assuming that it depends on our first Gospel.

This is strengthened by (and strengthens) the appearance of actual use of the phraseology of Matthew. It is evident, indeed, that the author does not intend to make exact quotations from or immediate appeals to any writing. In i. 1 he succinctly and clearly states the authoritative teaching, which is observed to be drawn from Scripture, but not quoted from any special passage of it. In like

manner, in verse 2 the evident purpose rules of definite, clear, succinct statement of authoritative truth. No authorities are adduced; the truth is didactically and dogmatically stated, as if from a teacher, accredited by his position, and dealing with his matter freely. Under such circumstances there is no reason to doubt that the matter is drawn from Matthew, because it is compressed and simplified and made easy to grasp and hold in memory. A comparison of the commands to love God and our neighbor, in i. 2, with the same injunctions in Matthew xxii. 37 sq., reveals the very closest relationship between the two; while the very form of them in the Teaching betrays a studied compression. It is, perhaps, too much to say that the prepositing of *πρῶτον* suggests a reminiscence of the parallel in Mark xii. 27 sq.; yet it is found there too. Only the change of "the Lord thy God" into "the God that made thee" needs accounting for before we decide that Matthew is certainly the source from which the Teaching drew. This phrase also occurs in Barnabas xiv. 2, where it is borrowed from the Teaching, and also in Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 16, where it may be borrowed from either Barnabas (although the use of Barnabas by Justin is not yet fully proven) or the Teaching—for that Justin did not use the Teaching is not so certain as some seem to think." There is no reason to think its insertion here any thing else than original with our author; and it seems due to the purpose of the treatise, as a catechism directed to those just becoming Christians, to whom the creatorship of God needed emphasizing rather than their personal part in that God which would suit Jewish readers better. But if we thus conclude that all the divergences of the words from the form given by Matthew are such as the author of the Teaching would naturally make in adapting them to his purpose, there exists no reason why we may not refer them to Matthew as their source.

²⁹ Cf. J. R. Harris, *Journal of Christian Philosophy*, 1884, p. 380.

The negative form which the Golden Rule takes in the latter portion of i. 2 is explicable also from the desire of the writer to express its far-reaching teaching in a form which should be at once, on account of its definiteness and easy comprehensibility, fitted to serve as the "milk-food" of catechumens and an easy point of attachment for the negative commandments which were to follow. Otherwise its language is not further removed from that of Matt. vii. 12 than ordinary freedom of quotation allows. There is compression and a change from the plural to the singular in the first clause, and in the last from the imperative to the future (the actual reading of the MS. is the imperative singular): but nothing that can throw doubt on Matthew's being its source. The fact that the sentiment is attributed to Confucius, and Hillel, and stands in Tobit (iv. 15, *καὶ ὁ μισεῖς μηδὲν ποιήσεις*) in the negative form, has no tendency to suggest that a sentence so nearly verbally from Matthew came from any or all of these sources rather than it. Nor is the fact that it was so current in the Stoical ethics of more importance. Harnack quotes Lampridius's Alexander Severus, 51: "*Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*," and apparently lays some stress on the parallel: the Latin version is far closer to this, however, than the Greek: "*Omne autem quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris*," and the conjecture lies very close that the Emperor drew from the Latin version of so characteristic a Christian teaching directly or indirectly.³⁰ On the whole, the dependence on Matthew, which is already probable from the general scheme of the tract is corroborated by these special phrases, which differ from

³⁰ We have preferred to speak thus mildly in the text, seeing that the negative form of this rule was, no doubt, pre-Christian even in Greek letters. Cf. Isocrates, as quoted by Gibbon (Decline and Fall, liv. note 36). But Lampridius distinctly states that Alexander got *this* saying from Jews or Christians:—*Clamabatque saepius quod a quibusdam sive Judæis sive Christianis audierat et tenebat*, etc. Lampridius adds: *Quam sententiam usque a deo dilexit, ut et in Palatio et in publicis operibus praescribi jubebat*. This seems, indeed, to be another trace of the circulation of the Latin Didascalia.

Matthew only in the direction and the degree that the direct, didactic purpose of the writer and the character of the audience which he is addressing will readily account for.

The plan of the section on the Way of Life (i. 2—iv.) is very easily traced (i. 3, *εὐλογεῖτε*—ii. 1 being omitted on the grounds given above). After the general introductory statement of i. 2, there follows immediately an enumeration of the sins which are forbidden in the way of life, covering the matter from i. 3 to iii. 6, and this we may call the negative part. A positive part, communicating the duties commended in the Way of Life, follows, including iii. 7—iv. 11, and is itself followed by three broad concluding exhortations, iv. 12—14. The negative portion itself (i. 3—iii. 6) falls into two parts, the first of which sets forth the negative commandments of the way of life (i. 3—ii. 7) and the second of which sets forth "what is forbidden in these commandments" quite in the sense of this phrase in the Westminster Shorter Catechism, questions 41, 55, etc.,—an odd indication of the continuity of Christian thought and methods through all ages.

The reference of the words that open verse 3, "of these words, however, the teaching is this," is not altogether obvious, and has been variously understood by commentators. On the whole, it seems likely that in this charge to the catechumens the writer had only the command to love our neighbor in mind, and, having stated, passes over the command to love God. Then the command to love our neighbor is stated negatively in the Golden Rule and expanded into the commandments that are attached to it. In that case the reference of "these words" is to the immediately preceding Golden Rule, of which they promise an expansion. It is undeniable that, if this be the true interpretation, the writer does not stick closely to his scheme throughout: iii. 4 concerns itself with idolatry and iii. 6 with blasphemy, while in v. an occasional item suggests duties to God rather than to man. But these

departures, if departures they be, are exceedingly slight as well as rare, and the tract distinctly concerns itself with morality rather than religion.

At ii. 2 the list of sins condemned by the Golden Rule taken negatively is begun. That the decalogue (Ex. xx. 13) underlay the author's principle of arrangement is clear. The order of the decalogue, or its restatement in Matt. xix. 18 (cf. Mark x. 18), is followed at the beginning. And yet that the decalogue is only the basis of the work, is already evident from the distribution of its simple "Thou shalt not commit adultery," into the three items of adultery, paederasty, and fornication. An enlarged, explained, and enforced decalogue, on the model of our Lord's words as reported by Matthew, seems to be the author's purpose. Whether or not Romans xiii. 9 was also in his mind seems difficult to determine: it seems likely, however, that a reminiscence of that passage has deflected the Latin version into an order of sins which places adultery first and murder second. That Matt. xix. 18 sq. was the prominent deflecting force in the arrangement of the original, however, seems probable from Matt. xix. 19, and its apparent expansion in ii. 4-6, especially 6. The debt to Matthew crops out, too, in the *οὐκ ἐπιιορκήσεις* (Matt. v. 33) with which ii. 3 opens. In ii. 6 there is apparent dependence on 1 Cor. v. 10, 11; not only are the classes mentioned by Paul, "fornicators, covetous, extortioners, idolaters," all hinted at, but the two items so closely connected by Paul, "covetous and extortioners," are brought together. A reminiscence of Rom. i. 29 sq. also appears somewhat probable in this verse: *πλεονεξία . . . κακοηθείας . . . ὑπερφάνους*. The structure of the sentence ii. 7 forcibly recalls Jude 22 and 23, and if the words *οὓς δὲ ἐλέησεις* be inserted, as it seems likely they ought to be, a reminiscence of Jude can scarcely be doubted (cf. Harnack, p. 227, note). The

bring his list to an end with a somewhat strengthened reminiscence of the same.

The order of sins in chapter ii. is somewhat peculiar, and that we may get at the ordering principle in the author's mind it will be necessary to compare the three lists of ii. 2 sq.; iii. 2 sq.; and v. 1 sq. The second of these is the most formally arranged and must be our key in the matter. From it we perceive that the writer is condemning five great classes of sins: (1) murder, (2) lust, (3) idolatry, (4) theft, (5) blasphemy; and, though basing his arrangement on scriptural grounds (where, e. g., idolatry is frequently brought close to adultery), yet appears to introduce an original element. On comparing, now, the other lists with this, we may observe that the evils brought together at the end of v. 1 belong under the fifth head (iii. 6), inasmuch as the *αὐθάδης* of this class appears here as *αὐθάδεια*: but it is also clear from their general character that these are the same that appear in ii. 6—both containing *πλεονεξία, ἀρπαγαί, ὑποκρίσεις*. It is curious, however, that the sins of ii. 3 and ii. 6 are somewhat mixed together in v. 1 *fin.*; "false witness" and "double-mindedness" seeming out of place after "robberies." Even in ii. 6, however, "hypocrisy" is not a sin of deceit, but a sin of violence or evil-nature. And it is observable that, according to our author's scheme, murmuring, self-will, and evil-mindedness all fall under the head of blasphemy. Apparently, the class of blasphemy of iii. 6 is represented in v. 1 from *ἀρπαγαί* down, and in ii. 3-6 inclusive. No doubt, we must guard against erecting an artificial harmony between the three lists. In classifying sins, not by their nature, but by their progeny, if we may so speak, the same tendency may often find place under one head as readily as under another: particularly "thefts" (iii. 5) and "blasphemies" (iii. 6) lie close to one another." In iii. 5 false speech is a "theft," and so is vain-glory: in ii. 6 and v. 1 rapacity is separated from "thefts" and put with the

²¹ Cf. the words *ιερόσυλος, ιεροσυλέω*.

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sins of evil nature that lead to blasphemy. Nor will the identification that we have suggested settle all the problems of the lists. Why, for instance is theft placed between lust and magic (idolatry) in ii. 2 and v. 1, but between idolatry and blasphemy in iii. 5? This variation of order appears to be certainly due to the author, not the scribes, and is apparently caused by deflection from his preferred order (iii. 5) under the influence of the decalogue. Why, again, are abortions separated from murders, in ii. 2, and classed apparently with sorceries? Why does ii. 2 close with "covetousness" to pass over to sins of speech and return to "covetousness" in ii. 6? Difficulties remain; but if we consider abortions an appendix to sorcery, and the items of ii. 3-6 as a detailed statement of the sins that lead to blasphemy (iii. 6), the parallelism of the lists and their principle of arrangement are both apparent, thus:—

II. 2 sq.		III. 2 sq.		V. 1.
Murder,		Murder,		Murder,
Lust,		Lust,		Lust,
Theft,	=====X=====	Idolatry,	=====X=====	Theft,
Sorcery,		Theft,		Idolatry,
{ Covetousness, }		Blasphemy.		Blasphemy.
{ Blasphemy. }				

At iii. 1 the second part of the negative treatment of the way of life begins (iii. 1-6), in which the sins of the list ii. 2 sq. are traced to their finer roots,—the transition being not so much to more refined sins as to the deeper and less noticeable roots of evil. Hence the appropriateness of the opening words: "My child, flee from every evil and from every thing that is like it,"—taken, almost certainly, from 1 Thess. v. 22,—on which is founded, on the

which they lead. The symmetrical structure of these sentences does not suggest the construction of a Christian decalogue (5×2), as Harnack thinks, out of the second table of the law; but rather recalls in its tone and manner the proverb-literature of the Old Testament (Proverbs and Sirach especially). The detailed sins here condemned rest on the Old Testament law, as worked out on the evangelical side: most of the items are found in the LXX. or lists of sins in the New Testament. Especially Titus i. 7 (*ὀργίλος*, 2; *αὐθάδης*, 6) and 2 Peter ii. 10 appear somewhat prominently as possible sources. The latter passage even seems to have been probably used: it declares that the Lord knows how to keep for judgment especially those who are daring and *αὐθάδεις, δόξας οὐ τρέμουνσιν, βλασφημοῦντες*. The Didachographer forbids (iii. 6) the catechumen to be *αὐθάδης*, because it leads to blasphemy. It is possible that in iii. 8 a reminiscence of the trembling at dignities crops out also.

At iii. 7 the negative treatment of the way of life is left and the positive duties it entails are introduced. The section thus introduced extends to iv. 11 inclusive, and treats in turn of the duties to one's self (iii. 7-10), to the church (iv. 1-4), to the poor (iv. 5-8), and to members of the household (iv. 9-11). The remainder of the third chapter is thus occupied with what may be called the personal duties which each man owes to himself—the duties of right temper and disposition. It has, therefore, a direct relation of opposition to the sins hitherto condemned, and rightly stands next to them and opens the positive treatment of the subject. The section begins with a direct appeal to the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 5)—the *ἐπεὶ* adducing a well-known and revered truth—and the character of all its injunctions is in the highest degree Christian and scriptural. Few of them, however, fall into the exact language of Scripture. At iii. 2 there seems a probable reference to Gal. v. 20: at iii. 8 a clear reminiscence of Isa. lxvi. 2 (LXX.), which

may have been suggested to the writer here by the passage from 2 Peter ii. 10 that was apparently ruling his thoughts when he wrote iii. 6; at iii. 9 it is difficult to avoid finding a reference to Rom. xii. 16; and at iii. 10 the writer rests on Sirach ii. 1.

The discourse passes from the duties owed to one's self to those due to the church, at iv. 1, in words that may be a reminiscence of Heb. xiii. 7 (cf. 2 Peter iii. 2), and orderly treats in turn of the duties due to teachers (iv. 1), to the saints (iv. 2), to the church unity (iv. 3 beginning), and to church discipline (iv. 3 end—4). The somewhat enigmatical clause that constitutes iv. 4 has been a puzzle to reworkers and commentators alike: both have usually interpreted or altered it so as to make it refer to prayer, —a reference entirely foreign to its context. Hermas, Vis. iii. 4, 3 (Zahn's *Supplementum Clementinum* p. 315), possibly refers it to prophecy. Apparently the author of the Two Ways meant it of judgment, cf. v. 3; but may have left the expression purposely broad, with a mental reference to Jas. i. 8. Barnabas seems so to have understood it; for while retaining the unlimited expression and misplacing it he keeps it in a context of judicial dealing with the brethren.

From iv. 5 to iv. 8 the duties of charity are treated—which, in the corrupt text of the MS. and the Constitutions are anticipated in i. 3 sq. This sub-section opens (iv. 5 = Sirach iv. 31) and closes (iv. 8 init. = Sirach iv. 5) with appeal to the teaching of one of the most popular Jewish apocrypha. In the last verse (iv. 8) there is also an obvious reference to Acts iv. 32 and later to Rom. xv. 27.

Household duties (iv. 9–11) are orderly treated: first, duties of parents to children (iv. 9); second, of masters to servants (iv. 10), and lastly, of servants to masters (iv. 11), quite after the model of Paul's Epistles, especially Eph. vi. and Col. iii., iv. In particular the mutual duties of masters and slaves are closely parallel to Eph. vi. 5 sq.

and Col. iii. 22—iv. 1,—although the language of our treatise is free and independent.

The closing verses of the fourth chapter (12–14) round up the whole treatment of the way of life by offering certain final exhortations of such a general sort that they cover the whole ground recapitulatorily. The stress laid on hating hypocrisy seems founded on our Lord's constant reproof of that vice in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere. The last clause of v. 13 recalls Deut. iv. 2 or xii. 22. The opening words of iv. 14 seem to rest on Jas. v. 16; its close presents a reminiscence of Heb. x. 22, "Let us draw near, having our hearts sprinkled ἀπὸ συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς," possibly not without influence on the memory of such passages as Matt. v. 23 sq. The close conjoining of prayer and confession is very likely due to the reminiscence of Jas. v. 16 which affected the early part of the verse.

The second grand division of the treatise on the Two Ways—that setting forth the Way of Death—occupies c. v. and consists of a long list of sins, divided in the middle by a change of construction. The first half (v. 1), consisting of twenty-three items, is parallel with the lists in ii. 2 sq. and iii. 2 sq., and ends climactically in ὑφοβία [θεοῦ] (omitted in the MS.). The second half, consisting of eighteen items, is new and ends in the climax, πανθαμάρτητοι. The section opens with a general description which seems not unlikely to include a reminiscence to 2 Peter ii. 14, 15 (κατάρως τέκνα κ.τ.λ.). The items that are adduced are all clearly Christian and biblical, but can be assigned to special passages only with considerable doubt. In v. 2 the phrase ἀγαποῦντες ψεύδος somewhat forcibly recalls Rev. xxii. 15, where, however, φιλέω is the verb used; a little lower down οὐ κολλώμενος ἀγαθῷ recalls Rom. xii. 9; and still lower there seems a reminiscence to Isa. i. 23 in "loving vanity," etc.

The sixth chapter, opening with a warning against deserting the teaching of the book (vi. 1), closes the whole

work with a tender word of allowance (vi. 2) and a strict caution against idolatry (vi. 3), recalling, in this last point, the last words of 1 John,—though perhaps not so sharply as to prove dependence on it. The first clause of vi. 2 recalls Acts xv. 10 and Matt. xi. 29, while the second clause recalls (though with a broader reference) Matt. xix. 21. The teaching of 1 Cor. viii. sq. is precisely that which is summed up in vi. 3. This chapter is a fit conclusion to the treatise, and brings it symmetrically to an end. The last verse appears clearly a part of the Two Ways, and only accidentally begins with a phrase parallel with the section-headings to succeed (cf. Harnack, etc., p. 40 sq.).

As the result of this somewhat long discussion we may form a table of the Scriptures used by our author, and a synopsis of his train of thought. The latter has already been given.²³ For the former it will be enough to say in a recapitulatory way that the writer has used apparently besides certain Old Testament books, canonical (such as Exodus, Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, and Isaiah) and apocryphal (Tobit and Sirach), the following New Testament books:—Matthew, Acts, Romans, 1 Corinthians, 1 Thessalonians, (Ephesians), [Colossians], Hebrews, James, (2 Peter²⁴), Jude, [Revelation].²⁵

THEOLOGY AND ETHICS OF THE TWO WAYS.

The meaning of the prominence of the ethical, as distinguished from what is called theological, teaching in these chapters is not to be determined apart from their object and aim. The comparison with the Epistle of James, which has been suggested by many writers, is premature, until the relation of these opening chapters to the remainder of the Didache has been settled. If we judge that the Didachographer has simply incorporated here a catechetical treatise which he found already in use, an

²³ See above, p. 119 sq.

²⁴ Cf. (with judgment) Harnack, Prolegom. p. 15.

²⁵ For the whole subject of relation to Scripture, cf. Schaff, pp. 78–95.

explanation of its purely ethical contents may be suggested, with some plausibility, which would be altogether out of place, if we judge that he has composed this catechism for himself. In either case, however, the use which he has made of it is not such as will justify our declaring that it represented Christianity to him and contained all that he considered that Christians need concern themselves about. As a matter of mere fact the reception of the act of baptism, before which (vii. 1) this teaching was to be received, implies a much greater amount of teaching of theological truth than is given in these chapters. The meaning of the rite itself has not been explained: nor would the recipient, had he been taught only what is here stated, know so much as what the triune name in which it was administered meant. The name of Jesus is not once named in the whole catechism: the fact of sonship, to say nothing of its meaning, is not once spoken of. The Holy Spirit himself is only mentioned once, and that wholly by the way and incidentally. To the candid student it will be clear that chapters i.-vi. were to the Didachographer, not the catechism properly so-called, or body of truth to be taught the catechumen by which he was fitted for baptism: but the formal declaration to the catechumen at the moment of baptism, of the mode of life that solemn act entailed upon him. They are not so much the catechism as what in modern language we should call the "charge" to the catechumens. They represent, thus, not what seemed to the Didachographer the essential elements of Christianity, but what seemed to him the essential nature of the Christian walk: not the nature of Christianity, but the character of Christian life: not what was to be believed, but what was to be done: not the theology of Christianity, but its ethics. In this view of the matter we cannot appeal even to Origen's saying that Christ taught beginners the law, and only the perfect the gospel. These chapters do not represent the teaching given to beginners: they constitute only the solemn charge as to the life they

were henceforth to live in the world, given by the officiating officer at the moment of baptism to those who, already properly instructed for that act, appeared to receive the sign and seal of the new birth, and to have "the beautiful name" named upon them. And this is the most natural view of the aim and object of these chapters, whether they are considered the product of the same pen that wrought the rest of the *Didache* or older material found ready to his hand and freely incorporated into his work. For in the latter case, he would most naturally use the matter which he adopted because already in use, for the purpose for which he found it in use. And it is apparent that he uses, if not composes, these chapters as the charge to the neophytes about to be baptized."

If this is probable, we are not surprised at not finding our present chapters more theological. They have nothing to do with faith, but deal with immediate and practical duty. And we can ask after their theology only as we ask after the theology of any other practical charge,—that is, we can only seek to discover from chance hints dropped in them what theology was held by their author. And so far from being able to attribute to him only the theology which we can find trace of in such a treatise, we can only hope to run across an occasional remark in it that may give us a hint as to his theology in its broadest and most shadowy outlines. This treatise is not unusually barren of such hints: it is rather rich in them for a document of its class. The writer's doctrine of God, for instance, is tolerably fully revealed to us. We might not, indeed, be able to confidently determine his attitude towards such a conception as that of the Trinity, although iv. 10 is big with obscure hints. What is this Spirit (*τὸ*

calls,—or, according to another and perhaps better reading, who *came to call*? Obscure hints, these,—from which we scarce dare draw inferences. But certainly the Holy Ghost and his work on the human heart is here alluded to; and if he who came to call men is Jesus, then, he is specifically called God,—not so very strange a thing when we remember that the Christians of Bithynia were distinguished in Pliny's time (cir. 105 A.D.) for just this,—that they sang hymns of praise to Christ as God. The strangeness of these hints resides only in the fact that they stand alone in these chapters,—and elsewhere in them neither Holy Spirit nor Jesus is named nor even certainly alluded to. Even the oddness of this, however, passes away when we remember the nature of the treatise that we are dealing with.

The creatorship of God is openly asserted in i. 2; and that by his plastic power (*πλάσμα θεοῦ*, v. 2) children come into life. His omnipresent and unceasing watch over events is declared in iii. 10: "Without God, nothing comes to pass." He is God over all, and as such to be feared (iv. 10); our Master (iv. 11); the searcher of hearts (iv. 10), and hater of all that is evil (iv. 12). Goodness is the essential quality of all his acts (iii. 10). It is he who is the recompenser of the reward (iv. 7): and there is no respect of persons with him (iv. 10). Love is demanded of us towards him, because it was he who made us (i. 2): honor belongs to him (iv. 1), and fear (iv. 10). To be lacking in fear to him is the climax of sin (v. 1 end),—a trait drawn, perhaps, from reminiscence of the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

Over against God there is no other. The unity of God is not, indeed, asserted—as it could not well be in such a treatise.²⁴ But idolatry is repeatedly forbidden (v. 1), and all that leads to it (iii. 4): and the beings worshipped by the offerings of the heathen are but "dead gods" (vi. 3).

²⁴ On the other hand, if we had here a true catechism for heathen catechumens, this *must* have been asserted.

God has made known his will to men through commandments (iv. 13), and has therefore a word (iv. 1), which is proclaimed to them by special servants, who are therefore to receive honor. The sacredness of the word is insisted upon: the reverential awe that it inspires is not obscurely hinted at (iii. 8) where it is declared that it is a mark of those in the way of life that they continually tremble at the words they hear. It lays a yoke on men's necks (vi. 2), but makes them perfect if they bear it; for (iv. 8) it brings them what is imperishable as distinguished from mortal things. No teaching is to be received that is "apart from God" (vi. 1), and having received, as they have, his commandments, they are to guard them well and preserve them from addition no less than loss (iv. 13). Nothing is said as to these commandments being written; but there is unmistakably contained in these passages something very like a doctrine of sacred Scripture, and that doctrine might very well be expressed in the modern formula that the word of God (iv. 1, iv. 13) is the sufficient (vi. 2, iv. 8) and sole (vi. 1, iv. 13) rule of faith and practice. Clearly a definite revelation from God of his will—not to be added to, not to be taken from—leading to salvation, is here presupposed. It would be impossible to find this revelation in the Old Testament only: it is not the Old Testament law that the writer of the treatise professes to be explaining, but the teaching of the apostles; and it is from the New Testament that all his spirit and most of his commands are taken. Yet the Old Testament is not set aside: the laws of the decalogue shine through his own,—Isaiah and Sirach yield him sacred words. But along with these are words from Matthew, Acts, Romans, 1 Corinthians, 1 Thessalonians, Ephesians, [Colossians], Jude, James, (2 Peter), Hebrews, [Revelation]. Were not these part of his sacred deposit—which could not be taken from nor added to? Like the closely related (in tendency and time) Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs, Paul's work and word is apparently for him written in the

sacred books (*βίβλοι ἁγίαι*),—not substituted for them, but adjoined to them." In any event, he knows a definite word of God, to be honored as such and to be preserved intact and unalloyed: and he uses these new books, too, as parts of a very important sacred teaching.

The doctrine of salvation held by our writer is less clearly adumbrated in his words. The whole scheme of his treatise proclaims the necessity of a holy life: the two ways of life and death separate just in this,—one is in holiness, the other in vice. And the judge is a just recompenser of the reward. But the difference between them lies equally revealed also in this: those who walk in the one, love God and their neighbor. And the good works of the way of life are but the fruit of the inner dispositions (iii. 2 sq.). If, in a single passage, alms-giving is looked upon as working a ransoming of sins (iv. 6);³⁷ so also in another (iv. 10) and closely neighboring passage it is the Spirit, not man's own will, that determines whom God shall come upon to call. It is openly asserted that God calls men: and that not according to the outward condition in which they live, but according to the preparation of the Spirit. We need not be sticklers for the entire theological consistency of our author: a Jewish-Christian heritage probably shows itself in the stress laid upon alms-giving. But neither need we make him unnecessarily inconsistent: probably he placed salvation in the hands of God, but made much of the necessity of works, and is to be placed not far from the attitude of James (ii. 14 sq.). Faith is not once mentioned in the treatise; which need not surprise us, however, in such a treatise.

Unto what God calls men (iv. 10) is not more plainly indicated than by the word life (i. 1) as over against death. There seems to be a deliverance contemplated from both

³⁷ Compare, for a curious parallel, the tenth of the paragraphs of the manifesto of the Jews of southern Russia of our own day.

³⁸ Compare, for the prevalence of this doctrine in the early church, Uhlhorn's *Christian Charity in the Early Church*, p. 211.

the curse of sin (iv. 6) and its power (*passim*). And what is obtained from God is imperishable in contrast to what is mortal (iv. 8). The fate of the wicked is called only death. When the meek are promised the inheritance of the earth (iii. 7), we are left in darkness as to the exact understanding of the words which our writer held. It is only certain that he loved holiness and dreaded a curse of death.

The ethics of the treatise are high and in the best sense Christian. The simplicity and immediate practical purpose of the writer makes it almost as difficult, however, to trace an ethical theory in his words as to draw his theology out of them. This much, however, is plain, that right and wrong were plain and tangible facts to him, and the difference between them great (i. 1). His conscience of wrong was keen enough to pierce beneath acts to dispositions, beneath appearances to the roots of evil (iii. 1). His appreciation of the good was sufficiently cultivated to specially admire that meek sisterhood of graces which it was reserved for Christianity to awaken the consciousness and love of in the world (iii. 7 sq.). The Christian spirit is further shown in the summing up of all duty in love to God and our neighbor (i. 2), and, like the Proverbs of the old dispensation, finding the beginning of wisdom in the fear of God (iv. 9, 10). Not mere conscience, which, however, is recognized as the monitor of man (iv. 14), but the commandments of God (iv. 13), furnish the standard of duty: and these commandments are conveniently summed up in the decalogue of the Old Testament as broadened and deepened by the interpretations of Jesus (ii., iii., v.). The external norm of virtue, thus, is what is pleasing to God (iv. 12); its internal norm a tender conscience (iv. 14); while a convenient rule of negative action is found in the Golden Rule (i. 2).

Underlying the whole treatise runs an appeal to a virtuous life, based on the diverse ends to which evil and good conduct lead. The way of virtue is the way of life:

that of evil, of death. The chief motive to good that is appealed to is thus the hope of reward and fear of punishment (i. 1; i. 2 b.; ii. 4; iii. 7; iv. 6, 7; v. 2). Righteousness has its reward (v. 2): we give in the hope to receive again (iv. 7) and to work out a ransoming of our sins (iv. 6). Yet we must hesitate to attribute too grossly utilitarian an ethic to the author: the New Testament side by side with its lofty appeal to conscience places an equally strong appeal to the recompense of the reward; and our author ranges among the most heinous sinners those that seek after reward (v. 2); and, though he probably meant this in a human relation, his divine theories may have partaken of the same principle. As a matter of fact, too, appeal is made to other motives: we are to choke down evil dispositions, because they lead to evil deeds (iii. 2 sq.), whence evil seems hateful for its own sake (iv. 12); and a desire for perfection is evidently a strong and leading force to the writer (vi. 2) and is used to determine action,—whence good seems lovable for its own sake. So a remembrance of the blessedness of what we have received is used as a motive to further good (iv. 8). Even pure love of souls appears as a motive capable of moving men to watchful care over their conduct (iv. 10). We need not seek perfect singleness of motive: it is thoroughly consistent to use both higher and lower considerations to secure the same end, and it does not argue that our author had no love for holiness that he pleads the future retribution and reward as a motive to it. On the contrary, he appears to have a very high appreciation of its beauty and a keen insight into its loveliness. Most concisely stated, his ethical system appears distinctly Christian, and, as such, separated as decidedly from the merely Jewish as from the heathen morality of the times.*

Certain difficulties are found in the apparent sanction of classes or castes of virtue in vi. 2, and the apparent crossing of the evangelical law of love to our neighbor in ii. 7.

* Sabatier is extreme in his statements of its Jewish affinities.

We should be very sure that we rightly understand the passages, however, before we introduce an inconsistency of teaching in so well-ordered a treatise. Perhaps in the latter case the exaggeration of the final clause of ii. 7 is the saving clause. And we must recollect that this verse occurs in the midst of the negative portion of the treatise, where "thou shalt not hate any man" is the counterpart of "thou shalt love thy neighbor." The added positive clauses are in this point of view a concession to the Christian heart of the writer, and culminate in the command to love some at least not only as, but above, ourselves. In the face of the positive command at i. 2 and these added clauses here we are not justified in seeing a lowering of the demands of our Lord's rule in our present passage. The meaning of vi. 2 has been clouded by too much discussion. It ought to be a principle not to go out of the context for an interpretation: and certainly the context says nothing of chastity, or celibacy, or the Jewish law. Verse 1 warns the reader against being led astray from *this* way of teaching; where "this" must refer to the requirements laid down in the previous chapters. Verse 2 joins on to this with "for," and therefore has to do with the same subject. He who keeps the whole yoke of the law, therefore, is he who puts into full practice all the precepts that had been in the preceding chapters enunciated; and he who does so will be τέλειος—a term used apparently in the exact sense of Matt. xix. 21. But the author recognizes that sanctification is striven after, rather than attained, and adds a clause apparently designed to preserve the young Christian from hopeless despair and to encourage him to fight his good fight in hope: "But if thou art not able to bear the whole yoke of the Lord, do what thou art able." It is the pastor that speaks here, as elsewhere in the treatise; the pastor, who encourages and aids the lambs. So far from there being recognized here, therefore, two distinct classes in the church—the Montanistic conception which Hilgenfeld seeks to fasten upon

these words,—or two stages of attainment: there is only revealed a mild and tolerant spirit that makes more of the upward striving than of the self-righteous attainment. Again the conception appears Christian.

The detailed ethical teaching of the treatise, which is very rich and very compressed, can best be observed in reading it over with the help of the analysis which has been presented above. It cannot be justly estimated unless we carefully bear in mind that the treatment is first negative (ii.-iii. 1-6) and then positive (iii. 7-iv.) and then negative again (v.)—the first negative treatment pointing out the sins that he who is travelling in the way of life must avoid, and the second those which are characteristic of the way of death. Negatively all sins of anger and murder, lust and impurity, sorcery and idolatry, lying and theft, necromancy and blasphemy, and all others that beget them or resemble them are distinctly forbidden. A sharp analysis is made which carries back the sin of act into the sin of disposition: and special attention is paid to sins of deceit and pride. In the positive portion a step higher than even this is taken; not only freedom from evil dispositions, but positive dispositions to good, are demanded, and especially those virtues are singled out for notice which the heathen world despised and which make men gentle,—meekness, long-suffering, mercy, harmlessness, quietness, goodness, teachableness, loveliness of soul. And at the end it is commanded that association be sought, not with the lofty, but with the just and the lowly. In harmony with this feature much space is given to prescribing the duties to the poor, including cheerful and ready giving as lending to the Lord, and just sharing with the Lord's little ones as the recipients ourselves of better things from him. So, too, justice and tenderness in dealing with slaves are enjoined and secured by a Christian sanction. On the other hand the slave is to reverence his master as seeing in him the image of the Master of all, God. The treatise is so compressed, however, that to make an abstract of it would

be to transcribe it. It is only needful here to point out the main lines of its teaching.

Attention should not fail to be given to the truly religious character of the whole ethical teaching of the treatise. It is in no part simply ethical but in all its purpose and details, religious; and it would be more precise to speak of its counsels of sanctification than of its moral teaching. This is apparent, for instance, in its care to secure the performance of our earthly duties by referring them to what may most specifically be called our duty to God. The duty of parents to their children that swallows up all others is that from their youth up they shall teach them the fear of God. The motive for restraining bitter commands to slaves is lest they should lose their fear of Him who is Lord over both master and servant.

There is also evidently a very rich church life underlying the commands of our treatise. The commandments or word of God, which has been received as a sacred and unalterable deposit (iv. 13), is proclaimed unto them by an official person (iv. 1) whom they are bidden to honor as the Lord himself and to remember night and day,—apparently in order to his support. It is with the saints (cf. iii. 9) that their daily life is to be passed and their social life to be lived (iv. 2). The unity of the church is to be a matter of study to them and schism is to be avoided (iv. 3). What officers the church had,— what organization it had received,— what power of government and discipline,— what connection with other churches,—of all this we obtain no hint. But it seems certain that there was such a thing as may be called a church—consisting of saints, taught by an accredited teacher, and the unity of which was important. The usages of the church are also left

fession of sins and prayer, although it is still most probable that the reference here is to public worship. From iv. 1 it appears that public teaching was a part of the church work. Beyond this we have nothing.

Lechler⁴⁰ is no doubt dealing in his estimate of the theological and religious teaching of the *Didache* with the whole treatise, but what he says is in great degree applicable to this section taken separately. It is brightly "illuminated with the evening glow of the apostolic radiance," and is dominated everywhere by the conviction that eternal life has been revealed by Jesus Christ,—the strange assurance that seemed to Lucian the most striking characteristic of Christians. Though the confession of Christ and the call of faith fall here into the background, and the purity of the Christian walk forms the chief subject, yet even here it is God who calls and prepares the journeyers on the path of life and who sustains and brings to completion his church.

To speak of the "tendency" of such a treatise is somewhat of a misnomer. Its "tendency" is Christian and, apart from a doubtful tenet or two, orthodox, so far as we can trace it. There are not lacking, however, signs of Jewish inheritance and it seems most natural, in every way, to attribute it to a Jewish Christian of the same type as the authors of St. James' Epistle and of the Testt. XII. Patriarchs, which three Canon Spence rightly draws together. Internal evidence is silent as to place of composition and the time is only so far defined as to be consistent with a very early date. The use of the treatise by Barnabas on the one hand, and its use of Paul and Matthew on the other, give us the pretty wide limits of the last quarter of the first century. Sober judgment in recognition of this will place it somewhere earlier than, but near, A. D. 100.

⁴⁰ *Das Apostolische und Nachapostolische Zeitalter*, 3 ed., 1885.

ARTICLE VI.
CRITICAL NOTES.

A DEFENCE OF DRUMMOND.

IN the *Expositor* (London, Hodder and Stoughton) for April and May, some one has come to the "defence" of Professor Drummond's book. Perhaps it is the author himself. The fact is recognized that "its method of reasoning has been objected to, its central principle has been pronounced an illusion, and nearly every one of the applications of this principle has been denied by some critic or other." We have had our say in showing that, if fairly and carefully tested by the laws of thought, the book by no means establishes at all, even as a partial thesis, or in a single instance, what it professes to establish. It must stand in logic, or else fall; and plainly it does not stand. Whether the religious ideas it attempted to place on a new platform of physical uniformities are correct or not, and whether the novel analogies it suggests are just or not, no identity of law in the two realms is made out. The "defence" says that the author "was struck with the identity of a few of the laws governing both regions," and "leapt to the vast generalization that the laws of both *might* be identical;" but "he does not pretend to have proved it: as yet it is merely a hypothesis awaiting proof." "He does not yet ask the public assent to it except to the extent of the few illustrations of it which he has produced." An unintended inaccuracy of language here is nearer the truth than more correct phraseology would have been. Professor Drummond's cases *are* illustrations, not exemplifications, as they should have been to help out his "vast generalization." An example would do more than throw light on its meaning, as an illustration or analogy can: it would establish the truth exemplified. It would give us matter of fact. Plainly his translation of spiritual laws into the language of uniform facts of matter gives us nothing of the kind.

It is often possible to restate a law or prevailing fact of a particular kind in language less precise and specific, which will allow some sort of application to facts of an entirely different kind. Professor Drummond might have taken this course, as we have intimated,¹ and as an after-thought it seems to have occurred to the writer of the "defence." "Already in Scripture," he says, "there may be found laws of wide sweep which are identical in both spheres; as, for example, the favorite saying of our Lord,—*To him that hath shall more be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him who hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.*" The terms "hath," "given," "abundance," "taken," belonged originally in the physical sphere beyond question; but they are not so used by our Saviour here. They are transferred to the spiritual sphere, and are employed in this connection in

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. xlii. (April, 1885) pp. 274, 278.

this sphere alone. Godet says, "This apothegm . . . expresses one of the profoundest laws of the spiritual world." Cf. Alford *in loc.* "He in whom there is no spark of spiritual desire nor meekness to receive the engrafted word, has taken from him even that which he 'seemeth to have' (Luke)." (In Rev. Vers., 1881, "thinketh he hath.") The saying may have been, as a proverb among the Jews, previously applied only to worldly affairs. Christ certainly does not so apply it all. If money or wealth followed the word "hath," in the proverb, it could not be applied as a law (but only by analogy) to spiritual things; if the word truth followed "hath," in our Saviour's language, it could not be applied (save by analogy) to things secular. Ambiguous or elliptical expressions, of course, can be transferred at will from one realm to another. Thus Godet says, "Acquisitions are made only by means of, and in proportion to, what is already possessed." State this as a specific quasi "law" of either worldliness or spirituality,—prefix worldly or spiritual to "acquisitions,—and then it is a uniform fact in one realm,—not the same law in two different realms. It is its vagueness alone, i. e., its statement in elliptical, ambiguous phraseology, that makes it *seem* to be the latter. The writer of the "defence" himself furnishes an example of this very thing which refutes himself. "It seems to us," he says, "there can be no doubt that in many cases the laws of natural and spiritual life may be stated with scientific exactness in identical terms. Here is an instance from Mr. Drummond: *Any principle which secures the safety of the individual without personal effort or the vital exercise of faculty, is disastrous to character.*" *Expositor*, p. 252. Turning to Mr. Drummond's book, the principle stated there is a very different one. It is not propounded as a common law of the two worlds, by any means. He is speaking of the spiritual world alone; and he prefixes the word "moral" to the word "character"! Amer. Ed., p. 326. Was the omission of this all-essential word in the "defence" inaccuracy or unfairness? Is there any excuse for it, since the book says explicitly, "The spiritual principle to be illustrated stands thus: *Any principle which secures the safety of the individual without personal effort,*" etc., "*is disastrous to MORAL character.*" The word moral is necessary here to make this a spiritual statement at all. And as such, Professor Drummond certainly never thought of applying it to the Hermit Crab, the Sacculina, the Dodder, or the Mistletoe. Have these things moral character? Nor could he, after stating the principle as a law of natural objects, transfer it to religion, save by analogy.

Why do not these advocates of the obliteration of distinctions between things that so differ quote Paul's saying, *Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap*? Is it not a clear, crowning example of the identity of two distinct sets of phenomena, the agricultural and the moral? Does it not affirm identical sequence of cause and consequent in both? It may, to those who cannot distinguish between figurative language and literal. "Sow" and "reap" are literally agricultural; never literally moral, only metaphorically so. The law of reaping obtains only where reaping is literally possible. Retire from Paul's saying all words that point to the literal facts from which it is

generalized ; substitute for "soweth," a definite, distinct term, the indefinite term "doth," and for "reap," the indefinite phrase "receive in kind again," — and this rhetorical change seems to make of the uniformity stated a more comprehensive "law," true alike in two different realms. But it is only in seeming: it becomes more comprehensive *by losing the character of law*. Do and receive, or their equivalents, doubtless, once had such physical meanings as sow and reap have still. But these have quite faded out. And other words which are still literal are necessary to give any proposition in which these words are used the meaning of a law in any realm, by indicating the realm. It is only loose thinking to assert that the saying, *whatsoever a man doth he shall receive in kind again*, is a more general law in any realm. In what realm, pray?

We are obliged to say, what seems very elementary, that indefiniteness is not generification, or even generalization. Take out of a statement an essential term, which makes it a law in any department of science, and you simply render it indefinite, you do not erect it into a higher generalization. The misquotation of Mr. Drummond above is by no means a generification, under which certain parasites and semi-parasites in natural history are one species, and certain religious persons another and co-ordinate species. It hardly ought to be needful to say this, but the persistent violation of simple laws of thought makes it so. The writer of the "defence" asks: "Can any diversity in the nature of two different sets of objects render it certain, before observation, that the law of their existence, in the sense of 'an ascertained or working order among phenomena,' which is all that Mr. Drummond means by the term, cannot be identical? The primary laws of logic are well-known instances of laws which apply equally to objects the most diverse in the world of matter and the world of mind." This is a fair reflex of the loose thinking of Professor Drummond's book. To material *objects* the primary laws of logic do not apply at all, but to concepts of them, that is, to objects in the world of mind alone. Will those who assert in this indefinite and absurd way of things that differ,—who try to turn the veriest inexactness into "scientific exactness,"—be good enough to show how the axioms of non-contradiction and excluded middle apply to things as they do to thoughts! Is there no difference between the quantification of the predicate in judgments and quantitative analysis in chemistry? True it is, that a principle stated in proper terms, showing of what (scientifically) it is true, can be decanted into such indeterminate and uncertain expressions that it may be affirmed of almost every thing. But such "airy nothings" never deserve the name of laws. An "ascertained order" of one class of phenomena is not an order of another class.¹ There are limits to this style

delusive and anti-scientific fashion — "the application of Natural Law . . . has decided and necessary limits;" viz., to natural or physical phenomena alone.

It is easy, now, to dispose of the claim made by the "defence," that the book under criticism has put certain truths for the first time "in a seeing form." Is there any more "seeing" in this fallacious way of putting religion into phraseology true only of other things, than in legitimate and logical forms of statement? Is theology tricked out in the guise of natural science any better recognized than it is in its own dress? It may be, for the student of science, "only a step from the fields which he has been investigating to this new field," where he is assured that he will meet the old uniformities, or "working order among phenomena," transferred by some legerdemain from matter to spirit; but is there no danger of his finding himself grievously misled, and missing the spiritual laws altogether? The writer of the "defence" seems to aim to forestall this by asserting that his author has made the great discovery that "the spiritual is experienced no less than the natural, and many facts of religion are as accessible to human observation as the facts of science"! We deny any discovery altogether. Nothing is better known among Christian thinkers than all this. Indeed, the writer admits that it is a method of verifying religion "which has long been used practically, whether theology has acknowledged it or not." Theology *has always* acknowledged it. But when this is lauded as a new method of apologetics, theologians have reason to demur. The legitimate use of the experience of converted men does not warrant any illegitimate use of it. And to make other religious facts, on which conversion itself rests, in turn rest upon the facts of conversion, incontestable as they are, is plainly illegitimate.

Let us put together two paragraphs from the *Expositor*. Speaking of the religious inquirer, it is asserted:

"He believes there is such a thing as salvation, not merely because the Bible has said so, but because he is a saved man: he believes Christ is a divine Saviour, not only because this is stated in Scripture, but because Christ has saved himself," 247.

"From the saved individual he will work his way back to the facts of redemption; and from these he will pass to the record of redemption in the Scriptures, thus leading the inquirer step by step to the most elevated position occupied by the old apologetic." *Ibid.*

If this means merely that experience, as an after and additional witness, confirms the word of God; that having with docility received the doctrine, doing His will satisfies us that it came from God; it is only what has been thoroughly known from the beginning until now. But evidently it is not. It is a substitution. It proposes to reach "the most elevated position" by a new and different route from the legitimate one of Christian evidence. It puts the subjective in place of the objective. For the use of the facts of Christian experience is made to rest upon the false principle of the book; viz., the identity of spiritual law with physical law. Given certain facts in

religious life, and certain analogous phenomena in the world, their asserted identity is a "new credential" of religion. *Not at all!*

For what do the facts in religious life rest upon? Upon the religion of which they furnish the new credential, or upon what? If the former, what are its credentials? Is a man saved without the facts of redemption to which he works back? If so, how? and on what basis? Plainly upon one without redemption. What becomes, then, of the imagined identity between this non-redemptive basis and a redemptive one not yet known? Whether a man may be actually redeemed without knowing all this? is not now the question; but whether he can *know* any identity between a known credential of—any thing, and a yet unknown one. How does salvation begin? Is the record of Scripture pushed aside for the basis of science? No, the "defence" would say; but for the identity of the laws of science with those of the religious life. Let us first see if we have any such thing as religious life, and what it is! Without knowing Christ as a divine Saviour, can any individual who has heard of Him know that he is saved by Him? saved as if there were no record of redemption? That he performs certain mental acts, he can of course know: but salvation is not a mental act. It demands an objective basis, or it is nothing. As Paul says: "If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain; your faith is also vain; ye are yet in your sins." Paul knew much of faith and subjective salvation in experience; he knew much of the objective historic resurrection of our Lord; though he knew nothing of biogenesis, or of any identity of its law with the law of spiritual life, or of his Master's founding Christianity "upon it in its most literal form." A non-scientific fact attested by abundant and irrefragable testimony as the basis and credential of the experience of saved individuals, to whom Christ had been preached, he knew well. Matthew Arnold, in his "Comment on Christmas," contradicts all this. Miracle is legend, with him, and not for a moment to be believed. Yet men are "saved" outside of Bible truth!—for salvation is but the acquisition of self-control, purity, conformity to "the eternal order," whatever this may be. This—flinging away all biblical miracle, resurrection and all, Christ's or ours—is what men acquire from Christ, by naturalistic salvation. And then he agrees with Professor Drummond and his defender: "Experience of these saving results of the method and secret and temper of Jesus makes the strength of that wonderful Book"—in spite of its "immense vehicle of legend!"—"makes the strength of the Bible." The experience of a man who recognizes nothing supernatural in Christ is "the strength of the Bible"! Here is working back to the record with a vengeance! whether the prerequisites to experience are valid ones or fictitious ones held in abeyance till after the experience occurs! The basis in scientific "identity," etc., reduced to a subjective basis entirely! Salvation independent of any certainty whether there is any salvation! "This may yet become the universally recognized method of apologetics." It is to be hoped it may not. Else will apologetics need to be apologized for.

In the second part of the 'Defence' (*Expositor* for May) it is manifest that

some friend of Professor Drummond is defending him from criticism. He does not regard all parts of the book as satisfactory. He makes, or quotes, remarks which recognize analogy as distinct from identity. E. g. that *Knowledge* (Sept. 1884) recognizes Professor D—'s handling of "*illustrations* from the more recondite phenomena of the development of life" and "*the parallelism of the laws regulating the development with the principles of Christianity.*" But this is quoted in a note to an assertion that students of science passing into the field of religious experience will "*see the same reign [!] of law in a higher order of things.*" A singular instance of distinction and confusion of thought blended may be seen in the following: "Starting with this doctrine of biogenesis, he [Professor D—] has thought out the whole of Christian experience *on this line* [sic] and then, laying this *alongside of the revelation of truth made in science*, has shown the two to be in remarkable accord." He seems to imagine that to say that a Christian minister looked upon a man on the threshold of Christ's kingdom who nevertheless does not choose to enter it with "the same wondering impatience with which a biologist" sees "the component elements of protoplasm arranged beneath the lens of his microscope" ready for the coming of life which does not come, is to prove that the man and the protoplasm, in the two cases, are under the same natural, i. e., physical law! Whether the rule of uniformity, *omne vivum ex vivo*, is identical in two different realms, depends upon the question whether "life" in the two realms is identical, or whether merely two different things are called by the same name because of the poverty of language.

One or two points of Professor Drummond's belief come out in this defence. He is said to reject the notion that evolution has proceeded "from matter up to the highest forms of life, without the intervention of the creative hand," and also the notion that changes occur in animal and plant "life" across the lines of species. The writer also denies that he teaches by implication the figment of conditional immortality. But as to his having given "a new demonstration of immortality" in his chapter on eternal life, no one will assert this who does not start with accepting the erroneous thesis of his book. Mere imagination, every one ought to know who has access to Bishop Butler's immortal work, is incapable of constructing a demonstration.

GEO. F. MAGOUN.

MORMONISM AND THE SPAULDING MANUSCRIPT.

Mrs. Ellen E. Dickinson, in her recent work entitled *New Light on Mormonism*,¹ introduces herself as a grand-niece of Solomon Spaulding, who wrote "the romance called *The Manuscript Found*, from which the Book of Mormon was formulated." Her leading purpose seems to be to show that the Book of Mormon had its literary origin in an historical romance written by Solomon Spaulding, but never published by him, and

¹ With Introduction by Thurlow Weed. New York: Funk and Wagnalls. 1885. (pp. 272. 6×3¼.)

never intended to serve the purpose to which it has been perverted. The volume doubtless derives its title from the effort to establish this theory of the origin of the Book of Mormon, although it contains other matter connected with the history of Mormonism and the character of its doctrines. The book is vigorously and clearly written, and makes a strong impression of the wickedness of this great delusion of modern times.

The author clearly distinguishes between the Mormonism of Utah, as established by Brigham Young, and that of the Josephites, led by Joseph Smith, Jr., who indignantly repudiate polygamy and regard the system maintained in Utah as a great apostasy; yet she maintains that Joseph Smith, the father, received a revelation at Nauvoo encouraging polygamy, and had made a beginning in its practice. The proof of this is in the fact that Brigham Young, some years afterward, set forth such a revelation, claiming that Smith received it in 1843, but did not publish it. The Josephites deny this utterly, and charge the revelation as an imposture of Young.

There seems little in common between the two bodies of Mormons, except that they both hold the Book of Mormon as a revelation and Joseph Smith as a prophet. But the Book of Mormon contains no new system of religion, and could not of itself have given rise to the organized iniquity which prevails in Utah. It was only as the Book of Mormon was supplemented by further pretended revelations invented by shrewd and unscrupulous men that the mischief grew. It may be claimed, not unreasonably, that the credulity and superstition which could accept the Book of Mormon as a revelation made ultimate Mormonism possible.

The question chiefly discussed in Mrs. Dickinson's little volume, whether the Book of Mormon originated in a manuscript of Solomon Spaulding, is interesting, but by no means of special importance. The book is not so wonderful that it could not have been produced by Joseph Smith or Sidney Rigdon, or some other of the shrewd and unscrupulous, but uncultivated, leaders of the delusion. There is no occasion to go far to find its origin. It might be satisfactory to trace it to a definite source in the Spaulding manuscript, but Mormonism, as it exists at present, has so little connection with the Book of Mormon that such a discovery would scarcely disturb it.

Mrs. Dickinson's theory is that Rev. Solomon Spaulding, a graduate of Dartmouth College, living at Conneaut, O., in 1810-12, wrote an historical romance purporting to give the origin and history of the people occupying the continent in the early ages, whose remains are found in the ancient mounds and earthworks scattered over the country,—that Spaulding carried this manuscript to Pittsburg, Pa., and left it for some months in the printing office of Robert Patterson, whom he had asked to print it,—that while it was lying in this office Sidney Rigdon, who was *probably* employed there as a printer, took a copy of it, and fifteen years afterward, in collusion with Joseph Smith, wrought out of this manuscript the Book of Mormon.

Many of the facts on which this theory rests are proved beyond question. Spaulding wrote such a manuscript, which he called *The Manuscript Found*, because he represented it as a translation of an ancient record which he had

found buried in a mound not far from his house in Conneaut. This manuscript he was accustomed to read to his neighbors gathered at his house, during the progress of its composition, and there are persons still living who heard the reading from time to time as the work went on. Twenty years or more afterward, when the Book of Mormon was brought into Northern Ohio, in connection with the preaching of Sidney Rigdon, some of Spaulding's old neighbors, as they listened to the new revelation, were reminded of the readings which they had heard so many years before, and seemed to recognize names and incidents as the same in the two documents. Thus the idea gained currency that the Book of Mormon had its origin in the manuscript of Solomon Spaulding.

In 1834, E. D. Howe, of Painesville, O., about to publish a book entitled *Mormonism Unveiled*, arranged with Dr. D. P. Hurlbut, of Conneaut, to go to Mrs. Spaulding, then living with her daughter in Munson, Mass., to procure from her the old manuscript of her husband, who had died in Amity, Pa., eighteen years before. The manuscript was supposed to be at that time in an old trunk, at the house of a cousin of Mrs. Spaulding, in Hartwick, N. Y. Hurlbut obtained an order from Mrs. Spaulding [Davidson], found the manuscript, and delivered it, as he claims, to Mr. Howe at Painesville. It did not prove to be what was expected. It was a manuscript of Spaulding, corresponding in many general qualities with the traditional character of *The Manuscript Found*; but it was clearly not the basis of the Book of Mormon, and did not serve the purpose which they had anticipated. This manuscript was in Mr. Howe's possession several years, and was finally lost, Mr. Hurlbut having failed, according to his promise, to return it to Mrs. Spaulding.

At this point Mrs. Dickinson introduces the supposition that Hurlbut obtained *two* manuscripts from the old trunk, one of which he delivered to Howe, and the other, *The Manuscript Found*, he treacherously sold to the Mormons. This charge Hurlbut denied to the day of his death, in 1882. Mr. Howe, in a letter to Hurlbut dated August 7, 1880 (p. 259), says: "Hardly a year passes that I do not receive more or less inquiries, some of which seem to reflect on your honesty in regard to the manuscript obtained from that wonderful old trunk, that was all explained truthfully in the book I published; as I then believed, and have ever since, that Spaulding's Manuscript Found was never found or received by you." Yet, in an interview with Mrs. Dickinson (p. 273), Howe is represented as expressing a suspicion of Hurlbut's fair dealing in the matter.

The manuscript which Hurlbut actually delivered to Howe was recently discovered in the possession of L. L. Rice, Esq., of Honolulu, and has been forwarded by him to the Library of Oberlin College for safe keeping. A brief notice of this manuscript was given in the January number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1885. In many general features this manuscript fulfils the conditions of the *Manuscript Found*. The package in its wrapper is about an inch in thickness (p. 238). The manuscript is much worn and discolored by use as well as age, showing that it has been abundantly read and handled.

It is represented in the introduction as a translation from an ancient record found in a mound near the author's dwelling (pp. 15, 16). The writing of the story was suggested to the author by his interest in the ancient mounds, and the story is a professed account of the people that constructed these mounds and earthworks. The manuscript is unfinished—the story stops before the end is reached (pp. 17, 239). The manuscript fails to meet the traditional requirements of the Manuscript Found, in that there is not a name or an incident in it which is found in the Book of Mormon. It is not written in the solemn style of the accepted version of the Scriptures, as the Book of Mormon is, and as is claimed for the traditional manuscript. Yet, from a general resemblance, the manuscript and the Book of Mormon might suggest each other, and it is conceivable that one who had heard the manuscript twenty years before should be reminded of it on hearing the Book of Mormon. It is on such recollections, on the part of the old neighbors of Spaulding, that the claim is based that the Book of Mormon had its origin in a manuscript of Solomon Spaulding. The following is a transcript, with orthography corrected, of the three introductory pages of the manuscript. A crumbling of the edges of the paper occasions the loss of two or three words.

"INTRODUCTION.

"Near the west bank of the Conneaut River there are the remains of an ancient fort. As I was walking and forming various conjectures respecting the character, situation, and numbers of those people who far exceeded the present race of Indians in works of art and ingenuity, I happened to tread upon a flat stone. This was at a small distance from the fort, and it lay on the top of a great mound of earth, exactly horizontal. The face of it had a singular appearance. I discovered a number of characters which appeared to me to be letters, but so much effaced by the ravages of time that I could not read the inscription. With the assistance of a lever I raised the stone. But you may easily conjecture my astonishment when I discovered that its ends and sides rested on stones, and that it was designed as a cover to an artificial cave. I found, on examining, that its sides were lined with built in a conical form with down, and that it was about eight feet deep. Determined to investigate the design of this extraordinary work of antiquity, I prepared myself with necessary requisites for that purpose, and descended to the bottom of the cave. Observing one side to be perpendicular nearly three feet from the bottom, I began to inspect that part with accuracy. Here I noticed a big flat stone fixed in the form of a door. I immediately tore it down, and, lo, a cavity within the wall presented itself, it being about three feet in diameter from side to side, and about two feet high. Within this cavity I found an earthen box, with a cover which shut

that it contained twenty-eight rolls of parchment ; and that when appeared to be manuscripts written in an elegant hand with Roman letters in the Latin language.

"They were written on a variety of subjects. But the roll which principally attracted my attention contained a history of the author's life, and that part of America which extends along the great lakes and the waters of the Mississippi. Extracts of the most interesting and important matters contained in this roll I take the liberty to publish."

The author then proceeds with his story giving an account of a company of travellers and sailors, in the days of the Emperor Constantine, on the voyage from Rome to Britain, driven by a tempest across the ocean to the western continent. A writer in this company prepares an account of their wanderings, and their association with various tribes and nations of the original inhabitants of the country, their habits and civilization and conflicts, and leaves the record for a coming generation to discover.

On the last page, in a different hand from the body of the manuscript, is the following endorsement :

"The Writings of Solomon Spalding. Proved by Aaron Wright, Oliver Smith, John N. Miller, and others. The testimonies of these gentlemen are now in my possession.

D. P. HURLBUT."

No one who sees this manuscript can doubt its genuineness. Mr. Rice succeeded Mr. Howe in the printing office at Painesville in 1839, and thus came into possession of the manuscript, which has lain unobserved among his papers until the last year.

Yet Mrs. Dickinson says (pp. 79, 80): "It is remembered at Conneaut that he [Hurlbut] returned with a manuscript, or that was so reported. This is presumably the manuscript which E. D. Howe says was lying in his office at Painesville for years, and which the Mormons pretend was compared with 'the Golden Bible of Joseph,' at a public meeting the Mormons called for the purpose, and found to be entirely wanting in the essentials claimed for it. It was beyond question, from very strong circumstantial evidence, the *manufactured* manuscript prepared by Hurlbut, or his confederates, for the occasion." This "strong circumstantial evidence" utterly fails in sight of the manuscript.

The discovery of this manuscript does not prove that there may not have been another, which became the basis of the Book of Mormon, but it seems clearly to furnish a presumption against the existence of another ; and it is doubtful whether the evidence on the subject, thus far published, can set aside this presumption. Mrs. Dickinson follows up and presents this evidence with abundant zeal, not always with a judicial temper. Imagination seems often to supply the vacancy when facts are wanting, and the conclusion is drawn without misgiving. As an instance take the following (p. 16): "A young printer named Sidney Rigdon was in Mr. Patterson's printing house ; he had been there but a short time, and, from many indisputable facts, it is believed he had followed Mr. Spaulding from Conneaut, or its immediate neighborhood, and having heard him read *The Manuscript Found*,

and announce his plan for its publication, devised a treachery toward both author and publisher which the world has reason to remember." Now how much of this is fact, and how much fancy? Sidney Rigdon was born in 1793, and was only nineteen years of age in 1812, when Spaulding left Conneaut and went to Pittsburg. He was born in Allegheny county, Pa., and, as his relatives testify, lived in the same neighborhood until after Spaulding left Conneaut, and could not have known Spaulding or followed him. The proof is wanting that he was ever connected with Patterson's printing office, or was ever a printer at all. Rev. R. Patterson, of *The Presbyterian Banner*, of Pittsburg, the son of Patterson the printer, has published a very able monograph on this question, and he is not able to establish any connection of Rigdon with his father's printing office.

Again, (p. 32): "Smith is known to have had a copy of the Spaulding manuscript in his possession about the year 1820, or at the time when these three worthies [Smith, Rigdon, and Pratt] met, as it is certain that the scheme of the great Mormon fraud originated about this period between Smith and Rigdon." These confident assertions do not seem to have a shadow of evidence to sustain them.

Still again, the chapter (pp. 62-76) in which the author sets forth her interview with Hurlbut and with Howe, and the little incident of the delay of her trunk between Painesville and Conneaut, which she invests with great mystery, discloses an activity of the imagination little calculated to secure the reader's confidence in the results attained.

As the case now stands one must still doubt whether the Book of Mormon had its origin in a manuscript by Solomon Spaulding. One who has had experience of the uncertainty of memory after the lapse of twenty years, especially in connection with fresh occurrences which suggest resemblances and supply particulars, cannot escape the apprehension that many of the definite recollections of Spaulding's neighbors may have risen from the Book of Mormon itself. It is thus that the exact fulfilment of dreams takes place. The definiteness of the dream springs from the event with which it has some general correspondence. Of course evidence might appear within a year, or even a month, which would remove all doubt, and there are those who believe the traditional manuscript is in existence and will still come to light.

It cannot be denied that there is a strong antecedent improbability that a smart, self-confident man, like Rigdon, intellectually far more vigorous than Spaulding, should purloin, or sit down to copy, an extended manuscript of no significance or value, with the thought that he might need it at some remote future time. Still further, to one who has examined this recently discovered manuscript, it seems antecedently improbable that Spaulding could have been the author of the Book of Mormon. It would be difficult to find a greater contrast than that of the somewhat turgid and exuberant style of the manuscript, with its show of learning, and the constrained, meagre, childish style of the Book of Mormon, written in imitation of the English Scriptures. It might be thought that the attempt to imitate the

Scriptures would explain the contrast in style. But in this fact lies another improbability. The Book of Mormon is highly religious and even orthodox in its tone, permeated with Scripture conceptions, and phrases, and quotations, exhibiting remarkable reverence for the Scriptures, and familiarity with their contents on the part of the author or authors. Nothing of the kind appears in the manuscript of Spaulding recently recovered; and indeed the neighbors of Spaulding who had heard the traditional manuscript, and testified to its identity with the Book of Mormon, were careful to except various religious matters which had been introduced. But the religious matter and scripture quotations pervade the entire book, and could not have been introduced by another hand. That Spaulding had no such regard for the Scriptures, as the Book of Mormon indicates, no such familiarity with them, and no taste in that direction may be inferred from two loose leaves, in his hand writing, accompanying the manuscript now brought to light. The leaves are of the same form and texture as those of the manuscript, and apparently of equal age. The statement they contain seems to have been written in reply to a friend who inquired of his religious views. We quote the essential part :

“ In giving you my sentiments of the Christian religion, you will discern that I do not believe certain facts and certain propositions to be true merely because that my ancestors believed them, and because they are popular. In forming my creed I bring every thing to the standard of reason. This is an unerring and sure guide, in all matters of faith and practice. Having divested myself therefore of traditionary and vulgar prejudices, and submitting to the guidance of reason, it is impossible for me to have the same sentiments of the Christian religion which its advocates consider as orthodox. It is in my view a mass of contradictions, and a heterogeneous mixture of wisdom and folly, nor can I find any clear and incontrovertible evidence of its being a revelation from an infinitely benevolent and wise God. It is true that I have never had the leisure nor patience to read every part of it with any critical attention, or to study the metaphysical jargon of divines in its vindication. It is enough for me to know that propositions which are in contradiction to each other cannot both be true, and that doctrines and facts which represent the Supreme Being as a barbarous tyrant can never be dictated by infinite wisdom. Whatever the clergy say to the contrary, can have no effect in altering my sentiments. I know as well as they that two and two are four, and that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. But, notwithstanding I disavow my belief in the divinity of the Bible, and consider it as a mere human production, designed to enrich and aggrandize its authors, and to enable them to manage the multitude, yet casting aside a considerable mass of rubbish and fanatical rant, I find that it contains a system of ethics or morals which cannot be excelled, on account of their tendency to alleviate the condition of man and to promote individual, social, and public happiness, and that in various ways it represents the Almighty as possessing attributes worthy of a transcendental character. Having a view therefore to those parts of the Bible which are truly

good and excellent, I sometimes speak of it in terms of high commendation, and, indeed, I am inclined to believe that, notwithstanding the mischiefs and miseries which have been produced by the bigoted zeal of fanatics and interested priests, yet that such evils are more than counterbalanced, in a Christian land, by the benefits which result to the great mass of the people by their believing that the Bible is of Divine origin, and that it contains a revelation from God. Such being my view of the subject I make no exertions to dissipate their happy delusions."

It is incredible that a man holding such views of the Scriptures, and writing from a literary impulse for his own entertainment, would have produced a work like the Book of Mormon. In the absence of positive evidence such considerations must have weight. "New light" is still needed on the question of Spaulding's connection with the Book of Mormon.

JAMES H. FAIRCHILD.

PHILO AND THE ΔΙΔΑΧΗ.

One of the most noteworthy treatises on the *Διδαχή* is by Prof. Massebureau of Paris—"L'Enseignement des Douze Apôtres," pp. 36. Its special feature is the comparison with Philo; and the comparison is continued in "Le Temoignage"—a Lutheran Journal—for Feb. 7, 1885. The author, with a single exception, merely gives the references, but it will be worth the while to give some of the passages themselves.

1. The Δ. associates magic and sorcery with murder, adultery, and theft;

Οὐ φονεύσεις, οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ παιδοφθορήσεις, οὐ πορνεύσεις, οὐ κλέψεις, οὐ μαγεύσεις, οὐ φαρμακεύσεις. Ch. 2.

Philo. Εἰσὶ δὲ ἕτεροι πονηρότατοι, χερσὶ καὶ γνώμας ἐναγείς, οἱ μάγοι καὶ φαρμακευταὶ Καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως ὁ μὲν ἐμφανῶς ξίφει κτείνων ἢ τινὶ ὄπλῳ τῶν ὁμοιοτρόπων καθ' ἓνα καιρὸν ὀλίγους ἀνελεί, φαρμάκοις δὲ θανασίμοις μυρίους ὅσους τὴν ἐπιβουλήν οὐ προαισθανομένους, ἐδωδίμοις τισὶν ἀναμίξας καὶ συνανακρασάμενος. De specialibus legibus iii. 17, Tauchnitz ed. vol. v. p. 89.

2. The Δ. condemns soothsaying and kindred arts as leading to idolatry.

Τέκνον μου, μὴ γίνου οἰωνοσκόπος· ἐπεὶ δὴ ὁδηγεί εἰς τὴν εἰ-

πράττουσαν οὐ μετρίως εἰς ἀνοδίαν τὴν μαντικὴν, οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς ἐὰν χρῆσθαι, πάντας δὲ τοὺς κολακεύοντας αὐτὴν ἐλαύνει τῆς αἰδίου πολιτείας, θύτας, καθαρτάς, οἰωνοσκόπους, τερατοσκόπους, ἐπάδοντας, κληδόσιν ἐπανέχοντας. Παρασκευαὶ δὲ πάντα ταῦτά εἰσιν ἀσεβείας. Διὰ τί; "Οτι ὁ προσέχων καὶ πειθόμενος αὐτοῖς ἀλογεῖ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου, μόνα ταῦθ' ὑπολαμβάνων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ κακὸν αἷτια. De Monarchia i. 9, Tauch. ed. vol. iv. p. 322.

3. The following parallels are cited on the Eucharistic prayers:—

(a) Δ. Πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου· Εὐχαριστοῦμέν σοι, Πάτερ ἡμῶν, ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁγίας ἀμπέλου Δαβὶδ τοῦ παιδός σου, ἧς ἐγνώρισας ἡμῖν διὰ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ παιδός σου. Ch. 9.

Philo. Μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοί τις τῶν πάλοι προφητῶν, ὅς ἐπιθειάσας εἶπεν· Ἀμπελὼν κυρίου παντοκράτορος οἶκος τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ (Isa. v. 7.) [ψυχὴ] ἐστὶν ἀμπελὼν ἱερώτατος, τὸ θεῖον βλάστημα καρποφορῶν, ἀρετῆν. De Somniis ii. 26. Tauch. ed. vol. iii. p. 319.

(b) Δ. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κλάσματος· Εὐχαριστοῦμέν σοι, Πάτερ ἡμῶν, ὑπὲρ τῆς ζωῆς καὶ γνώσεως, ἧς ἐγνώρισας ἡμῖν διὰ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ παιδός σου. Ch. 9.

Ἡμῖν δὲ ἐχαρίσω πνευματικὴν τροφὴν καὶ ποτὸν καὶ ζωὴν αἰώνιον· Ch. 10.

Philo. Ὅρις τῆς ψυχῆς τροφὴν οἷα ἐστί; λόγος θεοῦ συνεχής. Legum Allegoriae iii. 59. Tauch. ed. vol. i. p. 179.

"Ἐτι τοίνυν τὴν οὐράνιον τροφὴν ψυχῆς, ἣν καλεῖ μάννα διανέμει πᾶσι τοῖς χρησομένοις λόγος θεῖος ἐξ ἴσου· Quis heres sit. 39. Tauch. ed. vol. iii. p. 43.

Καὶ μὴν λέγεται· Ἴδου ὧ ὑμῖν ἄρτους ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ (Ex. xvi. 4). Τίνα οὖν ἀποτροφὴν ἐνδίκως ὕεσθαι λέγει ὅτι μὴ τὴν οὐράνιον σοφίαν, ἣν ἀνωθεν ἐπιπέμπει ταῖς ἡμερον ἀρετῆς ἐχούσαις ψυχαῖς; De Mutatione Nominum 44. Tauch. ed. vol. iii. p. 221.

Οὕτως μέντοι καὶ ὁ θεοῦ λόγος ποτίζει τὰς ἀρετάς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ πηγὴ καλῶν πράξεων οὕτοσί. De Posteritate Caini, 37. Tauch. ed. vol. ii. p. 35.

[Of the cities of refuge.] Προτρέπει δὲ οὖν τὸν μὲν ὠκυδρομεῖν ἱκανὸν συντείνειν ἀπνευστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον

θεῖον, ὃς σοφίας ἐστὶ πηγὴ, ἵνα ἀρυσάμενος τοῦ νάματος ἀντὶ θανάτου ζωὴν ἀτὶδον ἀθλον εὕρηται. De Profugis 18. Tauch. ed. vol. iii. p. 136.

(c) Δ. Εὐχαριστοῦμέν σοι, Πάτερ ἅγιε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἁγίου ὀνόματος σου, οὗ κατεσκήνωσας ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς γνώσεως καὶ πίστεως καὶ ἀθανασίας. Ch. 10.

Philo. Καὶ ἂν μηδέπω μέντοι τυγχάνῃ τις ἀξιόχρεως ὧν υἱὸς θεοῦ προσαγορεύεσθαι, σπουδαζέτω κοσμεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν πρωτόγονον αὐτοῦ λόγον, τὸν ἄγγελον πρεσβύτατον, ὡς ἀρχάγγελον πολυνύμῳ ὑπάρχοντα· καὶ γὰρ ἀρχή, καὶ ὄνομα θεοῦ, καὶ λόγος, καὶ ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἀνθρωπος, καὶ ὁρῶν Ἰσραὴλ προσαγορεύεται. . . . Καὶ γὰρ εἰ μήπω ἱκανοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες νομίζεσθαι γεγόναμεν, ἀλλὰ τοι τῆς αἰδίου εἰκόνης αὐτοῦ, λόγου τοῦ ἱερωτάτου· θεοῦ γὰρ εἰκὼν λόγος ὁ πρεσβύτατος. De Confusione Linguarum, 28 Tauch. Ed. vol. ii. p. 303.

4. The thirteenth chapter of the *Didaché* is compared with the beginning of the treatise of Philo on the Gifts to the Priests. Compare especially:

Δ. Ἐὰν σιτίαν ποιῇς, τὴν ἀπαρχὴν λαβὼν δὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐντολήν· Ch. 13.

Philo. Κελεύει γὰρ τοὺς σιτοπονοῦντας ἀπὸ παντὸς στέα· τὸς τε καὶ φυράματος ἄρτον ἀφαιρεῖν ἀπαρχὴν εἰς ἱερέων χρῆσιν, προνοούμενος ἅμα καὶ τῆς εἰς εὐσέβειαν ἀγωγῆς οδοῦ νομίμῳ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν ἀφαιρούντων. De Praemiis Sacerdotum, 1. Tauch. ed. vol. iv. p. 340.

I ought to say that the foregoing passages are not all that are referred to by the learned author, and that these are but portions of what in some instances are long citations. The reader will therefore please accept these extracts as specimens, suggestions, and guides. In certain expressions in the Eucharistic prayers the author sees Philo rather than John. (See Harnack, *Proleg.* pp. 79-81.)

The *Didaché*, then, must have originated in Egypt. Not so, says Prof. Massebieau:—"Les ressemblances que j'ai signalées avec les livres où Philon commente les dix commandements avec d'évidentes intentions apologetiques et missionnaires vis-à-vis des païens, fortifieraient l'hypothèse de l'origine égyptienne de la *Didaché*, si l'empreinte judéo-alexandrine ne se trouvait aussi très marquée dans l'épître de Clément de Rome. Le respect de l'antique Eglise romaine pour le judaïsme comparé au respect si énergiquement manifesté par la *Didaché* pour la loi mosaïque et pour ce qui a été dit aux anciens nous inclinerait pour elle en faveur d'une origine romaine. Le fait qu'elle a été constamment en usage en Egypte ne s'opposerait pas à cette hypothèse; son histoire serait en ce cas tout-à-fait semblable à celle du Pasteur d'Hermas." p. 17.

L. S. POTWIN.

ARTICLE VII.

CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

I. AMERICAN.

FOR several months past the editors of the *Andover Review* have been setting forth, both in a series of articles and in incidental discussions, what they call "Progressive Orthodoxy." The elucidation has now proceeded so far that we can profitably summarize it in this department of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*; and the importance of the discussion is such as to warrant us in devoting to it all our available space in this number. We shall make best progress by beginning at their goal and working backwards, rather than by following the chronological order.

The port supposed to be attained by these adventurous voyagers is that which has often charmed their predecessors from the time of Origen down. They think they have found such a basis of hope for some members of the human race, other than infants and idiots, who die unregenerate as to make it easier than by any other method to justify the ways of God with man. The old doctrine that the mass of "the heathen are hopelessly lost unless they have the gospel in its historic form" while on earth (vol. iv. p. 148) is not only doubted, but "repudiated" (p. 360). They repudiate, also, the theory "that salvation is possible without any knowledge of the gospel, and yet by reason of the gospel," and declare this to be "unevangelical," "rationalistic," "most mischievous and dangerous" (pp. 150, 153); by it "earnest inquiry is almost insulted" (p. 155); and the writers exclaim, "Can no more be said than that God will do what is right, and we must leave all in his hands?" The humble believer may well inquire in astonishment, What more is necessary in the premises? We have never supposed that man could expect to fathom all the mysteries of divine action. Often when we cannot see how God can justify himself, it is still clear that we cannot affirm the contrary, and that we must admit that we do not know *but* that much is clear to him which is dark to us.

But the writers under review would elevate a theory of their own respecting this point to the rank of a dogma without which they affirm it is impossible to justify the ways of God. Their dogma is "that those who do not know of God's love in Christ while they are in the body will have knowledge of Christ after death" (p. 155). With some affectation of modesty, however, they say, "we are not as positive concerning the times, seasons, or circumstances under which God will reveal himself in Christ, as we are that the principle is of universal application: that no man will be finally judged till he knows God in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and that no man will be hopelessly condemned except for the wilful and final rejection of Christ.

The sin against the Holy Ghost, which is thought to be that hostility to Christ which makes one incapable of redemption, is the only sin for which we are explicitly told there is no forgiveness in any world or age" (p. 160). But in this very account of the sin against the Holy Ghost it is expressly said that all blasphemies which are merely against the Son of Man may be forgiven. The passage would therefore seem to imply that there may be sin against the Holy Ghost which is independent of any knowledge of the historical Christ. Again we read, "Our belief is, that somewhere and sometime God will reveal himself to every one in the face of Jesus Christ, and that the destiny of each and all is determined by the personal relation to Christ." And again, that "the temporary presence of sin presents no such problem as the everlasting presence of sin. The argument is one of the weakest to bring against the doctrine of universal restoration" (p. 161). But unless these brethren believe in the restoration of all men, and even of Satan, they cannot get rid of the problem of the everlasting presence of sin in the universe. Do they really mean to come out upon the ground of the Universalists?

In another connection (*ibid.*, p. 145) we read that "if men are judged by Christ . . . they are not to be judged under the light of reason and conscience alone, but under the light of the gospel of Christ, . . . the judgment will be a Christian judgment." Is it possible the writers do not see the transparent amphibology of such a statement? Does "Christian judgment" mean the judgment of one who knew the historical Christ? We had supposed that a Christian judgment was referred to when Christ affirmed that it would be "more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment" than for Capernaum; where the implication certainly is that the cities are to be judged on the basis of a lower plane of opportunity than that granted to Capernaum.

Upon finding such dogmatic confidence as to future offers of salvation, we naturally examine the position of the writers (for the many inconsistencies of reasoning, if nothing else, show that the articles are not all from the same person) upon co-ordinate doctrines. Turning to that on Atonement (pp. 56-68), we read that "there is no evidence whatever that the race is divided into two great sections, one of which is dealt with on the basis of the gospel, and the other on the basis of law and natural conscience,—one on a basis of justice, the other on a basis of grace" (p. 67). All this is indeed true in a certain sense; but the reader should notice here, also, the ambiguity in co-ordinating "the basis of the gospel" with "the basis of grace." Why may not God, on the basis of grace, as wrought out by Christ, forgive a penitent soul, if such there be, who has not heard definitely of the provision? Nature is not without its gracious provisions and intimations, so that, as Paul affirms, the heathen are without excuse. They have not, indeed, had *ten* talents, but they have at least had *one*; and the judgment is to be on the basis of what they have had.

The writers find also "a difficulty in believing that but for this insignificant earth the most glorious revelation of God [i. e., in the incarnation] might

not have been given at all" (p. 56). Here, also, we may well ask how there could have been an incarnate Logos if there had been no world and no human race in existence? Again, we read, "The correct and scriptural starting point is the mediation of Christ in its universal character. Christ mediates God to the entire universe. Through Christ the worlds were made, and through Him they consist. . . . The created universe and all rational beings are through Christ and in Christ. Therefore He mediates or reveals God to any part of his universe according to the condition or need which may exist in that part. If at any point his world is sick, weary, guilty hopeless, there Christ is touched and hurt, and there He appears to restore and comfort" (p. 57). From which it would follow that Christ's efforts "to restore and comfort" Satan would be most strenuous, for he certainly is most hopeless. From their repugnance to the admission that sin may be everlasting, it is not improbable that they really hold to the restoration of Satan.

The view of moral freedom presented in these articles will also surprise most readers. It is denied that man has any real freedom outside of Christ. "It is only in Christ that he [man] has such knowledge of God and of himself as is necessary to a repentance which is revolutionary." On page 262, however, they say with little regard to consistency, "We would not deny the existence of regenerate life outside Christianity." But they go on: "It is not true, we admit and insist, that repentance without Christ is availing for redemption, for man of himself cannot repent; but, on the other hand, it is not true that Christ's atonement has value without repentance. Christ's sacrifice avails with God because it is adapted to bring man to repentance. This gives it ethical meaning and value" (pp. 62, 63). Is, then, the whole value of the atonement to the universe limited to those who have sinned and repented? Is there no value to the universe in the manifestation of God as in atoning love he *offers* salvation to men independent of the question whether they accept it? This would seem a very low view even of the moral theory of the atonement.

Again, in the same strain we read, "God does not become propitious because man repents and amends, for that is beyond man's power. He becomes propitious because Christ, laying down his life, makes the race to its worst individual *capable* of repenting, obeying, trusting" (p. 64). On the following page we read that "the large truth of atonement, however illustrated, and from whatever side approached, is that *except for Christ* God could only punish sinners by withdrawing himself more and more from them To the world before Christ came God was unreconciled, because the world had no knowledge of him in Christ. To the individual, so long as he knows God only on the side of nature and law, God is unreconciled. Not till he sees Christ in his sacrificial love does he know that God can and will forgive." But how should the sinner's ignorance prevent God from being reconciled? Upon the cross Christ prayed "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke xxiii. 34). And Paul affirms that "when Gentiles which have no law do by nature the things of the law, these, hav-

ing no law, are a law unto themselves ; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences bearing witness therewith" (Rom. ii. 14, 15).

The following extract illustrates how atonement and gospel can be confounded: "The extent of atonement resides not so much" "in the thing done, in the ample provision made, but rather in the personality of Christ. He is the universal Person." "His religion, therefore, is the universal, absolute religion. . . . This would seem to lead us to the conclusion that the final word concerning destiny is not pronounced for any man till he knows Jesus Christ and Him crucified. . . . It has been said that God *must* be just, and *may* be merciful, as if the exercise of mercy were not necessary to God in any such sense as justice is necessary. . . . Justice is concerned that every attribute of God should be displayed ; is as jealous for the rights of love as for those of holiness. If it is God's very nature to love, if it is a desire of his to save men from sin, justice sees to it that love is not deprived of its rights, and is not hindered in any of its impulses" (p. 66).

The discerning reader will here note the confounding of *love* and *mercy*. Justice is as really an element of love as mercy is. Love is as really impelled to do justice as to exercise mercy. It is a strange doctrine here advanced that love is not hindered in any of its impulses. How oft would Christ have gathered Jerusalem as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings ; but these impulses were hindered by Jewish obduracy, and through blinding tears he pronounced judgment upon the ill-fated city.

In the same connection occurs the following, which, if accepted, would foreclose all further argument from Scripture or reason. Whence the supreme dogmatic confidence pervading the sentences comes, we are not told. But it certainly is not from either Scripture or the reason of the Christian believer as ordinarily enlightened by the Holy Spirit. "We must now conclude that justice does not pronounce its final word till God has revealed himself in all his intended manifestations of righteousness and love. . . . We may go so far as to say that it would not be just for God to condemn men hopelessly when they have not known Him as he really is, when they have not known Him in Jesus Christ. And it is evidently the intent of God that all men should know Him through Christ. The judgment does not come till the gospel has been preached to all nations. The gospel is preached to a nation, not when within certain geographical boundaries it has been proclaimed at scattered points, but only when in reality all individuals of all the nations have known it. Atonement, that is, the gospel, is universal, absolute. It is to be made known to every creature, and then cometh the end" (pp. 66, 67). It would scarcely be possible to use language more likely than this to blot out the deep distinction between law and grace, and to encourage belief in universal restoration. Here again the reader will notice the ambiguity. How clear are the manifestations which God intends to make to everybody? Is there no prerogative of sovereignty in the dispensation of grace? Let the parables of the talents and of the laborers in the vineyard, and the reply to Dives—"They have Moses

and the prophets, let them hear them," answer. Again, how much is included in the phrase "to know him as he really is"? Do we ever attain to full knowledge of what God really is? Or if the phrase is used in a lower sense, does not nature to some extent reveal God as gracious? What, for example, led the Ninevites to repent?

Upon noting these startling departures from the ordinary faith of evangelical Christendom, the reader naturally looks to their expositions of Scripture to ascertain whence the authority by which these writers speak. He will find the writers affirming with great confidence that the parenthetical clause in 2 Cor. v. 10, "For we must all be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ, that each one may receive the deeds done in the body," is limited to those who have heard the gospel (p. 155). They add that "no other passage distinctly refers to the bodily life in relation to judgment." The whole argument of the first and second chapters of Romans, addressed to a heathen people, and describing sins that are largely of the body, and declaring in the most emphatic terms that the Gentiles show in their consciences the work of the law written in their hearts and are without excuse, since they refused to have God in their knowledge,—all this is brushed aside by a few remarks to the effect that these chapters show the need of the gospel rather than that its offers are limited to this life. Here again gospel and atonement are confounded. Likewise the teaching, upon this point, of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus is set aside on the ground that they were Jews and not heathen. Cornelius, too, was accepted previous to Peter's visit, because, if not a Jewish proselyte, he had contributed liberally to the support of Judaism. Such are the shifts to evade the plain meaning of Scripture. No mention is made of the lists of sins in Romans, Galatians, and Revelation, for which men are to be judged, and which are such as could only be committed in the body.

The ease with which such plain Scripture can be vacated of its meaning finds its explanation in the *a priori* presumptions with which these writers approach its interpretation. The character and strength of these presuppositions appear in Professor Harris's expositions of the so-called "Christian Consciousness," of which the following extracts furnish a specimen:

"We can go farther, and claim not only that the Christian consciousness is the organ of increasing knowledge, but also that all statements and interpretations of truth, to be accepted, must commend themselves to the Christian consciousness. In their main features they must correspond with what Christians have already verified through experience, and with the best Christian sentiment of the time. The Christian consciousness does not create Christianity, but it is capable of distinguishing that which is not and that which is Christianity. It therefore has a kind of authority. Its authority is co-ordinate, but none the less real. Its function, then, may be considered both the development and testing of progressive theology" (Andover Review, vol. ii. p. 345). "Hence any theories which claim to be confirmed by the Bible, yet against which Christian sentiment protests, should not be accepted. There may be waiting and confessions of ignorance, but no

assent to opinions against which refined Christian sentiment rebels" (p. 348).

"It is true that the Christian consciousness of to-day exercises its judgment in this respect. It does not bow to the authority of the early church but by its own examination is convinced of the claims of the canon to acceptance" (p. 349).

Here, too, we may well pause and ask, why not bow to the authority of the early church upon the question whether a book has apostolical authority or not? To reject the testimony of the early churches upon such a question is to set aside the weightiest evidence in the premises. For our part we are inclined to set a much higher estimate upon that evidence than upon the transient phases of the so-called Christian consciousness, or even *refined* Christian sentiment of the nineteenth century. The habit, now becoming somewhat common, of minimizing the argument for the canon drawn from the general consent of the early Christians, and of endeavoring to decide upon the authority of the various books of the Bible by the fragmentary direct evidence now within reach, is neither scientific nor reasonable.

The formal article on the Scriptures in the *Andover Review* is in the November number. This, however, is written in such an involved and nebulous style as to baffle analysis. For the most part the ideas are those of Dorner and Ewald struggling for the light through the imperfect medium of their untranslatable, and we fear incomprehensible, sentences; as, for example, the following: "When we come under the influence of the apostolic letters we feel that their vitality penetrating the truth is of the very essence of their disclosing power. It is not so much that we draw ideas about God out of them, as that we touch God himself in them, because the life with which they palpitate is fed in its central springs by His own" (p. 462).

But we find also the following clear-cut statements: "There is not a scintilla of evidence that God assumed to the minds of the apostles a new relation as soon as they sat down to write, and that, in consequence, what they wrote had a different quality from what they said" (p. 459). But the ordinary argument for the inspiration of the Bible assumes only that the apostles had the same kind of authority when they wrote as when they spoke, so that the church has the inspired apostles still speaking to them in the apostolic writings. The views of Martensen (*Christian Dogmatics*, Eng. Trans., p. 402) will commend themselves to every thoughtful reader: "Writing compresses the copiousness of the oral word into a permanent form, and is the expression or embodiment, now fixed and settled and purified by careful consideration of the inspired thoughts, so that we have in Holy Scripture the ripened fruits of inspiration." This the Andover men virtually admit in saying that "very likely he [Paul] always put truth into a more compact form when he wrote" (p. 460). In the paragraphs following this, the importance of apostolic testimony arising from their nearness to Christ is well stated, and should have prevented such unguarded statements as these: "We sometimes discover in their successive letters signs

of progress into more adequate conceptions; as, for example, in Paul's teachings concerning marriage" (p. 464). "The church is ever adding to its knowledge of Christ, and the exegetical process is certainly not the exclusive means of making the increment" (p. 466). And this in seeming contradiction to the preceding sentence. "We believe that these men [the apostles] were so placed and so gifted that they saw Christ's nature and relations to man with both more penetrating and broader vision than that of any other seers; that the main features of his life and mission, the truths of his eternal being, the outlines of his historical relations, were mirrored in their minds with such just perspective that we must seek all our knowledge of Christ within the limits and under the outlines of their teaching." Finally, after saying that the imperfection of the Bible is part of its perfection, the writer concludes with the following paradox: "The Bible, which brings the living reflection of his [Christ's] self-revealing acts, is, in its reality, and freshness, far more effective in putting men into contact with those acts than a perfect description of them, miraculously dictated could have been" (p. 476). "Men sadly hamper themselves in their endeavor to do this [to satisfy the mind that Jesus is Christ] by undertaking to establish, as the necessary postulate of his divine nature and mission, the perfection of a book whose chief ground to confidence is its connection with Him and manifest possession of his truth. Christian Apologetics has enough work to do in proving Christ to reluctant minds, by moral and spiritual data, without entangling itself in such an absurd procedure as this" (p. 477). Does the writer suppose that if the perfection of Scripture demanded that the style should be adapted to the times and the men who wrote, the Creator could not by dictation have secured this perfection? Even James Russell Lowell can argue that Shakespeare did not conceive of Hamlet as really insane, but made him so simulate insanity that nobody can tell the difference between the counterfeit and the reality. Now the orthodox writers of the present day believe that the language and rhetoric of the Bible is, through divine providence, perfectly adapted to accomplish the appropriate ends of a written revelation; but they do not affirm that God is limited to direct dictation as the only mode of securing this perfection. This is where theories come in. We may believe that God made the world and that every special thing is the result of his design, without holding that he works as a carpenter. Inspiration may operate not only by dictation, but by oversight, and by prevenient care in providing the instrument of revelation.

This is not the department in which to discuss at length the views here summarized, nor is it possible to present as fully as we should like the many stimulating and fresh statements made in the articles of truths which we hold in common. It is rather our painful duty to expose the real character of the attempt by stripping it of its disguises, and to separate some of the objectionable elements from the truths with which they are connected, so that we may weigh the leaven by itself to see if there is enough to vitiate the whole lump. The result of our analysis seems to show pretty clearly that the

movement under consideration is backward and not forward, towards darkness and confusion of ideas, rather than towards the light.

The following are among the objections which occur to us :

1st. In the form in which these writers thrust their views upon the evangelical churches of America, they ignore the results of the long and serious controversies out of which our present religious life has grown. (See the first article in our present number.)

2nd. The theories presented are not new views of truth, but largely restatements of the speculations of such men as Dorner and Ewald, which have already had their day in Germany and been found wanting. Dorner has few followers in Germany. Luthardt and Ritschl are now the representative men. The one rationalistic in the extreme, the other High Church and evangelical.

3d. It will be impossible in practice to distinguish these eschatological theories from those involving universal restoration. The rationalism that, on speculative grounds, demands continued probation for the heathen must claim it for a large part of the population of nominally Christian lands.

4th. These theories will be disastrous in that they minimize almost to zero the light of nature and the natural moral powers with which man is endowed. In the minds of these writers no sin has much guilt except that committed against Christ as revealed in history. This low view of the guilt of the heathen is both untrue and unscriptural.

5th. By confounding the systems of law and grace there would seem no longer to be any true foundation for grace. The sovereignty of God is denied. It is said that He *must* be gracious.

6th. To arrive at these conclusions the Scriptures must be subordinated to the so-called Christian consciousness. The exegesis of the Bible is no longer the chief work of Christian believers and theologians.

7th. Nor can we refrain from referring to the prudential considerations which should properly give tone to speculation upon this subject. In matters remote from human interests, such as those relating to the constitution of the fixed stars, we may speculate freely, with no concern as to the consequences. But in all matters relating to human conduct and welfare prudential considerations demand attention, and materially limit our freedom of speculation. If we are absolutely certain of the truth, of course that settles the question. But in practical matters it is rare to have absolute certainty, and where there is doubt our decisions should lean to the side of safety. We are not at liberty to indulge freely in speculation where speculation is hazardous to souls. When, for example, we have a long-tried and efficient preventive of small-pox we should be cautious about urging people to exchange it for another until we are very sure that the other is as good as the one we propose to abandon.

Now it cannot be denied that the general system of doctrine which for the last three quarters of a century has stimulated and directed the evangelical and missionary activities of England and America is highly confirmed by the Holy Spirit ; for, in connection with this conception of the truth, the

gospel has spread more rapidly than in any other period since the first centuries of our era. It would seem as if the Christian world had already had sufficient warning of the evils of elevating to a dogma individual speculations concerning opportunities of reformation in the future life. At any rate, we shall do well to pause long before cutting loose from our present moorings. We are aware, however, that the authors of the speculations above summarized, like Hugh Miller's penniless tailor (who was ready to *guarantee* the English government against all loss from adopting his financial schemes), are ready to insure the world against loss from the acceptance of their views. Sober-minded people, however, may well be pardoned for doubting the sufficiency of the guarantee.

II. FRENCH.

The following lectures were given during the Summer Half-year by the Protestant Theological Faculty in Paris: *Lichtenberger*, The Relation between Ethics and Dogmatics. *Sabatier*, The Sources of the Life of Jesus; The Gospel of Mark. *Vignié*, History of Christian Worship; History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant; Homiletical Exercises. *Bonet-Maury*, History of Reformed Protestantism in the 16th century. *Ménégos*, Soteriology; The Epistles of John; Translation of Harless' "Ethics." *Ph. Berger*, Hebrew Archaeology; Jeremiah; Hebrew Grammar and Translation of the easier passages in the books of Genesis and Judges. *Massebian*, Christian Education in the first five Centuries; Selected Letters of St. Jerome; Philosophy of Plato. *Stapfer*, History of the Text of the N. T.; Cursory Reading of the Gospels, and The Acts. *Vaucher*, History of Doctrine; Theological Encyclopaedia; Catechetical Exercises. *Jundt*, Church History of the Middle Ages; History of Catholicism in the 19th Century; German Grammar; Translation of Luther's Smaller Catechism, and the Augsburg Confession. *S. Berger*, The Ancient Translation of the Bible. *Réville*, Heathenism in the Roman Empire from the second to the fourth century.

III. GERMAN.

The visit of congratulation made by the representative of Pope Leo XIII. to Joachim IV. upon his recent elevation to the Patriarchate of the Greek Church, has called out much comment and speculation in European circles. Many have declared that a union between the Greek and Roman churches was in immediate prospect, or at least under discussion. Some color was lent to these surmises by the fact that the new Patriarch had once, when Archbishop of Derki, paid a visit to Rome when on a tour for his health. A long and able paper has been published on the possibility of such a union by Prof. A. D. Kyriakos, of Athens, in the "Aeon," published in that city, a translation of which is given in the PROTESTANTISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG, of Sept. 2, 1885. This gentleman was educated in Germany, and is Professor of Church History. After exhibiting the really hostile attitude of Leo and Rome towards the Greek church, he goes on to show the utter impossibility

of any union. He says: "The Greeks have a very deep and unchangeable conviction that while the Oriental church has always remained true to the old Christianity of the first centuries and has to the present day preserved its dogmas, its worship, its administration, and its ecclesiastical constitution upon the basis of the seven oecumenical councils, the Roman church, on the contrary, changed and transformed in many respects the original old Christianity in the Middle Ages on account of the barbarism of the people of Middle, South, and West Europe. In the constitution of the church it introduced the absolute and unlimited despotism of the Papacy; of its own power it proclaimed new dogmas, as in recent times that of the immaculate conception and of infallibility; in worship it introduced the Latin language as the general one, thereby reducing its services to a dead formality; and by means of absolutism, of *opus operatum* and of the treasury of supererogatory good works, and other like doctrines it undermined the foundations of Christian ethics. On account of all these things a reformation was made necessary so early as the sixteenth century, which separated one-half of the nations of the Occident from the Papacy; the Papacy is according to the irreversible opinion of the Orthodox, a departure from the original Christianity; never then shall we Orientals bring ourselves to leave the church of the gospel, the ancient fathers, and the oecumenical councils, and attach ourselves to the Papacy.

Another reason which explains the lack of sympathy among the Orientals for the Roman church is this, that the Roman church has always maintained a hostile attitude toward governments and science. After she had herself become a secular power in the days of Pipin, 754 A. D., against the words of Jesus Christ "My kingdom is not of this world," she determined to subject other governments and to force her will upon them. In the Middle Ages the Papacy enslaved the various states in consequence of the barbarism of the times and because the Occidental peoples were without education and full of superstition, and so the Pope elevated and overthrew the emperors.

Since in modern times the peoples of the Occident have developed, and obtained full consciousness of their rights, the European states have gradually freed themselves from the papal guardianship and power. Nevertheless the papacy claims in principle to this day, and even since in the year 1870 the secular power of the popes was destroyed, the same rights as ever, and the same supremacy over the governments. The Roman church respects neither the laws of the different states of Europe nor their freedom, wherefore she finds herself, since she will not govern herself in accordance with the legal arrangements of the different lands, in hostile attitude toward the governments of Italy, France, Switzerland, Germany, England, etc.

Also science which has a tendency to overthrow the prejudice and superstition upon which the papacy founds its power, is perpetually attacked by the popes. As long as she had the power the Roman church burnt the scholars who refuted her or threw them into prison and persecuted them, e. g., men like Wiclif, Hus, Jerome, Savonarola, Galileo; yet now in her weakness, she must content herself with cursing the scholars by encyclica

and syllabi—Pius IX. condemned as dangerous errors the principles of freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, speech, and press, that is, all the principles which form the foundations of all modern states and the entire political and social structure of modern times. This is the reason why the European governments and peoples have risen up in the most recent times against the Papacy: also the peoples of the Orient have begun in this century to awake to life again and they are still struggling for their freedom; having entered the circle of free and civilized nations, they long also to live in freedom under free laws; therefore they honor freedom of conscience and of speech; therefore they prize science, and desire a free development of the same. But all these lofty privileges, as we have seen, are attacked by Rome.

We subjoin, both as a sign of the times, and as valuable bibliographical information, the following list of German publications relating to missions. Beside such periodical literature as the Berlin "Missionsfreund," the "Ev. Missionsmagazin" of Basle, the "Blätter für Mission," we have G. E. Burkhardt's "Kleine Missionsbibliothek," the works of Barth, Gundert, Graul, Wallman, Fabri, Warneck, Wangemann and others. Also Braun, "Beiträge zur hannoverschen Missionsgeschichte;" Dahle, "Madagaskar und dessen Bewohner," v. Dewitz "In Dänisch Westindien, 150 Jahre der Brüdermission;" Fritschel, "Geschichte der christl. Missionen unter den Indianern Nordamerikas;" Gerhard, "Geschichte und Beschreibung der Mission unter den Kolhs;" Gundert, "Die ev. Mission ihre Länder Völker und Arbeiten;" Kalkar, "Geschichte der christl. Mission unter den Heiden;" Kypke, "Missionsgeschichte für das christl. Volk;" Lebensbilder aus der Mission," by Warneck; Leonhardi, "Nacht und Morgen;" Calwer, "Missions Bilder;" "Das Missionswerk der ev. Brüdergemeinde Pauli," "Die ev. Missionen in Afrika;" Plitt, Kurze Geschichte der luth. Mission in Vorträgen;" Rohden, "Geschichte der rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft;" Schneider, "Missionsarbeit der Brüdergemeinde in Australien;" Schreiber, "Lebensbilder aus der rheinischen Mission für Missionstunden;" Schwartzkopff, "Missionsgeschichte in Hessen;" Speckmann, "Die Hermannsberger Mission in Afrika," "Umschau über die ev. Mission;" Vormbaum, "Ev. Missionsgeschichte in Biographien;" Wallmann, "Leiden und Freuden rheinischer Missionäre;" and also "Missionstunden" from various other authors.

We continue our list of recent German works:—

I. GENERAL.

Baldamus, Ed. German literature in the department of Protestant theology, 1880-4. (Die Erscheinungen der deutschen Literatur auf dem Gebiete der protestantischen Theologie, 1880-4, Systematisch geordnet und mit einem alphabetischen Register versehen,) Leipzig, 1885. Hinrichs (iii. 194 S. gr. 8) M. 4. German literature in the department of Catholic theology, 1880-4. (Die Erscheinungen der deutschen Literatur auf dem Gebiete der katholischen Theologie, 1880-4, Systematisch geordnet, etc.) Ebdr (ii. 101 S. gr. 8) M. 3. Both together M. 6. Whoever has need of

and desires a reliable and systematically arranged compend of all the German theological works and pamphlets published within the last five years with accurate titles, contents, and prices attached, will do well to purchase the above named works of Baldamus.

Carriere, Mar. Art in its relation to the development of culture and the ideals of humanity. (Die Kunst im Zusammenhange mit der Culturentwicklung und die Ideale der Menschheit, 3 verm. u. neu durchgearb. Aufl. 1-4 Bd.) Leipzig Brockhaus 1877-84: (xx. 656, xvi. 653, xiii. 317, xiii. 554 u. xii. 721 S. gr. 8.) M. 45.

Kaulen, Dr. Fr. Assyria and Babylon according to the most recent investigations. (Assyrien und Babylonien nach der neuesten Entdeckungen, 3., abermals erweiterte Auflage. Mit Titelbild, 78 in der Text gedruckten Holzschnitten, 6 Tonbildern, einer Inschrifttafel und zwei Karten.) Freiburg i. Br. 1885, Herder. (x. 266 S. gr. 8.) M. 4.

II. EXEGESIS.

Delitsch has issued a new octavo edition (the eighth) of his Hebrew New Testament, which has been revised with the help of many scholars, both Jewish and Christian, in the most thorough manner.

Deutsch, Herm. The Proverbs as illustrated in the Talmud and Midrash. (Die Sprüche Salomos nach der Auffassung im Talmud und Midrash dargestellt und kritisch untersucht. Erster Theil. Einleitendes.) Berlin, 1885, Ad. Mamepe (iv. 108 S. 8).—Dr. Strack, of Berlin, speaks of the author as a young Jewish theologian who possesses scientific spirit and tact as well as a good general education, and says that this work supplies a long-felt need and that the author presents in it the fruits of many years of careful and industrious study of the old Jewish interpretation of the Proverbs.

Marx, G. H. Ancient rabbinical tradition concerning the order and origin of the Old Testament books illustrated. (Traditio rabbinorum veterima de librorum veteris testamenti ordine atque origine illustrata.) Leipzig, 1884, Drescher (60 S. gr. 8) M. 6.40.

The seventh edition of *Meyer's Commentary* on Mark and Luke, revised by Prof. B. Weiss, has appeared.

Strack, Prof. Dr. H. L. Hebrew Grammar. (Hebräische Grammatik mit Übungsstücken, Literatur u. Vocabular. 2 wesentlich verm. u. verb. Aufl.) Karlsruhe, 1885. Reuther. (xvi. 151 u. 69 S. 8) M. 3.—This second, "essentially enlarged and improved," contains an increased number of exercises, with somewhat enlarged grammatical discussion, especially a new treatment of syntax.

III. DOGMATICS.

of their use to that which is not perceptible to the senses; against Ritschl and Herrmann he defends sober metaphysics.

Haug, Ludw. Presentation and Critique of the theology of A. Ritschl. (Darstellung und Beurteilung der A. Ritschl'schen Theologie. Zur Orientirung dargeboten. Ludwigsburg, 1885, Neubert (118 S. gr. 8) M. 4.80.

IV. HISTORY.

Corpus of the Latin ecclesiastical writers. Complete works of Sedulius. (Corpus scriptorum ecclesiarum latinorum, editum consilio et impensis academiae literariae caesariae Vindobonensis. Vol. x. Sedulii opera omnia. Rec. et commentario critico instruxit Johs. Huemer. Accedunt excerpta ex Remigii expositione in Sedulii paschale carmen.) Wein, 1885, Gerold's Sohn in Comm. (lii. 414 S. 8) M. 7.

Arnaud, E. History of the Protestants of Provence, of the county Venaissin and the principality of Orange, with a map of ancient Provence. (Histoire des Protestants de Provence, du Comtat Venaissin et de la principauté d' Orange avec une carte de l'ancienne Provence. Volume i. Provence. Volume ii. Comtat Venaissin et principauté d' Orange.) Paris, 1884. Gros-sart. (xxii. 573 et 414 p. gr. 8).—This author has already written a "History of the Protestants of Dauphiny" (Paris, 1875-6), which was received with great favor, and has contributed materially to French church history by the publication of sources and independent illustrations. In these volumes also he presents large results of independent research which make this work, as much as the Dauphiny, an indispensable guide to the history of the Reformed church in France.

Bestmann, Dr. H. J. History of Christian Morals. (Geschichte der christlichen Sitte.) 2 Theil. Die katholische Sitte der alten Kirche 2 Lfg. Nördlingen, 1885, Beck (x u. 129-711 S. gr. 8).

Buddensieg, R. Jno. Wiclif and his time. (Joh. Wiclif und seine Zeit. Zum 500 jähr. Wiclifjubiläum [31 Dez. 1884].) 8. Tausend. Gotha. F. A. Perthes (vi. 214 S. gr. 8). M. 3.

Gelzer, Heinr. Sextus Julius Africanus and the Byzantine Chronography (Sextus Julius Africanus und die byzantinische Chronographie 2. Thl. 1. Abth: Die Nachfolger des Julius Africanus.) Leipzig, Teubner, 1885 (viii. 425 S. gr. 8) M. 12.80.

Hase, F. Church History on the Basis of academic lectures. (Kirchen-geschichte auf der Grundlage akademischer Vorlesungen. 1 Thl. Alte Kirchengeschichte.) Leipzig, 1885. Breitkopf u. Härtel (vii. 638 S. gr. 8) M. 12.

Lechler, D. G. V. Apostolic and Post-apostolic times with a regard to the difference and unity of faith and practice. (Das apostolische und das nachapostolische Zeitalter mit Rücksicht auf Unterschied und Einheit in Leben und Lehre.) 3 vollständig neu bearb. Aufl. Karlsruhe, 1885. Reuther (xvi. 635 S. gr. 8) M. 9.

Meyer, Eduard. Ancient History (Geschichte des Alterthums 1. Bd. Geschichte des Orients bis zur Begründung des Perserreichs.) Stuttgart, Cotta, 1884. (xix. 647 S. gr. 8) M. 12.

Sachsse, Prof. Origin and Character of Pietism. (Ursprung und Wesen des Pietismus.) Weisbaden, Niedner, 1884. (vi. 382 S. gr. 8) M. 6.

v. Scherer, Rudf. Manual of Canonical Law. (Handbuch des Kirchenrechts.) 1 Bd. 1 Hälfte. Gratz, 1885, Moser. (vi. 308 S. gr. 8) M. 1.80. The author seems, from all appearances, to belong to that class of authorities in his church who have submitted to the Vatican decrees only with mental reservations, and who oppose the literal interpretation of the same, which, if put into practice, would work great injury both to the church and the state. He acknowledges himself an opponent of the Curialists, that is, the adherents of the doctrine that the pope is by divine right the only source and repository of ecclesiastical authority; he denies, most strenuously, the teaching that there exists a duty of absolute obedience to the pope; and also treats the question of the relations of church and state, as will be seen more clearly in the quotations hereafter, in a manner totally at variance with that of the Curialists. For example, he says "We are, under all circumstances, to presuppose amicable relations between church and state; mutual goodwill combined with due regard for the interests and demands of each by the other." Again, "To every power, whether of church or state, there is due its rightful authority; and catholic subjects cannot hold that any civil law declared bad or without force by church authorities is thereby deprived of its character as a civil law." "The legal authority of a law, whether it be one of the church or of the state, is at any time, in the legal province of the party in question, independent of the validity of the same law in the province of the other party, state or church as the case may be."

Schwartz, Dr. W. Popular beliefs of the Indo-Germanic peoples. (Indo-germanischer Volksglaube. Ein Beitrag zur Religionsgeschichte der Urzeit.) Berlin, Seehagen, 1885. (xxiv. 280 S. gr. 8) M. 8.

Warneck, Dr. Gust. Protestant exposure of Romish assaults upon evangelical missions to the heathen. (Protestantische Beleuchtung der Römischen Angriffe auf die evangelische Heidenmission. Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik ultramontaner Geschichtschreibung.) 2 Hälfte. Gütersloh, 1885. Bertelsmann (vii. u. 235-508 S. gr. 8) M. 3.60, complete, M. 6.60.

V. PHILOSOPHY.

Sommer, H. Concerning the Nature and Significance of Human freedom and its modern opponents. (Ueber das Wesen und die Bedeutung der menschlichen Freiheit und deren moderne Widersacher.) 2 vervollständigte und umgearb. Aufl. Berlin, 1885, G. Reimer. (x. 150 S. gr. 8) M. 4.—The stand-point of the author is essentially the same as Kant's. He adheres quite closely to Lotze, "who successfully completed, the new, fruitful, and healthy development of philosophical research, introduced by the reform in criticism." Instead of theoretical knowledge (Kant), the sensibility, the immediate inner experience (Lotze) is emphasized as the fountain and rule of knowledge and truth; "in the sensibility, the content and value of life are first revealed and thought only explains these in their present relations." Freedom is "the ability to govern one's self by inner motives and to keep clear of motives which contradict the real essence of our moral determination."

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

REVELATION: ITS NATURE AND RECORD. By Heinrich Ewald, late Professor in the University of Göttingen, etc. Translated from the German by the Rev. Thomas Goadby, B.A., President of the Baptist College, Nottingham. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark (Clark's Foreign Theological Library). 1884. (pp. vii. 482. 7×3½.)

The last great work of Ewald, of which the first volume is here offered to the English-speaking public in a very readable translation, shows the excellences, and, we are sorry to add, the defects, so familiar in the previous voluminous writings of the illustrious author. To form a just estimate of Ewald's services to biblical science is a delicate task, which, perhaps, only ten years after his death, it would be premature to attempt. Overawed by his colossal learning, charmed by his spiritual enthusiasm, and dazzled by the splendor of his rhetoric, many Englishmen and Americans appear to us to have set far too much store by his authority. Intimate familiarity with all the phenomena is not the same as mastery of all the facts; nor is boundless fertility of invention equivalent to a genius for historical reconstruction. Ewald is the great intuitive critic; his first glance, like the polarized ray, resolves in gorgeous colors the secret structure of his dull materials. We are not surprised that he often goes wrong, rather that he so often goes right. In grammar, in exegesis, in history, and in theology, a good share of the time and labor of Old Testament scholars for a long while to come will be occupied in undoing what Ewald has done. His defects are not like those of a Cuvier, a Lyell, or a Darwin—the unavoidable imperfections of advancing science; they arise from his arrogant and inveterate habit of building in dicta along with facts in such a manner that it is impossible to see how the weight of the structure is sustained.

Let us observe, now, his procedure in the work in hand. The attempt is, in the words of his translator, "to read Revelation, Religion, and Scripture in the light of universal history and the common experience of man with reference to all the great religious systems of the world." The translator thinks that the principles which run through this work are precisely the principles which modern science accepts. Every thing rests upon the basis of fact and is ultimately subjected to the test of experience. This is Ewald's own opinion; he says (page 413): "It cannot be disputed that it would be an irremediable loss if, concerning Moses and his time and concerning Christ, the two poles upon which the whole history of the community turns, we possessed in the Bible sources of information only late in origin and half or wholly untrustworthy." Again he says (p. 407): "The Bible is through and through of historical nature and spirit. . . . It has upon its

face, looked at as a whole, the clearest impress of historicity." Yet Ewald does not accept as historical a single miracle of all this grand history. His dictum is: "On whatever stage Hebrew tradition introduces Deity as acting and incarnating itself in history, it undoubtedly is always mythical." Even the central fact of Mosaic history, the giving of the law on Sinai, comes to us in a form "late in origin and half untrustworthy." There were no stone tables, no writing by the finger of God, no writing at all, in fact, at Sinai. Here, then, we have an attempt to furnish a scientific philosophy of the true religion and holy Scripture which by a wave of the hand, at the outset, dismisses all the principal facts concerned. Having so easily gotten rid of the back bone, he finds small difficulty in adjusting the *disjecta membra* to his own notions, especially as any other inconvenient fact may be annihilated and any necessary but lacking fact created by the same magic. What deceives the unsuspecting in all this process is the great magician's glowing enthusiasm and his air of scientific constructiveness, supported by his undeniable affluence of learning.

Just what Ewald's view of revelation is, it is, on account of the "diffuse magnificence" of his style, somewhat audacious to attempt to state. Ewald has a genius for vagueness. He is master of all the grammatical and rhetorical possibilities of indefiniteness. Perhaps the following is as fair as a definite statement can be. All insight and truth, skill and art, have been wrung by the entire human race from their direct opposites historically, and fought out in conflict with thousandfold ignorance and inaptitude. The Bible gives us the history of the one nation which, alone among the nations of antiquity, had the courage to determine to be an actual nation of the true God. It gives also a universal history of all nations, so far as this is connected with the maintenance and progress of the true religion. In the struggle and conflict with obstructive errors, the human spirit, by the impulse and also by the light of revelation, approached the divine, and by their co-operation arose a new humanly-divine spirit. The Bible is the outgrowth of the life of the nation animated by this humanly-divine spirit. It does not claim to be holy in itself, but presents luminous pictures of the development of true religion.

This book abounds in profound thoughts, just observations, and inspiring sentiments; it is a monument of the genius of its author; but it is essentially an attempt to provide for the rise and record of the true religion a different explanation from the plain objective one of the Bible itself.

THE OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY OF THE CONSUMMATION OF GOD'S KINGDOM, TRACED IN ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. By C. von Orelli, Professor of Theology, Basel. Translated by Rev. J. S. Banks, Headingley, Leeds. New York: Scribner and Welford. 1885. (pp. viii. 472. 7×4.) (Clark's Foreign Theological Library. New Series Vol. xxii.)

The comprehensive study of the Old Testament in the historico-critical method is the peculiar glory of our own times. Such a study alone can afford firm ground for the arrangement of details in the Old Testament and

is also indispensable for a full and right understanding of the New. Dr. Orelli has in this work followed out the central thought of the Old Testament — the consummation of God's kingdom — with great thoroughness and profound insight and has produced a book worthy to stand beside that of Oehler. The fundamental positions of Orelli are those commonly held among conservative divines. He recognizes in Old Testament prophecy the speaking of individuals under the influence of the supra-mundane spirit of God, who only comes on man exceptionally to qualify him for work beyond his natural powers, and only settles in permanence on him extraordinarily, and moreover is clearly distinguished from man's natural life-spirit. Coming to Orelli fresh from the reading of Ewald, we miss the warmth and glow, the gorgeous colors and vague splendors, of the great Orientalist. The sober scientific style of our guide seems dull indeed. As however, in this quiet way he proceeds to trace the sublime sweep and reach of the prophecies, their eternal glory shines in unclouded light.

THE DIVINE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY indicated by its Historical Effects.

By Richard S. Storrs, D.D., L.L.D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph and Co. 1884. (pp. xiv. 674. 6½×4.) \$3.50

As a contribution to the evidences of Christianity this book has few equals. It consists of ten lectures, with ample notes and citations of authority appended, and a full index. The notes, nearly equalling in bulk the rest of the volume, form a sort of prose anthology, rich, varied, suggestive, and instructive, culled from a wide range of literature, ancient and modern. When the citations are from classical or foreign authors they are presented in English translations.

The first lecture treats of the importance of the external evidence for Christianity and of its progressive force. Christianity claims for itself a divine origin and a divine authority. An embarrassment in discussing the external evidences of Christianity arises from the fact that the Christian religion itself "makes a personal, spiritual experience of its power the only final evidence of it." To this our author replies: The difficulty does not really lie in our way. Enough if our discussion shows a *probability* that Christianity is from God; so that "a conscientious and intelligent man may study it for himself, and set himself in intimate personal harmony with its law and life, thus making a sufficient experiment of it by accepting and applying it to his own soul." The probative force of the argument is that of moral truth. It is not coercive of intellectual assent, and cannot be. "Where moral truth is the subject presented, the mind must not withstand it with predetermined hostility if it would feel its fair impression."

The reason for basing the argument on the historical effects introduced by Christianity is next set forth. It is assumed that a clear difference must appear in the historical effects produced by religions that are a fabrication of man and a religion coming from God. Taking the state of human soci-

ety as it palpably was before this religion was declared in the world, and comparing it with that which has since appeared, his aim is to show that "certain peculiar and transcendent elements have entered the governing life of mankind," in consequence of which we live in almost a new world. To a caviler this may seem to be only a *post hoc ergo propter hoc* line of argument, fallacious, and of little value; and he may think it would be quite as easy to prove that Christianity was of satanic origin by the same method, by alleging it to be the cause of some of the worst evils that have afflicted mankind. But no candid reader would ever form such an opinion. The historic effects ascribed by Dr. Storrs to Christianity are in such evident agreement with its spirit and intention that they are like children whose features unmistakably indicate their parentage; the evils alleged are so utterly contrary to its spirit and intention that they are related to it only as the crimes committed under a beneficent government, in violation of its laws, are related to that government.

The New Conception given by Christianity of the Duty of Man toward God in Worship is next considered. In place of the old sacrificial rites of the ancient religions, Christianity puts "the more intimate and important sacrifice of self." The impulse that prompts and constrains to such sacrifice is born of love,— "the master-word of this religion." This love uttered itself in hymns of joy and praise. Music and hymnody were inspired by the new faith. Such music never before was heard and is not now heard except where Christian faith is found. "Philosophy does not sing. Unbelief does not sing. A scientific Positivism has no conceivable utterance in music."

The New Conception given by Christianity of Man's Duty to Man in Politics and Society is next treated of. Childhood has been transfigured by it, woman greatly elevated, the slave set free. It has also wrought a New Conception of the Duties of Nations toward each other. Instead of the old relation of hostility, there has sprung up, "through the sense of obligation to unseen equities honored by Christ," a relation of "mutual alliances and reciprocating charities."

The Effect of Christianity upon the Mental Culture of Mankind is next set forth with great wealth of learning and convincing force. In this lecture and the one following, on the Moral Life of Mankind, the volume rises to its highest merit. In regard to the former topic the author says: "Being the religion of a book with many authors, who wrote of history, biography, legislation and prophecy, with maxims of profound ethical wisdom, great arguments of doctrine, spiritual rules for the shaping of character, gnomic sayings containing vast riches of thought,— it has set the mind of mankind, wherever its impact has fallen, into instant, various, and wide-ranging action."

The last topic discussed is the Effect of Christianity on the World's Hope

from the millions of heathenism, "the future is as certain as if he touched it," and that future is radiant with glory.

The tenth lecture is a Review of the Argument with Added Suggestions. Among these suggestions two are specially noteworthy:

1. Christianity did not come by natural development from any preceding religion. The uniqueness of its operation and the separateness of its results, as shown in history, are proof of its entire separateness of nature.

2. Though the argument from Miracles is not so impressive to us as to those who witnessed them, the argument derived from the Historic Effects of Christianity is increasingly strong. Those effects form "the standing miracle of Christendom," and the religion to which that must be ascribed has a growing prestige.

Such is the barest outline of this crowning work of Dr. Storrs. It is throughout candid and temperate in tone, clear and brilliant in style; and it abounds in passages of rare eloquence. It will take its place among the classics of sacred oratory.

PRAISE SONGS OF ISRAEL. A new rendering of the Book of Psalms. By John DeWitt, D.D., of the Theological Seminary, New Brunswick, N. J.; a member of the American Old Testament Revision Company. Funk and Wagnalls, New York and London. 1884. (pp. xx. 219. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ ×3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.50.

This new rendering of the Psalter came out just before the appearance of the Revised Version, not at all in rivalry with it, but "as a revision less restricted than is proposed in the Anglo-American Revision and that shall always seek the most exact expression of the cadences of Hebrew song in pure, rich, racy Saxon English of the earliest times." Scholars will recognize in this work a most valuable exegetical help, and unprofessional readers will place it joyfully among the companions of their devotional hours. For such use the tasteful form in which the publishers have sent it forth is especially adapted.

Of the several general peculiarities claimed for this translation, the chief is the use of the English present tense to represent the two principal Hebrew tense forms much more frequently than in the Authorized Version. The increased use of the present tense is indeed a characteristic of the Revised Version, but not so much as of Dr. DeWitt's, and this improvement alone would be a sufficient justification for a special version. Eight pages of the preface are devoted to a very clear exposition of the doctrine of the Hebrew tenses as now generally taught on the basis of Ewald and Driver. We have here no quarrel with Dr. DeWitt, who appears only as an expositor, and the conclusion which he reaches is indisputably true: but it will always remain hard for many minds to see how the fundamental conceptions of complete and incomplete action explain the connotation of the Hebrew tenses in practice. A more rational basis for the facts of usage and a more obvious justification of Dr. DeWitt's translations appear to us to be afforded in the definitions proposed by Professor Ballantine in an article in the October *Hebraica*. Accordingly, we should say that the perfect "expresses the mere predica-

tion of a fact" without regard to time; and that the imperfect "connotes the act predicated as following upon or arising out of a known act or situation of affairs." These definitions amply justify the use of the English present in translation, and they show that the carrying on of history by so-called future forms is in no sense a "semi-poetic" usage, but a simple, prosaic way of indicating the sequence of events.

The reader who begins with the preface will be probably disappointed with the version. After so distinct a declaration of independence from the restrictions of the Revisers and so large a promise of clear, strong, pure, rich, racy, Saxon English, one is astonished to find Dr. DeWitt's version so much like the Revision, often differing only in substituting the margin, or the American reading or some equivalent synonym, for the text. But we are delighted to find it so. Here is a wholly unintentional but most signal tribute to the perfection of the Revision. A scholar of undoubted competence, expressly freeing himself from the weight of popular prejudice which restricted the revisers, at liberty to express the exact shade of thought of the original poetry, is satisfied with a version no more different from the standard than this.

We wish that in some places Dr. DeWitt's attempt had been a little more ambitious. For instance, in Ps. xcv. 4, the Revised Version is:

In his hand are the deep places of the earth,
The heights of the mountains are his also.

Dr. DeWitt renders:

In whose hand are the depths of the earth,
And his are the treasures of the mountains.

This is a good example of the way in which the versions generally differ. They differ, not in quality of English, not in theory at all; but simply as the productions of scholars working independently under the same rules will accidentally differ. From the language of the preface some attempt to interpret more suggestively the pregnant expressions *מַחְרֵי-אָרֶץ* and *תְּעֻפּוֹת הָרִים* would naturally have been expected. Still, the number of places where a better word is used (as in Ps. cvi. 9, "plains" for "wilderness;" "young of the flock" for "young sheep," Ps. cxiv. 6) is very considerable. Any thorough-going strophic arrangement of the Psalter must be largely mechanical, Dr. DeWitt's like all the rest, and yet the mere separation of the parts, as in such a psalm as the ninety-first, sometimes lets in a flood of light and seems almost like a new rendering. That the Revisers have so seldom admitted it is greatly to be regretted.

THE PROPHECY OF JOEL: Its Unity, its Aim and the Age of its Composition. By William L. Pearson, A.M., Ph.D. Leipzig: Theodor Stauffer. 1885. (pp. x. 154. 6½×3¾.) Paper. \$1.00.

The particular occasion of this elaborate monograph, recanvassing the whole question of the book of Joel, is the work of Merx (*Die Prophetie des Joel und ihre Ausleger*, 1879), who places Joel in B. C. 445 at the completion of the second temple. Its chief object is to settle, if possible, the

much disputed question whether Joel wrote before or after the exile. The first part discusses the contents, unity, and aim of Joel; the second part, did Joel live before or after the exile? the third part, in which pre-exilic age did Joel prophesy?

Dr. Pearson arrives at the conclusion that the book is original and a unit. The locusts are not allegorical and probably came from the Syrian desert. As to the date he is led to the position that if we are to regard the historical books as affording sufficient facts, indications, and hints by which the age of the prophet may be determined, then probably Joel prophesied under Rehoboam (after B. C. 970). But if some plundering of the temple may be assumed of which the historians omitted to make mention, then the reign of Uzziah is as probable as any period.

This discussion is invested with additional interest when it is seen that the Joel question (like so many other questions) is solidly bound together with the Pentateuchal question, and that the advocates of the Graf hypothesis can scarcely avoid the necessity of bringing Joel also down into the time of Ezra. The painstaking thoroughness of this work may excuse a sort of heaviness and occasional obscurity of style, growing perhaps out of the variety of views to be noticed and the slightness of materials upon which argument must be based. It is another valuable addition to that constructive biblical literature which the immoderation of the recent higher critics has called out.

DANIEL THE PROPHET; Nine lectures delivered in the Divinity School of the University of Oxford. With Copious Notes. By the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church. New York: Funk and Wagnalls. 1885. (pp. lxviii. 519. 7½×4.) \$3.00.

THE MINOR PROPHETS, with a Commentary, Explanatory and Practical, and Introductions to the several books. By the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D. Two vols. New York: Funk and Wagnalls. 1885. (pp. 427, 504. 7½×4½.) \$3.00 each.

Dr. Pusey's commentaries have been before the public for twenty years or more and their high character and value are too well known to require any extended notice now. It may not be superfluous, however, to assure theological students that they have not yet been superseded and that their fulness of learning, sound sense, and deep piety still keep them at the head of the list of authorities upon the prophets treated. In this new, attractive, and cheap form, we hope that they will be generally purchased by our clergy.

HOSEA, with Notes and Introduction by the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M. A., D. D., late Fellow and Lecturer of Balliol College, Oxford, and Rector of Tendring, Essex. (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: at the University Press. 1884. New York: Macmillan & Co. (pp. 132. 7½×3½.) 90 cents.

The general plan of this series is very excellent. It is to present in com-

pact and non-technical form the results of the latest and most exact scholarship. Dr. Cheyne's thorough familiarity with the literature of his subject and his critical acumen are well known. But we feel less satisfied with this than with some of his other work. There is a curious difference of flavor in this commentary on Hosea and that of his third edition of Isaiah brought out in the same year. The Isaiah is above all things cautious, with a growing tendency toward conservative positions. In the Hosea the confident tone of the most recent revolutionary criticism prevails without reserve. Hosea "regards the conduct of Jehu in a different light from the writer of 2 Kings, x. 30" (p. 42). The backsliding of Israel "is not to be traced, as the older writers of the Old Testament naively traced it, to a peculiar wickedness in the primitive Israelites" (p. 53). "Hosea is more consistent, more outspoken, than Isaiah" (p. 101). "The references to Hosea in the New Testament, so far as they imply interpretations, would not at all stand the test of a purely western criticism" (p. 38). Upon the much-abused passage iii. 4 ("For the children of Israel shall abide many days without a king, and without a prince, and without a sacrifice, and without an image, and without an ephod, and without teraphim; afterward shall the children of Israel return and seek the Lord their God and David their king," etc.) Dr. Cheyne remarks (p. 60): "It follows from this passage of Hosea that the worship of Jehovah in northern Israel presented features altogether alien to the orthodox worship of Jehovah according to the Law, and that Hosea raises no protest against it. He refers to its suspension as a privation corresponding to and equally felt with that of kings and princes." And yet in a note on the preceding verse Dr. Cheyne has just said: "Gomer is to lead a quiet, secluded life; *her licentious course is cut short*, and her conjugal intercourse may not be resumed." Why then is it not more natural, with Pusey, to regard these "features altogether alien to orthodox worship" as a part of the "licentious course"?

In discussing the point whether the sorrows of Hosea's domestic life are to be understood historically or allegorically, Dr. Pusey says: "There is no ground to justify our taking as a parable what Holy Scripture relates as a fact." To this Dr. Cheyne replies: "There must be some plausible ground for it or the opinion rejected by Dr. Pusey would not have commended itself to the majority of modern commentators. It is not at all a necessary inference from the inspiration of the Scriptures that the events described by Hosea should be historical; it is rather an *intuition* which comes of itself to the unbiassed reader who has any poetic insight" (p. 17). Now it may seem captious, but we feel this kind of argument to be saturated with a subtle arrogance. "Intuition," as here used, can, in the vocabulary of an exact psychology, mean only hasty, unconscious, and unverified induction. Here indeed it leads to a right result but that is only a fortunate accident. Such an appeal to intuition of course closes all debate and consigns the objector to the dunce block. It is this kind of criticism that assigns Hosea to the northern kingdom "because the tone of his piety is warmer and more joyous than that which prevails in the great Judahite prophets." This intu-

itional criticism, of which Ewald was so incomparable a master, has proved a dangerous organon of exegetical investigation.

THE BOOK OF ESTHER, a new Translation; with Critical Notes, Excursuses, Maps and Plans, and Illustrations. By the Lowell Hebrew Club. Edited by Rev. John W. Haley, M.A., author of "Alleged Discrepancies of the Bible," and of "The Hereafter of Sin." Andover: W. F. Draper. 1885. (pp. 196. 7×3 $\frac{1}{2}$.) \$1.50.

We hope that the excellent example of the four parish ministers who have prepared this scholarly and exhaustive commentary on the book of Esther, will be widely influential for the sake of the intellectual freshness of the ministry and of the churches, and for the sake of biblical learning in America. The difficult problem of meeting the incessant demands of a parish and of keeping up genuine, fruitful, scholarly work seems in this case to have been happily solved. Embracing an introduction, new translation, notes, sixteen excursions upon special topics, numerous illustrations, maps and diagrams, the work possesses unusual completeness. We heartily commend it to all students of the book of Esther.

A HARMONY OF THE FOUR GOSPELS IN GREEK. Newly arranged, with Explanatory Notes. By Edward Robinson, D.D., LL.D., lately Professor of Biblical Literature in Union Theological Seminary. Revised Edition, giving the Text of Tischendorf, and Various Readings accepted by Tregelles, Westcott, and Hort, and the Revised English Version of 1881. With Additional Notes. By M. B. Riddle, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in Hartford Theological Seminary. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company; New York: 11 East Seventeenth Street; Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1885. (pp. xxvi. 273. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ ×4 $\frac{1}{2}$.) \$2.00.

We are glad to welcome from the accomplished pen of Dr. Riddle a new edition of Robinson's Greek Harmony, for long study has confirmed us in the opinion that Robinson's arrangement of the Gospels and his discussions of the various apparent discrepancies are so judicious that the book is worthy of a permanent place in Christian literature. About all that was needed was to incorporate in a new edition the results of recent textual criticism. This Dr. Riddle has done in a most satisfactory manner, giving in foot-notes the principal authorities for the important changes in the text. There are also many valuable additions to the Notes. In the light of some recent assertions to the contrary, the following emphatic testimony of Dr. Riddle is interesting: "The longest and, in many respects, most valuable note in the Appendix,—that on the Passover and the Last Supper (pp. 243–56),—has been scarcely modified, and not much enlarged. Recent controversies have not, I make bold to say, rendered the author's positions untenable or his arguments antiquated" (p. v.).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RALPH CUDWORTH: A Study of the True Intellectual System of the Universe. By C. E. Lowrey, A.M. New York: Phillips and Hunt. 1884.

The contrast between the attention paid to the philosophers of Germany

and England by their respective fellow-countrymen is almost startling. Nearly a score of good general histories of the line of German thinkers could be counted up, while the press and library fairly teem with special exposition. For the history of English philosophy, aside from the thorough sketch of the movement from Locke to Hume, prefixed to Green's edition of the latter, we have to go to a Frenchman, De Rémusat, and a Teuton, Kuno Fischer. What has been said deals almost entirely with the empirical aspect of English thought. With such reflections we turned with more than usual interest to the book before us occupied with a special phase of the too generally neglected idealistic philosophy of England, hoping to find it not only a worthy contribution to the history of British thinking, but a special exposition of the relation which the whole Platonic movement of the seventeenth century bore to the rising tide of the strictly scientific and mechanical *Weltanschauung*.

In both respects, however, we were disappointed. The book is rather "materials to serve," as the French would say, than such a contribution. It gives an excellent, compact, generally lucid summary, or rather abstract, of the thought, perhaps we should say *writings*, of Cudworth, with many of the points emphasized in which he stood in hostile relation to Descartes and Hobbes, but that is about all. The author seems hardly to have grasped the significance of Cudworth in the intellectual life of his times, nor to have a due sense of the relative importance of the various elements of Cudworth's thought. The book is lacking in both the sense of connection and of perspective.

If we abate what perhaps were undue expectations, the work is well and thoroughly done, and may be heartily recommended to those who wish a knowledge of Cudworth without wading through his own almost encyclopaedic tomes. The work, it may be proper to state, was written as a thesis for the doctorate of philosophy in the University of Michigan, and as such reflects credit upon author and institution. It is provided with an excellent analytic table of contents, as well as with an index.

THE MENTAL SAVINGS BANK. A convenient means of classifying by topics and filing for ready reference newspaper clippings, pamphlets, notes, and memoranda. With portfolios for holding clippings, etc. Chicago: Brown, Pettibone, and Kelly. 1884.

Most systems of classification have for their end the classifying of books: such cannot well be adapted to newspaper clippings. Although we question as to the success of Mr. Brown's system as applied to books, we believe it to be the best obtainable for classifying newspaper clippings. By means of eighteen "grand divisions," each with one hundred subdivisions, the author has provided a place for every topic usually referred to, in a systematic order. At the close, an exhaustive index enables one to find without trouble any topic desired, while every other page is left blank, to allow modification or the introduction of allied topics.

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIOUSNESS IN CHRIST- IAN THEOLOGY.¹

BY THE REV. A. J. F. BEHREND, D.D., BROOKLYN, N. Y.

CLEARNESS of definition, and a fixed terminology, are the two great and indispensable conditions of solid progress in knowledge. Definite meanings must be associated with words and phrases, and, as in the employment of algebraic symbols, there must be no variation in their use through all the intricacies of a long and difficult argument. It is acknowledged, too, that many a phrase is best understood under the light of its historical origin and earliest use; and such an investigation may lead to the conclusion, that, however winning it may appear to be, its early and long service associates it with tendencies and

¹ The present article has not been cumbered with footnotes, for the simple reason that the only authors quoted are those whose names are given in the text, and whose writings are presumed to be familiar to the theological reader. The dogmatic treatises themselves have been read as carefully as time permitted, to discover what meaning was attached to the phrase "Christian Consciousness," and what part was assigned to it in theological science. Besides these, Dörner's *History of Protestant Theology*, and Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie*—articles *Dogmatik* and *Religion*—may be read to advantage. Van Oosterzee's *Christian Dogmatics* contains a very clear and concise criticism of the subjective method in theology. The most searching and caustic handling of the mediation theology, which the writer has seen, is by Dr. Carl Schwartz, of Gotha, in a book entitled *A Contribution to the History of the Newest Theology*, which, however, closes with the year 1869. The boldest and most consistent advocacy of the theology

conceptions that cannot be defended. Of such phrases "Christian Consciousness" is one. Etymologically harmless and attractive, its theological history may prevent its acceptance by many. For it has been the watchword of a theological school. It has served, for more than seventy-five years, as the rallying-cry of a definite method in theological inquiry, whose claim of superior merit cannot be conceded, and many of whose fruits are not encouraging to Christian faith. It is an alien on American soil, and American theology is not friendly to its naturalization. It has been used among us in a greatly modified sense, and the honors claimed on its behalf have been comparatively modest; but it is well to recall the pedigree of the newcomer, and to remember that with the word must be associated a long and eventful history in religious thought. And, unless we are ready to range ourselves under the banner thus unfurled, or unless we are prepared to confess the poverty of our speech, it may be wise to abandon the phrase altogether to those whose theological spirit it defines.

Now the underlying debate, marked by this innocent phrase, does not concern the philosophical question as to the ultimate ground of certainty, which must be posited

based upon "Christian Consciousness," as its source and organ, by an American writer, is from the pen of Professor Allen, of Cambridge, whose book on the Continuity of Christian Thought created something of a sensation in New England circles of thought. There is, however, no single treatise in which the subject of this article has been submitted to a searching historical examination, followed by a critical analysis and exposition of its implications. The present writer rises from his brief essay, which he has found compassed with great and many difficulties, and for whose thorough study an exacting pastorate does not leave him the needed leisure, in the earnest hope that some one thoroughly at home in German theology may undertake the task, than which none could be of greater service to American theology. There can be no more mischievous state of things than the adoption of phrases whose principles are kept in the background, postulates whose simple enunciation would be promptly challenged and earnestly rejected. And in this catalogue of phrases "Christian Consciousness" is one of the most important.

in self-consciousness.. All knowledge begins with, and is conditioned by, self-knowledge. I can be sure of nothing, unless I am sure of my present thought, and through that, of myself. Primarily, I am certain only of myself. All other knowledge is mediated by that. Without self-knowledge, the certainty of our mental states, the reality of our thought, there could be neither science, nor philosophy, nor theology. All this is self-evident, and if no more were intended by the claim urged in certain quarters that the Christian consciousness must be invested with a very high, if not the very highest, degree of authority, in determining Christian doctrine, than what is involved in the philosophical thesis that certainty must be traced to self-consciousness as its primary source,—the discussion would not be worth an hour's breath. Of course, I must begin where I am, and with myself. I cannot vault outside of myself in any process or pursuit of knowledge. But it does not follow that knowledge and certainty end where they begin. Like the radius of a great circle, firmly and constantly held to its invisible centre, thought may sweep a wide circumference infinitely removed from the point where it begins. I may be as certain of the divine existence as I am of my own, however true it may be that the consciousness of my own existence is the first thought that dawns upon me, and is woven into all subsequent mental life. It is the old question whether knowledge is limited to the consciousness of mental states, of ideal and empty relations only, or whether these states are not rather the transparent media through which the objects of knowledge are themselves apprehended. Are what we call the laws or categories of thought, limitations and hindrances in the search for truth, preventing us from even attaining any other than a regulative certainty, or are they essential lines along which all thought must move, and has moved from everlasting, so that the goal of an absolute certainty awaits our honest and patient endeavor? The latter thesis is here assumed. On this question Hegel is

preferred to Kant and Sir William Hamilton. The last word of the Kantian philosophy is man's hopeless ignorance; the first word of the Hegelian school is the original potential omniscience of man. The true philosophy maintains that man is neither impotent nor omnipotent, but endowed with mental capacity to pass from the certainty of self-knowledge to the certain apprehension of objective truth. The contention, therefore, that all certitude is rooted in the knowledge of self, cannot be made to substantiate the claim that all conviction of certainty must be spontaneous and intuitive. The former is fully granted, the latter is resolutely denied.

Nor does the debate touch the religious affirmation that the revelation of God in Holy Scripture deals only with the facts and doctrines designed and fitted to call forth intellectual assent, and to provoke spiritual responsiveness. The word of God is living. It has never been anything else. Prophets and apostles were not automatic penmen or speakers, borne away by a tempest of thoughts of which they knew little or nothing. Revelation was none the less real because supernatural. It means unveiling, it is inconceivable apart from illumination, though not synonymous with it. It was like fire in the bones of him who was favored with it, whose holy heat pervaded the entire mental and moral frame of prophet or apostle, stirring to profoundest and intensest reflection, issuing in fixed and unalterable personal conviction. The revelation was a vision. That living quality in the word of God is the abiding secret of its energy. Its first appearance was life, the life of knowledge, hope, and salvation; and where it does not bring life it has not truly come. Faith must seize, or be seized by, the life that the word suggests or conveys, or it fails to deal with the word in its divine reality. There is nothing magical in the impact of God's thought upon the mind of man. Neither in inspiration nor in regeneration is man passive. Christian theology can never, therefore, be indifferent to what is called

Christian experience. The Scriptures cannot be understood and expounded as the multiplication table can be repeated, or as the propositions of Euclid can be followed and verified. Grammatical, exegetical, historical helps are invaluable, as reproducing for us the local attitude and specific surroundings of the writer or speaker, but we must make his thought our own, reproducing it in terms of personal conviction, or the burden of the message will remain as foreign to us as are the antipodes to our sight.

Nor, once more, does the debate concern the question of progressive clearness in theological statement, or the need of a new adjustment of the separate doctrines in a self-consistent whole. No one claims that the creeds and confessions are infallible, and that their free criticism is irreverent. Nay, if the word of God be life, it must be born again in the mind and heart of each generation. If it be as sacred fire, its glow must quicken the pulses of each decade. Each age must create its own theology from the original sources, if it is to have any theology at all. That involves gradual and incessant enlargement, an elimination of past misapprehensions, and a retention of the transmitted testimony only so far as it is the vehicle of the transforming life of God. The Augustinian, the Calvinistic, the Federalistic, the Hopkinsian, the Arminian attempts at systematization have their historic place, but they are seen not to have co-ordinated all the vital facts, and to have inserted dead branches into the tree of Christian doctrine. There is a vague feeling, in our day, after a better system, growing out of living, deeper, and more fruitful principles than the idea of the church, or the doctrine of Divine decrees, or the fanciful notion of covenants, or a theory of virtue, or a philosophy of free agency. Some find escape in a reconstruction of theology by the Christological idea, and others despair of tracing all the lines of biblical teaching to the single point whence they take their departure, and in which they are firmly held together. Our theology, in its systematic form, is confes-

sedly in a formative state. We are neither Augustinians, nor Calvinists, nor Arminians; neither Old School, nor New. We touch all schools, and belong to none. We write and read monographs, not comprehensive treatises, as did Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. We look with distrust upon a finished and self-consistent theology. There is to-day no dominant type of systematic thought in Christian doctrine, and some think that it has disappeared never more to return. There can be no question that the Arminian controversy and the Wesleyan movement have powerfully quickened impatience with full-fledged systems, and given intensity and firmness to the spirit of toleration. Not because we have become indifferent to truth, and careless of theology, but because the word of God is seen to be of larger scope than the theological lines of any school. And perhaps it is true, as many think, that the golden age of systematic theology will never come again. Be that as it may, the burden of the hour is not to prove a thing to be either old or new, but to be true.

That raises the crucial question, how can we know what is true? What shall be our method of search? It is here, in the *method* of Christian theology, the point of departure and the court of appeal, rather than in the specific results of study, that the controversy of the hour gathers, and where it has swung as on a pivot for more than eighty years. Three methods have prevailed from the very first, represented by Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Abelard, in the Middle Ages, by Augustine, Jerome, and Pelagius, in earlier times. The first is the traditional or ecclesiastical, the second is the inductive and biblical, the third is the individualistic or rationalistic method. In the first method mental energy is concentrated on the church and its dogmas, in the second on the Scriptures, in the third on self. The latter method, again, has assumed three main forms, speculative, emotional and practical,—as knowledge, feeling, or conscience, has been regarded central and distinct-

ive in the philosophy of the soul. Where thought is regarded as the seat of the divine image, the subjective method has issued in rationalism; where the feelings have been considered the cradle of religion, the result of the method has been mysticism or mystical pantheism; and where the conscience has been consulted as the oracle of truth, the method has resolved theology into ethics.

The subjective method had its representatives in the rationalist Abelard, and in Bernard, the mystic, but the tendencies never came to their full development and fruitage until the Reformation left men free to speak and write as they thought. The overshadowing power of the Roman Catholic church checked the growth of the subjective method, as it also hampered the free use of Holy Scripture. Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin opposed the authority of the Bible to the authority of the Church. On that line the fierce battle was waged. It is true that Luther has frequently been quoted as introducing the subjective method, and committing German theology to its use, but his utterances are clear-cut and unequivocal, as when he declares that "Christian doctrine is learned by the revelation of God himself; *first, by the external word; then, by the working of God's Spirit inwardly.*" The gospel, therefore, is a divine word that came down from heaven, and is revealed by the Holy Ghost, who was also sent for the same purpose; yet in such sort notwithstanding, *that the outward word must go before.*" It is Dorner's labored insistence that in Luther's theology the formal and the material principles were of co-ordinate authority, that Scripture and faith were invested with equal and complementary honors, but the sturdy Reformer would have made short work with such an interpretation of his doctrine. To him the word of God was a living word, reproducing itself in the joyful testimony of faith; but the precedence was always given to Scripture as the primary and solely authoritative revelation. And his freedom in biblical criticism, leading him to the rejection of the Epistle by James, was not due

to subjective prepossessions, but to the objective conviction that the Bible contained a definite and fixed "gospel," by which its separate utterances were to be interpreted, and its separate books to be judged. Luther's principle was simply that of measuring the books of the Bible by the preponderant teaching of the Book as a living whole. His method was as emphatically, though in a different way, objective, as was that of Calvin or of John Knox. But the scholastic spirit reasserted itself in the churches of the German Reformation. The theology wrought out on purely biblical lines, yet all too hastily, took form in the Augsburg Confession; and thenceforward the main endeavor was to maintain the integrity of the doctrinal symbol, the plenary and even verbal inspiration of the Bible being used to invest the proof-texts with divine infallibility. Theology once more became scholastic, confined within the limits of an ecclesiastical creed, as Rome had confined it within the lines of an ecclesiastical tradition. It was really an abandonment of the Reformation principle; but in the reaction that followed the introduction of Deism by way of France, the authority both of the church and of the Bible was abandoned, and the appeal was made to the human reason. The subjective method in theological inquiry came to the front, and challenged alike the Church of Rome and the churches of the Reformation. It was intensely and exclusively rationalistic. It resolved revealed into natural theology, and left in the latter only these three things—God, duty, and immortality; while the thorough-going skepticism of Hume and the materialistic French philosophy reduced even these to a shadow. The eighteenth century was one of profound spiritual darkness, relieved only by the pious fervor of Spener, the evangelical simplicity of the Moravian brotherhood and the devotion of the Wesleys. It seemed as if Christianity had been buried in a grave so dark and deep that its resurrection was beyond hope. The poor heard the gospel with gladness, but the great churches answered

it with a sneer. Faith had perished in the seats of culture and among the educated.

Then came Schleiermacher, himself trained among the Moravians, who has been called "the greatest divine of the nineteenth century." This honor belongs to him, however, mainly as the prophet of a transition period, as the prominent leader in the reaction against an empty and flippant rationalism, in which he summoned the age to a profounder study of religion in its living root, and to a more reverent estimate of Christianity. He met the rationalists on their own ground, overthrowing their conclusions by a profounder philosophy of human nature, in whose sense of absolute dependence he found the eternal ground and necessity of religion. But he agreed with them in adopting the subjective method of theological inquiry, substituting feeling for understanding as the primary source and final test of all religious truth. The mystical method supplanted the rationalistic. Religion was defined as consisting neither in knowledge nor in conduct, but in a determinate feeling, the consciousness of absolute dependence, and the task of theology was represented as exhausted in a description of the pious feeling. With Schleiermacher the phrase "Christian Consciousness" became indicative of a fixed method of inquiry. Religion being regarded as a primitive energy, beginning and ending in pious feeling, "the highest norm was no longer, as hitherto, the letter of Scripture, nor a dogmatic formula, nor a postulate of the sound human understanding, but the religious feeling, the state of the pious self-consciousness, before which every doctrine must authenticate itself. The result was that a large amount of the old dogmatic material was thrown overboard, as not pertinent to the representation of the religious life, and remanded to history, cosmology, and metaphysics. Herein consists the importance of the 'Dogmatik,' that the religious feeling presented with infallible tact all that is essential to faith, while all the withered branches of dogmatics were cut away with the

sharp knife of criticism." This is the judgment of a friendly reviewer. Schleiermacher reduced Christian theology to its narrowest bounds. His system represents the minimum of doctrinal conviction involved in Christian faith. Hence the many and serious gaps in the dogmatic results of his labors. The essential being of God is reduced to causality, inspiration is virtually eliminated, the idea of sin is feebly grasped, miracles are ignored, the atonement loses its central place and scriptural significance, and universal restoration is frankly affirmed. It is needless to say that such a system cannot take the rank of a great and comprehensive achievement in theological construction, however marked the genius of its author, and however fresh and fruitful the theological method which he introduced. He may, not inaptly, and without discredit either to his learning or his piety, be called a mystical pantheist. The philosophical postulate of his system is the affirmation that God and the world are two *correlates*, so that a Being of God is not to be thought of without the world, nor outside of the same, but that God is simply the living unity of the world, "the totality of all being, regarded as unity." The mystical element in his thought is his reference of religion to the domain of feeling, as not only rooted in, but wholly contained in, the sense of dependence, so that the pious or Christian consciousness becomes the sole organ or criterion of Christian doctrine. Hence the *Dogmatik* discusses, first the postulates involved in the consciousness of absolute dependence, then the implication involved in the consciousness of sin, and finally the implications involved in the consciousness of grace. Theology exhausts itself in describing Christian feeling, and then, by the aid of a powerful dialectic, bringing to light the intellectual and ethical postulates. Doctrine is purely inferential, open to constant revision by a profounder analysis of the religious feeling. Hence the meagreness of Schleiermacher's use of the Bible and the creeds in his exposition of Christian faith. The original,

creative, perpetually living material of theology was found in the immediate knowledge which the Christian has of Christ. The New Testament and the church can only corroborate, the primary sources and the ultimate criteria of Christian doctrine are subjective, not objective. If Schleiermacher taught any thing, he taught this; and this postulate characterizes all his followers, though none have equalled him in the fearless consistency of its application. He is the father of the mystical method in modern theology, where the Christian consciousness is regarded as supplying the materials of Christian doctrine.

The subjective method, introduced by Schleiermacher, has continued to dominate the development of German theology to the present day, though its results have become increasingly richer and more evangelical, and the idea of religion has assumed a larger meaning. Nietzsche may be mentioned as bringing the method into closer and more constant relation with a reverent and patient use of the Bible, Neander as linking it with the life of the church, and Twisten as disclosing its harmony with the testimony of the great confessions. By these corrective processes, modern German theology has attained substantial enlargement and has become in the main profoundly evangelical. Religion, too, is now affirmed to include knowledge and conduct as well as feeling, as rooted alike in man's intellectual, emotional, and ethical nature, though its initial source is posited in feeling. Neander's motto "*Pectus est quod facit theologum*," may be said to have been altered so as to read: "*Pectus est quod facit religiosum, sed non facit theologum*." A "pectoral theology" has come to be recognized as insufficient. The entire subjective life, as involving not only pious feeling, but primary mental affirmations, and ethical postulates, has come under review. And this again has been brought into relation with history, with the sober verdicts of the Christian church, and especially with the oldest documents outlining the faith of Christianity. Christian consciousness is interrogated on-

ly as illumined and informed by the teaching of history and the New Testament. The method is regressive from personal faith in Christ, through the church to the Holy Scriptures, as containing the oldest record of the historical revelation of Christ. In this way the objective sources and criteria of Christian knowledge have been regained, though without reinstatement in their original priority of authority. The subjective method is still primary and controlling, though no longer exclusive.

This fact is unmistakable in the definition given of theology, and in the treatment of its subject matter. Theology, in our schools and dogmatic treatises, is defined to be "the science of God and his relations to the universe." Its outlook is objective. The German divines, on the other hand, speak of theology as "the science of religion." The outlook is subjective, introspective. It is the life of God in the soul that is the primary object of attention. And this method of inquiry has produced a literature peculiarly rich in the analysis of the elements of true piety. It is predominantly contemplative and devotional, great in spiritual insight and uplift. And yet it is in constant danger of refining, until it becomes so attenuated and shadowy as to result only in another kind of scholasticism, the scholasticism of mystical absorption. It lacks vigor, the rough energy that makes any theology effective for aggressive use. It is a razor, rather than a broad-axe.

The subjective method determines, not only the definition of theology, but the subdivisions under which its special doctrines are brought under review in German dogmatic treatises. Schleiermacher's dogmatic plan has already been noticed. Nitzsch discourses of the Good, the Evil, and Salvation. Lange treats of Christian doctrine under the forms of Ideal, Real, and Universal Christology. Rothe begins his *Dogmatik* by the statement that its mission is the analysis and clear portraiture of the evangelical pious consciousness, and accordingly divides theology into two parts, the consciousness of sin and the conscious-

ness of grace. Harless, Kahnis, and Luthardt make the ecclesiastical consciousness their point of departure, and the latter defines theology as the ecclesiastical science of Christianity, and again as the science of the coherence of dogmas, which theology must reproduce from the religious faith of the Christian. "Gottesgemeinschaft" is his watchword, determining the form of his dogmatic labors, tracing this fellowship with God to its ground in His eternal love, its beginning in the creation of man, its disturbance by sin, its restoration in Jesus Christ, and its appropriation by faith in Him. An admirable plan for a sermon, but according to our Anglican standards, of doubtful incisiveness and efficiency for theological science. Luthardt's watchword reappears in Philippi, the very title of whose book is suggestive of his method: "The Church Doctrine of Faith," and his divisions treat of the original fellowship with God, its disturbance, and its restoration. The same key-note is given by Thomasius, who develops it from the Christological idea as the point of departure. With Hase theology is purely descriptive, without any attempt to reach a definite conclusion. Twisten defines dogmatics as "a living reproduction of belief from the soul of the believer." Dorner regards the vocation of theology to be "the exhibition of Christianity as truth," and the immediate source of knowledge is declared to be Christian experience or faith. Nearly two hundred pages are devoted to the discussion of the dogmatic method, under the head of Pisteology, and the resultant may be described as a Hegelian refinement of Schleiermacher's postulate, its more thorough philosophical exposition. Referring to Schleiermacher's doctrine that the pious and Christian state of the subject constitutes the sole contents of Christian doctrine and that consequently theology exhausts itself in the description of the Christian consciousness, without attaining an objective knowledge of God and Christ, Dorner adds: "This cannot be agreed to." He thinks it better to say, with Julius Müller, Hofmann,

Thomasius, Nitsch, Lange, and Frank, that "we must strive from the religious certainty of faith to an objective knowledge of God; but that it is to be done *retrogressively*, by inferring the cause from the effect." This birth of objective knowledge, *via causalitatis*, however, does not satisfy Dorner, and he allies himself with Liebner, Martensen, and Rothe by affirming that such objective knowledge is the essential content of Christian faith. Faith is declared, not only to have a knowledge of itself, "and thus a self-consciousness, but also a GOD-consciousness, a knowledge of God, which is in fact the final verification of the Christian consciousness." The condensed statement of the Dutch theologian Van Oosterzee, is so admirable and judicious a review of this universal German method, that it is here inserted without note or comment: "To the Christian truth, in accordance with the gospel believed and confessed by the church, the Christian consciousness gives a witness, with reason estimated highly. Only where objective truth finds a point of contact in the subjective consciousness does it become the spiritual property of mankind, and can it be thus properly understood and valued. So far, and so far only, does the Christian consciousness deserve a place among the sources of dogmatics. But since the doctrine of salvation can be derived neither from reason, nor from feeling, nor from conscience, and the internal consciousness only attests and confirms the truth after having learned it from Scripture, this last must always be valued as the principal source."

The present sketch has been confined to the influence of Schleiermacher's postulate and method upon the development of German theology, for the simple reason that

standard of authority to the care of Christian faith. The latter is for us, at most, only interpretive and corroborative of what the Bible teaches; and only here and there has the leap been made to the position that nothing can be true for man "which has not passed through his self-consciousness, and verified itself before it." The phrases "world-consciousness, Christian consciousness, God-consciousness," are of foreign importation, and do not fit our habits of thought; and their philosophical postulates and implications are best studied among the people with whom the vocabulary is indigenous. For words are things, and these phrases indicate a theological method the very reverse of that which we have pursued and held in honor, the former being a method in which faith is regarded as "conscious of independence of all that is external, *the Scriptures not excepted*." Contrast with this the definition of faith in the Westminster Shorter Catechism as a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon Christ alone for salvation "*as he is offered to us in the gospel*" and the difference in doctrinal attitude is apparent. The German method is subjective and philosophical, the English method is objective and biblical. The difference is constitutional and ingrained. It recalls the old story that when an Englishman would describe the anatomy and habits of a camel, he visits the countries where the camel is at home, while the Frenchman makes occasional excursions to a zoölogical museum, and the German shuts himself up in his study finding all the needed material in his consciousness. Not but that the German theology will always have attractions for a few quiet and contemplative minds, and remain a storehouse of the richest devotional literature, but its pronounced and extreme subjectivity will prevent its naturalization in the English churches, whose spirit is more practical than it is philosophical. It is our temper to demand the statement of truth in such a form as to make it practically serviceable. We want a theology that is not only evangelical, but evangelistic, and in this

latter quality the mediation theology is plainly deficient. It has been said by a keen, though somewhat rude, critic, himself a German divine, that "however weighty and thoughtful the sermons of Nitzsch, Steinmeyer, Sack, Müller, may have been, still they were only reflective, sapless, and bloodless, so thoroughly unsuited to the people that here may be found the reason, the explanation of what seems a riddle to many, that the young generation of theologians passed over unconditionally from the lecture-rooms of Müller, Nitzsch, and Dorner into the camp of the orthodox, and in the pulpit assumed the tone of Löhe and Harms." The criticism may be too sweeping, but it is not wholly undeserved. The theology crystallized in the moulds of the subjective method does not readily yield itself to aggressive evangelization.

It is true that the objective method, which starts from the New Testament, consults the history of Christian thought, and interrogates personal Christian experience, in the formulation of Christian doctrine, may seem to differ but slightly from the subjective method, which simply reverses the process. Upon such a description, the existing debate may be regarded as mainly verbal. What difference can it make whether I proceed from present and conscious faith in Christ, through history, to the New Testament, or travel from the New Testament, through the witnessing church, to present knowledge of salvation? Do I not traverse the same path in either case, a path of which Christ is starting point and goal? Granting all this, the subjective method can only claim hospitable treatment, side by side with the older, the objective method, and the superiority of the former must be surrendered. We do not read the subjective method out of court, nor deny its legitimacy and usefulness, but we claim that it is in no way superior to the opposite method, which begins where it ends,—a reverent reading of Holy Scripture. Nay, we press the claim that the subjective method must always be at a great disadvantage in dealing with unre-

generate men. For it postulates faith in the hearer. It begins with man, not with God. It is not simply a Christian theology, but pre-eminently a theology for Christians. It is excellent for edification, but it is weak as an instrument for awakening. It is good for the saintly retreat, but not for a world of sinners. It cannot be a theology of revivals and missions. It could not be preached in China and India and Africa. Here the opposite method has the unspeakable advantage. It begins with a "thus saith the Lord," for itself and for others, and makes the divine authority prominent. The processes of philosophical thought frequently need to be reversed in popular appeal. The conclusion must be announced with the emphasis of personal conviction, before the proofs can be presented in detail. Now Christianity is pre-eminently the religion of conquest. Its proper vestment is the soldier's armor, not the philosopher's cap and gown. It must be carried to pagan, imbruted, worldly, unregenerate men. The assault must be from the objective side, in the full assurance that every spear hurled into the hostile camp will quiver in the enemy's heart. The soul has an echo for the word of God, but the surest way of making men hear that inner echo, is to speak in the name of the Lord. So that, even granting the equal legitimacy of the subjective with the objective method, the latter is to be preferred because it gives us a theology that can be preached.

It must be said, moreover, that the subjective method in Christian theology has been so associated with certain postulates or theories, as to justify hesitancy in accepting its leadership. In the first instance it was identified with the Kantian philosophy, according to which I can know only what is the immediate object of consciousness,—my own mental and moral states. All other knowledge is purely inferential, based upon the law of causality. Even God can make himself known to me only in certain states of which I am conscious, and for whose explanation I must

assume His action. Him I do not, cannot, apprehend; an objective knowledge of God is impossible, and therefore the psychological method is the only available one in theology. A theory of knowledge that shuts man up to the analysis of his own mental states, underlies the birth of the theology that limits Christian doctrine to the description of the Christian consciousness. The present article does not permit a criticism of this philosophical postulate, nor is the present writer competent to conduct it. But so much is manifest that this is only a higher form of a heresy that Kant himself riddled and that Sir William Hamilton exposed and demolished,—that sensation and perception are synonomous and equivalent. Sensation is the spring and concomitant of perception, the exciting occasion and permanent attendant of the same, but the *object* is viewed by the reason through the media of the conscious impressions. That is Hamilton's impregnable affirmation as demanded by the philosophy of common sense, an affirmation that he strangely abandoned when he touched the idea of God. Religion begins in feeling, as perception begins in sensation, but feeling is only the spur inciting to the search of truth, whose objective apprehension is the result, and for whose existence we must have objective evidence and warrant.

The main alliance, however, of the subjective method in theology, has been with the bolder philosophy of Hegel, according to whom all truth, God included, is the result of a process of thought. The reason of man has only to look within to find the absolute. This may not be pantheistic, but the difference between such a philosophy and pantheism is difficult of discernment and discovery. The significance of the Hegelian principle for dogmatics has been described by a loyal disciple to be in forcing the concession that "revelation authenticates itself as an eternal, continuous, internal energy, pervading universal history, as the immanent process of the life of God in the life of man. An external gave place to an internal, a soli-

tary to an eternal, a particular to a universal, a miraculous to a spiritually necessary, revelation." This is the philosophic atmosphere in which the theology built up on the data furnished by the "Christian Consciousness" has mainly lived, moved, and had its being. We will not repeat the charge of pantheism, which has so often and so earnestly been repudiated and termed the indictment of ignorance, but the theology certainly has had a pantheistic tinge. It has regarded God as pure causality. It has spoken of creation as eternal. It has gone so far as to say with Rothe: "*Ohne Gott keine Welt, und ohne Welt keinen Gott.*" It has identified revelation with reflection, and made inspiration equivalent to the gift of genius. It has made the "immanence of God" its watchword and test. The most thorough-going and consistent exposition of the theology based upon the "Christian Consciousness," from an American pen, boldly adopts this postulate of the Hegelian philosophy. The history of theological thought is represented as determined throughout by the idea of God as either immanent or transcendent. The first is declared to have been the philosophy of the Greek theologians; the latter is regarded as distinguishing the theology of Augustine and of the West. In Schleiermacher the older Greek thought is affirmed to have resumed its place, and before its expansive energy Christian theology must be radically recast. Revelation must be conceived of as operative only in the reason of man, and Christian doctrine must find its authentication in the believer's consciousness. Without criticising the argument, or examining its historical development, the principle so plainly announced—the *Immanence of God*—is the vital question involved in the debate. What are we to understand by the divine immanence? What is the scriptural conception of God's relation to the universe? Is God immanent in the world by necessity of nature and from all eternity, related to the world as the soul is to the body, as thought is to speech? If so, the argument is closed, for then rev-

elation is universal, and the divine thought articulates itself in man's reflection, requiring no objective standard for its authentication, and resenting its presence. But if the divine immanence must not be so held as to exclude God's eternal transcendence, if the divine indwelling in man does not preclude God's objective and absolute independence of man and of the world, it is evident that however true it may be that in the reason of man God speaks, there is room also for a divine address *to* the human reason. Reflection may be a form of revelation, and it may be always the necessary product of revelation, but if the divine personality is not diffused in the world and in man, if God retains His conscious and eternal independence, reflection cannot be the equivalent for revelation, and it must be possible for God to make Himself objectively known. If He be transcendent as well as immanent, then man's thought is one thing, and God's thought is another thing, however true it may be that God's thought is creative and controlling. And if this be true, then the truth which claims to be of God must find objective authentication, and the theological method which begins with the recorded word of God is the safest and best. Assuming this to be the vital issue underlying the debate, there can be little doubt as to the final verdict of sober Christian thinkers.

ARTICLE II.

RECENT LIVES OF CHRIST.

BY THE REV. E. F. WILLIAMS, D.D., CHICAGO, ILL.

As a preparation for a study of the recent Lives of Christ, one cannot do better than carefully to read the monographs by Canon Farrar in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, by Rev. S. J. Andrews in *Johnson's Cyclopædia*, by Dr. William Thomson in *Smith's Bible Dictionary*, and by Zöckler in the *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*. An article on Christology in this last work, by Dr. Philip Schaff, should also be read. These articles will acquaint us with the differing theories and theological prepossessions of the authors of the leading lives of Christ, and enable us to understand and make due allowance for the prejudices of the author we are reading. The immense bibliography connected with the life of our Lord may be studied in the various editions of Hase's monumental work.

The Patristic church made no attempt to treat the life of Christ historically or critically. It was satisfied with the simple gospel story. The Harmonies of Tatian and Ammonius only seek to set forth the substantial agreement of the evangelists. Poetical representations of the life of Christ—*lyrical*, as the Apotheosis, of Prudentius; *dramatic*, as the Suffering Christ, of Gregory Nazianzen; *epic*, as the Evangelical History of the Spanish presbyter, C. Vettius Aquilinus Juvencus, who lived in the fourth century—were frequent and striking. The Greek paraphrase of the Gospel of John, by Nonnus of Egypt, which appeared in the fifth century, and the heroic poem of the Miracles, by Coelius Sedulius, of the same century, testify to the interest taken in the earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth. (See article in *Schaff-Herzog*.)

Harmonies and poetical treatises were also produced in the Middle Ages. The Harmony of Victor of Capua, published in the ninth century, and the Monotessaron of Gerson, which appeared at Cologne in 1471, were thorough and critical. Two of the many lives of Christ written in this mediæval period for purposes of devotion are worthy of notice: the work of Bonaventura, first printed in 1480, and appearing at London in an English translation as lately as 1881; and the work of Ludolphus Saxo, a Carthusian monk who lived at Strasburg about the middle of the fourteenth century. His book was printed at Strasburg in 1470 and at Brussels in 1870.

Of the lives of Christ written prior to the eighteenth century, the one by Jeremy Taylor, which appeared about 1653, alone has permanent value. For the richness and beauty of its style, the serenity and devoutness of its spirit, this life is still worthy of study. The life by John Fleetwood (probably an assumed name), which is sometimes bound up with a life of John the Baptist, the twelve apostles, and the Virgin Mary, appeared about the middle of the last century, and till very recently held its place as a popular presentation of the historical facts connected with our Saviour's public ministry. The sale of the book still continues, though its scholarship is far from accurate.

As Schaff and many others have pointed out, the beginnings of a new era in the methods of biblical study may be traced in the writings of the English deists of the last century. Their hostile criticisms were met by such Englishmen as Lardner, Stackhouse, Paley, and by such Germans as Döderlein, Semler, Reinhard, Herder, and Jacob Hess. But the great impulse which led to the modern critical study of the gospel history, and, above all, of its central personage, was furnished by Schleiermacher's lectures at Berlin. These lectures, first given in 1819, and many times repeated, were published from notes in his possession by Rüttenik in 1864.

"Schleiermacher," says Farrar, "wished to steer be-

tween the Ebionitic and the Docetic views of Christ, but while maintaining the divinity, he systematically endeavors to reduce the miracles within the scope of natural laws, and treats even the resurrection in a rationalizing manner, as though Jesus had not really died. Hase leans in the same direction, supposing that Jesus possessed some unknown power, and a sort of sanative magnetism." Both writers seem to have had Paulus in mind, who sought to explain away the supernatural elements in the Gospels, while yet accepting the evangelists as trustworthy witnesses. Hase's lectures at Tübingen in 1823-4—published as a *Leben Jesu* in 1829, in a fifth edition in 1865, and in a still more expanded form as a *History of Jesus* in 1875—also helped forward the new movement. The works of such negative and destructive critics as Paulus (1828), Strauss (1835-65), and their followers, were ably answered by Protestant writers like Neander (1837, a seventh edition of his *Life of Christ* is dated 1873), Tholuck (1837), Ebrard (1842), Wieseler (1843), J. P. Lange (1843-71), Hahn (1844); and by Roman Catholic writers like Kuhn (1838), Sepp (1843), Bucher (1859), and Bishop Dupanloup of Paris (1870). The writings of the Tübingen school, of which the great names are Bruno Bauer (1841-50), F. C. Baur (1847-53), Hilgenfeld (1854), and Volkmar (1857), were the providential cause of Ewald's *History of Christ and his Times* (1855), a work which Dr. Howard Crosby characterizes as "learned but unsatisfactory," but which has nevertheless been productive of good, and is worthy the attention of the careful student. In opposition to the theories of the same school are the works of Lichtenstein (1856), Riggenbach (1858), Baumgarten (1859), and Bishop Ellicott (1860). Renan's *Life*, sparkling like a diamond, popular and sceptical, was published in 1863; Schenkel's *Charakterbild Jesu* in 1864. A later work by this author on the Christ of the apostles and of the sub-apostolic times, appeared in 1878; Keim's *Historic Christ* appeared in 1865; his *Jesus of Nazareth* in 1867-72; Haus-

rath's *The Times of Jesus* in 1870; Wittichen's *Life of Jesus* in 1876, and Volkmar's *Jesus the Nazarene* in 1881. In contrast with these publications, and in some sense in answer to them, are De Pressensé's *Jesus Christ, his times, his life, his work* (1865), Weizsäcker's *Researches on the Evangelical History* (1864), Gess's *The Person and Work of Christ* (1870-79), Dupanloup's *History of our Lord Jesus Christ* (1870), Rev. S. J. Andrews' *Life of our Lord on the Earth* (1863), F. W. Farrar's *Life of Christ* (1874), and Cunningham Geikie's *Life and Words of Christ* (1877). The second volume of the Roman Catholic writer Bougaud's *Christianity and the Present Time*, entitled *Jesus Christ*, should be mentioned; and also the great work of Joseph Grimm, *The Life of Jesus according to the Four Evangelists*, of which the first volume was published in 1876, and which is thus far the best life of Christ which the Romish Church has given us. Two lives of the first importance have lately come from the press, that by Professor Bernhard Weiss, of Berlin, and that by Dr. Alfred Edersheim, of England. On the *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, the great work of Dorner (1845-56) is still our chief authority. Reference should here be made to *Ecce Homo*, to Dr. Joseph Parker's *Ecce Deus*, written in answer to it, to Dr. Parker's *The Inner Life of Jesus*, and to such monographs as Canon Liddon's *Bampton Lectures on Our Lord's Divinity* (1866), Hardwick's *Christ and other Masters* (1855-8), Professor A. M. Fairbairn's *Studies in the Life of Christ* (1880), and the Rev. Dr. W. G. Blaikie's *The Public Ministry and Pastoral Methods of Our Lord* (1883). Of this work by Professor Blaikie, which is made up of lectures given to the students of New College, Edinburg, a recent reviewer has said: "It is a careful study of our Lord as a minister among men, examining his propositions, his spirit, his work as a teacher, his discourses, and his dealings with the apostles, and the different classes with which he came in contact. The whole is considered as an example for the Christian min-

istry of to-day." The work is extremely interesting, and should be thoughtfully and widely read. The influence of Supernatural Religion, great as it has been in weakening confidence in the credibility of the New Testament writers, has been almost entirely destroyed with unprejudiced minds by Bishop Lightfoot's remarkable articles in the *Contemporary Review*, and by Rev. Henry Wace's Bampton Lectures of 1882, entitled *The Gospel and its Witnesses: the Principal Facts in the Life of our Lord, and the Authority of the Evangelical Narratives*.

The *Christ of History*, by John Young, LL.D., of Edinburgh, published in London, 1855, and republished in this country by Robert Carter and Brother, New York, is an able and interesting argument, by which the author seeks to show that the admitted facts of the personal life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth can be explained only upon the supposition that he was divine; that his public ministry and his spiritual character cannot be reconciled with the outer conditions of his life by those who deny his deity; in a word, that the incarnation, which unites the divine and the human, is the only possible explanation of his unique person and history.

Passing, now, from this historical sketch, for the materials of which I am indebted to the catalogues, and to Farrar's summary, and which I have prepared in order to show the extraordinary energy with which studies that centre in the Gospels and around the person of Christ have been pursued during the last fifty years, I come now to a brief review of those *Lives of Christ* which are accessible in English, and with which we are all more or less familiar.

And, first, let me speak of those *Lives of Christ* which may be termed partial, or incomplete, and which relate to some special aspect of his work or phase of his character. Two of these *Lives* are very stimulating and helpful,—that by Dr. Joseph Parker on the *Inner Life of Christ* (three volumes, 1882), and *Studies in the Life of Christ*, by Rev.

A. M. Fairbairn (1880). Dr. Parker's volumes are remarkable for the evidence they furnish of careful study, for keen insight, for fresh, original thought, for felicitous statement, and for the reverent, devout spirit which pervades them. The work has evidently grown out of sermons preached at the City Temple, and is therefore practical and timely. Professor Fairbairn's book is scholarly and instructive. Its chapters first saw the light as Sunday Evening Lectures at Aberdeen, and are now printed as preparatory to a larger and more comprehensive work, for which we impatiently wait. The titles of these discourses are full of suggestions; viz., *The Historical Conditions; The Narrative of the Birth and Infancy; The Growth and Education of Jesus, His Personality; The Baptist and the Christ; The Temptation of Christ; The new Teacher; The Kingdom of Heaven; Galilee, Judea, Samaria; The Master and the Disciples; The Earlier Miracles; Jesus and the Jews; The Later Teaching; The Later Miracles; Jericho and Jerusalem; Gethsemane; The Betrayer; The Chief Priests, the Trial; The Crucifixion; The Resurrection.* The work is not easy reading. Though the style is clear, and the words well chosen, the sentences are overloaded with thought. A pardonable fault, indeed, only let the student save the book for the freshest and best hours of his working life, rather than for the restful and dreamy days of vacation.

Another treatise of surpassing merit is Archdeacon Hardwick's *Christ and Other Masters*. The reader of this work thinks at once of the Rev. F. D. Maurice's *The Religions of the World and their Relations to Christianity*. Archdeacon Hardwick's object is to exhibit the real position and relation of Christianity to those other religions which have had and continue to have so great an influence on mankind. The work is in four parts. The first is introductory, and treats of the religious tendencies of the present age, the unity of the human race, the characteristics of religion under the Old Testament; the second

part, of the religion of Judea; the third, of the religions of China, America, and Oceanica; the fourth, of those of Egypt and Medo-Persia. Everywhere we see the hand of a master, and while the treatise is only an essay upon comparative religion, and therefore falls into the class of writings to which such books as the Rev. James Freeman Clarke's *Ten Great Religions* and Johnson's *Oriental Religions* belong, it is far superior to them. It is, indeed, among the few books which every minister ought to read. It is a book which broadens one's views, and strengthens one's faith in the historic truth of the Christian religion and in its immense superiority to any other religion which has received the allegiance of any of the families of men. Here, too, I may speak of Dr. E. H. Sears's *The Fourth Gospel, the Heart of Christ*, published at Boston in 1872. Dr. Sears gives us a picture of Christ, as he appears in the writings of St. John. In his treatment of the supernatural, miracles, Gnosticism, the Johannean writings, he is unusually fresh and instructive. Without claiming to be a complete life of Christ, but as furnishing a picture of the Christ of the Apostle John, I believe the book will have a permanent place in theological literature. The tenth chapter of Dr. Bushnell's *Nature and the Supernatural*, entitled, *The Character of Jesus*, as preventing his possible classification with men, should not be overlooked. Whatever may be the fate of the work of which this chapter is a part, it is safe to say that this chapter will live for centuries. It is in Dr. Bushnell's freshest and most characteristic style,—original, brilliant, profound, and reverent. It is inferior in no respect to Ullman's epoch-making book on the Sinlessness of Christ. This is the place, also, in which to mention Professor Henry M. Goodwin's *Christ and Humanity; A Life of Christ*, by Dr. Howard Crosby; another by Dr. Deems, and another by Edmund Kirk, the latter chiefly in the words of the evangelists; and Dr. W. G. Schauffler's *Meditations on the Last Days of Christ*. Dr. Schauffler

was one of our most distinguished missionaries, and his book, published by the American Tract Society many years ago, consists of a series of devout meditations designed to quicken and strengthen piety. *Ecce Homo*, appearing more than twenty years since, remains in the front line of suggestive, stimulating, though rationalistic, lives of Christ. For pure, perspicuous English; for manly expression; for vigorous, original thought; for striking ways of restating old truths, *Ecce Homo* has become a classic. Its heterodoxy, if heterodox it be, has been met by Dr. Parker in *Ecce Deus*, which should be read in connection with it. Those who are interested in looking at the life of Jesus from a Swedenborgian point of view will find pleasure in *Deus-Homo*, or *God-Man*, by Theophilus Parsons, late Professor of Law in Harvard University. The aim of *Deus-Homo* is neither controversial nor critical. The author believes that Christ the divine is human, and that the human is divine also; that He is God and man, perfectly and in full degree. The book was published at Chicago in 1867 by E. B. Myers and Chandler. The *Christ of Humanity*; or, the *Enigmas of Christianity*, by George Reber (Charles P. Somerby, New York, 1876), will not convince many readers that St. John never saw Asia Minor or that Irenæus was the author of the Fourth Gospel. His theory that the Christ we worship is the creation of St. Paul will find little favor.

Christ and Humanity, by Professor H. M. Goodwin, of Olivet College, is a thoughtful book, but has not had an extensive sale. It is in two parts. The first part is made up of discourses on Christ and Humanity: the second is an historical and critical review of the doctrine of Christ's person. This review has cost the author much study, and furnishes us much valuable knowledge. Rejecting the modified Sabellianism of Dr. Bushnell, to whom the work is dedicated, Professor Goodwin ranges himself with the *Kenoticists*, Zinzendorf, Thomasius, Liebner, Gess, von Hofmann, Kahnis, Delitzsch, Schöberlein, Kübel, Lange,

Ebrard, Godet, De Pressensé, and Dr. Howard Crosby. These Kenoticists say that Christ has but one consciousness and but one will; that by his *kenosis* (Phil. ii. 6-8; cf. 2 Cor. viii. 9; John i. 14; Heb. ii. 17, 18; v. 8, 9) he actually laid aside, abandoned, the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence during the whole period of the incarnation. These writers differ in the degree of the *kenosis* which they advocate. Kahnis and Lange think that it is in not using, rather than in not possessing, these attributes. Dr. Crosby says that our Lord reduced himself to the dimensions of humanity, but adds that this is a subject about which we cannot speculate, inasmuch as it transcends human thought. Professor Goodwin believes that the *λόγος* is the human pre-existing element which "became incarnate by taking flesh, and which occupies the place of the soul. To be incarnate, the divine must be harmonized; this is limitation, and implies progress from ignorance to knowledge and wisdom. The Word did not assume flesh, but *became* flesh. As the true idea of God includes humanity, so the true idea of Man includes God. Their essential unity is the basis of the possibility of the incarnation as a *kenosis*."

I have already spoken of the lives of Christ by Strauss and Renan. The positions of Strauss in his earlier work were carefully considered and honestly met by a multitude of able and scholarly men. Hence his second and more popular Life of Jesus for the common people, which is still in circulation. Both of these books are painful reading. They give evidence of vast, but perverted, knowledge, and plead eloquently and piteously for that "fear of the Lord which is the beginning of wisdom."

Renan, scholarly after the French style, clear cut, brilliant, popular, has had more readers than any other infidel writer, and, by his confident yet not over-accurate statements, has shattered the faith of not a few. His Life of Jesus, though little more than an "historical romance," has been answered, not only in France, but in England and

America as well. The reply both to Strauss and Renan, by Dr. Schaff, published by the American Tract Society in 1865, and entitled *The Person of Christ, the Miracle of History*, and containing a collection of the testimonies of unbelievers as to the deity of Christ, has a value in inverse ratio to its size. This is a little book which ought to go into every pastor's library.

Another fragmentary life, and one which rejects the Fourth Gospel as the work of St. John, able, yet far from convincing, is from the pen of Sir R. Hanson, an English judge residing in Australia. This life, *The Jesus of History*, was published in London by Williams and Norgate in 1869. In this work Jesus is a humble peasant who leads a pure and holy life, and gives wise and useful instruction. As such he was looked upon by the Jews as a fanatic. His claim to be king brought him into collision with the Roman authorities and led to his crucifixion. The author's style is strong and clear. He sums up opinions like a judge. He strives to be fair, but it is evident on every page that he has never seen "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," that he is simply a critic dealing with data which may or may not be true, and the truth or falsity of which, startling as the thought is at first, is after all a matter of no real consequence. His position is virtually that of Monsieur J. Cohen, in the *Deicides*, (Michael Levy Frères, Paris, 1864)—that the Jews are not justly chargeable with guilt in seeking the death of Jesus, inasmuch as, with their training and prejudice, they could not accept him as their Messiah.

Most of the other *Lives of Christ*, which are easily obtained, may be grouped in two great classes,—those which are popular rather than scientific, and those which are severely critical. The value of *Lives of the first class* depends very largely upon the extent to which they carry out the purpose for which they were written. A compilation may have far greater merit than an original production.

One of the best popular Lives of Christ is by Hesba Stretton, a well-known Sunday-school writer. Her book, *The Wonderful Life*, (Dodd and Mead: New York, 1874) is only "a slight sketch," but in that "sketch" of 325 small pages Miss Stretton sets forth all the facts of the earthly ministry with clearness and force. She makes no pretensions to originality or scholarship. She enters into other people's labors, appropriates and arranges as suits her taste. The book is worthy a place in every Sunday-school library and would be read with pleasure and profit by many a man who has no time for Geikie, or Hanna, or Farrar. Another excellent work of this same class is a *Life of Jesus for the Young*, especially for young men of sixteen or thereabouts, by Dr. Joseph P. Thompson, the lamented pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle. Style, arrangement, thought, theology are characteristic of the author. The book is one which a father would gladly put into the hands of a son on entering college or leaving home for a life in the great business centres. Its high price has stood in the way of its circulation.

Immanuel, or The Life of Christ, by Dr. Zachary Eddy, with a rich and brilliant introduction by Dr. R. S. Storrs, published at Springfield, Mass., by W. J. Holland and Co. in 1868, and sold only by subscription, is a book which has some faults and many decided merits. It contains the fruits of the faithful study of many years. Its style is somewhat sermonic, magisterial, dogmatic. It is, or rather was, fairly abreast of modern learning, yet it nowhere gives evidence of any thorough acquaintance with the positions of the distinctively critical school of our day. As a popular treatise, written for rural homes, for Sunday afternoons, and as a help to devotion, the work is to be warmly commended. In saying this I should add that if it had been one-half as large its value would have been more than doubled.

The Life of Christ by Dean Milman, and forming a portion of his *History of Christianity*, is a summary of the

main facts of the public ministry. As such it is clear and interesting. It has been made with due regard for what is to follow, and is neither full nor meagre. A compilation like this by Dean Milman sometimes affords us a pleasure in reading which is not found in the pages of Geikie or Farrar. Perhaps the reason is that such compilations are compelled to pay due regard to what may be called "the perspective of history." A mere compendium, belonging to the Series of Hand Books for Bible Classes by T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, and prepared by Rev. James Stalker, and comprising only one hundred and thirty-eight pages, is, in my judgment, one of the best books of its kind in existence. Its author is something more than a compiler. He has mastered the difficulties of his subject. He writes like a scholar, yet without making his scholarship prominent. In analysis he is sharp and thorough. His pages abound in startling, suggestive contrasts. In a single sentence he often packs away the learning of volumes. This is one of the books to be kept on the study table for constant use. The *Life of Christ* by Dr. Lyman Abbott is scholarly and devout. It makes wise use of the better commentaries, of modern geographical and archaeological researches, of essays by specialists on controverted points, and of the works of Ellicott, Andrews, Neander, and Lange. As a tolerably full life, written with great care, and contained in a volume of moderate size, Dr. Abbott's book is to be unreservedly commended.

A word should here be added in reference to the brilliant fragment on the *Life of our Lord* by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher. Of little value as the production of a scholar, yet not without scholarly pretensions, it is full of suggestions on every page. Yet it everywhere lacks completeness, and is without perspective even where it claims to be finished. Like its author it is immensely stimulating. We read, and read again. How marvellous the language! How striking the imagery! How wide the sweep of thought! What intuitions, what revelations!

A second perusal is even more satisfactory than the first. Nevertheless, one feels, though it would be hard to say why, that the book is not one to be thoroughly trusted, or to pass into history as a classic. For the sake of its author we rather hope that the long-promised second volume will not appear. Nevertheless let no one who can, fail to read the volume which has already appeared.

Turning now to that class of lives which claim to be original and scientific we find that they fall into two groups. In the first group are such lives as Hanna's, Farrar's, Geikie's, and Edersheim's; in the second, such Lives as those of Hase, Neander, Liddon, Ellicott, Andrews, Weiss, and Keim.

The *Life of our Lord*, by the Rev. William Hanna, D.D., LL.D., was brought out in this country by the house of Robert Carter and Brother, in 1870. It was in six volumes, though the volumes did not appear simultaneously nor in chronological order, but as they grew out of the author's ministry. Thus the volume on the Last Day of Our Lord's Passion was published several years before the other volumes of the series. In later editions the six volumes were compressed into a single volume. For family use, for devotional purposes, for the restfulness, and peace its perusal produces, this *Life* merits high praise. Its scholarship is trustworthy. The best results of modern research are made use of. The author's main purpose is to present the facts of our Lord's life and to persuade his readers to believe in Him. Hence the devoutness and reverence of the volumes, the spirit of genuine piety that breathes forth from every page.

He marks very clearly the divisions of time in our Lord's ministry. The beginning and end of each of its periods are set forth distinctly. Nowhere can we read a chapter without feeling that the author has thought his way through the subject of which it treats. He quotes sparingly, and chiefly from the Scriptures.

The one fault of the work, if fault it be, is the monotony

of the style. This is too uniformly excellent. There are no passages which take us into the author's confidence, where he talks with us. He never forgets that he is the preacher and that we are listeners. We make the best use of the book, therefore, when we read but one or two chapters at a time, and keep it on hand for comfort and instruction, in weary, lonely, despondent hours. The volume should be in all our parish libraries.

Farrar's Life (E. P. Dutton and Company, 1874) both in its original two volume edition, and in the cheaper one volume edition, is too well-known to call for extended notice. The grace and ease of its style, the fulness of its notes, the clearness of its divisions, its wise summaries on disputed points of the opinions of many investigators, the movement and rhythm of its sentences have given it a popularity to which no other life of Christ has yet attained. In 1881 it had passed through twenty-three editions in England, in addition to an equally wide circulation in Canada and the United States. And yet, few ministers, or well-trained laymen, I think, read the book with entire satisfaction. There is a little too much of the "reporter" in it. It has an unpleasant suggestion of the newspaper. It is too sensational, or too dramatic for the subjects of which it treats. Could it borrow some of the dignity and reverent piety of Hanna, and repay the debt thus created with some of the felicities of its language, and some of the sprightliness of its style, we should have two well-nigh perfect treatises on the life of Christ in the English tongue.

The Life and Words of Christ by Cunningham Geikie (D. Appleton and Company) is perhaps *facile princeps*, among the popular Lives of Christ. Dr. Geikie is a man of vast learning. His net gathers of every kind. Unlike Hanna's his pages bristle with quotations from all sorts of books. We often wish, in the weariness of our flesh, that he would be content to give us the facts, and set less store on names and authorities, that he would diminish the number of his pages by putting into them less lumber. Yet his use of

archaeological, ethnological, historical, geographical, and exegetical learning is marvellous. Taking the notes at the end of the volumes into account, I know not where another such mine of information is to be found. But, hazardous as it is to make the statement, I do not altogether like Dr. Geikie's book. It is safer than Farrar's, not so stilted, or richly monotonous in its style as Hanna's but I doubt, if after all, it is really their equal. Its paraphrases of the words of the evangelists seem to me unfortunate and out of place. Not infrequently they are positively flat, repulsive even. For myself I make haste to turn from its perusal to the clear, simple, crisp sentences of the Gospel writers. Having said this, it still remains true that Geikie's *Life of Christ* is a masterful production. This *Life*, with the *Lives* by Hanna and Farrar, will furnish most intelligent people with all the reading of this sort which they will care to have. Critical minds, however, will not be content to stop here. Edersheim's *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah* (A. D. F. Randolph and Company, 1884) in two volumes of 698 and 826 pages respectively, will therefore claim attention, and claim it as the work of a Jew of immense erudition, and the most devout Christian spirit. In placing this work among the popular lives of Christ, I fear lest I have made a mistake. True, the work has reached a second edition, and this for a costly work, six dollars net, may be taken as convincing testimony to its popularity. Yet I doubt if the common people will ever hear Dr. Edersheim gladly. I hesitate to speak positively, but it seems to me that his pages are too full of curious learning, and carefully expressed thought, for all save thoroughly disciplined readers. Those who do read these pages and understand them,—the style is not always clear—will find themselves amply repaid. Dr. Edersheim gives us a picture of the times in which Jesus lived,—and here we may compare Professor Delitzsch's *A Day in Capernaum*,—shows us the homes of the people, introduces us to their customs, makes us feel the burdens

both of their religion and of their government. With him as a guide we form an acquaintance with the schools of that early day, and enter into sympathy with the wise Gamaliel, the devout Simeon, the zealous Saul. No one who has yet written on the life and times of Jesus has brought to his task such familiar acquaintance with Jewish learning as Dr. Edersheim. For this reason the volumes are unique and important. They are too scholarly and critical for the daily reading of the average Christian family. They lack the glow and devoutness of spirit for which, in works like this, the common mind invariably looks. But scholars cannot afford to neglect them.

The Life of Christ by DePressensé, has never had a large circulation in this country. It is a work with many specially valuable features. It has all the sharpness of analysis the clearness of thought, the crispness of expression which characterize the French mind. Nor does it lack "unction." It is very full on the events connected with the life of John the Baptist, and his relations to Jesus. It paints its pictures in single sentences, and it paints them so that we can see them, and tell what they are. If only to see how differently the French mind, even when profoundly Christian, treats the same subject from the German, the English, or American, we should read this work of DePressensé. For a similar reason I recommend the perusal of Mozoumdar's Oriental Christ, a series of meditations, in themselves of no particular value, but suggestive of Hindu mind and Hindu thought.

Of the Bampton lectures for 1866 on our Lord's Divinity, by Canon Liddon, I need simply say that it is rich in

tery of these two books will do more for the minister than the reading of a dozen such Lives as Geikie's or Farrar's. Superior to either of them in some respects is the unpretending *Life of Our Lord, Considered in its Historical, Chronological, and Geographical Relations*, by the Rev. S.J. Andrews of Hartford, Conn. This Life was published by the Scribners in 1873, and is full of painstaking research. I have found the study of this book exceedingly profitable. In his harmony he usually follows Robinson, though he is everywhere an independent thinker.

Here too I must refer again to Neander's *Life of Christ*, a book which will never grow old or cease to be fragrant with memories of the simple, childlike spirit of its distinguished author. Most of us are familiar with the English translation of this work made in 1847, and now appearing in Bohn's library. The book should be read a few pages at a time, with a knowledge of the circumstances in which it was written. Not more learned, but with a greater appearance of learning, is Hase's *Life of Christ*. For its stores of information, as well as for its methods of treating the records of the New Testament, this life should be constantly consulted. As a summary of opinions, and for its bibliography of the Lives of Christ, this treatise has never been surpassed. It is minutely critical but rationalistic in its tendencies though claiming to be orthodox.

The two Lives of which I am now to speak are those of Keim and Weiss. Both are critical. They are books to be studied, rather than read. From differing points of view these two writers seek to cover the whole field of gospel study. That the results of their efforts will be universally acceptable, either in rationalistic or in orthodox circles, we very much doubt. Both works are of great value,—that of Keim for the thoroughness of its investigations from a rationalistic point of view, that of Weiss as

Weiss, and Edersheim. I am not yet prepared to accept his opinion. For Lange's encyclopaedic work I have great admiration. It is a thesaurus of learning. Like the commentaries that bear his name it contains every thing. It is heavy, dull, fanciful, faulty in arrangement, not abreast with the scholarship of to-day, yet, for the wise and plodding student, I doubt if it has been superseded even by Mr. Cook's trinity of writers.

In this brief sketch I have given little but names and titles. A volume would be needed for any adequate criticism of the authors to whom I have referred. I hope I have done none of them injustice. With varying merit in the treatment of the earlier and later portions of our Lord's ministry, they seem alike to fail in their attempts to describe the closing scenes of his earthly life. Like General Lew Wallace's charming *Ben Hur*, their final chapters invariably disappoint us. Is it because of our inability to comprehend the height and depth, the length and breadth of the love of God in Jesus Christ, to enter into complete sympathy with Him in His Passion? Is not this a proof of our Lord's Deity, a proof also of the inspiration of the Evangelists, who write neither too much nor too little, on whose pages the story of this wonderful life moves steadily on to the consummation on the cross, to the burial in the sepulchre, to the resurrection on the third day, to the ascension from Olivet, to the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost in that upper room where the disciples gathered in Jerusalem? Let scholars and critics continue to write as they will. The Four Gospels are after all our only storehouse of facts, the only witnesses to whom we must all be content to appeal. No lives of Him who spoke as man never spake, will ever be produced which will repay study like the simple evangelical narratives. To these we must ever return with increasing confidence and admiration. "But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through His name."

ARTICLE III.
SOUL AND BODY.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY, PH.D., OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY.

LEST the reader trained in a school which holds that there is nothing to be said of the relations of soul and body, except that there is soul and there is body and that is the end of it, should turn away at the outset in disgust from what must seem to him an attempt to solve the insoluble—let me say a word or two to avoid misapprehension. Lotze has somewhere called attention to the fact that the natural tendency of an historical age, priding itself on its historical sense, and working by an historical method, is to surrender the understanding to the imagination, and to demand pictures instead of principles. We are not contented until we can *see* the object matter as a series of definite images. Instead of explanation we want a drama before our eyes. It is because of this tendency, I believe, that it is assumed that there is some difficulty special in kind surrounding the question of the relations of soul and body which makes all attempts to consider the subject necessarily futile. It seems to be assumed on the one hand that nothing can be said about it unless we can see into the bowels of the molecules constituting the brain, and behold from their mutual attractions and repulsions, a sensation and a thought engendered. Or on the other hand, it is assumed that to know any thing about the relations of soul and body, we must be able to contemplate the soul, seated as on a throne in the body, thence sending forth her messengers to lay hold of the nerves and cause them to bring her reports of what is going on in the outlying regions of her domain, or to execute her orders among refractory subjects. And if the only way of knowing any thing about their relations were some such imaginative exploit, the question were

well called insoluble. But questions, as science and philosophy can well testify, are more often insoluble by reason of some unnecessary and absurd assumption, than from the inherent nature of the case. And so the failure of all attempts on this line is rather, I conceive, testimony to the absurdity of the mode of search, than to the absurdity of the question itself. We have an understanding as well as an imagination; principles may be thought as well as pictures seen; laws exist as well as panoramas. We may well give up the attempt to imagine the neural and psychical processes so as to see a transition from one to another, and confine ourselves to the less picturesque, but more hopeful, task of inquiring what principles shall be employed in order to render intelligible the relations of the physical and psychical, so far as these relations have been actually made known. We have certain facts declared by physiology and psychology. The sole question is: what principles, conceptions, shall we use in order to explain these facts, i. e., in order to render a consistent, intelligible account of them? To say that this cannot be done is simply to say that there are facts in the universe which are utterly irrational, which have no meaning. And the one who has the capacity of discovering by his reason that certain facts are non-rational to his reason, is not the one whom I address.

Therefore, if it is again stated that the object of this paper is to consider the relations of soul and body, I hope it will be understood that the object is not to get into the inside of nature and behold with mortal eyes what is going on there, but the less ambitious one of inquiring what principles must be used in order to give meaning to the facts of the case. How shall the facts of physiological psychology be interpreted?

What are these facts?

First. The nervous system, complex as it is, consists ultimately of fibres and cells. The fibres serve normally to conduct or transfer nervous stimuli either from the

organ of sense to some collection of cells, or ganglion, or from this centre back to the muscles and glands, or from one such centre to another. The cells, on the other hand, receive the stimuli brought to them from the surface, and react upon them in such a way as either to neutralize them from their own supply of force, or so as to set free their own nervous energy. In short, the fibres conduct the nervous energy; the cells produce it and regulate its distribution. This distinction in the mode of work of the two elements exists. But it has been usual to regard this distinction in such a way as to make of it an actual separation of functions. This introduces a dualism into the action of the nervous system at the start. It has been held that the fibres are purely passive and receptive, while cells are active. This leads to this result: the cells alone are regarded as having psychical bearings, so that the brain is held to be the sole organ of the mind. The nerves and the peripheral organs are eliminated. Some even go so far as to hold that in the brain there must be some particular set of cells to which all stimuli must be conducted, and that this alone is the organ of the soul. We must avoid, at the outset, any such error. The truth is that the distinction between fibre and cell is a relative one. Fibres possess an activity of their own as well as the cells, and cells conduct. The fibre is not a string which, pulled at one end, rings a bell at the other, itself remaining the meantime indifferent to the process; it is a series of nervous elements each reacting upon the stimulus of the one before it, as the cell reacts to the whole, and each passing it on to the one after it, as the cell distributes its energy. It is, in effect, a connected series of cells. What makes it behave differently from the cell proper is the fact that its power of resistance is so small, and its stored up energy relatively so slight. The cell, on the other hand, is something more than an explosive; it is a conductor. As there is no difference, chemically, between the firing of a gunpowder train and the resulting explosion of the

magazine, so there is none, physiologically, between the processes of the nerve and cell. The difference of the result in both cases is due partly to the amount of energy at hand to be set free, and still more to the resistance offered. In the cell there are no tracks laid down for the carrying off of the energy introduced. It meets resistance, friction, and accumulates till either the cell energy inhibits that introduced, or reacts upon it so as to increase it, and send it forth through the nerve.¹

I may seem to have dwelt needlessly upon so simple a point, but it is the foundation of any further approach to a correct theory of psycho-physiological relations. The conclusion which it warrants in this respect is all important. In brief it is this: The psychical is *homogeneously* related to the physiological. Whatever is the relation of the psychical to the neural, it is related in the same manner to all parts of the neural. The brain is no more the organ of mind than the spinal cord, the spinal cord no more than the peripheral endings of the nerve fibres. The brain is undoubtedly most closely and most influentially connected with the life of the soul, but its connection is of the same *kind* as that of every other part of the nervous system. Now this gives us but one alternative: either there is absolutely no connection between the body and soul at any point whatever, or else the soul is, through the nerves, present to all the body. This means that the psychical is immanent in the physical. To deny this is to go back to the Cartesian position, and make a miracle of the whole matter—to call in some utterly foreign power to make the transition which is actually found. This may cater to our love of pictures, but it is out of the line which we have laid down for ourselves. The nineteenth century substitute of a double-faced substance is only another ex-

¹ This is not theory, but physiological fact. The experimental data with the conclusions warranted will be found set forth in Wundt, *Mechanik der Nerven, und Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, vol. 1. pages 240-64.

cursion into the land of fancy sketches. It makes the imagination the source of an ontology. But it fares even worse than the Cartesian scheme. A double-faced substance not only refuses to be thought, but, if one is in earnest, refuses to be imagined. It is the result of the decrepitude of the imagination as well as of the laziness of thought. Not colors for the imagination to see, but principles for the understanding to think, is the desideratum. That compromise which seemed to think that the problem of the relations of soul and body was simplified if the connection of the two could be reduced to as small a space as possible, and excluded it first from the fibre, then from the spinal cord, then from the basal ganglia, the cerebellum, all of the cerebrum except the cortex, then possibly one point of the cortex,—that, too, must be abandoned. The fact is, that the action of the nervous tissue is the same in kind in the cortex and in the peripheral fibre, and hence if any part of the nervous system has any connection with the soul which is not supernatural in character, every part must have, in kind, the same. All, or none, is the disjunction forced upon us. The immanence of the psychical in the physical is, therefore, the foundation of our future inquiry. The nature of the immanence must now be inquired into. That there is unity of function in the cell and fibre is established. What this function is and what conclusion it warrants are the questions now to be asked.

Second. The fundamental nervous activity is a process of adjustment, consisting in a twofold contemporaneous process of stimulation and reaction or inhibition. If we turn to the same physiological authorities whence we learned of the homogeneous nature of the action of fibre and cell, we shall learn what this action is. Nervous tissue, in the first place, wherever found is a highly unstable chemical compound. Any excitation tends to set up such chemical change as will reduce it to relatively simpler and more stable compounds. There is thus set free an

amount of energy equivalent to the amount which would be required to lift this lower compound up to its higher state again. The potential energy of the unstable compound has, in short, become kinetic. The first element in nervous action is, therefore, the excitatory or stimulating, which has the setting free of nervous energy for its result. But if this were all, the energy of the nervous system would be soon used up. Every stimulus would set free nervous force, and the result would be that the body would respond to every stimulus, however slight, and the process would end only with the complete exhaustion of the power. We would be physically in the condition of those having the Saint Vitus's dance; mentally, in the state of some of the insane, who, having no reserve power, react violently upon every impression, intellectual or emotional, until they sink into a stupor, out of which they come only to repeat the process. In short, there must be something which gives control, which regulates the reaction, and which also ensures a reserve power. There must be opposed to the exciting activity one which resists, and thereby prevents the whole force at hand, the whole unstable compound, from being used, and which also restores it as it is expended. And so it is found that there is a complementary process. Not only is energy being constantly put forth, but energy is being constantly stored up or rendered latent. Not all the force which comes to a nervous element is employed in breaking down the unstable compounds and thereby losing energy; part—in some cases much the greater part—is used in building up these unstable compounds, thereby forming a reservoir of energy for future use, while the process itself acts as a restraint upon, a control over, the excitatory factor. Every nervous action is, therefore, a reciprocal function of stimulation, excitation, and inhibition; control through repression. Every nervous activity is essentially an adjustment. It is called forth through the stimulus, but the stimulus is not the sole factor; it does not wander at its own sweet will, but

is checked and directed by the reacting activity, the inhibiting. This is true, of course, of every process, whether occurring in fibre or in cell; but because of the structural differences between the two, previously spoken of, the former mode of action greatly *predominates* over the other in the fibre; while in the cell the inhibitory activity exceeds at the expense of the stimulating. Since the fibres correspond, in a general way, to the peripheral nerve system and the cells to the central, it may truly enough be said that the stimulating or exciting is the peripheral, and the reacting and controlling is the central or ganglionic.

Looked at from this point of view, *the unitary nervous activity is evidently that known as reflex action*. In that, we have precisely these relations of excitement on the one hand, and adjusting activity on the other, of which we have just been speaking. Our conclusions are as follows: there is a fundamental mode of nervous activity; in this the psychical is immanent. This mode of activity is an adjusting activity; therefore the psychical is immanent in the physical as directing it toward a given end. It is not only immanent, but it is teleologically immanent. This teleological character is seen in the nature of the function itself as just described. The loss of the proper proportion of the stimulating and the inhibiting activity is a token of morbid disorder. It is pathological. If the centres react on feeble stimuli, they squander their force upon the little stimuli, which are constant, by playing upon them; if they react only upon very strong stimuli, the force they contain is never put forth when needed to perform the proper adjustment of the organism. But in normal life we find that exact proportion between the two activities which ensures that the force shall be used when its expenditure is for the good of the organism, and then alone. If we take the simplest case of nervous action, such a one as occurs in a cold-blooded animal deprived of all its nervous apparatus except the spinal cord, it will only render still more distinct the teleological character as objec-

tively manifested. **Read the** following account of Wundt:

"A **decapitated** frog moves its legs against the pincers with which it is irritated, or it wipes away with its foot the drop of acid applied to the skin. It sometimes tries to get away from a mechanical or electrical stimulation by a jump. If put into an unusual position (e. g., on its back) it often returns to its normal position. The stimulus does not introduce merely a motion in general, which spreads from the irritated part with increasing intensity of the stimulus and growing irritability, but the movement is adapted to the external impression. It may be a movement of defence, or one to get rid of the stimulus, or a movement to remove the body from the sphere of irritation, or finally it may aim at restoration of the previous posture. *This purposive adaptation to the stimulus* stands out even more clearly in experiments by Pflüger and Auerbach in which the ordinary conditions of movement are somewhat changed. A frog, for example, whose leg has been cut off on the side on which it is irritated by acid, first makes some fruitless attempts with the amputated stump, and then, pretty regularly, chooses the other leg, which is wont to remain at rest when the animal is unmutilated. If the decapitated frog be fastened by its back, and the inner side of one of its thighs be sprinkled with acid, it tries to get rid of the latter by rubbing the two thighs against each other; but if the moved thigh be separated far from the other, after a few vain attempts it suddenly stretches this one out, and pretty accurately reaches the point which was irritated. Lastly, if one breaks the upper thighs of decapitated frogs and cauterizes, whilst they are stretched on their bellies the lower part of their backs, they correctly touch the cauterized spot with the feet of the broken limb, in spite of the disturbing nature of the treatment. These observations, which may be varied in diverse ways, show that the animal can adapt its movements to its changed conditions." (Wundt, op. cit. vol. ii. p. 404.)

Of course what is true of this simplest form of nerve action is still more true of the higher forms, until we have a large number of nerve centres acting co-ordinately with each other, and all subordinated to the execution of a given act recognized as necessary for the preservation or development of the organism. But it is enough for our purpose to take our stand upon this elementary form of reflex action, and thus cut the very standing ground from under the feet of the materialist.

This, then, is our conclusion: the psychical is immanent in the physical; immanent as directing it toward an end, and for the sake of this end selecting some activities, inhibiting others, responding to some, controlling others, and adjusting and co-ordinating the complex whole, so as, in the simplest and least wasteful way, to reach the chosen end. We find, therefore, that in the simplest form of nervous action there are involved categories transcending the material; principles to which matter, as such, is an entire stranger. Matter *per se* knows no higher category than that of physical causality. Its highest law is that of the necessities of antecedent and consequent. In nervous action we find the category of teleology. The act is not determined by its immediate antecedents, but by the necessary end. We have gone from the sphere of physical to that of final causation, and thereby we recognize that we have gone from the purely physical to the immanence of the psychical in the physical, directing the latter for its own end and purpose.

The materialist, with his reversed logic, which attempts to get the higher from the lower, instead of accounting for the lower on the ground of the higher, utterly misses the nature of the case. To him, the fact of reflex action, the fact of purposive adjustment (if he be far enough advanced in the elements to recognize the fact at all) is evidence of the self-sufficiency of matter. He forthwith makes teleological action an attribute of matter, and intelligent purposiveness a function of the material. He does not recog-

nize that in doing this he is giving up all that characterizes matter as matter, and is, in effect, recognizing the primacy of spirit. If teleology belong to the essence of matter, and purposive regulated action be the nature of the material, then matter and material cease to be what they are commonly regarded as being (viz., matter and material), and become but the hiding places (which are the dwelling places) of spirit and the psychical. The dispute is not, I suppose, about what words we shall use, but what principles. Nor is the question, again, about pictures, but about laws of explanation. If we cease to form a verbal or pictorial conception of matter we shall find that for scientific purposes it means the principle of physical causation; the constant and invariable relations of antecedent and consequent. To attempt to get more into the conception of matter is unscientific in that it is unwarranted; and unscientific in that, if it were accomplished, it would destroy the basis of all physical science and leave it the field for the play of imaginative fancies by whose side the highest flight of the science of the Greek, or of the Middle Ages, will sink into insignificance. The recognition of this one principle of physical causation, the invariableness of succession, is the theoretic basis of all physical science. To attempt to include more is to destroy the principle without reason, and to introduce unbounded confusion. Some foregleams of the depths of absurdity to which we may reach, once started on this course of surrendering principles to words or images, may be seen in the efforts of some German materialists, who, in their laudable efforts to be consistent, have found it necessary to supply the primordial atoms with sensations, and who hold that the laws of the universe are to be deduced from

admit that the nature and laws of the material are constituted by the psychical, which is the determining and prior element in the case. To attempt to swallow up the psychical in the material is not only absurd, but it is useless, for the psychical always revenges itself by encroaching upon the material, and when we finally look for some independent speck of matter, there is none there. It has all been spiritualized. Or, if there be one speck there, it must be defined in terms of the conception of matter just laid down. It will be found to be matter because it acts according to the principles of physical causation and not of final causation; because it is determined by its antecedent, not by an end working itself out in it. So that after all there is no choice for the materialist. If he will but once open his eyes to the fact of purposive action he has no alternative. He may attempt to claim this function as an attribute of matter; if he does, as just seen, he dematerializes his matter. He may admit that there is matter whose principle and law is that of psychical causation. He will then recognize that whatever transcends this principle is essentially non-material, and that with the appearance of teleological action upon the scene, we have passed from the realm of the material into that of the psychical immanent in the material. This is rational, and this saves science from becoming the sport of every inflated and ill-balanced imagination.

There is another method of escaping the significance of purposive action, equally futile, but equally attractive to the mind that prefers panoramas to principles. It is, at present, the more fashionable method. In brief, it is to admit that the actions are at present teleological, but that they became such through a long series of accidental experiments (experiments which were not experiments, as they were not trying to reach any end) of which some happened to be advantageous to the organism, and, surviving, give us now the appearance of purpose. This theory attempts to make the teleological an accidental prod-

uct of the mechanical. It generally hides itself behind imposing scientific terms connected with the theory of biological evolution. It uses its "variations" and "selection," and "survival of the fittest" and "heredity," and thinks that in the end it has got something out of nothing — purpose out of accident. But the argument is suicidal. It only changes the special case into a general law. It gets rid of the primitive purposiveness of, say, a given reflex act, only by importing purposiveness, and thus intelligence, into the very structure of nature. It simply says that nature is such that, by the observance of its own laws as ascertained by science, it gives rise to action for and by ends. Variation, selection, heredity, as *names*, do not, I suppose, accomplish the result. It is that there are embedded in the very constitution of things, forces and principles which as they work themselves out, by their action and reaction, give rise to activity for an end, to purposive action. In short, not only is the structure of the nervous system such that it gives rise to teleological action, but the structure of nature itself is such that it gives rise to this special kind of purposive action. He who has thought to get rid of teleology, and thereby intelligence, in this special case, has done it only by the recognition of teleology, and thereby intelligence, as a universal principle and acting force. Darwinism, far from overthrowing this principle, merely establishes it as a general law of the universe, of the structure of things. Nature is made teleological all the way through.

From this digression, which has, I hope, developed the argument, as well as secured it from possible misconception, I return to the conclusion. The psychical is teleologically immanent in the physical. The simplest nerve action is not so simple as to exclude the adaptive, purposive factor. It is always an adjustment. It is never a mere mechanical result of a stimulus, but always involves selection, inhibition, and response. The stimulus favorable to the well-being of the organism is selected from the immense

number playing upon the organism; others, especially those unserviceable, are inhibited, and then the action results according to the needs, that is, the purpose, of the organism itself. If we broaden our view and take in the consentaneous action of the whole organism, the conclusion appears only the more clearly. The various sensory and muscular stimuli, almost infinite in number, are always co-ordinated and harmoniously combined. The nerves of the cord, the cord itself, the special sense nerves, the cerebellum, the basal ganglia, the cerebral hemispheres, with their infinitude of fibres and cells, act as an adjusted unity for one purpose, and one alone—the welfare of the organism. At times it may seem as if one part were functioning alone, but it is always found (unless the action be pathological) that it is a relative independence. The end of the organism is best gained by allowing a certain amount of originaive and self-executed action by the particular part. The apparent independence is but the evidence of the thoroughly teleological character of the whole. It signifies the division of labor in order that the whole task, the development of the organism, may be the more speedily and economically effected. There is no communistic level, but the due gradation and subordination of the various factors in the unity of the whole, as in a well-organized society. There is, in short, the co-ordination of all the nerve organs, and the further subordination of all to the end of the whole, self-realization.

Such is the conclusion we arrive at, without leaving the purely physiological sphere. But such a conclusion is one-sided and narrow, until expanded to take in all the phenomena. The body, through the nervous system, is not only a *physiological*, but a *psycho*-physiological organism. Expressed in its lowest terms, there is *sensation*, as well as adjustment of all the activities to one end. Those who have asserted the spirituality of the soul have often begun to build too high. They have taken as their fortress abstract thought, or the free-will. Now these offer,

indeed, an impregnable refuge, but, in opening the campaign from there, ground is abandoned which, by all territorial rights, is the eminent domain of the spiritual soul. To return to the former metaphor, we can finally build higher and more firmly, because on a broader foundation, on the basis of sensation. Too often is the claim of the materialist that sensation, at least, can be accounted for by material processes, admitted explicitly or tacitly. It seems to be thought that because the immediate and close connection of sensations with the nerve organs and the brain can be made out, that thereby their material character is established. At bottom, this is the survival of a metaphor, out of date at its very birth. The mischief that the term "impression" has played with psychology can never be measured. One of the greatest claims which physiological psychology has upon us is that it has forever outlawed the term and the conception. The only word which has any place in psychology as expressing the material antecedent of the psychical state, sensation, is *stimulus*. Our semi-materialists, like Mr. Huxley and Mr. Tyndall, always conclude their baldest assertions of the dependence of the mind upon the brain with some such statement as this: The passage from the physics of the brain, from a nervous irritation, from a change of motion and matter, to a fact of consciousness, to a psychical state, to a sensation, is unthinkable, is an inexplicable mystery, a gulf which imagination cannot span; and so on, *ad libitum*. One would think that if they would cease attempting to picture the transition and endeavor to *think* it, the explanation would be so patent as to stare them fairly out of countenance. The "mystery" would explode in its own fatuous vacuity. The unthinkable arises from the use of wrong categories, wrong principles. No better evidence that the physical and the psychical are not related as cause and effect, as producer and product, could be adduced than the utter "mysteriousness" hanging with "inexplicable" persistence over all at-

tempts to get one out of the other. When it is recognized that "inexplicability" is not an ultimate fact to be supremely contented with, but a positive condemnation of the method and principles which have led to it, our scientific men will reflect twice before they thrust their uncomprehended physical categories into the psychical realm, thereby begging the whole question, and, themselves being witnesses, landing the whole affair in a mystery which cannot be discriminated from an absurdity. It was recognized some hundreds of years ago that in geometry a *reductio ad absurdum* is a perfect and beautiful demonstration of the untruth of the original hypothesis. Let us hope that the idea of the unity of all thought will finally dawn upon the scientific men who have taken the contract of philosophizing for the English-speaking portion of the nineteenth century, and that they will recognize that what holds in the basis of all scientific reasoning holds also in the rudiments of philosophical.

We will abandon, then, all attempts to picture the confessedly unimaginable, and those endeavors to explain which lead us into the confessedly inexplicable. We will begin with the facts, and inquire what principle they force upon us to explain them; we will not begin with a principle, and, after having in nine-tenths of the paper victoriously "explained" all facts by it, wind up with confessing that it is all inexplicable, and accordingly go on to revel in the unutterable bathos of the "mysterious." If we take the facts, they are simply these: (1) the constant sequence upon a certain nervous process of a psychical state known as a sensation; (2) the entire lack of any connection between the two by way of physical causation, i. e., by way of identity of matter and motion involved. The principle which this leads us to is that the physical antecedent is a stimulus necessary for the production of a sensation; and that it is only a stimulus. The sensation does not come *from* it, although it would never come *without* it. The sensation has its *occasion* from the nervous process; it has

its *cause* from within. The physical process awakens the mind, it incites it to action; the mind, thereupon, spontaneously and by its own laws develops from itself a sensation. The specific names given to the various factors involved is of no importance, as long as it is recognized that the principle concerned is that of stimulus and response; response, which, for its existence, depends upon the physical antecedent, but for its content and nature, upon something else. We must recognize that we have got to go beyond the principle of physical causation to the principle of self-developing activity, though an activity which is not infinite or self-produced, but dependent upon an occasioning impulse beyond it. In short, not only is the soul immanent in the body, as teleological, as subordinating and adjusting its various activities to an end, but the body is the stimulus to the soul. It is the condition of the calling forth of its activities. It is the spark which fires the mind to light its own inextinguishable flame. Sensation, and, *a fortiori*, all higher physical activities, testify to the creative, self-determining power of the mind, with the proviso attached that this power has been called upon to act. There is just the same mystery about it that there is about every fact in the universe, the mystery that there should be such a fact at all. As to principles involved, there is no more mystery than in the explanation of any physical or chemical fact. In ultimate analysis, the spiritual principle is less mysterious, is lucidly transparent in comparison with the mechanical; for it is only from the former that the latter gets its explanation and the guarantee of its validity.

If we include within our survey the psycho-physiological facts as well as the purely physiological phe-

immanent in the body, as constituting its unity and end; it is transcendent to it, as transforming its activities for its own psychical ends. It uses it as material out of which to build its own structure, as food by which to nourish its own life. These two principles, of the immanence and the transcendence of the soul, to which we have been led by the study of the facts, cannot be left in this isolated way. They must be shown in their unity as necessarily involving each other. And again we turn to the facts of psycho-physiological life with the assurance that the principle will be involved in them, and that we are not left to the logical manipulation of our conceptions.

They are the facts connected with the execution of definite psycho-physiological functions. They may all be included under the phrase "localization of functions," if the phrase be understood in a broad sense to mean the performance of any definite act of psychical bearings by any specific, organized portion of the body. It would include, therefore, the performance of reflex acts by the spinal cord, as well as the supposed location of the "speech centre" in the third frontal convolution of the central hemisphere. The ground for this extension of the term is the unity of all nervous action, as well as particular facts to be presently mentioned. The only difference between the regular and constant "localization" of reflex action in the spinal cord, and of speech in one part of the brain, is a difference of degree, not of kind. The difference is between a localization perfectly formed, and a localization in process of forming. Organization of function might be the better term.

If we turn again to our authorities we shall find the facts substantially as follows:

1. In some form or other localization or, to use the better term, organization of psychical function, is all but universal. The body is not a homogeneous mass which is indifferent, equally as a whole and in all its parts, to the soul. On the contrary, neither as a whole, nor in any of

its parts, is it neutral to the soul. That it is not as a whole, we have seen when considering the immanence of the soul in the body; that it is not in any of its parts, is simply a detailed application of the same principle. The soul is not only in the body, but it is in it in definite, particular ways. The body as a whole is not only the organ of the soul, but the various structures of the body are differentiated organs, of various capacities and tendencies, of the soul. That is the meaning of the localization of function, or of the fact that certain activities have certain, more or less defined, nervous centres in various portions of the spinal cord and brain.

To give the specific evidence of this localization would be but to repeat the whole of the morphology and physiology of the nervous system. The nervous system itself is but a differentiation of the ectoderm; the special sense organs are only so many continuations of the brain and spinal cord. If we take the various movements, we find that, in going from the simplest to the most complex, from the mere reflex action to the most consciously purposive movement, nowhere does the will act without a structure already formed for it. Learning the higher movements, like walking, talking, etc., is but the formation of the organized structures of the body. If these be wanting, no matter how completely the end and the proper means of reaching it are present to consciousness, the volition cannot be performed. If we leave the motor and sensory spheres and come to the higher ideal operations, the evidence for the localization of functions is much less complete and forcible. But we need only to recognize the dependence of thought upon sense for its materials, and largely upon language for its form, to be aware that the same principles must, in some degree at least, hold here also. The fact that in thinking we never deal with the ultimate psychical elements, but with symbolic wholes, with processes already integrated, is still more striking psychological evidence of the same fact. Just as it would take

hours to perform a simple act like dressing, if the motor functions did not become organized in the bodily structure, if the will were obliged to go into detail of the act, instead of simply setting the whole mechanism into operation to work itself out, so in the intellectual sphere. If the various sensations and ideas remained isolated, if they were not organized into wholes, if they were not changed from material into structure, the mind would require hours to take in the meaning of a single sentence, or to reason out a simple inference. But the fact is that the mind does not deal with ultimate elements; it always has integral wholes which it may grasp and use without endeavoring or needing to resolve them. And that there is some similar physiological grouping and integration, some corresponding organization of function in the brain, all artificial experiments upon animals, and all natural experiments, performed by disease upon man, go to show.

2. But there must be explicitly stated, what has already been suggested; viz., that the degree of this localization, both as to definiteness and completeness, varies very greatly. The lower the function, the more perfectly and narrowly is it localized. The wider its scope, and the greater its consequent necessity, the more complete and spatial, so to speak, its localization. Thus the functions of breathing, digesting, swallowing, etc., which are necessary to life, and which have only indirect psychical bearings, have very definite and thoroughly localized centres; while the higher activities, like walking, talking, reading, and writing, involving more and more activities and of a more complex kind, have less and less definite local centres. In the higher activities there is no perfect mapping out at all, but all sorts of shadings-off and variations. So if we consider the sensory sphere, we find that, while the sense-centres may for some of the lower animals be made out pretty certainly, there is no such certainty and agreement in the case of man. And the reason is evident;

in the animals, the sensations remain mostly what they are—pure sense-feelings, while in man these sensations have been so related and interpreted that they have become for the most part perceptions, and even higher ideal relations. Consequently we find that *ideas* as such have no localization whatever. *There is not the slightest evidence whatever that any special idea, whether a percept, an image, or a concept, has any definite specific centre. There are all kinds of evidence that it has not.* The elaborate calculations of Mr. Bain in his work upon Mind and Body going to show that there are as many fibres and cells in the brain as the mind has separate ideas and associations, is based upon an utterly unfounded *a priori* assumption; viz., that cells in the brain correspond to ideas, and fibres to associations. It cannot be stated too strongly, or insisted upon too often, that there is not the slightest fragment of experimental evidence for the theory. There is much experimental evidence to show that the case cannot possibly stand thus. This evidence may be summed up in the statement that all lines of inquiry, morphological, anatomical, and physiological, converge to one result: the psychical function or bearing of the cell is dependent, not on its own structure, but upon its connections by means of the fibres. An “idea,” however simple it may seem, has not its physical basis in a cell, but in a group of cells, connected and interconnected by multitudinous fibres. If the idea be very complex it may possibly have relations to all the cells in the brain. This may be an extreme statement, but, beside the statement that any idea may be localized in a given cell, it is truth itself. Hence we see the entire failure of all attempts definitely to localize the higher intellectual functions. The evidence does not warrant the statement that, upon the whole, they have no physical connection; it does warrant the statement that the relations involved are so many, so far reaching, and so complex, that any attempt to find a sharply marked out centre must be forever in vain.

3. The two statements already made that localization is practically universal, and yet that the higher intellectual powers cannot be definitely localized at all, do not contradict each other. They find their reconciliation in the statement that *localization is not original, but acquired*. It has already been stated that the localization is no quality originally inherent in the cell; but that it depends upon the cell's connections through its fibres. As Wundt says (op. cit. vol. i. p. 225), "No element executes specific functions, but the form of the latter depends upon the connections and relations of the cell." And this dependence of localized function upon connection, is the same as to say that given elements of the brain act in a certain way only because they have been associated in the performance of the act. The localization is dependent upon use and exercise. Thus it is that Wundt goes on to state the two following principles: "Every definite function has, under given conditions of connection, a definite place in the central organ from which it proceeds: that is to say, whose elements stand in relations fitted for the execution of the function," and "Every element is the more fitted to the performance of a definite function, the more often it has been occasioned by external conditions to its performance." Localization of function is, in short, only the physiological way of saying habit. The organization of function is not indwelling in the brain as so much matter: it has been *learned* by the brain and learned through the tuition and care of the soul. By no twisting can the phenomena of localization of function be twisted into the support of materialism. The very fibres and cells cry out against such treatment. They all assert that the powers they have, they possess, not of their own original and indefeasible right, but by means of the activity, and under the authority of the soul. This accounts for the various degrees of localization found. The acts most necessary for the soul's ends, and therefore oftenest performed, have, through heredity, become definitely and completely organized,

and, like reflex actions, go on without consciousness, or, like instinctive actions, involve others, which in complexity and far reaching influence are beyond the immediate consciousness of the moment. But the soul, for its own ends, requires again that its higher activities be not thus mechanized. There must be a constant growth, adjustment to new relations, intellectual and moral, and this requires plasticity, variability. In the higher activities complete organization would mean stagnation, death. Thus it is that the higher we come, both in the range of animal life, and in the range of intellectual function, the less the localization. But in each case the evidence all goes to show that the localization is not original, but is acquired because the soul has repeatedly employed the given elements for the performance of a given act. The soul does not write in water, but in the plastic brain and spinal cord. *Litera scripta manet*. By the performance of its acts the soul gains a mechanism by which to perform them again the more readily, economically, and perfectly.

Thus we see how the phenomena of localization of function give us a stand-point whence to view the nature of the immanence and transcendence of the soul. The soul is immanent in the body just so far as it has made the body its organic instrument. The common saying that the "body is the organ of the soul" is literally much truer and more significant than is usually thought or meant. The term "organ" expresses a much more intimate and internal relation than is commonly understood. Organ presupposes function, and soul and body are related indeed as function and organ, activity and instrument. As Aristotle said so long ago, the body is the organ of the soul, as the eye is the organ of seeing. The body is not an external instrument which the soul has happened upon, and consequently uses, as a musician might happen upon a piano. The body is the organ of the soul because by the body the soul expresses and realizes its own nature. It is the outward form and living manifestation of the

soul. To quote from one of the most original and deeply spiritual thinkers whom America has yet produced: "It is the outward man, in and through which the inward powers of the soul express their form and character. It is the necessary mode of our existence in the world of sense, without the intervention of which we have no knowledge, either objective or subjective, no existence in nature, either in space or in time. It is not merely an organ to be conceived as distinct from our personal self; but *it is our proper self as existent in space*, in the order and under the laws of nature."¹

But this is only one-half the tale. The soul is immanent in the body only because, and in so far as, it has realized itself in the body. The body is its organ only because the soul has *made* the body its organ. The immanence is shown by the localization; the transcendence, by the fact that this localization has come about through the soul's own activities. The body as an organ of the soul is the result of the informing, creating activity of the soul itself. In short, the soul is immanent in the body, not by virtue of the body as mere body, but because, being transcendent, it has expressed and manifested its nature in the body.

The soul, accordingly, is not a powerless, impotent something, so transcendent that it cannot be brought into relation with matter. It is a living and acting force which has formed, and is constantly forming the body, as its own mechanism. This assures, on the one hand that no act or deed of the mind is ever lost, that it finds its registration and record; and that not alone in some supralunary sphere, but down here in the world of matter: and, on the other hand, it forms a mechanism by which the soul can immediately know, can grasp the fragments of its knowledge into one symbolic whole without laboriously gathering them and piecing them together, and by which it can immediately act. It is, as it were, the mind's automaton, ceaselessly and tirelessly executing the demands respond-

¹ President James Marsh, *Remains*, p. 257.

ing to the needs of the soul. All the phenomena which the materialist parades forth as "proofs"—the unconscious cerebration, the automatic, yet apparently intelligent, action in many states of unconsciousness; the dependence of perception and memory upon the proper condition and integrity of the brain; the accompaniment of brain disease with unconsciousness and insanity; the ratio between mental power and weight and complexity of the brain, etc., are the farthest removed from evidence of materialism. They are but the conclusive evidence of the thoroughness with which the soul has done its work, has formed its mechanism. They are all evidence that the soul is not hanging helpless in the air, but has made the body its home, and has realized itself so effectually in this body as its mechanism, that this mechanism can now act all but automatically, while disturbance of the mechanism of the organ excludes the execution of the corresponding activity, until the soul by its power form the organ again. The materialist but looks at the body after the soul has done its work in making the body what it is, and cries, "Lo, see what the body can do." Every one of the phenomena mentioned, as well as all which the materialist can mention, concern the formed body, the body in which the soul has already organized its functions. The true cry is, "Lo, see what the soul *has* done. It has tabernacled in the flesh and transformed that flesh into its own manifestation. The body is the bodying forth of the soul."

It was the "master of those who know" that said that the soul was the perfect realization or expression of a natural body, and at the same time, not the product of body, but its very life, its essence, its truth and reality—at once its final and efficient cause. (Aristotle, *De Anima*, ii. 1.) And it was the Teacher of all who know, the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world, who said: "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone: but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit." And it was the great disciple of the great

Teacher who wrote "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die; and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body as it has pleased Him, and to every seed his own body. It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body."

Christianity has no sympathy with those who have such a superfine fear of materialism that they aetherialize the soul past all contact with the body. It knows that in the body the soul is incarnate; that through the soul the natural body comes to be a spiritual body, as the soul works itself out, and realizes itself in it. The soul does apparently die in the body; it hides itself so effectually that the materialist says there is no soul; but it has died as dies the seed, to quicken and transform the body. It is by no accident or meaningless chance that we read in the Apostles' Creed those sublime words: "I believe in the Resurrection of the Body. Catholic historic Christianity, having such a confession on its lips, has no alliance with the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter, and no fear of the exactest demonstrations of physiology regarding the closest connections of body and soul. It takes its stand upon the words of St. Paul, to which these demonstrations can only add more weight: "There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterwards that which is spiritual." There is the body, the natural body, first. Spirit indwells within the body, and manifesting itself, realizing its own nature, it makes that body its own organ and servant. It thus makes it the spiritual body. Let it be no surprise that physiological psychology has revealed no new truth concerning the relations of soul and body. It can only confirm and deepen our insight into the truth divined by Aristotle and declared by St. Paul, and with good reason.

"Das Wahre war schon längst gefunden."

ARTICLE IV.

THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

BY THE REV. EDWIN C. BISSELL, D.D., PROFESSOR IN HARTFORD
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

[Continued from p. 99.]

OUR next step backwards brings us to the Second Book of Maccabees. It is of uncertain age, but was indubitably written before the destruction of Jerusalem (A. D. 70), though probably not earlier than B.C. 125, the date of one of the two letters with which it is introduced. This, in fact, was most likely about the time of the composition of the main work.¹ In the second of the two letters which, as I have said, preface it, though not originally forming a part of it, it is represented that the people of Judæa and Jerusalem, with the Sanhedrin and Judas Maccabæus, are addressing their Egyptian brethren, especially Aristobulus, the instructor of Ptolemy VI. Philometer (B.C. 180-145). Beginning with the statement that Antiochus Epiphanes, their dreaded oppressor, is now dead, they go on to say that they are about to celebrate the festival of the dedication and of the re-discovery, by Nehemiah, of the holy fire. To this celebration they cordially invite the Jews of Egypt.

But the part of the letter of special interest to us is that relating to the national literature (2 Macc. ii. 13). It reads: "And the same things, also, were reported in the records, namely, the memoirs of Neemias; and how he, founding a library, gathered together the books concerning the kings, and prophets, and those of David, and epistles of kings concerning holy gifts. And in like manner, also, Judas gathered together all those books that had been scattered by reason of the war we had, and they are

¹ See my *Apocrypha*, p. 59 f.

with us." The book here cited as the "memoirs of Nectanias" is some extra-canonical and now otherwise wholly unknown composition. It is alleged to contain, besides the legend of the holy fire, an account of Nehemiah's founding a library consisting of books concerning prophets and kings, works of David, and letters of kings respecting holy gifts.

We have no wish to press this singular allusion in a singular apocryphal book beyond what it will justly bear. It is conceded that much that is said in the context concerning Nehemiah is incredible. It is by no means certain that, in what is ascribed to him in connection with the founding of a library, his name has not been, consciously or unconsciously, interchanged with that of Ezra, as, a little before (i. 18), certain other things are imputed to him which, on much higher authority, we have every reason to believe were the achievements of a somewhat older contemporary. But, making due allowance for these drawbacks to our perfect confidence in the document as a whole, there are still remarkable and weighty statements in it which cannot be fairly ignored. For any writer's inventing them we can conceive no justifiable occasion. Moreover, they are simply confirmatory of what we are credibly assured of elsewhere, so that we are not at liberty to ignore them, if we would.

First, there is a tacit recognition of the fact that the second division of our present canon, commonly called "the prophets," is made up of two sorts of compositions, historical as well as prophetical. Secondly, we are told that, according to the "memoirs," Nehemiah's collection consisted not only of the works just named, but also of compositions of David and of royal epistles concerning holy gifts. The Psalms are undoubtedly referred to; with great probability, also, the histories of Ezra and Nehemiah; at the very least, the proclamations of the Persian kings, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes, found in them. It was just this fact of royal patronage which, in a letter to

Aristobulus, the tutor of an Egyptian king, we might expect would be singled out for emphasis. That these were all the books contained in Nehemiah's library is not said. The writer has plainly not the aim of giving a full catalogue, but simply, as was natural and in harmony with other references we have met with, to indicate its general character by referring to its principal features. Thirdly, this collection of books, it is distinctly implied, had been gathered and had already come to be highly regarded previous to the Maccabæan period. During the wars of the Maccabees they had become scattered, and had been re-gathered by the great Judas.

Fourthly, it is to be noted that, while clear reference is made to books forming a part of the Hagiography, or third division of the canon, no evidence is given that any apocryphal literature had been associated with it. Fifthly, the failure to name the Law as a part of Nehemiah's list is obviously due to the fact that there was no occasion for it in this place. The writer is discoursing of books which, *in addition to the Law*, which he elsewhere fully recognizes (ii. 1; cf. xv. 9), were in danger of being lost, and so needed to be sought out and connected together. Indeed, the Greek word used, as has been suggested, might well carry with it the idea that Nehemiah had made an addition to a previous collection.³ Now, this testimony to the canon of the Old Testament lacks the fulness and precision of others that have preceded. It is weakened, in some respects, by compromising additions. Still, it is clearly in harmony with them in several respects. It recognizes a threefold collection of the Scriptures. It treats it as already ancient in its day. It holds the books of which it is composed in high esteem, and deems them worthy of commendation to compatriots of other lands.

We now find ourselves in the historically brilliant and every way significant age of the Maccabees. As was to

be expected, the noble deeds of the Hasmonæan heroes were left to no single historiographer. Fortunate were it for us if the rest had been characterized by the straightforward honesty and simplicity of him who wrote what is known as the First Book. It covers a period of forty years (B.C. 175–135), and, for a conscientious use of materials, may be trusted about as implicitly as any modern history of England or the United States. The narrative is almost exclusively confined to the deeds of the three great sons of Mattathias—Judas, Jonathan, and Simon. While Jonathan was high-priest a treaty was made with the Lacedemonians. As a sort of offset to what was doubtless considered by some the folly of seeking an alliance, under any circumstances, with a foreign nation, the treaty is introduced with the remark (1 Macc. xii. 9): “Albeit we need none of these things, seeing that we have the holy books in our hands to comfort us.”

It is a most suggestive utterance, whose genuineness has never been questioned. What is to be especially noted is the epithet applied to the sacred library (τὰ βιβλία τὰ ἁγία) and the fact that it is to be found in a public document of this description. Not only is it a guarantee for the existence of the collection, but, as far as its title and the prominence given the books are concerned, it shows a reverence for it worthy of apostolic times. Moreover, this passage does not stand by itself in First Maccabees. In the very opening chapter (verses 56, 57) it is stigmatized as a peculiarly hateful form of the indignities which Antiochus Epiphanes and his minions heaped upon the Jewish people, that they deliberately set it before them as a goal to destroy all copies of the Scriptures which they could find among them; and sometimes, in order to show their contempt for Jewish exclusiveness, and shock, to the last degree, their feelings of veneration, even painted upon their holy pages, as it would appear, hideous pictures of their own idols (iii. 48).³

³ Cf. the commentary on this passage in my *Apocrypha*, p. 495.

In circumstances like these how is it possible for us, with Ewald, echoed by Stanley and many others, to adopt the hypothesis of a Maccabæan canon? To suppose that Judas the eldest brother, either on his own authority, or that of the Sanhedrin of his day, made actual additions to the list of books which they already held in such supreme respect? It finds no real support in the history. It was simply a theoretical exigency that started the idea. If it were possible at this point to limber up a little the historical guarantees with which Divine Providence has buttressed the Old Testament canon, it would, indeed, be an excellent place to slip in, not only a few psalms, but also some alleged late books, or portions of books, for whose present position it is not otherwise easy to account.

But we are not at liberty to exaggerate, much less pervert, the facts of history in order to accommodate our urgent theories. If there are Maccabæan psalms, the fact must be settled, if settled at all, wholly on internal grounds. The Maccabæan heroes and their armies, it is said, sung psalms; but it is nowhere so much as suggested that they ever wrote them (2 Macc. i. 30; x. 7, 38; xii. 37). And the sole historical foundation for the theory of a Maccabæan canon are the passages already quoted (2 Macc. ii. 13, 14; 1 Macc. i. 56, 57; iii. 48). It is said of Judas that he gathered together certain books; but his activity is expressly limited to books which had been scattered by reason of war. Elsewhere we learn more definitely the character of the library thus scattered and collected again: it was the "Holy Scriptures," which were already held in such veneration that, next to the defilement of the Holy of holies, no higher indignity could be shown the Jewish nation than to mutilate and caricature them. To suppose, therefore, that Judas, the Maccabee, or any contemporary of his, personally had any thing to do with

So far, then, we have found the current of history to which was intrusted the sacred books of the Jews, flowing between well-defined banks. As far as we have been able to judge, it has received no contributions from without serving to vitiate our conclusions. The point of transition from sacred to less sacred has not yet been reached. The canon of the Maccabees, in name and in esteem, is the canon of Josephus and the apostles. If it have other limits, we fail to find them. Our next post of observation will be the last before the one stream divides into several and the work of actual exploration begins.

The Son of Sirach is the oldest witness outside of the Bible, to the existence, division, and order of the Old Testament canonical books. His work, the so-called Ecclesiasticus, we date not so very long after the death of the high-priest Simon I. (B.C. 310-290); the translation of it into Greek at about B.C. 132.⁴ The translator, whom we have already cited, introduces his version with most important testimony on our theme, whose genuineness is undisputed.⁵

The first thing we especially notice in his statement is the fact, announced at the outset as something well known to his readers, that Israel was highly privileged in having *received from their fathers* a list of books embraced under three general divisions. These divisions are three times named in essentially the same terms, "the Law, the

⁴ See a full discussion in my Apocrypha, p. 278 ff.

⁵ "Whereas, many and important things have been handed down to us through the law and the prophets, and the others who followed after them, for which things Israel ought to be commended for learning and wisdom; and since not only must the readers become skilful themselves, but also they that desire to learn be able to profit them who are abroad, both by speaking and writing: my grandfather Jesus, who had given himself more

Prophets, and the Others," the last expression being exchanged once for "the other books," and, again, for "the rest of the books." It should be carefully noted that in each case the article is used, so that we may fairly conclude he meant to indicate by this title, as by the others, a definite, and, to his own mind, an already complete, collection. This is also implied in what the translator says of his grandfather's attitude towards this literature.

Some have thought that the Son of Sirach himself lays claim to prophetic gifts in one part of his work (xxiv. 30-33), and seeks to put his own composition along side of, and fully on a level with, those here mentioned. But this is wholly to mistake his bearing towards the Scriptures.⁶ They were something, it is stated, with which he had long intently busied himself, and his effort now was not to imitate or rival them, but to enable others to live in harmony with them. Note particularly his eloquent tribute to Bible worthies, from Moses to the post-exilian high-priest Joshua, with Ezra and Nehemiah (xliv.-l.). Of the twelve Minor Prophets he expresses the hope that their bones may revive again from the grave (xlix. 10). This is not the posture of one who aspires to be reckoned among these immortals of his people. In standard and achievement they are afar off to him. His pen already invests them with a half-ideal glamour.

What the collection was to the grandson near the middle of the second century B.C., that, *this testimony*, in harmony with the Book of Ecclesiasticus itself, assures us it was to Jesus Sirach near the middle of the third century B.C.⁷

⁶ In my commentary on this book, *Introd.*, p. 282, I have used too strong

To both, as far as we are able to judge from the language employed, and other considerations bearing on the matter, it was an already closed and highly revered collection. The expression, "the other books," "the rest of the books," is, indeed, peculiar. But the name applied to the third division of the canon was *never any more definite* than this. These productions, centuries after they had become fixed in the canon,—and to this day, in fact, in the Jewish Church,—were known simply as "the books," "the writings" (*kethubim*). Our Lord's reference to the third division of the canon (Luke xxiv. 44), if it were meant to be such, is even less explicit than the one before us. It was not easy to find an exact title for a collection made up of compositions so diverse as the Book of Ruth and Ecclesiastes, or the Book of Daniel and Canticles.

That it was already in its final form in the time of "Ben Sira," as much as the two others known as "the Law" and "the Prophets," there is also another good reason for supposing. If it had not been, and was open, as some suppose, to receive new accessions, just as subsequently the Greek list was open at Alexandria to contributions of all sorts and from all quarters, why was not this very excellent Book of Ecclesiasticus itself received into it in its Hebrew form? Why was it necessary to translate it into Greek in order to find for it even a *quasi* connection with the Hebrew canon? When the translation of Ecclesiasticus was begun, the Hebrew Scriptures were already in a Greek dress. This was not among them. It was a Hebrew waif of former days. Either it had knocked at the gate of the Hebrew Scriptures and been rejected, or, as we have every reason to suppose from the attitude and testimony of grandfather and grandson alike, it had come into being at a time when the Hebrew Scriptures stood already long since apart from the other Hebrew national literature as the special oracles of God. In the face of the declaration of Josephus that since the time of Artaxerxes no book had been added to the Scriptures of his

people, the apparent reference in "Ben Sira" to a *completed* canon is, we submit, entitled to the benefit of any doubt which might arise from the indefiniteness of its form. If it be held that other books were added to the list subsequent to the time when Ecclesiasticus was composed, it must be proved that they were. The weightiest probabilities are against it, and any valid historical evidence whatever in its favor has never been adduced.

And now we may address ourselves more directly to the question how and when the Old Testament canon was definitely established.* Some general principles should be recognized at the start. Unlike the books of the New Testament, which were the product of a single generation, the writings of the Old Testament extend over many hundred years. On the other hand, like those of the New Testament, the collection of the literature of the Old Testament would naturally be a very gradual process, and the result, in general, of a silent recognition of intrinsic claims, after a period of probation, though ordinarily supported by convincing external proofs. Just as in the case of the New Testament, too, it would be natural to expect, as Dillmann has shown,⁹ that the more special veneration of the sacred books would begin to manifest itself—unless, in some degree to the contrary, in the case of known authors of prominence—at that period when the peculiar presence and power of the revealing Spirit that had created them was decreasing or passing away. Moreover, the length of the period over which the books extend, and their externally heterogeneous character, would seem to demand that there be an historic order of canonization, and that it take place by affiliated groups, certain writings being first enucleated and associated together, and then, finally, under the natural law of unity and completeness, all gathered into one volume.

It was probably under these principles, acting more or less imperceptibly, that the Old Testament canon was formed. In the nature of the case we should expect it to be so. Let us see if the hypothesis is not verified by the fact.

The nations of antiquity, especially in the Orient, as if influenced by the traditions of that primitive period when God walked with men, were not accustomed to divorce, as we seem too much inclined to do, religion and the state. The sanctions of religion were eagerly sought, as well in public as in private life, by rulers and people. All literature was to a great extent religious. In ancient Egypt and Babylon, as we well know, the priesthood had a position only inferior to the throne. Not only were they the accredited mediators between God and men, they also held the keys of human knowledge. They were the *literati* of their times, the producers and the depositaries of every kind of learning. And later, in the great historic empires of the West, this was scarcely less true. The libraries of Greece and Rome, too, were their temples. These sacred places were the archives of the nation. Strabo, for example, applies to the temple of his day the very name *Pinakothek* which, in our own time, is given to one of the finest art collections of central Europe.¹

Consequently the Hebrew nation was in no sense peculiar in putting an Aaron beside Moses, in making their priests the curators of their literature, and the holiest precincts of their religion the place for its deposit. No sooner do we hear of the existence of books or rolls, than we read of their being committed to the custody of the priests. (Deut. xxi. 9; cf. xvii. 18.) According to the Old Testament history one of the latest acts of the great Hebrew legislator was to deliver what is called the "Book of the Law" into the hands of the Levites with the charge

fetich; but in the mind of the people of that day that would be the proper place for it. Nor was it intended as a temporary receptacle during their sojourn in the wilderness; but the one proper place for a law library at the spot where at once their responsibility and the sanctions of the law would be most keenly felt. Whether or not this "Book of the Law" included the whole Pentateuch it is needless here to discuss.'

In the book that next follows the Pentateuch (Josh. xxiv. 26) we read that on the occasion of the renewal of the covenant under Joshua, this successor of Moses wrote the words of it "in the Book of the Law of God." Here, not only is the existence and the accessibility of "the Book of the Law of God" assumed, but also the fact that it contained material similar to that which Joshua was now called upon to add to it. Somewhat later still, when the kingdom was established under Samuel (1 Sam. x. 25), we find this distinguished forerunner of the prophets, not only explaining to the people how its affairs were to be administered, but we are told that he wrote his ministrations in "the book" (as the margin of our Revised Version properly renders the present Massoretic text) and "laid it up before the Lord;" that is, he did with it what the Levites had been enjoined to do with the documents entrusted to them by the leader of the exodus, and what Joshua had done with the rolls he had taken from their sacred resting place, to record in them the vows of his people. If, indeed, we had had no statement to this effect, just this method of procedure might have been expected from what we know of the customs of contemporaneous nations.

When now we come down several centuries later in the

jected to repairs. While these were going on, the high-priest Hilkiah found a copy of what is significantly called "the Book of the Law," and brought it to the youthful king. (2 Kings xxii. 8.)" By the phraseology employed, a book is indicated whose contents, to some extent at least, were known and recognized as binding. Certainly the subsequent conduct of king and people can be explained on no other credible hypothesis. And from this period of King Josiah we may properly date the rise among the *people generally* of what may be called a canonical valuation of the Law. It became to them what, notwithstanding its amazing history, it had never been before, the Book of God. Until the exile, above all other books, even such as were intimately associated with it, it remained almost exclusively so. In the order of history, as by a just logical sequence, it became the radiant nucleus around which crystallized in their order "the prophets" and "the other books."

Dillmann" has beautifully said that "a law without prophecy would be a body without a soul." There was already prophecy enough in the Pentateuch itself to suggest the need and prepare the way for more. The uniform habit of New Testament writers in their citations to join Law and Prophets is something more than a convenient way of designating the Old Testament literature. It shows a just appreciation of what must be considered the two great and mutually complementary parts in a divine revelation. Nor was this feeling and habit confined to New Testament times. Ezra, too, quotes Pentateuch history as something that had been uttered by God's servants, the prophets. (ix. 10; cf. Neh. ix. 26, 30.) While the canon was still in process of formation, the law and

the prophets were co-ordinated as being on the same level of authority (2 Kings xvii. 13; Zech. vii. 12; Mal. iv. 4, 5; cf. Dan. ix. 2).

Moreover, from the outset, the prophetic writings might be expected, from the high popular standing of the prophets themselves, to be held in the highest esteem; from their first appearance they would fall little short of canonical rank. After Samuel's day, moreover, prophetical schools were in existence. To collect and preserve the writings of their revered instructors and models would be among their chiefest cares. At any rate the prophetical books themselves give ample evidence that such collections early existed. The exact citation of one prophet by another, especially the earlier by the later, is one of their most familiar characteristics; as, for instance, Obadiah by Joel, or *vice versa*, Joel by Amos, Joel and Amos by Isaiah, and Isaiah, in turn, by Nahum, Habakkuk and Zephaniah."

At the same time, a collection of the historical books would be immediately promoted, not alone by the fact that biblical historical writers were themselves regarded as prophets;" but by the association of the Book of Joshua for a long time directly with the Torah; while to the Book of Joshua the remaining historical books were of the nature of a sequel. We have every reason to suppose, therefore, that at some period not long after the return from the exile the connected series of histories found recorded in the Books of Joshua, Judges, 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings, were brought to a close, combined together, and associated with the prophetical writings proper, which had been previously collected. The very circumstances of the restored people: the rebuilding of the sanctuary, the knowledge of the fact that the exile itself was a prov-

the covenant and the impressive lessons of their own history, the dying out of the national language as vernacular, and above all the withdrawal, with Malachi, of the gift of prophecy,—would be, each and all, powerful incentives to such a collection of this class of literature.

As it respects the remaining books of the Old Testament, designated by the Son of Sirach as "the rest of the books," and known among us as the Hagiography, or Sacred Writings; viz., the Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, Daniel, Esther, and, possibly, Ruth and Lamentations, at just what precise time within a period of about one hundred and fifty years they attained, severally and as a whole, canonical valuation, it is impossible to say. The use of the Psalter in the services of the temple requires for it, or, at least, for a collection of Psalms, a corresponding early place in the esteem of the people nearly equivalent to canonical rank (2 Chron. xxix. 30; cf. Ps. lxxii. 18–20). It is pretty generally admitted that in the time of Nehemiah this collection was virtually brought to a close. The theory of Maccabæan psalms, as we have already seen, is possible only to a very limited extent and never has been widely adopted. In Nehemiah's time, too, if not earlier, its five-fold division must have been given to the Psalter, in imitation of the Pentateuch.

Already as early as the reign of Hezekiah (B. C. 726–697) a second collection of Solomon's Proverbs was made under his direction, and, not long after, the whole work must have been completed (Prov. xxv. 1). These two collections, especially the former, would furnish the link by which the entire class of books to which they belong, would finally be drawn to their subsequent position in the Hebrew canon. Esther was probably the last to take its place;¹⁷ and somewhat before the Book of Ecclesiasticus was *written*, the whole collection, already so highly re-

¹⁷ But see the order adopted in the Tract of the Talmud, *Baba Bathra* 14b 15a (Ezra and Chron. are placed last).

garded, in all its three divisions had been brought to an orderly conclusion, and the door shut upon new-comers. In this respect the testimony of Ecclesiasticus and First Maccabees is one with that of Josephus and every scrap of credible tradition known to us. And to this testimony the later legend of Nehemiah and Ezra gives a support no less valuable in its *essential features* that in other particulars it lacks coherency and fails to invite our confidence (2 Macc. ii. 13, 14; 2 Esdras xiv. 41-47).

If the Book of Daniel, or any part of it, or any other book, was admitted to the canonical list at the time of the Maccabees, as many critics hold, these critics are bound to give us a sufficient reason for the hypothesis. It fails to account for the attitude of the Maccabees towards the "Holy Scriptures." It overlooks the nearly contemporaneous testimony of the translator of Ecclesiasticus, to say nothing of its much earlier author. It falsifies the direct statement of Josephus, which, in turn, is confirmed by every phase of the Palestinian tradition both biblical and extra-biblical. And, in fine, it loads itself with the heavy problem of accounting for the immediate and undisputed acceptance of the Book of Daniel by the Maccabæan courts of appeal when Ecclesiasticus, and what other books we know not, applied in vain.

But it remains an interesting question: How was the Old Testament canon concluded? Who had the leading parts in so grand a work? Especially, have the persistent traditions connecting therewith the names of Ezra and Nehemiah a basis in fact? Or was the whole matter simply fortuitous, at most, controlled by a very general providence? There is nothing either in the spirit or usages of post-exilic Judaism to lead us to suppose that such a matter would be left to chance, or to shape itself without its concern. The more recent criticism, from the sheer necessity of accounting for admitted facts, has found itself compelled to return to the theory it formerly, to some extent, disparaged, of a great national assembly, restored,

if not organized, by Ezra and Nehemiah, by which, among other only less important things, the Hebrew canon was given the seal of official recognition. The mistake that caused the natural reaction which began two centuries ago, was in ascribing too great, in fact, an almost supernatural, influence to this assembly.

The method of divine providence in this matter, both in the Old Testament and in the New, seems to have been rather to express itself first through the tacit assent of an enlightened religious consciousness and a sort of popular consensus of readers, and not till afterwards to permit the stamp of a formal ecclesiastical approval. The divinely guided *ecclesia* selected; ecclesiastics acting for them and in their name, at most, have only elected. Divine providence, working through the church itself, put all our present books into the canon; the councils, plainly after this preliminary work had come to an end, under the guidance of this same providence, have been set to fix the bound that should keep other less worthy books out of it.

I have already referred to the activity of the royal reformer Hezekiah in the preservation and multiplication of the sacred books. The college of scribes to whom this work was assigned received from him, not only the needed stimulus and support, but took the honorable title of "the men of Hezekiah, king of Judah" (Prov. xxv. 1). Julius Fuerst, in his work on the canon, maintains that this body of men existed, and continued their work, up to the very times of Ezra and Nehemiah.¹⁸ Whether this be true or not, they doubtless existed long after the death of their distinguished founder and patron, and furnished the example, and may be the partial incentive, to the formation of similar bodies in subsequent times. The so-called great synagogue or assembly, in fact, whose very existence some modern critics have had the temerity to deny, is but the natural outgrowth, under circumstances still more seri-

¹⁸ Der Kanon d. A. T. nach den Ueberlieferungen in Talmud u. Midrasch (Leipz. 1868), pp. 27, 75, 76, 77-80, 130-135.

ously requiring it, of this pre-exilian body for whose origin and activity with the sacred literature we have the authority of Holy Writ. The Talmud tradition concerning the rise and order of the sacred books directly connects them together as successive agents in the same undertaking."

The oldest and most trustworthy notice of the great synagogue is found in the Talmud tract generally entitled Massecheth Aboth (i. 1, 2). It is there said: "Moses received the Law from Sinai; he transmitted it to Joshua; Joshua to the elders; the elders to the prophets; the prophets to the men of the great assembly, who laid down three precepts: 'Be circumspect in judging; make many disciples; make a hedge about the Law.'" Further on, it is stated that "Simon the Just was one of the survivors of the great assembly." In another tract already referred to, where the Old Testament books are especially treated, these men are represented, along with Moses, Joshua, Samuel, David, Jeremiah, Hezekiah and his companions, and Ezra, as having done actual work on certain parts of our present canonical literature. Just what it was, the indefiniteness of the term leaves us in some uncertainty." On the whole, however," the meaning seems to be that they copied the books and edited them for popular use.

The most important matter furnished by the passage is the list of Old Testament books it provides, coinciding precisely with our own, and the fact that the men of the great synagogue are said to have been somehow engaged with others in bringing them into their given order and shape. The Talmud contains a good many other references to this body, of one kind and another, all however on this general line: that it was a post-exilian institution, first called together by Ezra and Nehemiah, having among its

Joshua, the prophets Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi; but extending downward also to the times of Simon the Just, i. e., the beginning of the third century, B. C. The affairs of the restored Jewish commonwealth were its concern. It had its whole existence in that very period from which we receive the Hebrew Bible in its final form. Could it, in fact, have been better employed, or have had an object more suited to its alleged origin and history, than in giving to its own people, and through them to the world, in a completed form, those Scriptures which they had received from prophetic hands?

The first to call in question the statements of the Talmud concerning the existence of this body, was Simon, whose work entitled *The Critical History of the Old Testament* was published just two centuries ago.* He was followed by Rau,** Aurivillius* (Michaelis), DeWette,** and others, all of whom made use almost exclusively of the *argumentum e silentio*. The silence of Philo, Josephus, and the apocryphal books concerning any such body, joined with the fact that our first notice of it is in the Talmud tract, whose date cannot be earlier than the first century of our era, in their view rendered it exceedingly improbable that it was any thing more than a quiddity of the rabbins, and no historical entity. On the other hand, names even better known, as Eichhorn, Bertholdt, Ewald, Jost, Zunz,** and many others, became enlisted in the defence of

* *Histoire Crit. du Vieux Test.*, 1685.

** *Diatriba de Synagoga Magna*, Utrecht, 1727.

** *Dissertationes* (ed. by Michaelis) Götting., 1790.

** *Einleitung* (ed. by Schrader, 1869) p. 20. Cf. also Hartmann, *Die Enge Verbindung d. A. T. mit d. Neuen*, Hamb., 1831, pp. 120-166; Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*, Camb., 1877, excursus ii.; Krochmal in the *Heb. periodical Kerem Chemid*. v. 63 ff.; Kuenen, *Over de Mannen der Groote Synagoge*, Amsterd., 1876; Graetz in *Frankel's Monatschrift*, 1857,

the tradition, holding that it was an extreme position in historical scepticism to doubt the very existence of a body so clearly in place in the post-exilian times and so frequently the subject of particular notice in the generally trustworthy tradition preserved to us in the Talmud. Without pretending to accept implicitly every statement made concerning it, as to its name, its numbers, and the like, the actuality of the great synagogue or assembly, and its employment in the re-organization of the Jewish religious life and literature, subsequent to the exile, it was argued, could not well be called in question.

And this, it may confidently be said, is the opinion of the majority of biblical scholars of our day. But it is not universal. The subject has of late been given new prominence by a treatise of Kuenen," whose results are fully accepted in Wellhausen's edition of Bleek's Introduction to the Old Testament," by Professor W. R. Smith in England," and far too hastily, as it seems to us, by some critics in our own country." With this comparatively small company of younger scholars, who, whatever else they may lack, apparently lack no assurance of the justice of their own conclusions, the matter of a post-exilian body of this sort has been peremptorily relegated to the realm of fable.

Professor W. R. Smith says (p. 156): "We now know that the whole idea that there ever was a body called the Great Synagogue holding rule in the Jewish nation is pure fiction. It has been proved in the clearest manner that the origin of the legend of the Great Synagogue lies in the account given in Neh. viii.-x. of the great convocation which met at Jerusalem and subscribed the covenant to observe the law. It was therefore a meeting, and

not a permanent authority. It met once for all, and every thing that is told about it, except what we read in Nehemiah, is pure fable of later Jews." Professor Smith refers to Kuenen as the champion of this view. It is he who has "proved in the clearest manner," that the whole hypothesis of a great synagogue is legendary.

Professor Smith, moreover, indicates how Kuenen has done this (p. 408 f.). Besides carrying out more fully Rau's argument derived from the silence of witnesses between the exile and the Christian era, he has shown, he thinks, that the alleged references of the Talmud to a great synagogue are really references to the convocation of Ezra and Nehemiah already alluded to, which they once for all assembled "in the street before the water-gate" to hear the law and to avow their loyalty to it.

Now Kuenen, as we are free to say, has done *something of this kind* and by so doing has rendered a most important service to the cause of biblical learning. We accept many of his facts which are set forth with great clearness and skill, without by any means feeling bound in consequence to accept his conclusions. He has, in truth, made it more evident than it was ever made before, although it is by no means a new discovery, just how and when the great synagogue had its post-exilic rise, who were its earliest promoters, and what its peculiar work, in some sense, was. But he and his adherents, we must think, have stopped short with a half-truth. They have taken what was the beginning of a movement for the whole of it. If the Talmud tradition, on whose trustworthiness Kuenen, too, so far relies as to build his main arguments upon it, teaches any thing, it teaches that while Ezra, Nehemiah, and other noted men of their times formed a part of the supposed great synagogue, they formed *only* a part, and that the beginning of it. The very tract which contains the final notice of the body contains also a statement that Simon the Just, who lived nearly two centuries later, was one of its survivors. This Simon cannot

be made a contemporary and direct co-operator with the early exulants. Elsewhere, too, they are spoken of as successors to the prophets Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi.

We depend on no exaggerations of an Elias Levita. We willingly give up the sixteenth century theory of the great synagogue and its work in the crude and uncritical form in which it was then held. We accept the reasoning of Kuenen and his fellow-critics, while denying, as before said, that it is in any sense a novelty of our times, which identifies, in so far the great synagogue spoken of in the Talmud with the assembly convened by Ezra and Nehemiah respecting the observance of the law. It is in strictest harmony, too, with those pre-Christian traditions already noticed in 2 Maccabees and 2 Esdras. But in accepting the Talmud statements and building on them here, we feel bound to accept them in their full extent. Neither Ezra nor Nehemiah, nor any immediate associate of theirs, *can* have done the work the Talmud ascribes to this body. Only because of a solidarity of interest and a similarity of aim are the offices and titles of widely separated generations treated in the later tradition as one.

And as it concerns the almost unbroken silence of subsequent Jewish history and literature for so long a time concerning this great assembly, how could it well have been otherwise? That history, when one comes to examine it, is nearly a total blank. The forty years of wilderness wanderings, the dark ages of mediæval history are not more marked by black chasms and mysterious silences. Their own inviolable rules, moreover, prevented members of the body itself from publishing in written form its laws and ordinances. Down to the time of the Talmud it was a custom most scrupulously observed to record nothing of such matters as must have characterized

ence and general scope and aim of such a body is founded. "He who writes down the ordinances," was the standing motto of these strangely silent workmen of the ancient church, "is like one who burns the law."¹ A praiseworthy loyalty to what they understood to be God's highest revelation had effectually closed their lips to their own labors until considerably after the beginning of our era.

Hence, in harmony with the main body of sober biblical scholars, we are not prepared to give up as yet our belief in the existence and wide-reaching activity of the so-called great synagogue. It forms precisely the link needed to connect two otherwise badly disconnected periods of Jewish history. If it receive somewhat of its support from Talmud tradition, it is a tradition which, in its main features, is unassailable. Meantime, be it observed, its principal support is in positive institutions of post-exilian Judaism for whose being and working we have the authority of biblical books. We are not inclined to attribute supernatural endowments and acts to these mostly unknown men, except as they were under the guidance of God's acknowledged prophets of this period. We do not wish to assume that they did any thing as it respects the canonical books which they did not do. It was really very little that they would be called upon to do, if we may judge from their New Testament collaborators. They had simply to recognize the evident work of Providence. The supernatural element in the formation of either canon is not excessive. The present collection of these books, whatever we may say of their composition, was mostly a natural, by which I do not mean, however, that it was not a providential, result.

We have traced a certain process and movement in the Old Testament literature down to the time of the alleged great assembly. After their times we behold it as a completed work: moreover, with certain unmistakable marks of age and an evident halo of sanctity about it. We do

¹ Cf. Wright's *Kohleth*, p. 484.

not say that, under God, the great assembly organized by Ezra and Nehemiah did that work. We only say that it was concluded before that assembly broke up not quite two centuries later; that they were eminently fitted to do it; that so far as we are able to look in upon their deliberations, it is the kind of business with which they employed themselves. To put a hedge about the law was one of their confessed aims. And that sounds like a not so very distant echo of the ancient legislator's words: "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it." We have an effect which demands a cause. This, so far as we can see, is an every way sufficient and suitable cause.

Some unknown hand reaches down to us out of the mystery of the third century a completed Hebrew Bible. Can we justly doubt that that hand represents the body of men of whom it is said that Simon the Just, whose praises "Ben Sira" sings, was one of the last survivors? With them we must leave it, or we must clearly leave it unaccounted for. It is safe to leave it with them—and with Him who for wise purposes of his own has chosen that here, too, we should see through a glass darkly."

²⁹ Besides the works and articles already cited, and the well-known Introductions to the Bible, the following are the more important treating the Canon of the Old Testament: Semler, *Abhand. v. freier Untersuchung d. Kanon*, Halle, 1776; Schmid, *Historia Antiqua et Vindicatio Canonis*, etc., Lips. 1775; Movers, *Loci Quidam Historiae Illustrati*, etc., Breslau, 1842; Herzfeld, *Geschichte* ii. 1857; Bleek, "Stellung d. Apokryphen," etc., *Stud. u. Kritiken*, 1853; Stuart, *Crit. Hist. and Defence of O. T. Canon*, Andover, 1853; Cosin, *Scholastical Hist. of the Canon*, etc., Lond. (vol. iii. of works), 1849; Vaihinger, "Zur Untersuch. ueber d. Abschluss d. Alttest. Kanons," *Stud. u. Kritiken*, 1857, pp. 93-99; Credner, *Zur Geschichte d. Kanons*, Halle, 1857; Oehler, "Kanon d. A. T." *Herzog's Encyk.* 1st Aufg.; Welte, "Bemerkungen ueber d. Entstehung, d. Alttest. Kanons," *Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1855, pp. 58-95; Steiner, *ibid.*, Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexikon*; Ewald, *Geschichte* (iii. Götting. 1868); Diestel, *Geschichte d. A. T. in d. Christlichen Kirche*, Jena, 1869; Reuss, *Gesch. d. heil. Schrift. d. A. T.*, Braunschweig, 1881; Wordsworth, *Canon of O. and N. Tests.*, Hulsean Lect. for 1847-8.

ARTICLE V.
THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE NEW ENGLAND
DIVINES.

BY THE REV. FRANK H. FOSTER, PH.D. (LEIPZIG), PROFESSOR OF CHURCH
HISTORY, OBERLIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

II.

HAVING in the previous article¹ presented a sketch of the work of Dr. Chauncy which called forth the reply of Dr. Edwards, we now proceed to the reply itself. We shall consider it, first, as an answer to Chauncy, and, second, as a contribution to theology.

1. *The Reply to Chauncy.*

This may be denominated a perfect specimen of unyielding logic. Edwards demands that Chauncy shall be held to the proper meaning of his words, and upon this basis he drives him into a multitude of contradictions. He does not thereby always arrive at results which Chauncy would have acknowledged as his own positions, but this serves only to reveal the more clearly, what it was his object to exhibit, the inner inconsistency of Chauncy's scheme.

He begins by showing that what Dr. Chauncy expressly holds as to some of the wicked, he must hold of all; viz., that they *suffer the full penalty* of the law, and hence, when finally saved, are not *forgiven*, but simply liberated from further punishment. Justice is satisfied, and liberation follows in strict justice.²

But Dr. Chauncy also holds that the future punishment of the wicked is *disciplinary*. It is intended for their good. It is to make them the "willing and obedient subjects

¹ pp. 1-32.

² Works, i. 5-8.

of God."³ But these two ideas are utterly inconsistent, if Dr. Chauncy holds to the distinction between retributive justice and discipline, as it is shown he does.

Again, Dr. Chauncy holds that all men, both believers, and those who are saved after suffering the punishments of hell, are saved *by the mere mercy and grace of God* through Jesus Christ. But this idea is also inconsistent with the first view mentioned, since together they declare that God will of his *abounding goodness* grant to his creatures just so much relief from misery as they are entitled to in *the strictest justice!*⁴

An ordinary reasoner would have been content to stop here; but not Dr. Edwards. He proceeds now to show that Dr. Chauncy not only *does*, but *must*, hold these discordant ideas in order to maintain his scheme.⁵

The damned who suffer for ages of ages must be punished according to their deserts, or else there is some greater punishment threatened than this of ages of ages, which no one pretends. Again the punishment of the lost must be discipline, for otherwise it is vindictive, and this, Dr. Chauncy admits, is inconsistent with the salvation of all men. But, again, all men must be saved of the mere mercy of God, or else all the arguments drawn from the divine goodness are in vain. "Thus," says Dr. Edwards, "Dr. Chauncy was compelled by necessity to associate in his scheme principles which will wage eternal war with each other."⁶

We pass on to chapter iv. which contains an examination of Dr. Chauncy's arguments to prove that endless punishment is inconsistent with justice. There are three of these.

(1.) The difference of treatment between the smallest sinner and the smallest saint is out of proportion to the difference of their characters, and so not reconcilable with the justice of God.—Edwards points out in reply that the question is whether the *sinner* is treated with injustice, which question the argument begs.⁷

³ Ib. 8-10.⁴ Ib. 13.⁵ Ib. 14, 15.⁶ Ib. 15.⁷ Ib. 77.

(2.) Endless punishment is out of proportion to the magnitude of finite sin. Our sin is finite, Dr. Chauncy thinks, because it is impossible in a finite duration to commit a crime which shall deserve an infinite, or endless, punishment.—Edwards replies by showing that Chauncy, in his admission that in strict justice it is impossible that all men should be saved, and in his supposition that future punishment may possibly be annihilation, has already really granted what he now denies. His positive answer is this: that the argument involves the position that no crime can justly be punished for a longer time than was consumed in the perpetration of it. This is palpably absurd.⁸

(3.) The endlessness of punishment makes it equal in all cases, which is against the representations of Scripture.—But Edwards shows that infinity of *duration* does not involve infinity of *degree* also. An infinite line, and an infinite superficies are not equal because both infinite.⁹

Although Edwards thus emphasizes the rational reply to Dr. Chauncy, he by no means confines himself to this. He makes thorough work of the exegetical argument, and displays, as we think all would admit, not only greater acumen, but vastly sounder scholarship than Chauncy. He does not use the methods of modern exegesis altogether, but it is only because he has not at hand the same extent of appliances as now both assist and perplex the interpreter. He interprets like Calvin. He determines the sense by the connection of thought. If the historical element of modern exegesis is wanting, if the grammatical is not so prominent, yet the lexical is there, the contextual is handled as by a master, and the analogy of Scripture is wisely employed.

We select, as examples of the whole, the reply to the explanation of Rom. v. 12 ff., and the discussion of *αἰών, αἰώνιος*.¹⁰

⁸ Ib. 84.

⁹ Ib. 88 f.

¹⁰ The reply to Rom. viii. 19-24 is equally good. Inasmuch as we have already given Dr. Chauncy's arguments on *κρίσις* in a note (p. 28) we subjoin here a few points of Dr. Edwards' reply, p. 159 ff.:—

Dr. Chauncy's argument on Rom. v. 12, etc., hangs, as we have already seen, on the assumption that the antithesis between Adam and Christ, and the universal effects of the act of each is exact and applicable at every point. Dr. Edwards discovers three arguments for this assumption in Chauncy; viz., (1) that as "many" in the former part of the fifteenth verse ("If through the offence of one *many* be dead, much more hath the grace of God abounded unto *many*;") means all men, so it must in the latter part, else "the antithesis will be lost." But, says Edwards, if we say: "The Pretender drew many into rebellion, but many were brought back"; we do not need to assert that *as* many were restored as seduced, in order to the antithesis. (2) οἱ πολλοί means all men because of the article. This is refuted by numerous examples. (3) In

(1) After showing that the figure of speech found in the words "groaning," etc., if we understand *κρίσις* of the inanimate creation, is by no means too bold to be found in Scripture, Edwards, as is so often the custom of both the Edwardses, father and son, states Dr. Chauncy's argument more strongly than he had himself, in these words: "There is an absurdity in the representation that they [brutes and inanimate creatures] shall be brought into the liberty of the children of God, after the end of the world; because they will then be annihilated; and to represent that, after they shall be annihilated, they shall still enjoy glorious liberty, is a gross inconsistency.

To this he replies: (a) Some writers think that this happiness is to be enjoyed during the millennium, before the destruction of the world. (b) Many writers think that the world is not to be annihilated, but after being purified by fire is to be the home of holy and happy beings forever. (c) Even if they are destroyed, brutes and inanimate beings will be delivered, upon the redemption of man, from the abuse and misuse under which they have suffered; which may be called a participation in liberty.

(2) As to *πᾶσα κρίσις*, Edwards shows by a careful examination of the passages that, of the four instances in which it occurs in the New Testament besides this of Rom. viii., it signifies in *every* instance either more or less than mankind, except Mark xvi. 15. He affirms that *κρίσις* alone is used in the New Testament ten times, "in no one of which does it mean mankind," and *cites the passages*. And, furthermore, he goes into the Septuagint, and takes the three cases of its occurrence, when it is translated "cattle," "substance," and "riches;" and cites the nine cases of the Apocrypha in which it is not once used "to signify all mankind and not more or less."

We think that the comparative thoroughness of these two works is no mean indication of the comparative merits of the two causes they represent.

the eighteenth verse it is expressly stated that both the judgment and the free gift came to *all men*. The antithesis demands that the phrases be understood in the same sense.—Here Edwards does not content himself with refuting this statement. He points out that the words of inference used at the beginning of the eighteenth verse compel us to understand the second “all men” in the sense of the words “they which receive abundance of grace” found in the seventeenth. The argument introduced by Dr. Chauncy to prove that οἱ λαμβάνοντες, *they who receive*, means simply the *persons on whom this grace is bestowed*, and not rather *believers*, is shown to be immaterial inasmuch as both parties admit that all such persons will be saved. The question is whether such persons are the same in number as “all men” strictly taken. Edwards then takes his stand on the whole course of thought from the closing verse of the preceding chapter. Great and exclusive privileges are ascribed there in many verses to *believers*. Does it follow from this that the free gift of Christ is to come upon all mankind, *believers and unbelievers*? This destroys the whole cogency of the reasoning. It is rather evident “that as by the offence of one, Adam, judgment to condemnation came upon all mankind *who were his seed*; even so by the righteousness of one, Jesus Christ, the free gift unto justification of life came upon all *his seed*, who are believers only, and who are the only persons of whom the apostle had been speaking in the premises.”¹¹ He follows also the example set by Dr. Chauncy, and makes a paraphrase of a part of the passage, only now writing a paraphrase which embodies Dr. Chauncy’s interpretations, and which contains a number of such inconclusive arguments as this (eleventh verse): “And not only so; but *believers* also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom *all men* have received the possibility of salvation.”¹²—that is, there is some *special* joy on their part for

¹¹ Ib. 149.¹² Ib. 154.

something which is no special but rather an altogether *universal* gift.

We pass on to the consideration of *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*. After showing the unfairness of several of Dr. Chauncy's statements, and the fact that he argues from possibility to probability, and from this probability to fact, Dr. Edwards disposes of several other chief assumptions of his. For example, Dr. Chauncy says that the "words *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* are evidently more loose and general in their meaning than the English words *eternity*, *everlasting*." He asks the question: "If it were not so how comes it to pass that *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* will not always bear being translated *eternity*, *everlasting*." Edwards replies: "By the same argument it may be proved that our words *eternity* and *everlasting* are more general than the Greek, for we speak of an everlasting talker." We notice the remark and its refutation because recent discussions repeat this ancient one. But when Edwards comes to the main argument, we see at once how poor a match in every respect Chauncy was for his antagonist. Edwards counts all the passages in the New Testament where the words under discussion occur. He classifies them. He subjoins a concordance. He proves that the words do correspond to our English words *eternity* and *eternal*, and that Greek and English are used now strictly and now loosely in the same manner. He shows that the presumption with which we come to the subject of future punishment is in favor of their strict use here; and he proves by parallel examples that the presumption is sustained. He follows Dr. Chauncy in all his windings, he confutes him everywhere. The refutation is complete. It has never been shaken since, nor improved upon, and it is safe to say it never will.

We have dwelt long upon this reply and yet we have only sketched it. We have been led to do this that all might

wisdom on this subject was born with the present generation. We turn now to the more important point and consider

2. *Edwards' Contributions to the Development of the Doctrine.*

(1.) *As to the justice of eternal punishment.*

We find in Dr. Edwards clearer definitions of justice than had been given by his predecessors. He distinguishes three kinds of justice. *Commutative* justice respects the equal exchange and restitution of property. With this our subject has nothing to do. "*Distributive* justice is the equal distribution of rewards and punishments, and it respects the *personal* rights and demerits of the person rewarded or punished. *General or public* justice respects what are called the rights of a community, whether a city, state, empire, or the universe. This kind of justice requires the public good. . . . it is the very same with general benevolence." "

"Now when we inquire whether the endless punishment of the wicked be consistent with justice the question is, whether to inflict an endless punishment on a man dying in impenitence, be an act of *distributive* justice, or be a treatment of him by his judge correspondent, and no more than correspondent, or proportioned, to his demerit, to his crimes, or to his moral conduct and personal character." " The question of the consistency of such punishment with *benevolence*, though deeply important, is another matter.

Having thus sharply defined the question, Dr. Edwards proceeds to answer it. A just punishment is one proportioned to the crime. Any punishment is such "when by the pain or natural evil of the punishment, it exhibits a

to this definition, for we think that Dr. Edwards has for a moment lost sight of his own distinctions. The furnishing of a motive to deter beholders from sin is a reason why benevolence may demand a given punishment, i. e., why it is just under the head of *public* justice; but it has nothing to do with personal demerit as such, and so does not enter into the *distributive* justice of a punishment. We should therefore reject the last clause of the definition. And we must reject, again, the apparent equivalence established between the ideas of "moral evil" and "ruinous tendency." Dr. Edwards commits at this point the error of emphasizing too strongly the governmental relations of God to the universe. "The chief evil of any crime," he says, "on account of which it principally deserves punishment, consists in the relaxation of the laws and government of the community in which the crime is committed." Hence he argues that it "deserves just so much punishment as, by restoring the proper tone of the laws, and proper strength to the government, will repair that damage." True, it deserves so much punishment, but it may conceivably deserve *more*, because it does not deserve it for that reason *as such*. Sin deserves punishment because it is not love to being-in-general; and being-in-general is a term vastly broader than "the community" as used in this place. Dr. Edwards held the doctrine of virtue taught by his father. According to this, God must hate sin equally as he loves holiness. He must hate it in proportion to its degree of heinousness, and that must be in proportion to its opposition to being-in-general. Now being-in-general is, first of all, God himself. Hence God must hate sin in proportion to its degree of opposition to himself, and he must express this hate, or punish, in the same proportion. Hence the ill-desert of sin, or the degree of punishment, may as truly be said to be independent of the "community," as dependent upon it, for it might exist, were there no community. Hence the desert of sin must

¹¹ Ib. 75.¹² Ib. 75.

be measured by referring to God himself. This President Edwards sought to do by declaring sin an infinite evil.

We have criticised President Edwards' reasoning principally because he neglected to consider both terms, and measured the degree of opposition to God in sin simply by the infinity of him to whom it was opposed. Dr. Edwards may have viewed the matter somewhat differently. He does not set forth the argument independently, so that we cannot say what modifications he would have made in it. But he says of those who hold that sin is an infinite evil, that "*all* they mean is, that it may be justly followed by an infinite evil." Such was certainly not President Edwards' meaning. According to him any sin against God was infinitely *heinous*, though it might be so with the infinity of a line and not of a superficies; and endless punishment being infinite in *duration*, is "no more than *proportionable* to the heinousness" of sin.²⁰ Dr. Edwards seems therefore to change somewhat the point of view of his father.²¹

Accepting, then, the definition of the infinite evil of sin as meaning that it deserves an endless punishment, how shall this be shown to be just? Dr. Edwards gives the negative argument—that it is not unjust—in the form of various replies to Chauncy. The positive argument advanced in the chapter devoted to the question may be thus expressed: Granting that it has already been established that "endless misery is the curse of the divine law; the inference is immediate and necessary," says Edwards, "that the endless misery of the sinner is a just punishment of his sin. It is impossible that a God of inviolable and infinite justice should threaten in his law an unjust punishment."²²

We desire to call attention to this argument, and to

¹⁹ *Ib.* 89.

²⁰ President Edwards' Works, v. p. 504 f.

²¹ He does not suppose himself to differ essentially, as is evident by his referring to President Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins. Works, i. p. 90.

²² Works of Dr. Edwards, i. 107.

express our opinion that it is a substantial contribution to the doctrine. That punishment for sin is just, that future punishment is just, are different truths from this, that *endless* future punishment is just. If President Edwards' argument fails, as we believe it does, what one will succeed? Who is to pretend to know all the elements entering into the moral desert of sin, and determine what pain expresses appropriately God's abhorrence of it? But God is just, and the Bible is his word. If the Bible declares endless punishment to be just, it *is* so. Auxiliary arguments may define the matter somewhat, and remove this or that difficulty; but the positive argument must, as it seems to us, always remain the biblical one.

Having thus taken an impregnable position, Dr. Edwards' further argument is only a putting in of the confirmatory evidence. The gospel is a scheme of mercy, not of justice. But if endless punishment be *unjust*, then it is no act of mercy on God's part, but only of the strictest justice to deliver man from it. The gospel is also a scheme which excites the *hope* of salvation. But if the endless punishment which it threatens be unjust, then it ought to assure us of the *certainty* of salvation. So the *promises* testify the same thing. God does not promise that he will not tyrannize over men, or injure them. He promises to deliver from what he might inflict without tyranny.

The second contribution of Dr. Edwards to the development of the doctrine relates to

(2.) *The relation of the goodness of God to eternal punishment.*

The second chapter of Dr. Edwards' book takes up the question "whether the damned deserve any other punishment than that which is conducive to their personal good."

play any lack of true goodness towards others, inasmuch as justice has not demanded anything more.

We know how Dr. Edwards would answer the question, and need not delay upon it longer than to say that he shows conclusively how irreconcilable the supposition is with the expressions of Scripture which describe punishment by such words as *curse, vengeance, great evil*, etc., etc. The supposition involves the doctrine, he says, that punishment is no evil, but a good; that the sinner experiences more grace and mercy in hell than while on earth; and fundamentally, since sin receives no true punishment, that sin is itself, *no moral evil*.

But now, is endless punishment, according to its true idea, consistent with divine goodness?

Many of the arguments against endless punishment may be dismissed with the remark that they are based on the idea that endless punishment is *cruel*. But, if it is cruel, it is unjust. So that such arguments from God's goodness are arguments from his justice, and when we have answered the objection that endless punishment is unjust, we have answered them.

This brings Dr. Edwards to "some general observations concerning the divine goodness," which contain the substance of his contribution to the doctrine. We read:

"The goodness of God is that glorious attribute by which he is disposed to communicate happiness to his creatures. This divine attribute is distinguished from the divine justice in this manner: the divine justice promotes the happiness of the universal system, implying the divine glory, by treating a person strictly according to his *own* character; the divine goodness promotes the same important object by treating a person *more favorably* than is according to his own character or conduct. So that both justice and goodness may and always do, as far as they are exercised, subserve the happiness of the universal system, including the glory of the Deity, or the glory of the Deity including the happiness of the universal system. As the glory of God and the greatest happiness of the system of the universe, and even of the created system, mutually imply each other; whenever I mention either of them, I wish to be understood to include in my meaning the other also. The declarative or the exhibited glory of God is a most perfect and most happy created system; and a most perfect and most happy created system is the exhibited glory of God; or it is the exhibition,

the manifestation, of that glory; as a picture is an exhibition of the man.

"That infinite goodness is in God, and is essential to his nature, is granted on all hands. *God is love.* This attribute seeks the happiness of creatures, the happiness of the created system *in general*, and of every individual creature *in particular*, so far as the happiness of that individual is *not inconsistent with the happiness of the system*, or with happiness *on the whole*. But if in any case, the happiness of the individual be inconsistent with the happiness of the system, or with the happiness of other individuals, so that by bestowing happiness on the first supposed individual, the quantity of happiness on the whole shall be diminished; in this case, goodness, the divine goodness, which is perfect and infinite, will not consent to bestow happiness on that individual. Indeed, to bestow happiness in such a case would be no instance of goodness, but of the want of goodness. It would argue a disposition not to increase happiness, but to diminish and destroy it."

The contribution contained in this passage is not one of essential thought, but only of new fulness and clearness of statement.

On this basis Dr. Edwards now reasons as follows: Pain inflicted in this life, and *some* punishment in the world to come (which it will be remembered Dr. Chauncy did not deny) are evidently for the good of the universe *on the whole*. "Why may not *endless* misery be so too, *provided* it be just?"²³ If it is an evil, and an infinite evil, may it not be overbalanced by the good resulting from it? Endless good arising from punishment is an infinite good. It does not then appear "but that all good ends which are answered by the temporary punishment of the damned, may be continued to be answered by their continual and endless punishment, if it be just."²⁴ Thus Dr. Edwards answers the objections by an irrefutable hypothesis. He thus compels his opponent to prove an universal proposition,—Endless punishment answers no good end.

He advances now to the positive argument that endless punishment is consistent with the divine goodness.²⁵ If good ends can be promoted by the infliction of a just punishment, as has been abundantly shown, then it is consistent with goodness to inflict it. But furthermore to *make* a law which is inconsistent with goodness, is just as contrary to goodness as to execute it. But here is the law threatening

²³ *Ib.* p. 124.

²⁴ *Ib.* p. 133 ff.

eternal punishment. Hence not only its existence but its execution must be consistent with goodness. And, finally, "the voice of reason is that divine goodness, or a regard to the general good, requires that sin be punished according to its demerit in some instances at least; otherwise God would not appear to be what he really is, an enemy to sin, and greatly displeased with it. It is certainly consistent with divine goodness that sin exists in the world, otherwise it would never have existed. Now, since sin is in the world, if God were never to punish it, it would seem that he is no enemy to it. Or, if he punish it in a far less degree than it deserves, still it would seem that his displeasure at it is far less than it is and ought to be. Nor, can mere words, or verbal declarations of the Deity, sufficiently exhibit his opposition to sin, so long as he uniformly treats the righteous and the wicked in the same manner. His character in [the] view of intelligent creatures will appear to be what it is holden forth to be in his actions, rather than what he, in mere words, declares it to be. But will any man say that it is conducive to the good order and happiness of the intellectual system, that God should appear to be no enemy, but rather a friend to sin?"

So far Edwards. We turn now to a pupil of his, the distinguished President of Yale College,

IV. TIMOTHY DWIGHT.

Dwight does not differ from his predecessors in any point of doctrine. He accepts with them the idea of probation, which, he says, "involves in its nature a close; infers a trial at that close, by which the character of the man who has gone through the probation, shall be finally settled, as good, or evil, as acquitted or condemned; and supposes, also, a reward suited to his conduct, and intended to recompense it with absolute propriety."¹⁰ Death terminates this probation." Man then enters on a state of reward or punishment," which will be rendered final

¹⁰ Ib. p. 140.

¹¹ Theology, iv. 404.

¹² Ib. 409.

¹³ Ib. 422.

by the confirmatory decision of the day of judgment.”

It should be remembered that the theology of President Dwight is presented to us in the sermons which he regularly preached before Yale College. He does not enter into formal controversy. He is also, doubtless, somewhat restricted in the range of his discussion by the youth of his auditory. This may be the explanation of his distinguishing peculiarity in the treatment of this doctrine,—I mean the absence of the speculative element. Dwight rests the proof of his doctrine solely on the Scriptures.

He assigns little weight, for example, to Edwards' argument that sin is an infinite evil, and deserves an infinite punishment. “It is not my design,” he says, “to deny this doctrine, nor to scrutinize the arguments by which it is usually supported. It is, however, but just to observe that neither the doctrine, nor the arguments, have appeared so satisfactory to the mind of others as they seem to have done to those by whom they have been alleged. *We know nothing of infinity but the fact that certain things are infinite. . . .* Concerning the nature of infinity, I discern no manner in which such minds as ours can argue at all. But in our discussions concerning infinity, we are prone, insensibly, to blend these two things together; and often are amused with words only, when we suppose ourselves to be employed about ideas.”²⁹

The same trait is seen in his discussion of the objection that the benevolence of God is irreconcilable with the idea of endless punishment. He does not give a positive answer, as his predecessors would have done, by showing that the benevolence of God demands such punishment. He might have done so. He accepted the doctrine that “love constituted the whole moral character of God,”³⁰ thus holding the doctrine common to all the New England school from Edwards down. He defined justice, “in an extended sense,” as “that which is right upon the whole, in all cases; that which is fittest and most useful to be

²⁹ Ib. 442.

³⁰ Ib. 461.

³¹ Ib. i. 196.

done; *that which will most promote the universal good.*"²² We even find, in other connections, some of the more speculative views of the subject briefly stated; as when he says: "It is evident that God, who is thus benevolent, *must* love the same disposition in his creatures, and hate the opposite one, unchangeably and forever. . . . His approbation at the final judgment is no other than a testimony of the pleasure which he takes in the moral character of those who are approved; and his disapprobation a similar testimony of the displeasure which he feels towards those who are condemned." And joining in with a strain of remark found in all these writers, though in a moderate way peculiar to himself, he says: "No good man, no angel, ever regretted that God was just. It is impossible that a virtuous being should not rejoice in the justice of God. The instinctive voice of all the virtuous universe is the voice of angels, and of the spirits of just men made perfect in the heavens crying: Alleluia! Salvation, and glory, and honor, and power, be unto the Lord, our God; for true and righteous are his judgments. Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord, God Almighty, just and true are thy ways, thou King of Saints."²³

All this, however, is incidental. It is enough to show that he was not blind or indifferent to the deep thoughts of theology. When he comes formally to treat the subject, he prefers, as his teacher Dr. Edwards did, to rest his case elsewhere. In answering the objection from the benevolence of God he prefers to say: "Were I to determine *a priori* what conduct the benevolence of God would prompt him to pursue; I should not hesitate to say that he would never permit either natural or moral evil to exist in the universe. . . . Very remote, however, from this scheme is the actual state of the world which we inhabit. . . . It is certain, therefore, that to permit the existence of sin, and to punish it with suffering, and that suffering often so excruciating as to terminate our present

²² Ib. i. 193.²³ Ib. i. 190 f.²⁴ Ib. i. 201.

life, are things consistent with the benevolence of God. No reason can be given why he who does these things here in a state of trial may not do the same things to a much greater extent in a state of retribution."²⁵ This does not prove his doctrine nor remove the difficulty. But it is a masterly stroke of both rhetoric and logic, whereby the difficulty is put where it belongs, in the very permission of sin. Were Dwight to put the same thought in modern phrase, he might say: "If, in face of the plain declarations of Scripture, you reject future punishment as warring with benevolence, you cannot stop short of the position of James and John Stuart Mill, and reject the doctrine of the existence of a benevolent God because of the undeniable existence of evil."

In like manner, to the objection that endless punishment is unnecessary, Dwight replies: "This cannot be said with propriety unless we know the whole state of the divine government, and all the necessities of those who are governed." Abhorrence excited by the state of the lost "may, for aught that appears, have a powerful, perhaps an indispensable efficacy to preserve virtuous beings throughout the universe in a course of endless obedience. The measures necessary in a moral government reaching through immensity and eternity cannot be contrived by such beings as we are."²⁶

This, then, is what of a speculative character Dwight's system contains. The positive proof is purely biblical, and presents no very new or striking features. The College President preaching to College students enters a little more thoroughly than others into the exegesis of the Greek text, and discusses *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος*. The definition of these words as denoting "the longest period of which the subject mentioned in each case is capable,"²⁷ is both happy and correct. The terms used in Scripture, he says, "leave, so far as I can discern, no hope of the termination of the sufferings of the impenitent."²⁸ The

²⁵ Ib. iv. 463.²⁶ Ib. iv. 464.²⁷ Ib. iv. 458.

idea of eternal sin is employed as a justification of eternal punishment, though derived from Rev. xxii. 15, and Eccl. ix. 10, the critical reading in Mark iii. 29 being still unknown. But this is not the sole ground of punishment," or of its eternity."

We shall pass next to Hopkins and the Hopkinsians.

ARTICLE VI.

THE REVISED VERSION OF ISAIAH XL.—LXVI.

BY THE REV. WILLIAM HENRY COBB, UXBRIDGE, MASS.

BEING a member of a Hebrew club which has been greatly interested for several years past in studying the second part of Isaiah, I offer some observations on this section of the Revision, while I should not venture to review any other portion.

It is often remarked of the revised Old Testament as a whole, that the changes are less numerous in proportion to its length than in the New Testament. This holds true of the section before us. A large minority of the verses are unaltered; five consecutive ones, for instance, in chapter xl. (12–16) and ten out of the thirteen in chapter lv. On the other hand, the next chapter has but one verse unchanged out of twelve; and chapter li. has but three out of twenty-three. The impression which many seem to have gained, that only a few changes have been made in the Old Testament, is entirely erroneous. A careful ex-

difficult to ascertain the number of variations; for, as Professor Mead has remarked,¹ opinions may differ as to how far a change should be analyzed. This practical difficulty is so great that I doubt if any two independent enumerations would agree throughout. My endeavor has been to reckon as only one change any word, or collocation of words, representing one distinct variation in the thought; and to notice all such variations, however slight. Thus, in xliii. 26, "set thou forth *thy cause*" (for "declare thou") is called a single change, since a part of it implies the whole; while, in verse 28, "I will make Jacob a curse" (for "have given Jacob to the curse") is counted as four changes, the steps being these:

1. I have given Jacob to the curse.
2. I have given Jacob to a curse.
3. I have made Jacob a curse.
4. I will make Jacob a curse.

No account has been taken of words italicized in the A. V. and printed in Roman letters in the R. V. Not to weary the reader with the details of each chapter, I give the following results: The chapters showing the greatest absolute and proportional number of changes are the sixty-sixth (71 changes in 24 verses), and the fifty-sixth (36 changes in 12 verses). Those showing the least are the fifty-fifth (6 minute changes in 13 verses), and the fortieth (34 changes in 31 verses). The first group of nine chapters contains 216 verses and has 371 changes; the second group of nine, 150 verses, 326 changes; the third group, 160 verses, 333 changes. Total, 526 verses, 1,030 changes, almost two changes for every verse. At this rate, reckoning by verses, the whole number of changes in the Old Testament would be 45,458; reckoning by pages, it would be 42,712. This last is a fairer way, for the average verse in our section is longer than the average verse in the Old Testament. Dr. Day, of the Revision Committee, informs me that, in some passages which he has taken at random,

¹ Roberts's Companion to R. V. of New Testament, p. 100.

the alterations average about one to a verse. Even thus, they would amount to nearly 24,000; a much larger number than the popular impression referred to supposes. I think it is safe to estimate them as exceeding 30,000.

We ought certainly to have expected a large number of changes, for Hebrew interpretation has made great strides within the present century, and Hebrew syntax, especially, may be called a recent science. The Revisers have evidently made thorough use of all attainable helps for elucidating their text. No one can fairly charge them with indolence, whatever their other faults. My examination of the second part of Isaiah has developed increasing respect for their painstaking care and admirable judgment. I shall now attempt to set forth some advantages of the new version, and then to suggest some amendments.

I. POINTS OF EXCELLENCE.

1. *Marginal Readings.* These prove a great convenience in the many passages of which the true sense is uncertain, the best authorities being divided. They show the caution of the Revisers and their freedom from dogmatism. Thus, in xl. 24, "they have not been planted;" margin, "scarce are they planted," and so on through the verse. In xlv. 24 the reader is informed of a difference of text, as so often in the revised New Testament. The A. V., "that spreadeth abroad the earth by myself," becomes "that spreadeth abroad the earth; who is with me?" margin, "Another reading is; *by myself*." We shall return to this subject of the text further on.

XLI. 2 is a difficult passage. Let us compare the two versions here, to illustrate the decided changes and the carefulness with which they are introduced. I place the marginal readings in brackets.

the nations before him, and made *him* rule over kings? he gave *them* as the dust to his sword, *and* as driven stubble to his bow."

R. V. Who hath raised up one from the east, whom he calleth in righteousness to his foot? [Or, *whom righteousness calleth to its foot*; or, *whom righteousness meeteth whithersoever he goeth*] he giveth nations before him, and maketh him rule over kings; he giveth them as the dust to his sword, as the driven stubble to his bow."

The mere English reader will appreciate Professor Huxley's satire on the flexibility of the Hebrew tongue, when he compares the new and the old renderings of lix. 19, and is told that both may be obtained legitimately from the text. For the margin of the R. V. agrees verbatim with the text of the A. V. (except "adversary," for "enemy"); but it differs from the text of R. V. as follows: Margin—"When the adversary shall come in like a flood, the spirit of the LORD shall lift up a standard against him." Text—"For he shall come as a rushing stream [Heb. *a stream pent in*], which the breath of the LORD driveth." And yet no fairer course could have been taken than to present both renderings, and admit the ambiguity of the original. The Semitic languages are far more pictorial, but far less precise, than the Aryan.

In the present state of the Pentateuch controversy, it is somewhat annoying to have no decision in such a case as xlii. 21 (text: "to magnify the law and make it honorable;" margin: "to make the teaching great and glorious"), but the former reading appears to have retained at least a numerical preponderance.

In xlvi. 14 the text reads (similarly to A. V.) "the Lord hath loved him; he shall perform his pleasure on **Bab-**

etc., "will make," etc.) while the perfect appears in the margin. The present tense would seem best, so (apparently) Driver, p. 117.²

In xlvi. 3 the A. V., "I will not meet *thee* as a man," becomes "I will accept no man," margin, "*make truce with, Heb. meet.*" The American Revisers have *spare* for accept, and omit *make truce with*. I prefer Alexander's explanation: "I shall encounter no man," i. e. none who can withstand me.

These specimens will perhaps sufficiently illustrate the marginal readings of the Revision.

2. *Grammatical Relations*. Among the Revisers were the well-known grammarian, Professor Davidson of Edinburgh, Professor Driver of Oxford, author of the valuable work on the Hebrew tenses, and Dr. Cheyne, who has written the foremost English commentary on Isaiah, which gives much attention to grammatical as well as to critical questions. Accordingly the internal evidence of the Revision shows that all such questions have been considered with care, though the published judgment of one or more of these scholars has often been overruled by the majority.

XLi. 28. A. V., "For I beheld and there was no man." R. V., "And when I look there is no man." This seems better than Driver's rendering (p. 221), "and suppose (if) I looked."

XLII. 21. A. V., "The LORD is well pleased for his righteousness' sake; he will magnify the law and make it honorable." R. V., "It pleased the LORD for his righteousness' sake to magnify," etc. The gain is manifest, however one settles the burning question between text and margin already referred to.

XLIII. 14. A. V., "I have sent to Babylon and have brought down all their nobles." R. V. preserves the change of tense, transporting us into the midst of the scene. "I have sent to Babylon, and I will bring down all of them as fugitives."

² The references are to ed. 2 of *The Use of the Tenses in Hebrew*.

XLVI. 1. A. V. begins in the present tense, changes to the imperfect, and returns to the present. R. V. preserves the present throughout, making the account more vivid, thus: "Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth; their idols are upon the beasts and upon the cattle; the things that ye carried about are made a load, a burden to the weary beast."

L. 10. This is greatly improved by a slight change in structure. A. V., "Who is among you that feareth the LORD, that obeyeth the voice of his servant, that walketh in darkness and hath no light? let him trust in the name of the LORD, and stay upon his God." R. V., "Who is among you that feareth the LORD, that obeyeth the voice of his servant? he that walketh in darkness and hath no light, let him trust," etc.

LIII. 2, 3. There is no need to transcribe so familiar a passage. The improvement appears in the choice of tenses, and the connection of clauses, especially at the close: "and as one from whom men hide their face he was despised, and we esteemed him not." The margin here reverts to the A. V.

LVIII. 4. A. V., "Ye shall not fast as ye do this day, to make your voice heard on high;" R. V., "Ye fast not this day so as to make your voice to be heard on high." Here also the margin accords with the A. V. The next verse contains a singularly adroit change, though so slight a one that it would pass unnoticed with many. A. V., "Is it such a fast that I have chosen? a day for a man to afflict his soul?" R. V., "Is such the fast that I have chosen? the day for a man to afflict his soul?" This indicates that the fast *is* instead of *is not* the day to afflict the soul,—and thus the verse becomes a clear allusion to the day of atonement, before the time of Ezra.

This, however, is a somewhat perilous rendering. It is singular that Cheyne, who espouses it, says nothing in defence of the article before *fast* and *day*. Nägelsbach and Delitzsch make both nouns anarthrous, but agree with

the R. V. against the Vulgate and the A. V. in the general sense of the passage.

LXIII. 19. A. V., "We are thine; thou never barest rule over them; they were not called by thy name." R. V., "We are become as they over whom thou never barest rule; as they that were not called by thy name."

LXV. 2. is very harsh in A. V., "which walketh in a way that was not good." R. V., "That is not good."

3. *Miscellaneous Cases.* "Peoples" for "people," in xli. 1; xliii. 4, 9; xlix. 1; lv. 4; lx. 2. This preserves the distinction between the people of God and other peoples. See the preface of the Revisers.

"Of old" instead of "from that time," in xliv. 8; xlv. 21. It would have been much better, I think, to keep the same, instead of "from of old," in xlviii. 3, 5, 7, 8. The Hebrew is precisely the same, *מִיָּמֵינוּ*, in all these places.

XLVII. 6. A. V., "polluted;" R. V., "profaned." So xlviii. 11; lvi. 2, 6.

XLIX. 20. A. V., "the children which thou shalt have, after thou hast lost the other." These twelve words represent only two in the original, *בְּנֵי שָׂדֵה*. R. V., "the children of thy bereavement."

L. 11. A. V., "sparks;" R. V., "fire-brands."

LI. 20. A. V., "wild bull;" R. V., "antelope."

LIV. 8. A. V., "in a little wrath;" R. V., "in overflowing wrath."

LVI. 3. A. V., "son of the stranger;" R. V., "stranger."

LVIII. 11. A. V., "make fat thy bones;" R. V., "make strong thy bones."

LIX. 4. A. V., "None calleth for justice, nor any pleadeth for truth;" R. V., "None sueth in righteousness, and none pleadeth in truth" (a very different thought).

LX. 5. A. V., "forces of the Gentiles;" R. V., "wealth of the nations." So lxi. 6., "nations" for "Gentiles."

LXIII. 1. A. V., "travelling;" R. V., "marching."

LXIV. 2. A. V., "as when the melting fire burneth;" R. V., "as when fire kindleth the brushwood."

LXVI. 8. A. V., "Shall the earth be made to bring forth in one day?" R. V., "Shall a land be born in one day?"

A few passages quite obscure in the old version are cleared up in the new.

XLI. 26. A. V., "The first shall say to Zion, Behold, behold them;" R. V., "I first will say unto Zion, Behold, behold them." The American Committee suggest here, "I am the first that saith," etc. Several other renderings have been proposed, but either of the above is a decided improvement on the A. V. It was quite an oversight in Dr. Chambers to criticize the English Revisers on this passage as follows: 'It is very hard to attach any meaning to the rendering of xli. 27, copied by the Revision from the A. V., 'The first shall say unto Zion, Behold, behold them.' But the Appendix renders sensibly," etc. The English Revisers have by no means copied the A. V.

XLVIII. 7, 8. The A. V. has the unintelligible translations, "even before the day when thou heardest them not;" "from that time that thine ear was not opened." The R. V. substitutes: "and before this day thou heardest them not;" "from of old thine ear was not opened."

LI. 14. A. V., "The captive exile hasteneth that he may be loosed, and that he should not die in the pit." R. V., "The captive exile shall speedily be loosed; and he shall not die and go down into the pit."

LVII. 6. A. V., "Should I receive comfort in these?" R. V., "Shall I be appeased for these things?"

LXV. 11, 12. A. V., "That prepare a table for that troop, and that furnish the drink offering unto that number. Therefore will I number you unto the sword." R. V., "That prepare a table for Fortune and that fill up mingled wine unto Destiny; I will destine you to the sword." Cf. the commentaries of Cheyne and Delitzsch *in loco*.

these things hath mine hand made, and so all these things came to be."

I pass next to suggesting some amendments to the Revised Version of the section before us.

II. PROPOSED CHANGES.

1. *Textual Notes.* I have already called attention to the marginal note on xliv. 24: "Another reading is, *by myself*." The only other passages containing precisely this designation, "another reading is," are: xli. 11; xlix, 5; lii. 2; lxiii. 9; and lxiii. 11. All these are cases of variation in the margin of our Hebrew Bibles.⁴ The note, "Or, as otherwise read," marks an extra-Massoretic interpretation, arising from a different vocalization of the Hebrew consonants. (See Revisers' preface.) It occurs only twice, lxiii. 14, and lxv. 1. A third form, "Or, according to another reading," is found only at lxiii. 6, one of the passages disputed between the Palestinian and Babylonian Jews. All these variations are agreed to, without comment, by the American Committee. It is otherwise when the English Revisers indicate their authority for a proposed change of text. This occurs as follows: xl. 6. ("Sept. and Vulgate"); xlix. 24 ("Vulgate and Syriac"); xlv. 21, and lxiv. 7 [Heb. 6] ("Some ancient versions"); xlix. 17, and liv. 9 ("Some ancient authorities"); lxvi. 17 and 18 ("Many ancient authorities"). One more passage stands by itself, lxiv. 5 [Heb. 4] where the English Committee note in the margin, "the text is probably corrupt," and the American Committee omit the note.

We have thus found eighteen textual annotations, of which just half are accepted and half rejected by the American Revisers. In the last case cited there are strong reasons for the decision of the American Committee. It is to be hoped that the Bible will remain a book for the

⁴ The last example disappears from the margin of the Baer and Delitzsch text, but is discussed on page 81 of that edition.

people, and as the popular mind is unfamiliar with the technical use of the word "corrupt," it will undoubtedly be puzzled and stumbled thereby. Here, at least, the bones of the skeleton should not have protruded. In the other cases neither committee appear to have been thoroughly self-consistent. Why, for example, should a reference to the versions have been inserted at xliv. 21 and not at xliii. 14? and why should the American Committee have objected to the former and not to the latter? for they do not simply strike out the *references* to ancient authorities, but the *renderings* also. These two passages are parallel; we have, in each case, a different vocalization of the same consonants, supported by ancient authority. Without entering fully into the vexed question of textual changes, I suggest that the facts brought out in the Revisers' preface warranted a departure from the Massora, on ancient authority, in certain extreme cases; but that the margin of the revised translation should no more have specified the *particular* authorities for a given reading than those against it. Every one knew that the Revisers would carefully weigh all questions legitimately before them; their results, not their processes, should have been given to the public. Hence the formula "another reading is" would have been proper in all these cases; and whenever such a reading failed to commend itself to the American Committee, they could have suggested its omission. But, as the matter stands, the average reader is put in possession of the light which makes darkness visible; his little learning proves a dangerous thing. What he needs to know is, that, according to the judgment of the majority of the Revisers, the reading of the text is *probably* right; that of the margin *perhaps* right. The attempt to establish

to insert the word *gnats*, it stood as an inferior rendering without any "perhaps."

2. *Words frequently occurring.*

(1) יהוה. When I found that the Revisers had retained LORD, I wondered with great admiration (in the archaic sense); for I had supposed the popularization of the name Jehovah, as the personal appellation of the true God, would be one of the great gains of the new version. As every one knows, this is the first of the suggestions on which the American Committee insist; it is to be devoutly hoped that it will be made effectual, at no distant day, throughout the English-speaking world. In the section under review, the various names of God form a most interesting subject of investigation, as reflecting the religious ideas of the period. For instance, in the sublime address to Cyrus at the beginning of chapter xlv., the thought is brought out distinctly that Jehovah is not to remain to the monarch an unknown God. The message is in effect: "As I have called thee by thy name, learn thou to call me by my name." The last part of verse 3 should be rendered, as I think: "that thou mayest know that I, who call thee by thy name, am Jehovah, the God of Israel." So Delitzsch takes it in his interpretation (Jes. 3 ed. S. 473, "Solches Siegesglück" u. s. w.). But how the sense is weakened, when we read, in the R. V., "that thou mayest know that I am the LORD, which call thee by thy name, even the God of Israel"! A curious ambiguity results from this rendering in lvi. 4—"Thus saith the LORD of the eunuchs," as though He were ruler of a class. The old version is preferable here, "Thus saith the LORD unto the eunuchs." "Concerning the eunuchs" would be better still.

(2) רוּחַ יְהוָה. This is rendered "spirit of the LORD" (with a small s), or "breath of the Lord." Why was not a distinction made between passages like xl. 7, "the spirit of the Lord bloweth upon it;" lix. 19, "a rushing stream which the breath of the Lord driveth," on the one hand,

and the passages on the other hand where the personal divine being is clearly intended? These are xl. 13; xlviii. 16 (his Spirit, the pronoun referring to Adhonay Jehovih); lix. 21 (my Spirit, the pronoun referring to Jehovah); lxi. 1, and lxiii. 14. Besides, the phrase "his Holy Spirit," occurs twice, lxiii. 10, 11, and is printed thus: "But they rebelled, and grieved his holy spirit;" "where is he that put his holy spirit in the midst of them?" I cannot but regard this as an obstacle to the recognition of the unity of the Old and New Testaments.

(3) אִיִּים. *Islands* appears inadequate; *far off coasts*, or *coast-lands*, as in the margin of lix. 18, R. V., would be preferable. "A distant region reached by water" seems to be the meaning in the passages referred to, which are as follows: xli. 1, 5; xlii. 4, 10, 12; xlix. 1; li. 5; lix. 18; lx. 9; lxvi. 18.

(4) שָׁרָה and שָׁרָה. I find no good authority for the renderings *sing* and *singing*. As they often denote other than musical sounds, the word *shout* seems generally a better equivalent. The Revisers give *singing* for שָׁרָה except in lxiii. 14, where *rejoicing* is substituted. שָׁרָה is translated *sing* except in lxi. 7, "they shall rejoice in their portion." In xlii. 10, שָׁרָה, both noun and verb, is well rendered *sing* and *song*; hence some other term should be found for שָׁרָה in the next verse, even if that may be properly rendered *sing*. The synonym שָׁחַח, ἀπαξ λεγόμενον, rendered *shout*, occurs here. I suggest the following for the whole clause: "let the inhabitants of Sela exult, let them cry out from the top of the mountains."

(5) הִנֵּה and הִנֵּה exactly correspond to the English *lo* and *behold*, the dissyllable being the more common in each language. I would give these respective renderings, except perhaps in lxiv. 9; "behold, look, we beseech thee, we are all thy people." (Even here *lo* might answer; cf. Cheyne.) The Revisers translate both words by *behold*, except in xlix. 12, where *lo* (twice) represents הִנֵּה. The A. V. gives

translation, but I think the above changes came properly within the scope of the Revision.

3. *Grammatical Relations.*

XL. 30. For "Even the youths shall faint," read, "Though youths may faint." (Ewald's Grammar, English ed., p. 283.)

XLI. 6. Change "they helped" and "every one said," to present tense. (Driver, as above, p. 44.)

XLII. 6. For "and will hold thy hand, and will keep thee," read, "that I may hold thy hand and keep thee." (Ewald, p. 256.)

XLIII. 8. For "Bring forth the blind people that have eyes," read, "Bring forth a people blind, although they have eyes." (Driver, pp. 227, 228.) In the next verse, change "let all the nations," etc., to a simple statement, "all the nations gather together, and the peoples assemble." (Driver, p. 30, n. 3.)

XLIV. 20. A. V. and R. V., "He feedeth on ashes; a deceived heart hath turned him aside." Driver (p. 233, obs. 2): "Feeding on ashes, a deceived heart hath turned him astray," i. e., while he feedeth on ashes. So lvii. 19, "Creating the fruit of the lips, Jehovah saith, Peace, peace." I think these suggestions of Professor Driver might well be adopted even in a revision.

XLVIII. 8. A. V., "I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously,"—a proof-text for the divine fore-knowledge. R. V., "I knew that thou didst deal," etc. Driver, p. 51, defends the A. V., and I see not why it should be abandoned. The imperfect may, however, express here a permanent quality; in which case we should render, as Delitzsch, "I knew that thou art utterly treacherous."

XLVIII. 21. For "They thirsted not when he led them through the deserts," read, "They thirsted not whom he led through deserts." (So Ewald, p. 219 and n. 1.)

XLIX. 23. For, "and they that wait for me shall not be ashamed," read, "on whom those who wait shall not be ashamed." Similarly, Cheyne, Delitzsch.

LIII. 7. "He was oppressed, yet he humbled himself."

Driver, p. 229, suggests "He was oppressed, he being (already) afflicted." Perhaps the abruptness of the Hebrew may be imitated thus: "Oppressed and afflicted he, yet he opened not his mouth."

LIV. 6. For "when she is cast off," read "she shall not be rejected." (Ewald, p. 206.)

LXIII. 9. A. V. and R. V. text: "In all their affliction he was afflicted," following the Q'ri. R. V., margin, translates the K'thibh thus: "In all their adversity he was no adversary." The latter is adopted by Dr. Kay in the Speaker's Commentary, and by Dr. Moore in the American edition of Lange. They object to the former rendering that if לְצָרָה were said of Jehovah, it would mean, not he was afflicted, but he was hard pressed (*ἐν ἀπορίᾳ*). Following this hint I suggest that we read the K'thibh, and render it thus: "In all their straits he was not straitened, but the angel of his presence saved them." Cf. Isa. lix. 1; 2 Cor. vi. 12.

4. Miscellaneous Cases.

XI. 19. "The graven image, a workman melted it." Appendix: "omit graven." The American Revisers certainly did well to avoid melting a *graven* image.

XLI. 2 *fn.* Despite Delitzsch's criticism, I think Nägelsbach has this essentially right. I would translate: "his sword maketh them as dust, his bow as driven stubble."

XLI. 15. If we put "make of thee," for "make thee," we shall show the English reader that Israel is to be, not to have, a threshing sledge.

XLIV. 10. "Or molten a graven image?" Cf. xl. 19, above.

XLIV. 28. "And to the temple, thy foundation shall be laid." The Hebrew is simply וְיִסַּד הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, and the whole, including the previous clause, may be rendered thus: "saying also of Jerusalem, She shall be built, and the

Cheyne deserved a place in the margin, if not (as I think) in the text. "Let them now rise up and save thee — the dividers of the heavens, the star-gazers, who every month give report of what shall come upon thee."

XLIX. 21. Put margin, "who hath borne me these?" in place of text. (Professor H. P. Smith, O. T. Student, Oct., 1885, p. 64.)

LI. 17. "The bowl of the cup of staggering" seems inelegant. Better, "the goblet-cup of stupefaction" ("goblet-cup" from Cheyne; "stupefaction" from Riggs, Suggested Emendations). I would justify this change even in a revision, for I think the phrase "the bowl of the cup" conveys no idea.

LII. 2. Instead of "arise, sit thee down," which reminds one of the fabled king of France, or, "arise, sit on thy throne" (American Committee), read "arise, take thy place."

LII. 15. I think the margin, "startle," or the word suggested by Dr. Riggs and others, "astonish," should take the place of "sprinkle."

LVIII. 13. Read, "If thou turn away thy foot from doing thy pleasure on the Sabbath, my holy day." So Riggs, Suggested Emendations.

LXIII. 15. For "yearning of thy bowels" read "multitude of thy mercies."

I remark in conclusion that I believe a farther revision of the new version to be entirely impracticable. I regard the present Revision as a great improvement upon King James's, but I hope the time when an equally competent committee shall be able to produce a new English *translation* of the Scriptures, may not be more than a century distant.

ARTICLE VII.

IS DESERTION A SCRIPTURAL GROUND OF
DIVORCE?

BY THE REV. CHARLES L. MORGAN, MOLINE, ILL.

I. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE.

UPON the interpretation of a single passage in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians depends our answer to this question. If, when Paul says in 1 Cor. vii. 15, "The brother or the sister is not under bondage (*δεδούλωται*) in such cases," he means to affirm, that when a believing wife is deserted by her consort, or *vice versa*, the two are no longer bound by the marriage vow, but are free to marry again, then he certainly sanctions another ground of divorce besides that which Christ, in his Sermon on the Mount and on one other occasion, seems explicitly to affirm as the *only* ground; viz., *fornication*. The right interpretation of this passage is of prime importance to the interests of morals and good government. Our inquiry may well begin with a brief historical survey.

In Christ's time the permission of Moses (Deut. xxiv. 1), that if a man found "uncleanness" in his wife, he might give her a writing of divorcement, and let her go, and "she may go and be another man's wife," was so freely interpreted by the school of Hillel, that divorce had become practically dependent upon the changing mood and taste of the husband. Although the school of Sham-mai held that the "uncleanness" specified by Moses must involve moral guilt, yet the view of Hillel so far prevailed, that the poor cooking of a dinner, the going from home without a veil, any bodily affliction, or even the preference of the husband for a more attractive woman, were justified by the rabbis as valid grounds of divorce.

Nor, as illustrated perhaps in the woman of Samaria, was this putting away confined to the act of the husband. It was not uncommon for the Jew of Christ's day to excuse the laxity of his people, in this respect, on the plea of the peculiar privileges of God's chosen people.

Of the facility of divorce in the Empire there is copious evidence. To no evil do historians attribute greater responsibility for the fall of the Republic, than to the perfect freedom with which wives and husbands were shifted at will, or even exchanged. Seneca mentions "illustrious and noble women who reckoned time, not by the number of the consuls, but by the number of their successive husbands." Into such disrepute had the married state fallen, and so emptied of its ancient dignity had the family relation become, that Augustus found it necessary, as a measure of state, to offer a bounty to those who would take wives and rear children. We gain some conception of the remarkable influence of the gospel in this fact, therefore, that, though it was the slow work of centuries, yet by mediæval times Christ's law of divorce had become a part of the civil code of every Christian people. This gigantic vice, which struck at the very root of social order by destroying the family, was *curbed* and brought into subjection to the law of Christ. This vast change was wrought on the basis of that interpretation of Scripture which regards Christ's command as declaring a true marriage indissoluble, i. e., permitting *no* final divorce with liberty of remarriage, so long as both husband and wife are alive. Separations, without liberty of remarriage, were granted for adultery, and for whatever other grounds the church deemed fitting. These were allowed on the supposed authority of Paul, "the brother or the sister is

hence it was urged by the church, that Christ, when he declared fornication to be the only ground of divorce, contemplated the just punishment of the guilty party, and so an end to the union. The denial of remarriage to both parties was also based upon the omission of such permission by both Mark and Luke, who quote Christ thus: "Every one that putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery;" and also upon Paul's words in Rom. vii. 2, 3, "For the woman that hath a husband is bound by law to her husband while he liveth," etc. The correctness of this interpretation was open to question. Augustine, in his later writings, expressed some doubt as to his earlier conclusions on this subject. In the Eastern church the view finally prevailed that separation for adultery constituted a final divorce, with liberty for the innocent party to remarry at once. In the Western church there was deemed to be one apparent exception to the rule of indissolubility. This was in the case of a Christian deserted by an unbelieving consort. Such desertion, in virtue of Paul's command, "a brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases," was deemed by the Western church an abrogation of a marriage which, from the outset, had possessed no sacramental sanction; hence the deserted party, as though never married, was permitted to contract a new alliance. This case was, in reality, no exception to the *rule* of the indissolubility of a *true* marriage, since no true and fixed marriage, "in the Lord," was deemed to have *ever* been consummated. This rule was reaffirmed in the Canons of Trent, and in the Syllabus of Pius IX. in 1864. It should be said, however, that the *impediments* to a true marriage, as set forth by the church, were so many as to render a verdict of nullity almost as easy to procure as a modern divorce.

Coming to the Reformation era, we find Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Zwingli, and Bucer, all advocates of the view that not only (1) was adultery declared by Christ a valid ground of final divorce, with privilege of

remarriage to the innocent party, but (2) that *desertion* was sanctioned by Paul as in *all cases* a righteous ground for the same final divorce with privilege of remarriage. Protestantism, therefore, in contrast with Rome, affirmed the principle that a true marriage is *not* indissoluble, but may be dissolved with privilege of remarriage, on *either* of the *two* grounds, adultery or *desertion*. With the exception of England, Protestant communities generally adopted this view. In Scotland, since 1573, absolute divorce, with privilege of remarriage, has been granted for adultery or desertion.

In England, although many efforts were made, of which Milton's was the most notable, to secure greater license, yet, until 1857, the law remained substantially the same as that of the Roman church, holding marriage to be indissoluble for any cause. During all this time, however, while the *law* remained fixed, divorces were repeatedly granted by special acts of Parliament on the ground of adultery. In 1857 a law was passed, providing for a complete divorce for the husband on the ground of the wife's adultery, and for the wife on the ground of the husband's adultery enhanced by aggravating circumstances, such as cruelty, etc. For desertion, cruelty, and all other causes save adultery, only judicial separation *a mensa et thoro* is permitted in England. The divorce on the ground of adultery is, however, *final*, permitting remarriage. In the United States, the variety of grounds on which a final divorce may be secured is only limited by the variety of iniquity. The State statutes range from the denial of *all* divorce, as in South Carolina, or the recognition of but *one* ground, adultery, as in New York, to the easy divorces of Connecticut, whenever "the happiness of the petitioner" is shown to be destroyed and "the end of the marriage relation frustrated," or, as in Indiana, where it may be allowed "for any other cause for which the *court shall deem it proper* that a divorce should be granted."

It is to be noted, then, that the stringent view of the Roman church, permitting no final dissolution of a true marriage, which was changed by the Protestant Reformers to the permission of a final divorce on either of the two grounds, adultery or desertion, has degenerated still further in the United States, to the permission of divorce for *any* cause which a civil court may deem sufficient. As a result of such degeneracy the ratio of divorces to marriages in New England stands as one to ten; in Connecticut, reckoning simply the American population, as one to eight; and in Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, with other Western States, the same lax tendency is marked. In view of the facts, it can hardly be a question, that, if marriage possesses any such sanctity as that with which Scripture invests it, which Christ avowed for it, and which history awards it as the corner-stone of political stability and moral growth, then it becomes the churches of America to ask whether they have not slept while the enemy has sown tares; and whether a mistaken interpretation of Scripture has not opened the way to a vast evil. The general admission of *desertion* as a valid ground of divorce opens not only one of the easiest and most available methods, but one which in itself possesses no such peculiar, and inherently disrupting, nature as that which distinguishes *fornication*. Regarded from a legal or humanitarian point of view merely, the reasons for granting a divorce for desertion are less forcible than for many other grounds. That which gives chief weight to the explicit commands of Scripture is an inherent reasonableness, appealing to the conscience. The fact that desertion no more possesses such inherent reasonableness than many other grounds, affords a strong presumption that it is *not* sanctioned by Scripture. It becomes every Christian pastor and teacher, therefore, carefully to review the Scripture on this point, before assenting to a ground which has opened the door to widest abuse.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST.

To the right interpretation of Paul's words in 1 Cor. vii. 15, "not under bondage in such cases," the first essential is the clearest apprehension of Christ's teaching. We may fairly assume that no interpretation of Paul, consistent with even the broadest view of inspiration, should conflict with the explicit declarations of Christ, provided we can attain reasonable certainty as to what those declarations are and mean. Upon two occasions Christ referred to divorce. The first instance occurs in his Sermon on the Mount, as recorded in Matt. v. 31, 32; the second, a few days before his final entry to Jerusalem, recorded in Matt. xix. 1-12; Mark x. 2-12; and Luke xvi. 18. In his Sermon on the Mount, Christ contrasts the righteousness of his kingdom with that legislation which had prevailed, by God's permission, among those of "old time." Third, in the order of topics, stands divorce; "It was said also, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: but I say unto you, that every one that putteth away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, maketh her an adulteress: and whosoever shall marry her when she is put away committeth adultery" (Matt. v. 31, 32). Remembering the extreme laxity that prevailed on this subject among the Jews of Christ's day, it seems certain that Christ here rebukes the wide-spread polygamy by contrasting the law, which in the "old time" God permitted "for the hardness of your hearts," with that divine law, which was at the beginning, and which shall prevail in a kingdom of righteousness. Christ's second recorded mention of divorce was his reply to a wily question of the Pharisees, put with direct intent to entrap him. "Is it lawful," they asked, "for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" "Have ye not read," replied Christ, "that he which made them, from the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and

shall cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh? So that they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder" (Matt. xix. 3, 6). To this the Pharisees plausibly rejoined, "Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorcement, and to put her away?" "He saith unto them: Moses for your hardness of heart suffered" (not commanded, as you affirm, but *suffered*) "you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it hath not been so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery." It is to be noticed, first, that Christ adds, here, to what he had previously said, in the Sermon on the Mount, this, that not only does the man so putting away his wife, save for fornication, cause her to commit adultery in case she remarries, but he *also* commits adultery if *he* marries another woman. To this, Mark's record adds, that the wife, "if she herself shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery" (Mark x. 12). Neither Mark nor Luke, however, refer to the one exception, mentioned by Matthew, of fornication.

The force of Christ's teaching here must depend on the meaning of the terms he uses. What *is* the "putting away" spoken of? Does it signify a putting away with privilege of remarriage, or refer to any separation? The fact that the Jews, whom Christ addressed, gave full liberty of remarriage to any wife or husband who had been "put away," has satisfied some that Christ here forbade *only* such putting away as involved the permission of remarriage. Opposed to this view, however, stand the words of Christ, declaring the union of husband and wife in one flesh to be a bond more sacred than that which unites the child to the parent; Therefore "shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." These words convey no permission for *any sort* of separa-

tion, either *final*, with liberty of remarriage, or a separation merely *a mensa et thoro*. On the other hand, the very fact that any putting away of wife or husband was counted by the Jews as opening the way for remarriage, forcibly argues that Christ both intended to condemn, and *did*, in his prohibition, emphatically condemn, any and every sort of *separation* of husband and wife. That any "putting away" involved in Christ's thought the possibility of remarriage, and that he therefore condemned *all* "putting away," is further indicated by the fact that, in each of his allusions to the matter, he connects with such "putting away" the possibility of remarriage.

Again, what does the "fornication" signify, which Christ affirms to be the only ground of "putting away"?

Both by ancient and the best modern exegetes, *πορνεία*, translated *fornication*, is held to be substantially equivalent to *μοιχεία*, adultery, and to signify the sexual intercourse of the wife with another than her husband. This crime was punishable, under the Levitical law, with death, but this penalty had ceased to be inflicted long before Christ's time. Christ's teaching, then, we may sum up as follows:

1. Save for the cause of fornication, no man may put away his wife.
2. The wife may not put away her husband, save (though Christ does not explicitly say this, yet consistency compels us to infer it) for reason of fornication. Favoring this inference that for *one* cause the wife may put away her husband, although it is not allowed explicitly by Christ, there is the argument that the wife should possess the same privilege with the husband. Opposed to the inference stands the fact, that the fornication of a wife was, under Jewish law, a much graver sin than the fornication of a husband, and more severely punished.

A like difference is recognized in English law to-day, which requires that the adultery of the husband, to warrant divorce, must be of an aggravated nature. That there is an obvious difference between the two cases has

been generally recognized; and yet the language of Mark, which applies precisely the same prohibition to both husband and wife, seems to put them in this respect upon equal footing, and we may reasonably infer that for one ground, *fornication*, the wife may also put away her husband.

3. He who puts away his wife, or she who puts away her husband, saving for fornication, and *marries again* (during the other's life), commits adultery. The language of Mark, "committeth adultery *against her*," indicates that the remarriage contemplated as involving adultery, was a marriage during the other's life.

4. Whoever *marries* the one so put away, during the other's life, *commits adultery*.

5. That the innocent party of a pair divorced for reason of fornication, may remarry, may be presumed, though Christ does not say it. This presumption the Roman church denies, holding any *true* marriage absolutely indissoluble, save by death. Favoring it, is the fact that Christ only declares that one guilty of adultery who remarries, after putting away his wife for *other* ground than fornication; hence the inference of *liberty* to remarry for the innocent party justly divorced *on* that ground. Whether the guilty party, after divorce, may remarry, Christ does not say. The expectation would seem granted that the civil law would not sanction the remarriage of the guilty party, and that such prohibition would be a part of the penalty for their crime.

The substance of Christ's teaching may be succinctly put into a sentence: Let no man *put away* his wife, and let no wife put away her husband, *for any cause, save fornication*.

This "putting away" may be justly interpreted as including both final divorce and the separation *a mensa et thoro*.

away." But, while Christ gives no sanction to a state of separation without divorce, that fact does not argue guilt to the innocent party who is deserted. The existence of such a state of separation, as a sad and helpless result of one party's desertion, is fully recognized by Paul, but neither Paul nor Christ can be fairly interpreted as advocating or commending any such separation brought about by *mutual* consent.

If now, we have rightly apprehended the letter and spirit of Christ's teaching on this subject, two further questions arise:—

First. Granting that Christ sanctioned but *one* ground of divorce, did he intend that sanction as a practical guide and rule for his day and all the future, or, did he simply present an *ideal* standard, toward which men were to approximate? In the latter opinion Dr. Lange and Dr. Schaff, with others, rest. They compare the command respecting divorce, with the commands, "Swear not at all," and "Whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also," and infer that all alike are set forth by Christ as the ideal rather than practical rule. If this conclusion be true, then the question is naturally suggested, Did Christ, when he condemned the old *permission*, given for the hardness of the people's heart, and proclaimed a new law, contemplate and sanction precisely the *same laxity* for the practical rule of his followers in the future, as that which he so forcibly condemns? That view would seem to empty Christ's commands of meaning and force.

Second. Is it possible that Christ, in forbidding all save *one* ground of divorce, so failed to contemplate the *emergencies* which would arise in his kingdom, such, e. g., as the desertion of a believer by an unbelieving consort,

on any subject, and especially one with which he deals very explicitly, but would make all his doctrine subject to apostolic revision. We must conclude, therefore, that, unless there can be found in other passages of Scripture such irreconcilable contradiction of what seems the explicit teaching of Christ as to warrant the serious doubt of our interpretation, Paul will be found to agree with Christ in *sanctioning* but one ground of divorce and only unavoidable separation.

III. THE DOCTRINE OF PAUL.

We begin our inquiry respecting Paul's teaching on divorce, with the fair presumption that it will conform to that of Christ. The words of Christ, carefully interpreted, must of course be authoritative and final, unless the teaching of the apostles conflicts so irreconcilably as to indicate that our interpretation of Christ must be at fault. What then is the fact respecting the reconciliation of Paul's statements with our interpretation of Christ as forbidding not only all divorce, but all voluntary separation, save for the one ground of adultery? Briefly, and in general, this: It is *possible* to interpret Paul's words, when considered by themselves alone, to sanction *desertion* as a second ground of divorce; but, when taken in connection with Christ's words, that interpretation creates a conflict, which only an unwarrantable exegetical strain can reconcile. On the other hand, there is a simple and natural interpretation of Paul's language, which perfectly accords with what we have seen to be the simple and natural interpretation of Christ's teaching. To show this, we will briefly trace the course of thought by which Paul leads up to the words, "a brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases." Paul opens the general subject of marriage, in his first letter to the Corinthians, with a preface stating that he now speaks "concerning things whereof ye wrote unto me." The nature of these "things" we learn from what follows. With respect to the unmarried he *commends*

celibacy, but at the same time advises marriage for whom it is necessary, and emphasizes the duties of the married life. It should be noted also that Paul's commendation of celibacy, to those for whom it was possible, was justified on account of the "present distress" (1 Cor. vii. 27). But if, in some circumstances, the single state is preferable to the married, the question would naturally arise in the minds of many of the married, Is it not better, and will it not advance our own and Christ's interests, for us to separate? It would not have been strange if there were some in Paul's day, since they exist in our own, whom a mistaken *assurance* of Christ's immediate coming persuaded to forsake wife and children, to engage in exclusively Christian work. The writer had occasion, a few years since, to counsel the obligation of home duties to an illiterate person whose unbalanced zeal was leading him to leave his family in dependence on charity while he went out ignorantly to preach Christ. Paul must have counselled many such. Or, again, husbands and wives of incompatible nature may have asked instruction from the church at Corinth respecting their separation, and these inquiries may have come in turn to Paul for answer. But, however varied the circumstances which suggested the question on this subject, here is Paul's answer: "But unto the married I give charge, *yea* not I, but the Lord, That the wife depart not from her husband (but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or else be reconciled to her husband); and that the husband leave not his wife" (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11). This advice *may* have had in view only those couples of whom both husband and wife were believers. The fact that in the next paragraph, under the designation of "the rest," Paul speaks to couples, of whom one party is an unbeliever, might argue, that his preliminary advice was designed exclusively for believers, but that conclusion is by no means certain. When Paul says that it is not he, but the *Lord*, who commands with reference to the married, he is understood by the best

authorities to refer to the commands of Christ recorded for us in the Gospels. These commands of Christ, however, were not addressed exclusively to believers, but notably on the second occasion to the Pharisees. In quoting Christ's authority, therefore, Paul probably addressed an audience as wide and varied, and certainly he would not *limit* the obligation of Christ's command. The probability is strong, therefore, that Paul first gives the authority of Christ in his general command to all married persons: "To the married I give charge, *yea* not I, but the Lord, That the wife depart not from her husband (but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or else be reconciled to her husband), and that the husband leave not his wife."

An important question here arises as to the meaning of the word *χωρίζομαι*, here translated "to depart." Does Paul mean "let not the wife absolutely separate herself with a possibility of remarriage" (let not the wife divorce herself), or does he mean "let her not separate from her husband's household, even though the marriage bond continues?" The argument for each of these interpretations is so strong as to create the probability that both ideas are included, and all separation forbidden. His appeal is to Christ's command, which, as we have seen, forbade any sundering of the marriage relation save for reason of fornication. But all separation, in the Jewish practice of the day, involved the liberty of remarriage, hence Christ forbade *all* separation or putting away, and the probability seems strong that, in strict accord with, and on the authority of Christ, Paul does the same. A further indication that the separation here forbidden by Paul was a separation which would be understood as opening the way to remarriage, is the specific command which Paul now adds "but and if she depart" (if for any unfortunate reason a separation occurs, if the lesser sin of separation is committed) "let her remain unmarried, or" (what is by all means preferable) "else be reconciled to her hus-

band." It is noticeable here, that Paul makes no mention of the one ground of separation sanctioned by Christ. Possibly the general acquiescence in the disruption of a union which such crime involved, rendered it unnecessary to allude to it. It is also to be noted, that Paul's *recognition* of the unfortunate fact of separation, and his command to those so separated, cannot be fairly interpreted as the least *sanction* of such a state. He simply views it as a calamity to be retrieved as soon as possible, and adds a command to avert a worse.

Now Paul passes to some peculiar cases, upon which his advice has been sought, and which he styles "the rest." "But to the rest say I, not the Lord." Paul reverts now from Christ's command to his own judgment, since, with respect to the cases he now considers, Christ did not particularize. We are not to forget, however, that when Paul appeals to himself, he appeals to an *apostle*, to one who speaks with authority, and who, as he says in the same chapter, believes himself to "have the Spirit of God." It is not without authority, therefore, that he now speaks to "the rest" who, as the context shows, are the believing husbands and wives, of unbelievers. "If any brother hath an unbelieving wife, and she is content to dwell with him, let him not leave her. And the woman which hath an unbelieving husband, and he is content to dwell with her, let her not leave her husband. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother; else were your children unclean, but now are they holy." Here the word signifying separation is *ἀφίημι*, instead of *χωρίζομαι*, but there seems no reason for distinguishing a different meaning. This passage reflects some light on the nature of the separation which Paul speaks of in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11.

such a husband and wife as are now referred to, there would exist evidently the strongest possible temptation to separate. The Christian faith of the believer must have suffered incessant annoyance, if not persecution, from the views and habits of the unbelieving consort which would present arguments for separation, beside which the most of our modern improvisations would be weak. But to the question respecting such, shall they separate? Paul answered, no! Notwithstanding the inconvenience, and incompatibility, and possibly suffering, of such pagan contact, yet, if the unbelieving one consents to remain in union, the believer is *not* to seek a separation. But now arises this new case: "If the unbelieving departeth (*χωρίζεται*), let him depart, the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God hath called us in peace." "Not under bondage" to what? This is the all important question.

Let us review. Paul has repeated Christ's command to *all the married* that there be *no* separation. Then he has advanced his own command respecting believers married to unbelievers. They also are to *maintain their union*: there is to be no voluntary separation, and, if compulsory separation occurs, the parties are not to marry again but to seek the earliest possible reconciliation. But if these are the commands, then what shall that believer do, whose unbelieving consort refuses to remain in union and departs? How can a believer maintain a union in such a case unless willing to deny the faith? Am I bound, such an one would ask, to follow the unbeliever and insist on maintaining the union, for the sake of obeying Christ's command to the married? No, replies Paul, a brother or sister is not bound in such cases. "Let him depart," for such insistence upon union could result only in strife, "but God hath called us in peace." Or if any one thinks, that to insist on following the deserter might result in the unbeliever's salvation, consider the great risk, "For how knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy

husband? or how knowest thou, O husband, whether thou shalt save thy wife?" Is not this the thing, therefore, which Paul says the believer is "not bound" to do; viz., to *follow*, and *insist on union* with, such an unwilling and deserting consort? What but strife could result! "But God hath called us in peace." The law of Christ commanding that there be *no separation*, you are "not under bondage" to observe, where, as in such a case, it is inconsistent and impossible. This interpretation of the "not under bondage," answers every just demand which can be made upon the words. So far from conflict with what we have seen to be Christ's law, this interpretation stands in natural and perfect agreement. It gives no sanction to a state of separation, save that which is necessitated by the guilty act of desertion. Paul simply says that, *when deserted*, the law of Christ does not require you to jeopardize your faith and peace by insisting upon an unwilling union. If, on the other hand, we accept the view held by the Reformers, and widely sanctioned to-day, and urge that "not under bondage" signifies, that the one forsaken is not bound by the *marriage tie*, but is free to remarry, then we conflict: (1) with Paul's direct command, given on Christ's authority, that, if a separation occur, the parties are to "remain *unmarried*;" (2) with the specific words of Christ affirming that he who puts away his wife, for any cause save fornication, and marries another, commits adultery, and that if she marries another, she commits adultery; (3) with two other utterances of Paul, the one in verse 39 of the same chapter, and the other in Rom. vii. 2, in both of which Paul speaks of the wife as being bound by the law "so long time as her husband liveth; but if the husband be *dead*, she is free to be married to whom she will." "So then if, while the husband liveth, she be joined to another man, she shall be called an adulteress." In view of the conflict entailed by such an interpretation of the words "not under bondage" as sanctions the right of divorce on the ground of desertion, in view of the necessity it also entails of emptying Christ's

words of their natural meaning, and in view, again, of the vast evils which history shows to have grown out of such interpretation,—are we not fully warranted in our conclusion, that it is altogether unjustifiable? Paul does not affirm that the marriage bond is rendered void by desertion; he does not sanction the dissolution of the bond on that ground; and so adds *no second* ground of divorce to the *single* one affirmed by Christ.

Christ set his seal to the sanctity of a marriage union which admits of no disruption, save for that single cause which, by its very nature, destroys the sacred inviolate unity of husband and wife in one flesh. Paul implicitly follows Christ's precept. He also forbids all separation. He adds his command to those who are in a compulsory state of separation because forsaken. This therefore we are to regard as the Scriptural law binding upon all Christ's people. Only in accordance with that law has the minister of Christ liberty to invoke the divine blessing upon the nuptial rites. Into accord with that law we are to seek, to the limit of our influence, to bring public sentiment and the laws of the state.

ARTICLE VIII.
NEW THEOLOGY.¹

BY THE REV. JOHN E. TODD, D.D., NEW HAVEN, CONN.

WHEN men leave the beaten tracks of religious belief, they usually continue to employ the familiar terms of the forsaken faith, giving them new and, as they flatter themselves, higher meanings. Their motive is, apparently, an unwillingness to break altogether with the sacred past, mingled, in some cases, perhaps, with a secret doubt of the security of the ground which they tread. Like colonists who name their settlements in a strange land after familiar places in the mother country, so long as they hear the well-known sounds they seem to themselves to be not altogether astray and lost, or at least they find a melancholy pleasure in being reminded of what was once dear to them. "It is a sad satisfaction to them to repeat the language although they have lost the faith of their forefathers."¹ By thus "holding fast to the form of sound words" they conceal from others, as well as from themselves, the fact, or at least the extent, of their aberration. It is, therefore, a prudent policy as well as a mournful pleasure. The works under review illustrate these observations. The old theological terms occur frequently in them, coupled with expressions of earnest belief in what they signify. "The voice is Jacob's voice." It is, therefore, not surprising that superficial readers should find

¹ The Freedom of Faith. By Theodore T. Munger. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. 1885.

little in them, and should wonder what others can find, to which to object. It is only on close examination that we discover that their theology is one of those "juggling" witcheries

"That palter with us in a double sense ;
That keep the word of promise to our ear,
And break it to our hope ;"

and that their gospel is a very different one from that which we have been accustomed to hear.

The doctrine of the Trinity as formulated in the Nicene Creed about fifteen hundred years ago, has been held by the great body of the Christian church in all its branches, with but trifling dissent. It is stated with substantial accuracy in the familiar words: "There are three persons in the Godhead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory." Our author holds that "God exists as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that this is an eternal distinction, and is so set forth in the Scriptures; not three beings, but One, yet manifesting himself in threefold form, so that we may say of each that he is God; 'God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God.'"⁴ He even believes that "in due time the doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit will be received as philosophy, and be made the postulate of all knowledge."⁵ This seems to be clear and strong. We are perplexed, however, to find the language of the Nicene Creed coupled with the ambiguous and always suspicious statement that God is "One, yet manifesting himself in threefold form."⁶ We are startled by the assertion that the doctrine of the Trinity "has another look to-day from that it wore a hundred years ago,"⁷ and that "a formal Trinity" is psychologically impossible.⁸ It is not our business to reconcile the statements that God

Trinity is psychologically impossible," but it is evident that the writer does not accept the doctrine of the Trinity in its ancient meaning. "We may or may not pronounce the ancient phrases, but we need no longer hesitate to say, 'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.'"⁶ From this we infer that he has in time past hesitated to use the ancient phrase, but has at last found a meaning for it which enables him to pronounce it with satisfaction; and we look with interest to see what this meaning is. "A paternal heart and will at the centre, a sonship that stands for humanity, a spiritual energy that is the life of men, and through which they come into freedom and righteousness."⁷ A paternal heart and will, a sonship, and an energy—it is needless to point out that these are not the three persons of the Godhead whom the Christian church adores.

The doctrine of the incarnation as held by the entire Christian church with but little dissent is, substantially, that the second Person of the Godhead, "being the eternal Son of God, became man," "by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul," "yet without sin," "and so was and continueth to be, in two distinct natures, and one person forever."⁸ Our author explains the incarnation thus: "It is the characteristic thought of God at present that he is immanent in all created things,—immanent, yet personal, the life of all lives, the power of all powers, the soul of the universe; that he is most present where there is the most perfection;

'He is more present unto every creature he hath made
Than any thing unto itself can be.'

With such a conception of God it becomes easy to see how there should be a Son of Man who is also the Son of God, and a Spirit everywhere present and acting."⁹ The only conclusion from the premises which *we* find "easy to see" is, that Jesus Christ was a created Son of man, to whom

⁶ Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, Anss. 21, 22. So also the Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed.

⁷ Freedom of Faith, p. 60.

God was as much more present than he is to other men, or other "created things," as he was more perfect; and consequently, that the incarnation in Jesus Christ differed from the incarnation in other men, or in inanimate things, in degree rather than in kind. Happily, however, our author gives another explanation of the incarnation, which is quite different from this, and inconsistent with it, though not less divergent from the teachings of the Scriptures and the confessions of the church. According to this view Christ is the manifestation of a certain "eternal humanity in God,"¹⁰ whatever that may be; and "Christ is in humanity in all fulness," not merely "by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul," but by "living the full life of humanity, and entering into all the conditions from which he would deliver—into the subjection to evil, the finiteness, the sorrow and labor and death, and the whole conditioned life of man."¹¹ Since this entrance into "the full life of humanity" could not take place all at once, but was effected through advancing experience, the incarnation was not complete at the birth of Jesus, or until his ascension, or rather it is a process which is never completed, but is "forever carried on in the Spirit."¹² According to this, the incarnation did not consist in the taking upon himself of human *nature* by the Son of God, but is, rather, the progressive and never-ending entering of a certain archetypal "eternal humanity in God" into human *experience*. It is vain to look into the derivation and usage of the word "incarnation," or into the creeds of the church, or into the writings of the great theologians, for such a conception.

The doctrine of the atonement is, that Jesus Christ, by his obedience, sufferings, and death, in behalf of sinful men, removed otherwise insuperable obstacles in the way of their forgiveness and salvation. The almost universal belief has been that these obstacles were other than those

¹⁰ Statement of Belief, iv. 3, 5.

¹¹ Ib. iv. 5.

¹² Ib. iv. 6. See also Progressive Orthodoxy, pp. 32, 33.

which are found in man himself. The oldest, generally accepted, and apparently scriptural, doctrine is, that these obstacles are found in the claims of the divine law, and the human and divine sense of justice, and that the atonement removed these obstacles, and made it possible for God to treat as righteous all who by faith accept this redemption." Other ideas have at various times found a local and temporary acceptance, as, for instance, the idea that the ground of the necessity of the atonement lies in the relation of the world to Satan, which was advocated in the earlier Christian centuries. Of the few, comparatively speaking, who have regarded the necessity of the atonement as grounded wholly in man himself, some have found this necessity simply in man's aversion to God, and have seen in the atonement merely a revelation of the self-sacrificing love of God, fitted to attract and subdue men. The ablest advocates of this "moral influence" theory have, however, confessed their dissatisfaction with it, as, in itself, an insufficient explanation of the atonement." Another theory is, that it is only through the sacrifice of Christ that man has "such knowledge of God and of himself as is necessary to a repentance which is revolutionary." " Still another theory is, that there is an identity of nature in God and man, which is revealed in the life of Christ and realized more and more by man through faith. According to this theory the grand medium of reconciliation between God and man, the atonement, is, the incarnation." The death of Christ is important only as necessary to the complete revelation of God in the life of humanity. Thus regarded, the effi-

¹³ Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, Anss. 25, 33; Westminster Confession, xi. 1; Heidelberg Catechism, Anss. 12-18, 60, 61; Articles of Religion (Church of England), xi.; Augsburg Confession, i. 4; Apology for the Augsburg Confession, iii.; Form of Concord, iii.; Helvetic Confessions, etc.

¹⁴ Vicarious Sacrifice, by Horace Bushnell, D.D., p. 534 ff.

¹⁵ Progressive Orthodoxy, p. 55.

¹⁶ The Republic of God, by Elisha Mulford, L.L.D., p. 185, and note; Progressive Orthodoxy, pp. 45, 46.

cacy of the atonement lies in its influence upon the minds of men. Hence this is another form of the "moral influence" theory. Most of its advocates, however, seem to recognize a "redemptive force" in the incarnation working through a mystical union of man with God in Christ. Hence the theory is known as the "mystical theory."¹⁷ This, apparently, is the doctrine of our author. "There can be for man no deliverance out of his evil, and from the vanity and sorrow of life, except through his belief that there is behind all things a mind and a heart like his own. Hence the need of a revelation of God by incarnation,—the first and greatest of Christian facts."¹⁸ "Christ lives this life by actual process—to the full, even unto death, and condemns it, i. e., proves it to be not what it seems, takes the evil and despair out of it, by showing men through himself that they belong to the eternal order of God, along with himself, and not to the illusive order of the world—a revelation beginning with the incarnation and ending with the ascension, or rather never ended, but forever carried on in the Spirit."¹⁹ According to this view, the atonement becomes efficacious only through faith in the divine life in humanity, leading to effort to realize it, and through the operation of a certain mysterious force which it exerts through our mystical union with it. Hence our author speaks of the atonement as "the entrance into the world, through a person, of a moulding and redeeming force in humanity,"²⁰ and "as meaning, Christ formed in us, a law and way of life."²¹ He distinctly rejects the idea of "legal atonement,"²² and recognizes no justification by faith, except "in the sense of a faith that, by its law, induces an actual righteousness."²³ The glorious doctrine that the believer is justified before God, completely and solely, by faith in the atoning sacrifice of Christ, and his love for the

tral and fundamental doctrine of the Pauline theology, of the Reformation, and of Protestantism, the doctrine which has proved the richest source of Christian experience, and the most powerful incentive to Christian living,—finds no place in his system, according to which a man can only be regarded and treated as righteous when he has actually become so through a process of realization of the life of God in humanity extending through years, or ages, or an existence void of “time relations.” In this theology the incarnation is the central and most important thing, rather than the atonement. In fact, it *is* the atonement. It exalts the birth of Christ rather than his death. Its symbol should be the manger rather than the cross. It finds small support in the Scriptures for the prominence which it gives to the incarnation. It utterly ignores their constant insistence upon the transcendent importance of the death and blood of Christ. It degrades the atonement from its place as the means of salvation from sin and of securing righteousness, to that of a means of salvation from vanity and sorrow and illusion and of elevation to a higher order of being. In other words, it takes it out of its *moral* setting and relations. It shows us, not a salvation wrought *for* us, and wholly “finished,” but a never-ending revelation of one which we are to realize for *ourselves*. It confounds the work of Christ *for* us with the work of the Spirit *in* us. In taking away the believer’s confidence and peace and joy in the thought that he *is* justified and saved, and bidding him be content with the hope that he at some time *will* be, it dampens Christian ardor, paralyzes Christian strength, and contradicts the facts of Christian experience and consciousness. In representing eternal life not as the free “gift of God” to the undeserving, but as the just consequence, secured by natural law, of “actual righteousness,” it “frustrates the grace of God.”

The difference between the evangelical doctrine of saving faith and that of our author lies, not so much in the conception of faith, as in the determination of its object, and

the idea of its method of operation. The common view is, that saving faith is "confidence in God as revealed in Christ, and leading to adoring surrender to him as both Saviour and Lord."²⁴ Its object is the Lord Jesus Christ; and though it may be sufficient when it receives him generally, rather than in any specific character or office," yet it must receive him, without limitation or reserve, as he is "offered to us in the gospel;"²⁵ and its intelligent and full exercise involves reception of him more especially as a divine Redeemer from sin through his atoning sacrifice." This faith has in itself no saving efficacy; nor does its saving power consist in its tendency to inspire effort for reformation or improvement. It is the divinely appointed *condition* on which justification, adoption, and sanctification are bestowed; it is the act of reaching out and laying hold of the salvation of God. And therefore from the first moment that a sinner truly exercises it, he is saved. On the contrary, our author represents saving faith as consisting in a practical recognition of the fact revealed in the incarnation, that we "belong to the eternal order of God," and "not to the illusive order of the world,"²⁶ and "are partakers of the divine nature,"²⁷ and that a divine life has been realized in the life of humanity, and is realizable and ought to be realized by us." Saving faith, therefore, does not save except by a gradual process as it, "by its law, produces an actual righteousness—a simple, rational process realized in human experience."²⁸ Consistently with this idea, our author defines faith as "the sum of those faculties in man through which he gets out of evil and the life of the world into the life of God," though "faith will always have its play within the Christ idea,"—whatever

²⁴ Lecture on Saving Faith, delivered by Joseph Cook in Boston. Music Hall, Feb. 1, 1885. The Christian at Work, Feb. 11, 1886.

²⁵ Systematic Theology, by Charles Hodge, D.D., vol. iii. p. 99.

that may mean,—and adds, “the whole work of regeneration of society may be included within the operation of faith in Christ.”³¹ These ideas of faith are adjusted to our author’s doctrine of the atonement. They are, alike, unscriptural, and foreign to the belief of the Christian church.

The evangelical doctrine respecting man is, that he is a created being; that he was “made in the image of God,” but fell from his first estate through transgression; and that, in consequence, he has ever since remained totally depraved, that is, alienated from God, and involved in the guilt, condemnation, and ruin of sin, until renewed by the Holy Spirit through faith in Jesus Christ, he is made “a new creature,” and *becomes* a “partaker of the divine nature.”³² Our author tells us that “man is more than a creation;”³³ that he “is an eternal being;”³⁴ that he is related to “an eternal humanity in God;”³⁵ that he is a sinful being, living “the life of the flesh,” but not totally depraved; that he *is*, in his natural state, “a partaker of the divine nature;”³⁶ and that his need is, not so much to be delivered from sin and its consequences, though he has this need, as to be lifted from the imperfect and undeveloped “life of the flesh” into the life of the Spirit,³⁷ through a revelation to him that he “belongs to the eternal order of God, and not to the illusive order of the world.”³⁸ This sweet gospel of human nature rises to its loftiest flight in the statement of a recent writer, that “when John Bunyan said of a poor profane wretch, ‘there goes John Bunyan but for the grace of God,’”—by the way it was John Newton who said it, of a man on the way to the gallows, but facts are of small

³¹ Statement of Belief, iv. 8.

³² Westminster Assembly’s Shorter Catechism, Anss. 10, 13, 18; Heidelberg Catechism, Anss. 6-8.

³³ Statement of Belief, i. 2.

³⁴ Freedom of Faith, p. 39.

³⁵ Statement of Belief, iv. 5.

³⁶ Freedom of Faith, p. 22.

³⁷ Statement of Belief, iv. 11.

³⁸ Freedom of Faith, p. 62.

³⁹ Statement of Belief, iv. 6.

account to imaginative theology,—“he might have added—and his humanity and religion would allow him to say what his theology might not—there goes a man whose sin is conquered, and who is a saint in Jesus Christ.” “It is needless to dwell upon the contrast between these representations, on the one hand, that men are sparks of deity, partakers of the divine nature, saints in Jesus Christ, unhappily involved in the life of the flesh and an illusive order of the world, and needing nothing more than to have it revealed to them how great they are, and, on the other hand, the uniform teaching of the Scriptures and humble confessions of the church, that men are fallen, depraved, wicked, condemned, and, without the mercy of God, the atoning blood of Christ, and the cleansing of the Holy Spirit, lost.

The author's view of the work of the Holy Spirit, is, of course, adjusted to his view of man's spiritual need. The received doctrine is, that the Holy Spirit produces a change in the sinful subject of his operations, so great that it may properly be called regeneration, or new birth, or likened to resurrection from the dead; that this change, which is instantaneous and incipient, consists, not in any alteration in the structure of human nature, or transference of it from a lower to higher mode of life, but, chiefly, in a reversal of the attitude of the *will*, so that it is turned and moves toward God instead of away from him;“ that this new life is nurtured and developed in holy character by the subsequent work of the Holy Spirit in sanctification,“ which is gradual and progressive, never reaching perfection in this life, but immediately completed at death;“ and these operations of the Spirit are effected, not indeed without the use of means, but chiefly by direct application

To our author this last savors of magic and superstition. He is "disposed to regard regeneration as a *process*, involving known laws and analogies, and to divest it of that air of magical mystery in which it has been held ; a plain and simple matter by which one gets out of the lower world into the higher by the Spirit of God." " Its effect is not so much to purify the sinful nature, as to raise the whole nature from a lower to a higher type. It is "a constructive rather than a reconstructive process." " The author " would also assign to the operation of the Holy Spirit the widest scope." " He is " the source of all good." All men are subject to his influence, and, according as they yield to it, are by him " led through the process of sanctification." The common virtues in the ordinary relations of life are wrought out by him, but " reach their full quality as spiritual only when they are brought into conscious relations to God." " This doctrine confounds regeneration with sanctification. It does not restrict sanctification to believers. It represents the work of the Spirit as one of elevation rather than sanctification. And it denies to the Holy Spirit direct, personal, supernatural action, and makes all his operations those of law.

The common idea of probation is, that it is a limited period within which men, surrounded and plied with gracious influences, but left to the exercise of their own freedom, must by their own decisive choice manifest their character and determine their destiny. The limit of the period depends upon the divine mercy. Until recently it was believed that the limits of the period coincide with those of life in this world. Dörnerism, however, maintaining that all men must finally be judged by their conscious, voluntary treatment of Jesus Christ, necessarily holds that for those who have had no offer of the Saviour in this life probation is continued after death though not

choice respecting the Saviour." This is commonly regarded as the principal distinctive feature of what is properly called "the new theology." But our author's new theology goes far beyond this. In his view, character and destiny are determined only by repeated volitions, under the law that repeated action of the will tends to become habitual and unchangeable, and character tends to become permanent. They are, therefore, never determined, probation never ends for any man, until through repeated choices the will has become morally incapable of making any different choice. Probation is therefore limited, if at all, not by time, but by law. "Probation is a continuous state or process, till it ends by its own nature. Man has but one probation, but, by its nature, it cannot have any bounds of time, whether of earthly life or world-age. It ends when character is fixed,—if, indeed, we have any right to use a word so out of keeping with moral freedom,—and it is not possible to attach any other bound or limit to it." Evidently the author does not contemplate the possibility of the will's fixing *itself* unalterably by a single decision: he recognizes nothing as fixing it but the law of habit. He does not accord to the will a royal, self-determining power: it can be fixed only by falling into bondage. The principle, however, works both ways; it is a two-edged sword. If the will cannot become irreversibly set upon evil, except by a long "process," neither can it be unalterably set upon good, except by a similar "process." No man, therefore, is secure in goodness, till his probation is ended, and his character is fixed by a "process" which has rendered him incapable of being any thing else. And then, it may be asked, wherein is the merit, or moral worth, of his goodness? If the author's view is correct, it is not at all prob-

The common belief is, that God commits to men certain duties, privileges, gifts, and trusts, for which he holds them personally responsible, and for which he will in due time call them to a strict and final personal reckoning with himself. This will be "the last judgment." Meantime men are left to their freedom. This freedom, which is absolutely necessary to the play and manifestation and development of character, is only possible because of the subsequent reckoning. In our author's view, the only judgment is that which comes upon man by the operation of natural law. Men are constantly reaping the fruit of their doings, and so being judged. Personal accountability is accountability *of* a person, but not *to* a person, but rather to inexorable laws. "We are all the while rendering account to the laws without and within." Judgment is a "present" and "ever on-going process." It is, however, not confined to this world, but has a "universal sweep."⁸⁰ But no judgment is final, until character is fixed. Even the judgment which follows death is not necessarily final. "A change of worlds is followed by judgment,—the change evokes judgment: thus, 'it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this cometh judgment;' but the Scriptures do not indicate that this judgment involves finality, as distinguished from previous judgments: it *may* involve it, but not necessarily, and only as successive judgments or crises point towards finality. Finality is to be found in character, and not in judgment, except as a crisis tends to develop and fix character."⁸¹ "Conduct is always reaching crises, and entering upon its consequences. It may be cumulative in degree, and reach crises more and more marked; it may at last reach a special crisis which shall be *the* judgment when the soul shall turn to the right or left of eternal destiny."⁸² The chief defect in the author's conception of judgment is, that it does not contain the element of justice. "The moment we touch fire we are burned. The sentence of

⁸⁰ Freedom of Faith, p. 341.⁸¹ *Ib.* p. 339, note.⁸² *Ib.* p. 341.

broken law is executed at once." " True; and the same sentence is executed, whether the act was accidental and innocent or wilful and guilty. The broken physical law is vindicated; the broken moral law is not. It is true that there may be suffering in the conscience and moral nature. "The quick pang of conscience that follows sin is the first stroke of judgment." " But some men suffer more remorse for an unkind speech than others do for a dozen murders. And under the law of disintegration, the more a man sins, the less he suffers in conscience. Our author himself has not much respect for the theory of purely moral penalties; "The true preacher of retribution is not one who tones it down to mere remorse and separation from God,—things that no evil-doer takes into account." " He is better satisfied with the theory that every broken law inflicts its own penalty; "If we sin against the body, we are punished in the body." " True; but some men reap less physical suffering from years of sensuality than others get from a single self-indulgence. And some men die without having received the physical penalties of their sins; and how are they ever going to receive them? The fact is, and it is acknowledged on all hands, and has been recognized from the earliest times, by heathen as well as Christian writers, that the divine administration of affairs in this world is not conducted on the principles of exact justice, as, indeed, it is impossible to conceive how it *can* be, with the present system of natural law. So patent is this fact, that unbelievers base upon it one of their strongest arguments against the existence of a moral Governor of the universe; while, on the other hand, believers find in it one of their strongest reasons for believing in a future life, in which the injustices of this world may be adjusted.

sion, and simply eliminates the quality of justice from the character and government of God.

The teaching of the church is, that multitudes of men will, through sin, and refusal to avail themselves of the means of salvation, fall at last under the condemnation and righteous judgment of God, and perish forever. Our author avows a "hope" that all will eventually be saved.¹⁴ Hope implies more or less expectation. But our author's "hope" seems to be much *more* than a hope. It is true that he does not expressly avow *belief* in universal salvation, though he admits that it is his "dream,"¹⁵ and that he even deprecates assertion of it "with dogmatic and institutional emphasis" as "practically demoralizing."¹⁶ But while he does not dogmatize, he skilfully piles up arguments, which, presented with rare charm of diction and tender grace of feeling, are far more effective, and therefore demoralizing, than any coarse dogmatism. He derives his "hope" (1) from a "certainty" which "can be drawn from the heart of God," and (2) from "the uncertainty that gathers about the possibilities of human nature;"¹⁷ (3) from the Adamic relation of Christ to humanity, (4) the solidarity of the human race, and (5) the equal sweep of evil and redemptive forces, and the superiority of the latter;¹⁸ (6) from "the spirit and logic of revelation;"¹⁹ (7) from the nature of probation, which he represents as without limits of time;²⁰ (8) from the nature of judgment, which he represents as without finality;²¹ (9) from certain "truisms," as he calls them, "that every human being will have the fullest opportunity for attaining to the end of his creation as a child of God; that every human being will receive from the Spirit of God all the influence impelling to salvation that his nature can endure, and retain its moral integrity; and that no human

¹⁴ Freedom of Faith, p. 60; Statement of Belief, iv. 8.

being will be given over to perish while there is a possibility of his salvation;" (10) from "the *consensus* of reason and revelation on this subject;" (11) from the local coloring of scriptural language;" (12) from "the sense of humanity" which "the leaven of the gospel generates;" (13) and (13) from the doctrine of evolution, which everywhere underlies and shapes his theology." On the other hand, while he admits that the mystery of free-will furnishes a possibility of the lost sheep's never being found," and of a soul's turning to the left of eternal destiny," he speaks of such a result merely as theoretically possible, and does not express any belief that it will ever in any one instance actually take place; and while he discerns in the future a shadow which we cannot pierce," and recognizes the fact that the lines of the forces of sin and of the gospel "do not converge to our finite eyes," he evidently thinks that the difficulty is in our finite eyes, and builds confidently upon the assurance that "the logic of the gospel is salvation, and the secret of the universe is joy."

Such views of our author suggest an inquiry into his understanding of the Scriptures. He believes that they are inspired," or, more exactly, that the men who wrote them were inspired; but all *theories* of inspiration, "verbal, dynamic, plenary," he rejects;" and he thinks that no theory of inspiration can be formulated which can be substantiated,"—which, if we accept his view of the amount of error in the religious teachings of the Bible, seems highly probable. Some of his views are plainly at variance with the Scriptures. So much the worse for the Scriptures. He disposes summarily of inconvenient passages, by finding in them a human and a fallible element. "There is no denial of the fact that doctrines now re-

social condition in which they were formulated. The doctrines of divine sovereignty, of total depravity, and of the atonement, are shot through with colors drawn from the corruption of Roman society, from the Roman sense of authority, and the Roman forms of justice."¹⁵ He might have added, had it suited his purpose, that the doctrine of the fatherhood of God is a "reflection" of family life, and that his own doctrines of probation and judgment are "shot through with colors drawn from" modern natural science. He does not seem to see that the fact that a doctrine is presented in the language and coloring of common life does not prove it to be untrue. He repels the confession of Dr. George Ellis, that "the Bible is an orthodox book," and scouts the idea that "we must revise our Bible or keep our creed;"¹⁶ but he does not point out the precise practical difference between revising the Bible and setting aside considerable portions of it on account of their local coloring. He regards the human reason,—taking the word in the largest sense,—as competent to recognize spiritual truth, and to judge of the correctness of statements of it." Nor does he limit this capacity to "Christian consciousness:" he attributes it to "the universal reason." We have sometimes wondered how certain writers ascertain what the affirmations of "the universal reason" *are*, to which they appeal so confidently. We suspect that the high-sounding phrase sometimes means the reason of the writer and those who think with him. "Human nature—so far as it acts by itself—accepts Christianity because it establishes a thorough *consensus* with human nature: it is agreeable in its nature to human nature in its normal action."¹⁷ This statement is open to the slight objection that mankind generally never have, as a matter of fact, found Christianity agreeable, or been persuaded to accept it. Possibly that is because it has been falsely presented to them by orthodox preachers. Whether it will prove more agreeable to them in the form

¹⁵ Freedom of Faith, pp. 21, 22. ¹⁶ *Ib.* p. 20. ¹⁷ *Ib.* p. 11. ¹⁸ *Ib.* p. 12.

of "the new theology" remains to be seen. At present there are no signs of its being intensely captivating. Our author protests against doctrines, as "misrepresentations," which "antagonize the sober conclusions of universal reason,"—which Paul tells us "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God," and "cannot know them,"—"and evoke the protest of the universal human heart,"—"which the same apostle assures us "is enmity against God." But then, Paul's ideas were considerably "shot through." For our own part, we can only say that it seems to us that if only those parts and interpretations of the Bible are to be received which commend themselves to the approval of mankind generally, and everything at variance with these is to be rejected as colored, there will not be much of the Bible left, and the book, as a revelation, whether *from* God or *of* God, is a failure, and, as a guide to religious truth, is about as trustworthy as a last year's almanac.

The fundamental and shaping principle of our author's theology seems to be the theory of evolution,—though Darwin and Huxley would smile to see the doctrine of "the survival of the fittest" transformed by the sentiment of a genial clergyman into the hope of the survival of *all*. Instead of telling us of a personal God who commands, proves, judges, condemns, atones, forgives, sanctifies, saves, the author points us to natural laws. Atonement is a process;" regeneration is a process;" probation is a process;" judgment is a process;" "even love and grace are by law." Mankind are slowly evolving, by natural processes, under great laws, from fleshly into spiritual beings. The author has attempted to construct a theology on the basis of natural science, or rather, what he conceives to be natural science. His system has an appearance of

poet, and had had more knowledge of science, and more of the scientific method and habit of thought. As it is, like another Aaron seeking to improve the religion of his people, he has cast the golden ornaments of fancy into the moulds of exact science, and there has come out this—*theology*.

His views are many of them unscriptural. He confesses this, by setting aside, as colored, such of the Scriptures as do not harmonize with his speculations." They are also illogical. This, too, he confesses, both by inveighing against logic in theology," and in frank admissions; "It is said of this theology that . . . it lacks logical precision and coherence, and that its parts are not mutually self-supporting. It accepts the criticism, and confesses that it does not first and mainly aim at these features." They are also repulsive. The representation that "God sustains all relations through law," takes away from us that immediate personal communion with God, which is the believer's greatest comfort here, and the perfection of which is his greatest hope. God no longer comes into personal contact with us: a system worse than a priesthood intervenes between us and him. The Holy Spirit no longer touches our hearts, and "witnesses with our spirits," and "helps our infirmities;" his operations are all processes, under law. There is no hope of our being "made perfect in holiness" and "immediately passing into glory," when this weary conflict is over; the conflict will never be over; we have before us the tedious prospect of a long "process" of development. Justice is banished from the universe. We can no longer come to God as our Father for immediate and full forgiveness and blessing: forgiveness and grace are dispensed only by law and process. The tender relation of a Father to his little

of a preacher of the gospel, the words "forgiveness," "mercy," "grace," occur with astonishing infrequency. The fact is, that the things signified by them have, logically, no place in his system. Natural law knows no mercy. Our author's doctrines would be still more repulsive and shocking, if they were carried out to their logical and necessary conclusions; but from this he himself shrinks. Contempt of logic is sometimes convenient.

Whatever else may be said of these views, this at least is certain, that they are in broad conflict with what are called evangelical views, and with the faith of the best part of the Christian church. This, too, he confesses. He does not hesitate to part company with New England theology, and even with Protestantism.⁸⁹ His views are wholly at variance with the creeds, faith, and preaching of all the great evangelical bodies, and particularly with those of Congregational churches. We are of the opinion that a preacher of such doctrines is out of place in a Congregational pulpit, and in the Congregational fellowship. It was not that such doctrines might be preached that our fathers toiled and made sacrifices to establish churches and seminaries. Approval of such preaching is an insult to their memory. Such doctrines are powerless. It was not by the preaching of them that Luther produced the Reformation, or Wesley built up the great Methodist church, or our Puritan fathers made New England what she has been. The sanction of such preaching in Congregational pulpits tends to produce contention and division in the denomination; for there are men, and a good many of them, who will have no fellowship with it. There is rich inconsistency and absurdity in extending fellowship within the denomination to preachers of these doctrines, and refusing fellowship to preachers in other denominations who preach the same doctrines, and probably preach them better. If such preaching is to be tolerated in the denomination, and recognized as good Con-

⁸⁹ *Freedom of Faith*, p. 20.

gregationalism, we may as well throw down all walls of partition, relinquish all attempts to guard the purity of our pulpits, and let any man who pleases preach what he pleases to our bewildered congregations.

And we believe that the preaching of such doctrines is productive of infinite mischief. We often wonder with what ideas or purposes so many of our preachers and professors endeavor to substitute the speculations of German rationalism for the old evangelical and scriptural doctrines. Has, then, the faith of New England been so unsuccessful in training character that we must find something better? Have rationalism and philosophy done so much for the religious condition of Germany, that it is desirable to introduce the same state of things here? Have Unitarianism and Universalism been so powerful in cultivating Christian and spiritual life, that we want to filter their doctrines through our theology? Has faith in the Bible done so little for men, and rejection of it, in whole or in part, and of its divine authority, been so fruitful of blessing, that we want to put people on their guard against putting too much confidence in it, and try to lessen its hold on the public mind as much as we can? At what are our preachers and theologians aiming? Whatever their aim, we have no doubt of the result. We think our author's representations of the atonement, saving faith, regeneration, and inspiration particularly dangerous. And to these we would add, with emphasis, his doctrine of probation after death and probable universal salvation. The inevitable tendency of the preaching of these doctrines is to lessen men's sense of accountability, and to encourage them to continue in sin and impenitence. Already the approval of such preaching, by important councils, is producing these effects. And these, above all others, are not the times when we can afford this. The very foundations of society are threatened by men in multitudes who have cast off all faith in God, all fear of judgment to come, all sense of moral obligation. There is fast

developing a corruption, like that of Rome under the emperors, or Europe in the Middle Ages, which is prolific of great wickedness and crime, and of no less suffering and woe. It is no time to be toying with unauthorized and demoralizing *hopes* and *dreams* of a universal restoration somewhere on the far-off misty horizon of the infinite, or to exchange the vivid and near realities assured by the Word of God for dim and distant possibilities, dreamt of by scientific and metaphysical philosophy, which at once soothe the fears of guilty consciences, and mock the longings of suffering hearts. The world needs more heroic remedies for its disease, profounder consolations for its agony.

ARTICLE IX.

THE BOOK OF JUBILEES.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ETHIOPIC BY PROFESSOR GEO. H. SCHODDE, PH.D.,
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY, COLUMBUS, O.

CHAP. VII. 1. And in the seventh week, in the first year thereof, in this jubilee, Noah planted vines on this hill upon which the ark had rested, named Lûbâr, the Ararat Mountains, and they produced fruit in the fourth year, and he watched their fruit and gathered them in this year in the seventh month, and he made wine of it, and put it into a vessel and kept it until the fifth year, until the first day of the new moon of the first month. 2. And he celebrated this day in rejoicing as a festival, and he made a sacrifice unto the Lord, a young one from among the oxen and a ram and a sheep. each seven years old. and a

was sacrificing to the Lord, and of the ox and the sheep he also placed the flesh upon the altar. 4. And he made all the fruit offerings thereof mixed with oil upon them, and thereupon he first scattered wine upon the fire on the altar, and placed incense upon the altar, and a sweet savor ascended which was acceptable before the Lord his God. 5. And he and his children rejoiced and drank of this wine in joy.³ 6. And it was evening, and he went into his tent, and he lay down drunken, and he slept, and he was uncovered in his tent while sleeping. 7. And Ham saw his father naked, and going out he told it to his two brothers without. 8. And Shem took his garment and arose, he and Japheth, and they carried the garment upon their shoulders, and their faces backward, and covered the shame of their father. 9. And Noah awoke from his sleep and learned everything that his youngest son had done to him; and he cursed his son and said: "Cursed be Canaan, a slaving servant shall he be to his brothers." And he blessed Shem: "Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, and may Canaan be his servant; and may the Lord extend Japheth and may the Lord dwell in the tent of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant!" 11. And Ham knew that his father had cursed his youngest son, and he became displeased with him because he had cursed his son and he separated himself from his father, he and his sons with him, Chush, and Meshrêm, and Pûd, and Canaan. 12. And he built for himself a city, and called its name after the name of his wife Nêêlâta-Mêk.³ 13. And Japheth saw it and became envious of his brother, and he too built a city, and called its name after the name of his wife Adalênsês. 14. But Shem dwelt with his father Noah, and he built a city by the side of his father on the hill, and he too called its name by the name of his wife Sêdûkâtêlbâb. 15. And

³ The writer apologetically describes the wine as having been drunk by Noah on the occasion of a religious festival.

³ Very little reliance can be placed upon these names as the MSS. vary, and nearly all trace of the etymology is lost. The copyists naturally made mistakes in writing them.

behold these three cities are near Mount Lûbâr: Sêdûkâ-têlbâb on the side of the hill on the east; Nêûltemâûk on the south side; and Adalânêsês toward the west; and these are the sons of Shem: Elâm, and Asûr, and Arpakeed: this is the generation after the second year of the flood (?)⁴ these are the children of Noah. 16. And in the twenty-eighth jubilee he began to command the sons of his sons the ordinances and the commandments all as he had learned them and the judgments, and he testified to his sons that they should observe righteousness, and that they should cover the shame of their flesh, and that they should bless him who created them, and should honor father and mother, and each should love his neighbor, and should preserve their souls from all fornication and from all uncleanness and unrighteousness. 17. For on account of these three things the deluge came over the earth, namely on account of fornication, in which the Watchmen indulged against the commandments of their law, with the daughters of men, and took to themselves wives from all whom they chose and made the beginning of uncleanness. 18. And they begat sons, the Naphidêm, and they were all unlike and they devoured one another: the giant slew the Naphil, and the Naphil slew Eljô, and Eljô the children of men, and all publicly practised every unrighteousness and shed much blood, and the earth was filled with unrighteousness; and after all these the animals, and the beasts, and the birds, and whatever walks and moves on the earth; and much blood was spilt on the earth, and all the thoughts and deeds of men were wicked in all the days. 19. And the Lord destroyed everything from the face of the earth on account of their deeds and on account of the blood which was spilt over the earth. 20. And we were left, I and you, my sons, and everything that entered with us into the ark, and behold I am the first to see your works

rating yourselves each from his neighbor, and are envious the one of the other, and are not in harmony each with his neighbor and his brother. 21. And yet, my sons, for I see and behold the satans have commenced to lead astray you and your children; and now I fear on your behalf that after my death ye will spill the blood of men over the face of the earth, and that ye too will be destroyed from its face. 22. For every one that sheds the blood of any man, and every one that eats the blood in any flesh, shall all be destroyed from the earth. 23. And there shall not be left any man who eats blood and who sheds blood upon the earth, and there shall not be left alone for him any seed or children under heaven; for they will go into Sheol, and into the place of judgment they will descend, in the darkness of the deep they will all be cast by a terrible death. 24. With regard to all blood over you which is in all the days that ye sacrifice an animal or a beast or whatever flies over the earth, and do a good deed concerning your souls in your covering of that which has been spilt over the face of the earth. 25. And ye shall not be like him that eats with blood; be strong that no one eat blood in your presence: bury the blood in the earth; for as I have been commanded, I testify to you and your children together with all flesh. 26. And ye shall not eat the soul with the meat, that ye be not those of whom your blood, that is, your soul, be demanded from the hands of every one that sheddeth blood on the earth. 27. For the earth will not be clean of the blood which has been spilt upon it, but only by the blood of him that shed it will the earth be cleansed in all the generations of the earth. 28. And now, my children, obey and practise righteousness and justice so that ye be planted in righteousness upon the whole face of the earth and that your renown be elevated before

its fruit shall not be gathered to eat it, and in the fourth year the fruit shall be sanctified, and the first fruits which they gather shall be brought before the Lord our God, the Most High, who created heaven and earth and all things, so that they bring in fatness the first of the wine and oil as first fruits upon the altar of the Lord who receives it; and what is left the servants of the house of the Lord shall eat before the altar which he has accepted. 30. And in the fifth year make the release, so that ye release them in righteousness and justice, and you shall be just and all your plants shall be right. 31. For thus did Enoch, the father of your father Methusaleh, command his sons, and Methusaleh his son Lamech, and Lamech commanded me all the things which his father commanded him; but I command it to you, my children, just as Enoch commanded his son in his first jubilee; while he was alive, in his generation the seventh, he commanded and testified to his son and to the sons of his sons until the day of his death.*

CHAP. VIII. 1. In the twenty-ninth jubilee, in the first week, in the first [year] thereof, Arphaxsd took to himself a wife, and her name was Râsûjâ, the daughter of Sûsân, the daughter of Elâm, and she bore him a son in the third year of this week, and he called his name Kâinân. 2. And his son grew, and his father taught him writing, and he went to seek for himself a place where he might seize for himself a city. 3. And he found a writing which the forefathers had carved into a rock, and he read what was in it, and he translated it and found that there was within it the science of the Watchmen by which they had seen the astrology of the sun and the moon and the stars and in all the signs of heaven;* and he wrote this down and did not say any thing concerning it, for he feared to speak to Noah concerning it, lest he be angry with him on this

account. 4. And in the thirtieth jubilee, in the second week, in the first year thereof, he took to himself a wife, and her name was Milkâ, the daughter of Abâdai, the son of Japhet, and in the fourth year she bore him a son, and he called his name Sâlâ, for he said, "Verily, I have been sent away." 5. And in the fourth year Sâlâ was born, and he grew up and took to himself a wife, and her name was Mûak, the daughter of Kêsêd, the brother of his father, in the thirty-first jubilee, in the fifth week, in the first year thereof. And she bore him a son in the fifth year, and he called his name Ebôr; and he took to himself a wife, and her name was Azûrâd, the daughter of Nêbrôd, in the thirty-second jubilee, in the seventh week, in the third year thereof. 6. And in the sixth year thereof she bore him a son, and he called his name Phalêk, for in the days when he was born the children of Noah began to divide the earth among themselves; and on this account he called his name Phalêk. 7. And they divided the earth among themselves in wickedness, and told it to Noah. 8. And it happened in the beginning of the thirty-third jubilee, and they divided the earth into three parts, to Shem and to Ham, and to Japhet, each one his inheritance, in the first year of the first week, while an angel, one of us who were sent to them, was there. 9. And he called his sons, and they came to him, they and their children, and he divided the earth by lot what his three sons should take, and they stretched out their hands and took to themselves the writing out of the bosom of their father Noah. 10. And there came out on the writing as the lot for Shem the middle of the earth, which he and his children should have as an inheritance for the generations unto eternity, from the middle of the mountain Râfû, from the exit of the water of the river Tîâ, and his portion goes toward

great sea: all that is toward the north of this is Japhet's, and all that is to the direction of the south is Shem's. 11. And it reaches until it comes to Karâsô, which is in the bosom of the tongue which looks toward the south. 12. And his portion reaches unto the great sea, and reaches straight until it approaches the west of the tongue which looks toward the south; for the sea is called the tongue of the Egyptian sea. 13. And it turns from there toward the south, toward the mouth of the great sea in the shore of the waters and proceeds toward Arabia and Ophrâ, and it proceeds until it reaches to the water of the river Gejôn and toward the south of the water of Gejôn, along the shore of this same river. 14. And it proceeds toward the north until it approaches the garden of Eden, toward the south thereof to the south, and from the east of the whole land of Eden, and toward the whole east, and it turns to the east, and proceeds until it approaches toward the east of the hills whose name is Râfâ, and it descends toward the border of the outlet of the water of the river Tinâ. 15. This portion came out in the lot for Shem and his sons, and he remembered his word which he had spoken with his mouth in prophecy, for he had said: "Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, and may the Lord dwell in the dwelling of Shem!" 17. And he knew that the garden of Eden is the holy of holies, and the dwelling of the Lord, and Mount Sinai, the centre of the desert, and Mount Zion, the centre of the navel of the earth,* these three, opposite one another, were created as sanctuaries. 18. And he blessed the God of gods who had put the speech of the Lord into his mouth. 19. And he knew that a blessed portion and a blessing had come to Shem and to the children of his generations forever; the whole land of Edom, and all the land of the Erythrian sea, and all the land of the east, and India and at the Ery-

* That Jerusalem is the centre of the earth is an idea often met with in the later Jewish writers, and it is therefore also the central place of the Messianic rule. Cf., e. g., Enoch, lvi. 7; Dillmann, *Aethiop. Chrest.*, p. 15.

thrian and the mountains thereof, and all the land of Bâsôr, and all the land of Lebanon and the islands of Kuphatûr, and all the land of Elâm and Asûr and Bâbêl and Sûsân and Mâdâr, and all the mountains of Ararat, and all the land beyond the sea which is beyond the hills of Asûr toward the north, a blessed and prosperous land, and all that is in it is very good. 20. And for Ham came out as the second portion, beyond the Gijôn, toward the south, to the right of the garden, and it proceeds to all the fire mountains, and goes toward the west to the sea Atil, and goes to the west until it reaches to the sea of Mâûk, of that one into which everything descends that is destroyed. 21. And it proceeds to the north to the shore of Gâdîl and goes to the west of the water of the sea until it approaches the river Gejôn, and the river Gejôn goes until it approaches to the right of the garden of Eden: and this is the land which came forth for Ham as the portion he shall retain for himself and the children of his generations forever. 22. And for Japhet there came forth a third portion beyond the river Tînâ, toward the north of the exit of its waters, and it goes toward the northeast the whole district of Lâg, and all the east thereof. 23. And it goes toward the north to the north, and goes to the mountains of Kilt, toward the north and toward the sea Mâûk, and it goes toward the east of Gadir over toward the coast of the water of the sea. 24. And it proceeds until it approaches the west of Para, and returns toward Aphêrâg, and goes toward the east, towards the waters of the sea Mêat. And it goes toward the shore of the river Tina, toward the east of the north, until it approaches to the shore of the waters thereof, toward the mountain Râfâ, and it bends toward the north. 25. This is the land which came forth for Japhet and his children as the portion of his inheritance which he should hold unto eternity for himself and the children of their generation unto eternity: five great islands and a great land in the north; only it is cold, but the land of Ham is

hot, and the land of Shem has neither heat nor frost, for it mixed in coldness and heat.

CHAP. IX. 1. And Ham divided among his sons; and the first portion came out for Ques toward the east, and to the west of him for Phud, and to the west of him for Kainan toward the west of the sea. 2. And Shem also divided among his sons, and the first portion came forth for Elam and his sons toward the east of the river Tiger, until it approaches the east, the whole land of India and on the Erythrian and its coast, and the waters of Dêdan and all the mountains of Mêbri and Ela, and all the land of Sûsan, and all that is on the side of the Phêrnak to the Erythrian sea and the river Tina. 3. But for Asûr came forth a second portion, all the land of Asûr and Nineva and Sinaôr and to the border of India, and ascends along the river. 4. And for Arphaksed came forth a third portion, all the land of the district of the Chaldees toward the east of the Euphrates, bordering on the Erythrian sea, and all the waters of the desert until near to the tongue of the sea which looks toward Egypt, and all the land of Libanon and Sanêr and Amana to the border of the Euphrates. 5. And for Aram came forth as a fourth portion all the land of Mesopotamia, between the Tiger and the Euphrates, toward the north of the Chaldees, to the border of the mountains of Asur. 6. And the land of Arara came out as a fifth portion to his son, the mountains of Asur and all belonging to them until it reaches to the east of Asur, his brother. 7. And Japhet, too, divided the land of his inheritance between his sons, and the first portion came forth for Gômêr toward the east, from the north side to the river Tina. And in the north there came out for Magog all the inner portions of the north until it reaches the sea Mêat. 8. And for Madai came forth as his portion that he should possess, to the west of his two brothers, unto the islands and unto the coasts of the islands. And to Egawan came forth as a fourth portion all the islands, and the islands which are toward Edalûd. 9. And

for Tôbêl came forth as a fifth portion, between the tongue which approaches toward the side of the portion of Lûd, to the second tongue, unto beyond the second tongue into the third tongue. 10. And for Melek came forth as a sixth portion, all that beyond the third tongue, until it approaches to the east of Gadr. 11. And for Tiras came forth a seventh portion; four great islands in the midst of the sea, which approach to the portion of Ham; and the islands of Kamatûra came out for the sons of Arphaksed in his division of his inheritance by lot. 12. And thus the sons of Noah divided out to their children, in the presence of Noah their father, and he caused them to swear an oath cursing him who endeavored to seize a portion which had not been allotted him. And they all said: "Thus be it! Thus be it!" for themselves and for their descendants to eternity in their generations, until the day of judgment, on which the Lord God will judge them with a sword and with fire for all the wickedness of uncleanness which they have committed in that they filled the earth with transgression, uncleanness, fornication, and sin.

CHAP. X. 1. And in the third week of this jubilee the evil demons began to lead astray the sons of Noah and deceived them and destroyed them. 2. And the sons came to Noah their father and told him concerning the demons which were leading astray, darkening, and slaying the sons of their sons. 3. And he prayed before the Lord his God, and he said: "Lord of the spirits^a of all flesh, thou who hast shown mercy to me and hast delivered me and my children from the waters of the deluge, and hast not suffered me to be destroyed as thou didst the children of destruction, for thy grace was great over men, and great was thy mercy over my soul; may thy grace be exalted over the sons of thy sons, and may the evil spirit not rule over them to destroy them off the earth. And

^a A typical name of God in the Parables of Enoch, c. xxxvii. 71.

thou hast verily blessed me and my sons that we increase and multiply and fill the earth. 4. And thou knowest how the Watchmen, the fathers of these spirits, acted in my day ; and these spirits also which are alive, cast them into prison and hold them in the places of judgment, and let them not destroy the sons of thy servant, my God, for they are terrible and created for destroying ; and may they not rule over the spirits of the living ; for thou alone knowest their judgment. 5. And let them have no sway over the children of the righteous from now on and to eternity. 6. And our God said unto us that we should bind all. 7. And the angel of the spirits, Mastêma," came and said : "O Lord, Creator, leave some of them before me, and they shall hear my voice and they shall do all things that I tell them ; for if thou dost not leave any of them to me I shall not be able to accomplish the power of my will among the children of men, for they are here for corrupting, and destroying, and leading astray before the judgment, for great is their wickedness to the children of men." 8. And he said : "The tenth part of them shall be left before him and nine parts shall descend into the place of judgment." 9. And one of us said : "We will teach Noah all their medicines ;" for they did not walk in righteousness, and I did not contend in uprightness. And we did according to his word ; all the wicked ones that were terrible we bound in the place of judgment, but the tenth part of them we left, that they should be judged before Satan on the earth. 10. And the medicines of all their sicknesses we explained to Noah together with all their deceptions how to heal them with the plants of the earth. 11. And Noah wrote all these down in a book as we in-

¹⁰ The name of the leader of the evil spirits found throughout the book. The role here occupied by him may have been taken from that of Satan in Job. but it is in place to remark that in many apocryphal works, especially

structed him, concerning every kind of medicines, and the evil spirits were held away from the sons of Noah. 12. And he gave all the writings which he had written to Shem, his oldest son, for him he loved exceedingly above all his children. 13. And Noah slept with his fathers and was buried on Mount Lûbar, in the land of Ararat. 14. Nine hundred and fifty years he completed in his life; nineteen jubilees and two weeks and five years; he excelled in his life on the earth the children of men on account of his righteousness, in which he was perfect, with the exception of Enoch. 15. For the history of Enoch is made a testimony to the generations of eternity to announce all the deeds of the generation on the day of judgment. 16. In the thirty-third [fourth] jubilee, in the first year of the second week, Phalêk took to himself a wife, whose name was Lâmnâ, the daughter of Sinaar, and she bore him a son in the fourth year of this week, and he called his name Ragev, for he said: "Behold, the sons of men have become evil through a plan of wickedness, because they build for themselves a city and a tower in the land of Sinaar;" for they separated from the land of Ararat toward the east to Sinaar, for in his day they were building a city and a tower, saying: "We will ascend on it into heaven." 17. And they began to build in the fourth week, and they burned with fire, and they used bricks for stones, and the clay with which they joined them was asphalt, which comes out of the sea and out of the fountains of water in the land of Sinaar, and they built forty years, and three years they were making bricks 18. And the Lord our God said to us: "Behold it is one people that has commenced to do it, and now I shall not let go of them; behold, we will descend and mix their tongues, and one shall not hear the other and they shall be scattered into cities and into nations and one counsel shall no longer abide with them until the day of judgment." 19. And the Lord descended, and we descended with him to see the city and tower which the children of men were building. 20. And

he confounded all the speech of their tongues, and they no longer heard the voice one of the other, and they ceased then to build the city and the tower. On this account the whole land of Sinaar is called Babel, because there God confused all the tongues of the children of men, and from there they were scattered to all their cities, each according to his language and his nation. And the Lord sent a great wind against the tower and it overturned it upon the ground, and behold, [it stood] between the land of Assur and Babylon in the land of Sinaar, and they called its name Ruins. 21. And in the fourth week, in the first year of the thirty-fourth jubilee they were scattered out of the land of Sinaar. 22. And Ham and his sons went into the land which he had taken, which fell to him by lot in the land of the north [south]; and Kainaan saw the land of the Libanon to the canal of Egypt that it was very good, and he did not go into the land of his inheritance to the west of the sea, and dwelt in the land of Libanon to the east and to the west of the land of the Jordan and on the coast of the sea. 23. And Ham, his father, and Cush and Mêzrêm, his brothers, said to him: "Thou hast settled in a land which is not thine and did not fall to us by lot, thou shouldst not do thus; for if thou doest thus, then thou and thy children will fall by condemnation in the land, and as cursed ones by sedition, for by sedition ye have settled and by sedition thy children will fall and thou wilt be rooted out to eternity. 24. Do not dwell in the dwelling place of Shem, for to Shem and his children was it given by lot. 25. Cursed art thou and cursed shalt thou be above all the sons of Noah by the curse which we covenanted with an oath between us in the presence of the holy judge and before Noah our father." 26. But he did not listen to them and dwelt in the land of Libanon

of the sea, and it pleased him, and he begged it from Elam, and Assur, and Arphaksed, the brother of his wife, and he dwelt in the land Mêdkin, near to the brother of his wife until this day. 29. And he called his dwelling place and the dwelling place of his sons Madakia, by the name of their father Madai.

CHAP. XI. 1. In the thirty-fifth jubilee, in the third week, in the first year thereof, Ragev took unto himself a wife, and her name was Orâ, the daughter of Or, the daughter of the son of Kêsêd, and she bore him a son, and he called his name Sêrûg, in the seventh year of this week of this jubilee. 2. And the sons of Noah began to fight with each other, to take captive and to slay each one his brother, and to spill the blood of men over the earth, and to eat blood, and to build strong cities, and walls, and towers (and single men elevated themselves above the people, and first founded kingdoms), and to make war, a nation against a nation, and nations against nations, and city against city, and all things became worse, and they acquired for themselves arms, and taught their sons war, and began to take captive the cities and to sell male and female slaves. 3. And Ur, the son of Kêsêd, built Erâ of the Chaldees, and called its name after his own name and by the name of his father. 4. And he made for himself molten images, and they worshipped each one his own image which they had made for themselves by molding, and they began to make sculptured images and unclean forms, and the terrible spirits assisted them and misled them to commit transgression and uncleanness. 5. And the prince Mastêma gave his power to make all this, and through the angels who had been given under his hand, he sent out his hand to do all wickedness and sin and all transgression, and to destroy and to murder and to shed blood over the earth. 6. On this account his name was called Sêrâch, for Sêrâch turned himself in all things to do all kinds of sin. 7. And he grew and dwelt in Ur of the Chaldees near to the father of the mother of his wife,

and he worshipped idols, and he took to himself a wife in the thirty-sixth jubilee, in the fifth week, in the first year thereof, and her name was Mëlka, the daughter of Kêher, the daughter of the brother of his father. And she bore him a son Nakôr, in the first year of this week, and he grew and dwelt in Ur of the Chaldees, and his father taught him the researches of the Chaldees, divination and astrology according to the signs of the heavens. 8. And in the thirty-seventh jubilee, in the sixth week, in the first year thereof, he took to himself a wife, and her name was Ijôsek, the daughter of Nêsteg of the Chaldees. 9. And she bore him Tarah in the seventh year of this week. 10. And the prince Mastema sent ravens and birds that they should eat what was sown on the land, in order to destroy the land, so that they might deprive the children of men of their labor, for before they plowed in the seed the ravens picked it up from the surface of the ground. 11. On that account his father called his name Tarah, because the ravens and the birds robbed them and devoured their seed. 12. And the years began to be barren on account of the birds, and all the fruit of the trees they ate from the trees; with great strength they were able to save a little from all the fruit of the land in their days. 13. And in the thirty-ninth jubilee, in the second week, in the first year, Tarah took to himself a wife, and her name was Edna, the daughter of Abram, the daughter of the sister of his father. 14. And in the seventh year of this week she bore him a son, and he called his name Abram by the name of the father of his mother, for he had died before his daughter conceived a son. 15. And the child began to understand the errors of the earth, that all went astray after the images and after uncleanness; and his father taught him writing when two weeks of years old; and he separated himself from his father that he might not worship the idols with him. 16. And he began to pray to the Creator of all things that he should save him from the errors of the children of men, and that his portion should

not fall into error after uncleanness and shame. 17. And the time of seed came to sow it upon the land, and all came out together to watch their seed against the ravens, and Abram came out with those that came out, and he was a boy of fourteen years. 18. And a cloud of ravens came to devour the seed, and Abram ran to scatter them before they sat down on the earth to eat the seed, and said: "Do not devour; return to the place whence you came!" and they turned back. 19. And clouds of ravens returned that day seven times, and of all the ravens none sat down upon any of the land where Abram was, and not one was left there. 20. And all those that were with him on the whole land saw him crying, and all the ravens turned back, and great was his name in all the land of the Chaldees. 21. And there came to him in this year all those that had sowed seed, and he would go with them until the time of sowing in the land ceased, and they sowed in their land, and in this year they brought home grain, and ate it and were satisfied. 22. And in the fifth year of the fifth week Abram taught those who make the instruments for oxen, the workmen in wood, and they made utensils over the earth, opposite the crook timber of the plows in order to put the seed thereon, and to let the seed fall out of it into the seed furrows. 23. And it was hidden in the earth, and they no longer feared the ravens; and thus they did on all the crook-timber of the plows over the earth, and they sowed and worked the land each one as Abram had commanded them, and no longer feared the ravens.

ARTICLE X.
CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

I. AMERICAN.

Evidently Progressive Orthodoxy is no mere side issue with the *ANDOVER REVIEW*. In their editorial (February number) on the Ignatian letters they state what every one must know to be true, that "there was once a vigorous Christianity without a New Testament." Few, however, will be likely to assent to the inference which they think follows from this premise, namely, that "the obvious lesson is, that the church has nothing to fear from historical criticism. If it were able to multiply almost indefinitely the difficulties which now exist in respect to portions of the Canon, more, far more, of truth than was realized by the churches to which Ignatius wrote would be still assured to us beyond controversy by criticism itself; and now, as in the early time, the one indubitable proof, the inviolable charter, of Christianity is the historic Christ" (p. 185). We beg leave to ask where they get their idea of the historic Christ? They certainly have little material on which to work outside of the New Testament, and if they do not accept all of the New Testament their conception of Christ is not as full as that which is entertained by ordinary Christians. To what limits the criticisms recommended by the *Andover Review* would reduce us we may judge by consulting the writings of Reuss, which they highly commend. He holds that the Apocalypse is no longer of authority, that Second Peter is a forgery, that we do not know who wrote the Fourth Gospel, and that the introductory chapters of Matthew and Luke are doubtful traditions. We fear the mass of the clergy do not perceive how far reaching these slighting suggestions concerning the importance of the New Testament are. With no "inviolable charter" but such as is left us by the so-called "refined Christian sentiment" of the *Andover Critics*, we are in danger of being left with neither helm nor compass.

Being thus set free from the trammels of New Testament exegesis, the editors proceed in the following manner to sustain their doctrine of continued probation. First, they quote a passage from Ignatius: "The divine prophets set their hope on Him, awaited his coming, expected Him as their teacher, were saved in Him. He came and raised them from the dead"

Here are two points: (1) The doctrine of the *descensus ad inferos*—and by implication the Andover doctrine of a preaching to the souls in Hades, and consequently of a continued probation—was “universal” in the church of the second century. (2) This implies “prior and trusted”—that is, apostolic—“authority for it.”

(1) The passage referred to is Magnesians, ch. 9 (οὐ καὶ οἱ προφῆται μαθηταὶ ὄντες τῷ πνεύματι ὡς διδάσκαλον αὐτὸν προσεδόκων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὃν δικαίως ἀνέμεινον, παρὼν ἤγειρεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ νεκρῶν). The Andover version is a mere paraphrase. We prefer to follow the Ante-Nicene Library, and render: “Whose disciples the prophets themselves in the Spirit did wait for him as their Teacher. And therefore he whom they rightly waited for, being come, raised them from the dead.” Now we say that there is but little probability that the *descensus ad inferos* is referred to in this passage. The interpolator who formed the so-called Long Recension did not understand it so, for he paraphrases thus: “The prophets were his servants, and foresaw him by the Spirit, and waited for him as their teacher, and expected him as their Lord and Saviour, saying, ‘He will come and save us.’” This was not because he himself rejected a doctrine which he found in Ignatius, and so suppressed it, for he did not reject it, as see Trallians, L. R. ch. 9: “For, says the Scripture, ‘Many bodies of the saints that slept, arose,’ their graves being opened. He descended indeed into Hades alone, but he arose accompanied by a multitude.” The true meaning is probably that suggested by the parallel passage, Philad. 5: “And let us also love the Prophets, because they too have proclaimed the Gospel, and placed their hope in him, and waited for him; in whom also believing they were saved, through union to Jesus Christ, being holy men,” etc. This is our ordinary modern idea of the relation of the Old Testament saints to Jesus Christ, and salvation through him. The true meaning of the passage, Magn. 9, is therefore probably to be explained as a reference to Matt. xxvii. 52, in which the idea of the *descensus* is not broached.

But let that pass. Suppose it is the *descensus*. This does not make it the “universal” doctrine of the first group of writers after the New Testament, the Apostolic Fathers, who are most important for one who will make inferences to a prior authority. It is not even their *general*—not even their *common* doctrine, for we think that Ignatius is the only one of this group that the *Review* will quote for the doctrine, and there are seven others, including Hermas, to whom we shall refer again below.

As to the other writers referred to by Lightfoot, since his work is not before us, we cannot enter into a minute examination of the argument. The text usually quoted for Justin Martyr is Trypho, 72, in which he accuses the Jews of having omitted from their text of Scripture the following passage claimed to be from Jeremiah: “The Lord God remembered his dead people of Israel who lay in the graves; and he descended to preach to them his own salvation.” Justin adds neither note nor comment! Hermas, Sim. ix. ch. 16, does teach that *the apostles* preached the gospel to the dead after their own death, and gave them “the seal of the preaching.” Ire-

næus teaches the *descensus*, but it is to bring up from Hades "those who proclaimed his advent, and submitted to his dispensations, the *righteous men*, the prophets, and the patriarchs" (iv. 27, 2) and none others (cf. iv. 22, 1 and v. 31). So Tertullian (de Anima, 7 and 55). Clement of Alexandria (Strom. vi. 6) teaches that the Saviour and the apostles preach the gospel in Hades to *all* men, and Origen (Cels. ii. 43) speaks of Christ's "converting such men as were willing to himself."

Now, if the passage in Ignatius explains certain passages in the New Testament, and thus favors the Andover view of continued probation, then these later passages explain Ignatius. Leaving out Clement and Origen, their voice is unanimous for their preaching being confined to the Old Testament saints,—which is too narrow for the Andover view. Or, including these writers, there is no general consent, except as to the mere fact of the *descensus*. And the particular view advocated by Clement and Origen is too broad for the present Andover view.

So, after all, the doctrine of the *descensus* is not "universal" in the second century; nor is what there is of it at all after the Andover sort. Indeed, there would seem to be a steady progress of thought in the wrong direction, from a hint given by Ignatius, and probably misunderstood, towards a view which we suppose even the Andover theologians regard as unevangelical,—that of Clement.

(2) But, again, we object as strongly to the logic of the argument, as to the interpretation of the facts. History can afford nothing more than a subsidiary argument,—never a primary one,—for a doctrine of faith. If a doctrine rest on sound exegesis, its occurrence in an early church father may form a confirmatory argument in favor of the exegesis. The doctrine of continued probation has no exegetical foundation. Even the text in Peter permits us only, according to the Andover professors, to hold their theory as an *hypothesis*,—a possible explanation. To go, now, outside of the Bible itself for its explanation is to erect into a standard of authority something which has not the slightest claim to be thus regarded. It is to make the opinions of fallible, and often foolish men interpret infallibility! The attempt is weak, and especially so in the case before us. The age of Ignatius was an uncritical age. None of the great doctrines had begun to receive critical study. To suppose that at such a time, three centuries before the church had got to the point of formulating a doctrine of sin, a doctrine of eschatology could be clearly held, is absurd. To quote Ignatius in any such a way would be to abuse history, or exhibit total ignorance of its province. To quote him as an exegetical authority is equally absurd.

We know that the *Andover Review* spurns prudential considerations. We therefore ask attention only to certain demands of *logical* consistency. If we are to accept the *descensus ad inferos* as an apostolic doctrine on the authority of Ignatius, so we must his unscriptural exaltation of the bishop in the church; and if we admit the decisive authority of the further development of this idea among the later writers, so we must admit the same in the case of the episcopal system. If the authority of Irenæus and Origen

is decisive in favor of the preaching of the gospel to the inhabitants of Hades, then it is decisive in favor of the ransom paid to the devil as an element of the atonement of Christ. If Clement of Alexandria is to be erected into an authority here, he must also in his realistic doctrine of our union with Christ.

But this is to ground theology on history. It has all the faults and none of the merits of the Roman Catholic exaltation of tradition.

THE BAPTIST QUARTERLY REVIEW for January has a symposium upon the Inspiration of the Apostles, containing many restatements which are specially valuable for their clearness and discrimination. Dr. Dodge, of Hamilton, N. Y., forcibly remarks: "We have no heart to tear into shreds the histories and letters of apostolic men. They are all of one piece, each complete in its way and after its kind. One must accept or reject each one as a whole. The critic who claims that some clause, torn from its connections, is without any religious significance, must present his reasons. The burden of proof rests on him. It will be time enough to consider such proof when it is presented, if it shall be found to deserve any serious consideration whatever" (p. 54).

President Robinson, of Brown University, dwells upon the analogy between the apparent imperfections of nature and those of the Bible.

Dr. Manly, of Louisville, to the remark that "the greetings to Tryphena and Amplias, the commendation of Phœbe, and the counsel to Timothy as to his health, are purely personal, private, and secular," replies: "But the record of these personal suggestions and feelings may have been controlled and directed by infinite wisdom, nevertheless. The obvious and important inferences from them, and the light they cast incidentally on the social and church life of early Christians, are of the highest value, and amply justify their presence in the record" (p. 63).

Dr. Lincoln, of Newton, sums up his argument under four heads: (1) The New Testament recognizes the infallible inspiration of the Old Testament. (2) By the light thrown upon the Old Testament we can understand the inspiration promised to the apostles. "With the record before us of the profound reverence cherished for the Old Testament Scriptures as a source of infallible truth and clothed with absolute authority, it would be a strange inversion of God's law of progress to attach less authority to the New Testament. If, under the imperfect light of the early dispensation and the incomplete help of the Holy Spirit, prophets were guarded against error and enabled to minister the perfect truth to later generations, so that no word of their teachings could be changed, is there room for doubt that in the final dispensation, under the full illumination of the Spirit, the inspiration is infallible, and no dross of human error dims the pure gold of divine truth" (p. 70)? (3) The authority of apostolic teaching was absolute. (4) The view of infallible inspiration, taught in the New Testament, is confirmed by the judgment of post-apostolic times.

Dr. Pepper, replying to the objection to the authority of our apostolical writings from the contingency attaching to their order and preservation,

aply remarks: "Human history is a mighty complex of contingencies, itself a prolonged contingency. Does this exclude eternal purpose? a foreseeing and decreeing and guiding mind? the inspiration of men by an infallible spirit to make known in a setting of contingencies the very truth of God which as expressed shall in every jot and tittle be fulfilled, because in every jot and tittle God's own mind and will? To urge the casual and contingent origin of Scripture as an objection to its value and authority is not valid. It might well be that, as God saw and judged, writings of such origin and sort would be the very best to meet the wants of after ages of men who must every one live a life of contingency. Nor may we rashly infer that the apostles had no clear knowledge that their writings were to carry God's revelation to the ages" (p. 76).

Dr. Stevens dwells upon the probability of the continuance of supernatural endowments in the church throughout the first century, these endowments being intimated in the New Testament by the reference to the prophets and to the discerning of spirits, as in 1 Cor. xiv. 29. He thinks "the canon, if not completed, was chiefly formed at that period, under the direction of men extraordinarily endowed with prophetic and discriminative intuition" (p. 83).

Dr. Owen, of Denison University, thus presents the presumption, from the nature of the case: "It is asking much to expect reasonable men to believe the Almighty would fail to have a true and perfect record kept, when the Lord came to his work. Let it be granted that he who came as Messiah, was, as believers know, the eternal Son of God, then his very presence requires that those who are with him shall come to a clear understanding of his mission and truly present it. Let it be remembered that it is a work for men, and that their true reception of Him with a faith that is at least intelligent as to its real import is essential, so essential that their eternal well-being depends upon it, and it is incredible that this should not be made known in such a way that error to the true hearted would be impossible. Consider that when the Lord came he chose the twelve definitely for this very purpose, that they might report his work, and you will see that if God has any thing at all to do with the affairs of men he must give to these men such guiding and control that no mistake shall come from them" (p. 86).

In the PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW Professor Caven concludes a long article upon the Revised Version of the Bible as a Whole with the following remarks:

"The conclusion to which we have come—that no doctrine held by the Church of God requires modification in consequence of the revision now made—by no means implies that theology will not profit by the laborious work of the revision. It is of importance to show all readers of the Scriptures that no possible change or emendation of the English Bible can substantially affect the doctrine of the Church of God; and it is necessary that every mistranslation which has lent support to true dogma should be corrected: '*non tali auxilio*'" (p. 87).

"No service rendered to the Bible since 1611 can be regarded as transcending in importance the work of revision now completed. For, while prodigious labor of textual critics and translators—of biblical scholarship in all departments—had gone before, and made a revision such as this possible, the results of this great and various labor are here gathered up and utilized for the benefit of millions of people—of whole nations. The work is not perfect, but the Revised Version will certainly be placed at the head of all translations of the Scriptures which have yet been made. It will be seen more clearly than ever that 'the words of the Lord are pure words; as silver tried in a furnace of earth, purified seven times'" (p. 88).

The editor of the *OLD TESTAMENT STUDENT* is pushing earnestly the matter of biblical study in the theological seminaries and among the working ministry. In every issue so far this year he has returned to the subject with renewed vigor, exposing unsparingly the defects, and indicating the improvements needed, in the usual methods. The following paragraph from the March number puts very plainly some painful truths:

"In some institutions of sacred learning (the statement is made guardedly) Bible-study is a farce; in too many it is sadly neglected. In very few does the work correspond to the vital relation which, it is generally believed, a true conception of the Bible events and precepts sustains to the efficient accomplishment of the minister's work. This is felt to some extent by instructors in these institutions; to some extent also by the men who study in them; but much more keenly by those who have passed through the course of study, and, having reached their fields of labor, find themselves but poorly equipped for their work. The ignorance of the Bible which characterizes the average seminary graduate is amazing. Nor does *he* realize it until he stands in the very midst of the conflict for which a proper knowledge of the Book would have armed him."

For the help of those who would remedy this bad state of affairs the editor announces a series of "Studies," or rather outlines for studies, designed to facilitate the acquisition of real Bible-knowledge, the cultivation of an historical spirit, and the attainment of a habit of independent investigation. The first of these—upon First Samuel—promises well for the series.

II. ENGLISH.

The recent revival of the discussion respecting the relation of Genesis to geology in English periodicals is remarkable. In the January number of the *EXPOSITOR* Dr. Driver, Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, gives the result of his prolonged study upon the subject. What he says upon the scientific aspects of the subject, however, is less important than that which relates to the exegetical. Upon the propriety of taking the word "day" in the first of Genesis to represent a prolonged period, while holding that the word must signify a literal day, he adds:

"At the same time the possibility must be admitted that the writer may have consciously used the term figuratively, fully aware on the one hand that the work of the Creator could not be measured by human standards,

but on the other hand desirous of artificially accommodating it to the period of the week. In spite of the phrases *evening* and *morning*, which seem to imply literal days, the supposition that the narrator meant his 'days' as the figurative representation of periods should not, as the present writer ventures to think, be ruled out as inadmissible."

"The question, however, is not so much what the word *means*, as whether or not it may have been applied figuratively by the writer. It seems reasonable to admit that this may have been the case. The 'morning' and 'evening' will then be part, not of the reality, but of the representation" (p. 27.)

In these remarks Dr. Driver only states a principle which is so clear as not to need repetition or emphasis, except for the fact that ill-advised statements have recently been put forward in this country by persons in prominent positions who assume to speak with authority. The truth is, as Dr. Driver clearly perceives, that the meaning of such terms is not a question of mere etymology or Hebrew grammar, but of the broader questions of rhetoric, upon which the judgment of any well-informed literary person is of about as much value as that of a specialist in Hebrew. Broad-minded scientific men like Dana and Guyot cannot by good rights, therefore, be warned off from this field, and men of wide literary tastes and political experience, like Gladstone, are in their appropriate province when estimating, from general considerations, the character of such a document as that containing the cosmogony of Genesis. It is, therefore, with great satisfaction that we find the distinguished Premier drawn out so recently into giving a distinct statement of his views upon this subject.

In the NINETEENTH CENTURY for November Mr. Gladstone was led, in reply to criticisms from M. Réville upon his previous endorsement of the scientific accuracy of the allusions in Genesis, to reaffirm his belief that such accuracy could have been attained only as the result of divine inspiration. In the brief statements of this article Mr. Gladstone very naturally left himself open to some slight criticism, from a scientific point of view. Professor Huxley, taking advantage of this seeming defect, volunteered to make in the December number of the *Nineteenth Century* what he apparently thought was a final and irresistible assault upon the position of those who assume to reconcile the statements of Genesis and the conclusions of geology. The chief value of Mr. Huxley's criticism seems, however, to have been that it served to draw out from Mr. Gladstone a reply in which he gives his full strength to the points in question. In comparing the two arguments, one cannot fail to be struck with the limitations under which Mr. Huxley labors from his lack of familiarity with literature and with the principles of interpreting literary documents, while Mr. Gladstone's pre-eminence in these respects gives him a remarkable advantage; and the scientific authorities upon which he depends are so eminent and decided in their statements that Mr. Huxley has no advantage over him even in this respect, for it must be remembered that Mr. Huxley's specialty is neither physics nor geology, but anatomy.

The following extracts from Mr. Gladstone's second article are noteworthy :

"He [Mr. Huxley] holds the writer [of Genesis i.] responsible for scientific precision : I look for nothing of the kind, but assign to him a statement general, which admits exceptions ; popular, which aims mainly at producing moral impression ; summary, which cannot but be open to more or less of criticism in detail. He thinks it is a lecture. I think it is a sermon. He describes living creatures by structure. The Mosaic writer describes them by *habitat*. Both I suppose are right. I suppose description by *habitat* would be unavailing for the purposes of science. I feel sure that description by structure, such as the geologists supply, would have been unavailing for the purpose of summary teaching with religious aim" (p. 5).

"No doubt there may be a degree of literalism which will even suffice to show that, as 'every winged fowl' was produced on the fourth day of the Hexaemeron, therefore the birth of new fowls continually is a contradiction to the text of Genesis. But does not the equity of common sense require us to understand simply that the order of 'winged fowl,' whatever that may mean, took its place in creation at a certain time, and that from that time its various component classes were in course of production" (p. 8)?

"What the Mosaic writer had in his mind were the creatures with which Adamic man was conversant" (p. 9).

"How came the Mosaic writer to place the fishes and men in their true relative positions not only to one another, and not only to the rest of the animal succession, but in a definite and that a true relation of time to the origin of the first plant-life, and to the colossal operations by which the earth was fitted for them all" (p. 11)?

"The five origins, or first appearances of plants, fishes, birds, mammals and man, are given to us in Genesis in the order of succession, in which they are also given by the latest geological authorities" (p. 14).

"He [Huxley] seems to assume that revelation is to be conceived of as if it were a lawyer's parchment, or a sum in arithmetic, wherein a flaw discovered at a particular point is *ipso facto* fatal to the whole. . . . There is the uncertainty of translation ; translators are not inspired. There is the difficulty of transcription ; transcribers are not inspired, and an element of error is inseparable from the work of a series of copyists" (p. 15).

"It is perfectly conceivable that a document penned by the human hand, and transmitted by human means, may contain matter questionable, uncertain, or even mistaken and yet may, by its contents as a whole, present such *πικτεῖς*, such moral proofs of truth Divinely imparted, as ought irrefragably *pro tanto* to command assent and govern practice. A man may possibly admit something not reconciled, and yet may be what Mr. Huxley denounces as a Reconciler" (p. 16).

"I do not suppose it would be feasible, even for Professor Huxley, taking the nebular hypothesis and geological discovery for his guides, to give, in the compass of the first twenty-seven verses of Genesis, an account of the cosmogony, and of the succession of life in the stratification of the earth, which would combine scientific precision of statement with the majesty, the

simplicity, the intelligibility, and the impressiveness of the record before us. Let me modestly call it, for argument's sake, an approximation to the present presumptions and conclusions of science. Let me assume that the statement in the text as to plants, and the statement of verses 24, 25 as to reptiles, cannot in all points be sustained; and yet still there remain great unshaken facts to be weighed. First, the fact that such a record should have been made at all. Secondly, the fact that, instead of dwelling in generalities, it has placed itself under the severe conditions of a chronological order, reaching from the first *nisus* of chaotic matter to the consummated production of a fair and goodly, a furnished and a peopled world. Thirdly, the fact that its cosmogony seems, in the light of the nineteenth century, to draw more and more of countenance from the best natural philosophy; and, fourthly, that it has described the successive origins of the five great categories of present life, with which human experience was and is conversant, in that order which geological authority confirms. How came these things to be? How came they to be, not among Accadians, or Assyrians, or Egyptians, who monopolised the stores of human knowledge when this wonderful tradition was born; but among the obscure records of a people who, dwelling in Palestine for twelve hundred years from their sojourn in the valley of the Nile, hardly had force to stamp even so much as their name upon the history of the world at large, and only then began to be admitted to the general communion of mankind when their Scriptures assumed the dress which a Gentile tongue is needed to supply? It is more rational, I contend, to say that these astonishing anticipations were a God-given supply, than to suppose that a race who fell uniformly and entirely short of the great intellectual development of antiquity, should here not only have equalled and outstripped it, but have entirely transcended, in kind even more than in degree, all known exercise of human faculties.

“Whether this was knowledge conveyed to the mind of the Mosaic author, I do not presume to determine. There has been, in the belief of Christians, a profound providential purpose, little or variously visible to us, which presided, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, over the formation of the marvellous compound which we term the Holy Scriptures. This we wonderingly embrace without being much perplexed by the questions which are raised on them; for instance, by the question, in what exact relation the books of the Apocrypha, sometimes termed deuterocanonical, stand to the books of the Hebrew canon. Difficulties of detail, such as may (or ultimately may not) be found to exist in the Proem to Genesis, have much the same relation to the evidence of revealed knowledge in this record, as the spots in the sun to his all-unfolding and sufficing light. But as to the Mosaic writer himself, all I presume to accept is the fact that he put upon undying record, in this portion of his record, a series of particulars which, interpreted in the growing light of modern knowledge, require from us, on the whole, as reasonable men, the admission that we do not see how he could have written them, and that in all likelihood he did not write them, without aid from the guidance of more than human power. It is in this guidance, and not necessarily or

uniformly in the consciousness of the writer, that, according to my poor conception, the idea of revelation mainly lies" (pp. 16, 17).

"Those who take for the burden of their song 'Respect religion, but despise theology,' seem to me just as rational as if a person were to say 'Admire the trees, the plants, the flowers, the sun, moon, or stars, but despise botany and despise astronomy.' Theology is ordered knowledge, representing in the region of the intellect what religion represents in the heart and life of man. And this religion, Mr. Huxley says a little farther on, is summed up in the terms of the prophet Micah (vi. 8): 'Do justly, and love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God.' . . . Mr. Huxley appears to cite these terms of Micah as if they reduced the work of religion from a difficult to a very easy performance. But look at them again. Examine them well. They are, in truth, in Cowper's words:—

Higher than the heights above,
Deeper than the depths beneath.

Do justly, that is to say, extinguish self; love mercy, cut utterly away all the pride and wrath, and all the cupidity that make this fair world a wilderness; walk humbly with thy God, take His will and set it in the place where thine own was used to rule. 'Ring out the old, ring in the new.' Pluck down the tyrant from his place; set up the true Master on His lawful throne.

"There are certainly human beings, of happy composition, who mount these airy heights with elastic step, and with unabated breath.

Sponte sua, sine lege, fidem rectumque colebat.

This comparative refinement of nature in some may even lead them to undervalue the stores of that rich armoury which Christianity has provided to equip us for our great life-battle. The text of the prophet Micah, developed into all the breadth of St. Paul and St. Augustine, is not too much—is it not often all too little?—for the needs of ordinary men" (p. 20).

Mr. Gladstone's reply to Mr. Huxley was written before he had seen Professor Dana's article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for last April. But, upon seeing that, Mr. Gladstone added the following postscript upon the last page of the *Nineteenth Century* for January:

"I learn with satisfaction that in America, where the stores of geological knowledge have been so greatly enlarged, the business of the Reconciler has been taken into the hands of scientists: Dr. Dana, Professor of Geology in Yale College, and Dr. Arnold Guyot, Professor of Geology and Physical Geography in New Jersey College. Both of these authorities, it appears, have adhered through a long career, and now adhere with increased confidence, to the idea of a substantial harmony between science and the Mosaic text. Professor Dana's latest tract has recently appeared in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April 1885. He thinks the evidence doubtful as to the priority of birds over the low or marsupian mammals (p. 214); but strong for an abundant early plant life in the Azoic period (p. 213): and he holds, with Professor Guyot, that the first, or cosmogonical, portion of the Proem not only accords with, but teaches, the nebular hypothesis (p. 220).

"It is a relief to find that the burden of this argument is shared with wit-

nesses, who are competent and unsuspected on the scientific side ; and who will not be liable to a repetition *mutatis mutandis* of an old objection : '*This people, which knoweth not the law, is accursed.*'" (Nineteenth Century, Jan. 1886, p. 176.)

In reply to this (February Number) Mr. Huxley is reduced to the following unworthy shift :

"There is no one to whose authority on geological questions I am more readily disposed to bow, than that of my eminent friend Professor Dana. But I am familiar with what he has previously said on this topic in his well-known and standard work, into which, strangely enough, it does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Gladstone to look before he set out upon his present undertaking; and unless Professor Dana's latest contribution (which I have not yet met with) takes up altogether new ground, I am afraid I shall not be able to extricate myself, by its help, from my present difficulties" (p. 204).

We submit that this is very uncandid treatment of Mr. Gladstone's use of Professor Dana's authority. The article from the *Bibliotheca Sacra* (April 1885) upon which Mr. Gladstone relied for Professor Dana's opinion upon this subject is of much later date than the Manual of Geology to which Mr. Huxley would refer, and is the Professor's deliberate and full statement of what, after a long lifetime's study of the subject, he believes to be the sober truth. For Mr. Huxley to confess that he has not read this article, and still pretend to know Dana's opinion upon the subject, does not reflect credit upon Mr. Huxley's method of forming opinions.

III. GERMAN.

The closing number of Luthardt's ZEITSCHRIFT for the year 1885 opens with a suggestive article on The Significance for Christianity of a firm position in the Truth. It begins with a lament over the leanness of production in the last decades in Germany of works in the department of systematic theology. But this is not all that is to be lamented. Belief in the existence of objective truth in Christianity has apparently begun to disappear. This is not, however, a phenomenon exclusively confined to theology. The reaction against groundless speculation has gone so far that ontology of every sort is given up, and metaphysics have fallen into contempt. In different ways a long series of theologians, from Schleiermacher to Ritschl, have based theology upon the "feeling," or upon the "ethical," or something else, but not on facts or upon any real knowledge of God or divine truth in general. And one school of thought exalts criticism into the place of theology, and takes as its motto, Belief in a fact is superstition.

The writer now goes on to show that Christianity has its foundation in an objective truth. Such is the meaning of the word *faith*, which presupposes the eternal reality of that in which we believe. So the whole conception of salvation rests upon reverence for and fear of the realities of the unseen world. In the statement that Jesus Christ is the Son of God lies a wealth of objective truth. The condition of salvation proclaimed by the Apostle (Rom. x. 9) demands the acceptance of certain truths elsewhere distinctly formulated. And so the church has ever taught.

It is upon this firm foundation that Christianity must be built up. The mere acceptance of the truth presupposes a knowledge of it. This may be an imperfect knowledge, but it must nevertheless be real. Its evidence lies in the fact that it touches the conscience. It excites whatever sense of truth the heart may possess, and thereby is received as the truth by the soul. And thus evidenced, it sounds through the soul with the power of an authority that demands immediate and unconditional obedience. It awakens conscience to self-reproach, but then it heals it, as medicine does the sick man, and thereby brings it to the consciousness that such is the truth it needs. Now it moves the will, first, to perfect its theoretical knowledge, for even here the will is active; and, then, to practical self-surrender, a more difficult thing. Thus the man becomes a Christian. But now he has to ground himself thoroughly in the truth. His knowledge must be deepened till it becomes something more than a mere external knowing of isolated facts. "True knowledge is only possible when one already has faith, and it comes through the new life received through the same. No one can truly know God till he is known of him. Only the disciple of Jesus knows the truth, which then has the power to make him free. This is Anselm's *credo ut intelligam*. Or, as Godet puts it: *Une nouvelle vue suppose une nouvelle vie*. In no department can one have thorough knowledge without surrendering himself to it. Divine things demand this, however, in an especial degree. One must love them to know them (Pascal). They disclose their heart only to him who opens his heart to them. Constant devotion of the heart to the living God in faith, an ever renewed consecration of love, are, therefore, indispensable to give new impulses towards knowledge, and to make this profound. To desire to know God is the same as to give him the honor which is his due. In so far is indifference towards the truth a sin against God!" So now it is the problem of the Christian to seek to know more of God.

"As certainly as the word of God ought to be the constant nourishment of the new life, and as a confident, steady spiritual life is impossible without a clear, well-grounded knowledge, so certainly belongs the leadership in the course of the spiritual life to progressive acquaintance with the truth, just as the knowledge of the latter was the condition of the rise of the former. 'His divine power hath granted unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness through the knowledge of him that called us by his own glory and virtue' (2 Pet. i. 3)." The emotions now become more pure, and more sensitive. New power of discerning the truth is bestowed through them. "In connection with this ennobling by the truth, there is joined, further, an ever tenderer sensitiveness to the monitions of conscience. A real repugnance to sin, arising from the new-created heart, springs up,—a feeling of ever more intimate and blessed association with the Lord, a real relish for divine things, a deep-seated joy and confidence." And out of this springs deeper consecration, more earnest conflict with sin, greater victory, and again deeper knowledge of the truth.

"We cannot refrain from giving our theme a practical conclusion. If a

firm position in the truth in the objective and subjective sense has so fundamental a significance, it becomes us all, ministers and people, to be grounded and rooted in the same. To make progress in all departments of worldly knowledge, but to remain upon the plane of childhood in the knowledge and understanding of religious truth, or even to sink below it, produces spiritual deformity. And, in our opinion, this disproportion between our knowledge of spiritual truth and our secular knowledge, since it naturally leads to a contempt for that truth, *is a chief source of unbelief.* In the same way, the disproportion between awakened religious needs and impulses, and a clear, comprehensive knowledge, is, in another direction, the source of much sectarian fanaticism. Whatever operates upon the impulsive side of our being must, if sound and permanent tendencies are to be developed thence, be raised into the sphere of knowledge, illumined and clarified thereby. And no less is the lack of a firm, evangelical position in the truth often the reason why Rome with her artificially constructed and forcibly maintained position, so impresses many. On all sides of this fatal triangle which surrounds us, against the unbelief, sectarianism, or the idealization of the papacy, will the nurture of sound knowledge, and a firm position in the truth be found to be the best defence. This is plain enough with reference to the last two. The first, however,—unbelief,—it is thought in these days, may be won for Christianity, and reconciled with the same, *by diminishing and weakening Christian doctrine!* But the weakness of compromise only excites contempt and the demand for new concessions. *Nothing but the dignified maintenance of the great truths of the faith inspires respect; and nothing but that can win any one who can be won at all.* How, on the contrary, we are to maintain our position against these powers, if this impoverishing and weakening of the wealth of Christian truth is to continue, it is impossible to perceive."

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN THEOLOGY. By the Professors of Chicago Theological Seminary. Vol. iii. Chicago: F. H. Revel. 1885. (pp. 359. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ×3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.50.

This volume and its predecessors aim to furnish an equivalent of the German *Theologischer Jahresbericht*. The effort of the editors to publish such an annual is most praiseworthy, and augurs well for the future of theological scholarship in this country. The aim is to present in the shortest possible form a review each year of the advance of theological science, and to guide the student to the sources of information, whatever his particular line of study may be. The work is carried on throughout in a candid and impartial spirit, and is in general well done. It is satisfactory also to find this work in the hands of writers who not only possess the true scholarly instincts, but have, as well, sound judgment and full sympathy with the evangelical spirit of Anglo-Saxon Christianity. The articles upon the literature of the New Testament by Professor Hyde, and of the Old Testament by Professor Curtiss, are marked with due respect for what is established as well as proper hospitality for whatever seems to be true in new views. The most difficult task falls to Professor Scott, who prepares the chapter on Church History, for in this department the flood of publications is peculiarly bewildering. Nevertheless we are not put off with merely a catalogue of names and titles but a brief digest of the whole is attempted. Under Systematic Theology Professor Boardman deals, in its place, with the progressive orthodoxy of the *Andover Review* and finds it wanting in elements of permanent interest. The articles of Professor Fiske on Homiletics and of Professor Wilcox on Pastoral Theology are also discriminating and helpful.

Professor Fiske's wonder at a typographical error in Dr. Peabody's Sermons suggests us to say that we have been annoyed by the numerous oversights in the proof reading of Current Discussions. At a single opening, for instance (pp. 42, 43), we find no less than seven typographical errors in the French and German words employed. It also strikes us that the field covered by an annual of this sort is so vast that the editors might profitably call to their aid specialists from other seminaries than this single one. But as it is, they are doing what no one else has undertaken, and are rendering an invaluable service to the English-speaking public.

STUDIA BIBLICA: Essays in Biblical Archaeology and Criticism and Kindred Subjects. By members of the University of Oxford. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1885. (pp. viii. 263. 7×3 $\frac{1}{4}$.)

The contributors to this volume are all scholars of eminence in their sev-

eral departments, and together they have produced a work of rare value to scholars. Professor S. R. Driver opens with a discussion of recent theories on the Origin and Nature of the Tetragrammaton, concluding that none of them can be regarded as established, and that no ground appears at present to exist for questioning the purely Israelitish origin of the Tetragrammaton, or the explanation of its meaning which is given in Exodus iii. 14. Dr. Woods of St. John's College furnishes an able paper on the Light thrown by the Septuagint Version on the Books of Samuel. The conclusion at which he arrives is that the Septuagint "enables us to recover in several cases the original reading of the Hebrew," and in a few other cases to "conclude almost with certainty that a reading is corrupt." Dr. Neubauer of Exeter College writes on Dialects spoken in Palestine at the time of Christ. His conclusion is that "the small Jewish-Greek colony and some privileged persons spoke Greek, which was, however a translation from the Hebrew rather than genuine Greek, in a word, a Judeo-Greek jargon." Dr. Ederseim writes on a new theory of the origin and composition of the Synoptic Gospels proposed by G. Wetzel. This theory is that the materials out of which our canonical Gospels are composed are substantially the lectures given, as he supposes, by Matthew at Jerusalem to the Hellenists who from time to time came up to Palestine, and were in need of instruction in their own tongue concerning the facts in Christ's life. These lectures he supposes were preserved partly in the retentive memories of the eager listeners, and partly in notes. Of these reports Mark's Gospel is supposed to be the simplest and oldest. But both Matthew and Luke are supposed to contain additions from other sources, of which the accounts of the Infancy are specimens. Dr. Ederseim does not give his adhesion to this theory, but merely presents it as a specimen of the fertility of speculation for some time rife on this class of subjects, and accompanies the presentation with much valuable criticism of other theories. What he has given makes the reader wish the learned author had given more. Indeed this is the case with nearly all the papers. Their brevity prevents an adequate treatment such as the authors are eminently qualified to give.

THEOLOGIK, ODER ENCYKLOPÄDIE DER THEOLOGIE. Dargestellt von Dr. J. F. Rübiger, ord. Professor der ev. Theologie an der Universität zu Breslau. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag (R. Reisland). 1880. (viii. 554. S.) (New York: Stechert.)

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THEOLOGY. By Dr. J. F. Rübiger, Ordinary Professor of Evangelical Theology at the University of Breslau. Translated with Additions to the History and Literature, by the Rev. John Macpherson, M.A., Findhorn. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1884-5. (Vol. i. pp. 430; vol. ii. pp. viii. 431. 9½×6.) (Clark's Foreign Theological Library. New Series. Vols. xx. and xxi.)

We welcome another Anglo-German contribution to our small but increas-

at least rather "practical." Rübiger scouts all "practical" considerations, and makes his task "determining the nature of theology according to its contents and form, and then, on the ground of its nature, developing the organic arrangement of its principal divisions and of the branches belonging to them." His encyclopaedia, therefore, is neither an introduction to, nor compendium of theological science, though approaching the latter. It is encyclopaedia for encyclopaedia's sake, Teutonically scientific, and therefore intended for nobody but a technical encyclopaedist. This is not to say that it has no value for others. That would be far from the truth. All amateurs as well, as all ambitious scholars should be, will find it interesting and suggestive, especially if they have no better.

The average German-reading student will find Zückler more profitable. The average theological student, of two, had better read Hagenbach, but one who does not read German will find this introducing him to a region of stimulating thought quite new to him, and, supplementing and for the most part replacing Rübiger by Hagenbach, he will have a skeleton of theology on which he may lay flesh as fast as his training and talents will permit.

The work is interesting. The author knows what he wants to do, and does not forget it. He gets into a curious snarl, however, in naming what he does. He seems to have a sort of consciousness that what he is doing is encyclopaedia, and so feels bound to prove that "formal" (Hagenbach, Schleiermacher, etc.) encyclopaedia is not, but "material" is, encyclopaedia. Having proved, thus, that his method is the only true "encyclopaedia," he suggests that it be called *Theologik*! Encyclopaedia is encyclopaedia, whether intended for the student, the theologian, or the encyclopaedist, whether Hagenbach or Zückler or Rübiger; as botany is botany, for the beginner, the amateur, or the specialist. This discussion, in which our author is not alone, is much like the question, "What is the best size for a house?" discussed as a "pure" rather than a "positive" scientific question.

Dr. Rübiger's treatment of his subject is acute, but narrow. Theology, with him, is the Science of the Christian Religion. He practically co-ordinates it with law or medicine, as special encyclopaedia. The Christian religion is to him "a particular form of religion." "To a long series of religions Christianity attaches itself as a particular historical religion." Religion is "a characteristic product of the human spirit," and "has, like every thing else, its historical course." He therefore treats theology as a strictly historical science, and with all the freedom and bias of a moderate rationalism. The coolness with which he speaks of a time when "negative criticism had demolished the principles of the orthodox theology" (vol. i. p. 160) distinctly puts him out from among the lukewarm.

Treating the subject as he does, he yet retains the fourfold division: (1) The idea of Christianity (Exegetical); (2) Its real historical development (Historical); (3) The proving of its absolute truth (Systematic); (4) The realization of the idea (Practical).

The task of exegetical theology, he says, is "to recognize and set forth Christianity in its historical originality upon the ground of the literary

sources which it has at its command. Its task, therefore, is a purely historical one." Dr. Grimm (*Z. f. wiss. Theol.*, 1882, s. 6), who takes the same ground, logically unites exegetical under historical, and urges reason that the fourfold division is justifiable only on the ground of a strict theory of inspiration which makes the Bible the absolute divine truth. Dr. Rübiger in his reply (*Zur theol. Encykl.*, Bresl. 1882, s. 72 sq. Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 415 sq.) has done little more than reassert his position.

One objects to giving the name "exegetical" to a division in which exegesis is a simple means, rather than a result. Exegetical theology ought to be that whose result is exegesis—the explanation of the meaning of the sources so that its result is the body of material clearly understood. As soon as you begin to arrange the facts according to the historical development or the philosophical relation, you pass out of exegetical theology.

Dr. Rübiger thus rightly places biblical theology under what he wrongly styles exegetical theology, and adds one to the growing list of authorities who, on one ground or another, are metamorphosing exegetical theology by introducing confessedly historical disciplines.

Dr. Rübiger, by the way, defines biblical theology as "the history of the Old and New Testament religion."

Another peculiarity of our author is his division of systematic theology into the theology of religion, dogmatics, and ethics, excluding apologetics, polemics, and irenics. Under historical theology he makes one of his branches a history of culture. If this work succeeds in introducing into general use among us this much-needed expression, it will not have been translated in vain.

One of the most valuable features of the work (though useless to the ordinary reader) is the long history of encyclopaedia. Another, of more general usefulness, is the selected bibliographies, in which a man dismayed by the weary waste of titles in the translation of Hagenbach, will take a great deal of comfort.

The work of the translator and editor has been, in the main, unusually well done. The editor really seems to know something about the literature; and the occasional notes, while showing a tendency to quotation, and to explaining the things which he happens to know about, indicate a command of the literature of the subject which we venture to say very few this side of the Atlantic have.

Besides the translation of the *Theologik*, and occasional notes, the work of the editor has been the translation of Rübiger's *Zur theologischen Encyclopädie* (Breslau, 1882), which contains reviews of Hagenbach, Hofmann, Rothe, and Grimm, and the insertion of it partly in the history of encyclopaedia, and partly in Appendices A and B; a discussion of the place of apologetics (Appendix C); and considerable additions to the history of ency-

misplaced, and lower down the date 1830 is substituted for 1630. Similarly, on p. 97, 1833 is changed to 1883. On p. 55, Mabillon, who is described in the original as "religieux Bénédictin," is transformed into "religieuse Bénédictin" !

Some other inaccuracies and omissions of late editions might be pointed out, but the work of the editor is so superlatively excellent, compared with Hagenbach's editors, as to discourage criticism.

We still wait for an introductory or compendious work suited to American scholars.

KIRCHLICHES HANDELEXICON. Ein Hilfsbuch zur Orientirung auf dem Gesamtgebiete der Theologie und Kirche. In Verbindung mit einer Anzahl evangelisch-lutherischer Theologen herausgegeben von Dr. Phil. Carl Meusel, evang.-luth. Pfarrer. 1. Lieferung. Leipzig: Neumann. New York: Westermann.

We have in this Church Encyclopaedia a book designed to give that kind of ready answer on churchly themes which the various encyclopaedias give on secular. It is designed for the clerical profession, and also for the large circle of laymen whose public connection with the church, whether in secular or ecclesiastical office, or whose private tastes, make such a work a desideratum. Of the thorough competence of the editor, Dr. Meusel, a pastor in Saxony, and that of his co-laborers, we are assured by the three great Leipzig professors, Luthardt, Delitzsch, and Kahnis. The general execution of the work may be seen from the following review of some of the separate articles: *Aachen*, about one column, mentions the distinctive historical features of the place, and gives a *résumé* of the seven imperial diets held here. *Aaron*, three columns. *Abaddon*, five lines. *Abelard*, four columns, account of his life written in a friendly tone, with a list and short description of his principal works. *Abdankung*, definition of the two very diverse technical senses of the word.—The Lord's Supper is discussed in a great variety of articles,—*Abendmahl*; *Abendmahlsbrot*, shall it be leavened? *Abendmahlsfeier*, a description of the various liturgies from the first, including the Reformed churches of the present day; *Abendmahls-gemeinschaft*, *-streitigkeiten*, etc., etc. *Abläss* presents the history and theory of indulgences, briefly, fully, and correctly, two columns. *Abraham*, three columns. *Abstammung des Menschengeschlechts* treats of the unity of the race critically and polemically against Materialism and Darwinism. *Ackerbau bei den Hebräern*, *Acta Martyrum*, and even *Acta Sanctorum* are explained. *Adventisten*, "founded in 1833 by William Miller," are described in twelve lines. *Afrika's Religionen und Missionen* have five columns.

This is perhaps enough to give an idea of the work. We notice further articles on the *Agendenstreit* in Prussia; *Ahlfeld*, of Leipzig (d. 1884);

THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA AND METHODOLOGY. Based on Hagenbach and Krauth. By Revere Franklin Weidner, M.A. Part I. Introduction and Exegetical Theology. Philadelphia: H. B. Garner. 1885. (pp. 183. $6\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$.) \$1.25.

Dr. Weidner has compressed a vast amount of useful material into this small volume. It is of special service to students and young ministers, both in the purchase of books and as a guide to a systematic course of reading. The lists of books are ample, and the brief judgments passed upon them are, in the main, judicious. In the introductory sections the author draws largely from his manuscript notes of the late Dr. Krauth's lectures. To many this will give them additional value, as these lectures have not been published.

GESCHICHTE DES JÜDISCHEN VOLKES IM ZEITALTER JESU CHRISTI. Von Emil Schürer. Zweiter Theil. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1886. (x. 884 S.)

A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE IN THE TIME OF JESUS CHRIST. Second Division: The Internal Condition of Palestine, and of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ. By Emil Schürer. Translated by Sophia Taylor and Rev. Peter Christie. In two volumes. Vols. i. and ii. New York: Scribner and Welford. 1885. (pp. xii. 379 and viii. 327. $7 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$ and $6\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$.) (Clark's Foreign Theological Library. New Series. Vol. xxiii.)

This is an *opus magnum* more in the qualitative than in the quantitative sense. It is both an old and a new work. Of the German, it is a second and much enlarged edition; while it now makes its appearance for the first time in an English dress. Its first German edition was issued in 1874 as a Manual of the History of New Testament Times, when its author was at the bottom of the ladder as a humble *Professor Extraordinarius* in the University of Leipzig; and it, more than anything else, was the means of securing for him recognition as a painstaking and accurate scholar, and a critic of rare abilities, in a land where, as a rule, only real merit wins. Ever since the publication of the Manual, Schürer has been regarded as one of the leading New Testament scholars in Germany. After a lapse of twelve years a new edition has been called for. In the meanwhile the author has, with characteristic German perseverance, continued his researches in this interesting field, and the second part of his work (which here appears before the first), which in the first edition went from pages 371 to 698, has grown to be a separate volume of 884 pages. This, in the English translation, will be divided into three volumes, two of which have appeared, the third being in press. Part First of the whole book is promised within the next twelve months in both German and English.

which, in the providence of God, it was placed as an historical phenomenon and factor. The work is divided into two parts, the first furnishing a clear-cut political history of the Jews from the year 175 B. C., to the destruction of the temple at 70 A. D.; the second furnishing the internal history of the people during this period. Here we have to deal only with the latter. Scope, method, and contents may probably be best understood by mentioning the subjects of the leading paragraphs. The volume opens with a description of Culture in Israel in general during the New Testament period, treating especially of the relations of Judaism to Hellenic culture, the language of the people, and the relation of Judaism to heathenism. Then follows a full description of the political condition of the various Hellenistic towns within the Jewish borders, of the Jewish Sanhedrim, and of the High-Priest. A further chapter (not found in the first German edition) treats of the priesthood and the temple worship, and is rich in its contributions, direct and indirect, to New Testament exegesis. The two following sections are of special interest for the study of the Gospels, treating of the Scribes, the Pharisees and the Sadducees. A further step into the inner life of the people is taken in the chapter on School and Synagogue, the Life under the Law, based almost entirely on Talmudic sources, the Messianic Hope, giving both an Historical and a Systematic Survey. This is followed by a discussion of the Essenes, the Judaism in the Dispersion, and the Proselytes. Here the English translation ends. The German has two further paragraphs—to appear as a third English volume—one on the Palestino-Jewish, and one on the Hellenistic Jewish literature. These are, in every respect, the richest and most complete sections of the book, and they also show the greatest improvement over the first edition.

The merit of Schürer's work, however, lies not only or chiefly in what he gives, but rather in the manner and method of his research. It is entirely based upon the authorities who alone can decide the points in question, and the author has wisely given almost the greater part of his space to citations and quotations of the authors from whom we derive our information of the New Testament times. It is a solid work built upon the foundation of a firm rock. The New Testament will ever remain the central object of study for Christian scholarship, and it is a labor worthy of recognition and thanks to have collected, arranged, and analyzed the non-biblical sources of our information for this period. Schürer has here made it possible for the students of his work to examine and judge for themselves of the merits or mistakes of the views expressed by scholars on various New Testament subjects. He leads his reader back to the original authorities for original and independent research, and there shows him what he must study and examine if his work and views are to have a firm basis. It is for this reason that the method and manner, as well as the matter, offered in these volumes, are of such great benefit to the New Testament student.

Concerning the English translation we would only add, that we have compared section after section of the original and have found the English version indeed better than many other translations of German theological books,

especially dogmatical and ethical works, but in many places sufficient care has not been taken to secure a rounded and entirely correct rendition.

THE COMMON TRADITION OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS in the Text of the Revised Version. By Edwin A. Abbott, D.D., and W. G. Rushbrooke, M.L. London: Macmillan and Company. 1884. (pp. xxxix. 156. $6\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.25.

Those familiar with the article on the Gospels in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* will have had their minds prepared for this convenient little volume. In that the common words of the first three Gospels are framed into a continuous though imperfect narrative; in this the three Gospels are printed in parallel columns, with the common portions in black type, while a fourth column presents the portions peculiar to Mark. Dr. Abbott's theory as to the origin of the Synoptic Gospels is that the writers all borrowed from a common tradition which is chiefly embodied in Mark, which he supposes is the earlier of the three. Whether agreeing with the author or not, the owner of this little work cannot fail to be profited by it.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SACERDOTAL CELIBACY in the Christian Church. By Henry C. Lea. Second Edition, enlarged. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. 1884. (pp. 682. $7\frac{1}{2} \times 4$.) \$4.50.

This well-known and valuable monograph has now appeared in its second edition. Mr. Lea has earned for himself, by this and his other works,—*Studies in Church History*, *Superstition and Force*,—an enviable reputation as a specialist in the Middle Ages. The range of the present work is wide, for it includes an account of those early tendencies towards asceticism, and those influences from other religions, which finally made monasticism an institution of the church, and through it established sacerdotal celibacy. The long struggle in the Latin Church for the enforcement of celibacy is described in its details. The ascetic rigidity and moral earnestness of a Dunstan, a Damiani, and a Hildebrand create, by their mere force of will, temporary "reforms," only to be overwhelmed beneath the returning tide of human weakness and common sense combined. All the elements of the religious life of the age mingled in the contest, and they are described with pictorial vividness by Mr. Lea. The independence of the ancient see of Milan resisted the demands of Rome. Heresy alternately assisted and opposed. At last Rome secured the final recognition of the obligation of celibacy, but secret immoralities undermine and corrupt the work of the church.

The most interesting part of the work for American Protestants will be the description of the reconquest of the church by true ideas in the period of the Reformation. The general progress of events is well known, but the details add interest as well as apologetic value to the picture. It is made evident, for example, that in this, as in other respects, the development of

are again thoroughly exposed. The Church of Rome set itself against this current of the times, a current so plain that the Calvinists did not think it necessary to make a formal recognition of clerical marriage. Elizabeth would have been glad to set herself against it too. The Council of Trent refused all concession, and heard no arguments from the necessities of the times or the need of purity in the church. Mr. Lea shows conclusively in his review of modern history how disastrous to the interests of religion the obstinacy of that council has been and still is.

We are glad to see this work reissued in a day when a false liberality is leading many to adopt a tone of complacency when speaking of the Romish Church. She may eventually be reformed, but it will be only when, by violent disruption, she has abandoned her mediæval errors of faith and practice, to which she has added some of the most preposterous of doctrines in our own enlightened time.

ELEMENTS OF HEBREW, by an Inductive Method. Sixth Edition—rewritten. William R. Harper, Ph.D., Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Chicago Baptist Union Theological Seminary; Principal of the Schools of the Institute of Hebrew. Chicago: American Publication Society of Hebrew. 1885. (pp. 182. 7½×4.) \$2.00.

INTRODUCTORY HEBREW METHOD AND MANUAL. Second Edition—rewritten. Wm. R. Harper, Ph.D. Chicago: Amer. Pub. Soc. of Hebrew. 1885. (pp. 170, 73. 6½×3½.) \$2.00.

The labors of Dr. Harper mark an epoch in the study of Hebrew in America. To his excellent practical judgment and unflagging enthusiasm must be credited mainly, if not solely, the extraordinary success of the Hebrew correspondence school and of the summer schools of the Institute of Hebrew. The outcome of the author's wide experience in these schools appears in the two works before us, which seem destined to supersede all the other introductory manuals now in use in our theological seminaries.

The first of these works is a rigidly scientific and consecutive presentation of the elements of Hebrew grammar, abundantly illustrated, as far as possible from the early chapters of Genesis. The second is a unique contrivance of lessons, exercises, vocabularies, and explanations, designed to introduce the learner to the grammar and to the Bible. The first lesson is upon the first verse of Genesis. In connection with that verse several grammatical principles are learned. And thus the student proceeds, learning a few verses and principles each day, until, having perused the first eight chapters of Genesis, he has learned in connection the whole of the grammar.

The special excellence of Dr. Harper's plan is in the combination of an unprecedented amount of help to the beginner with the scientific rigor of a Bickell. Everything is made as lucid as skilful explanations can make it,

and fragmentary sentences, each chosen to illustrate the use of a single word, which lies in it like a fossil embedded in a mass of rock. Thus, when Davidson's students first take up their Bibles, Harper's have already acquired an intimate familiarity with eight chapters—a solid gain, particularly in its influence upon the *morale* of a class.

As the paradigm of the regular verb, Dr. Harper uses the time-honored קטל. For the paradigms of the irregular or weak verbs, he forms stems from קטל, by successively substituting weak letters for its radicals. Thus, at each step the learner has his attention directed exclusively upon the application of a single euphonic law, while unembarrassed by the unfamiliarity of a new stem. To some this may seem a wide departure from the "inductive method," and it will be asked, Why not drill upon words actually in use, rather than upon theoretical stems? But it must be remembered that a large part of the forms in the full paradigm of any verb never occur in use; for example, the Niphals of קום and עמד are not only theoretical but absurd. And, even were this not the fact, the great advantage in clearness thus secured at the most difficult point would justify the new system—a system which, as Dr. Harper remarks, has long been used for nouns.

We are sorry that in books from which beginners are to make their first acquaintance with the forms of the Hebrew letters, a clear and elegant font of type, like that used in the ninth edition of Gesenius' Lexicon, or in Strack's new grammar, could not have been used.

The presentation of several minor points is open to criticism. The subject of the tenses and *wāw* conversive is introduced in the old paradoxical fashion; and the self-evidencing explanation which Professor Driver has given of the so-called copulative וְהִי (Use of Tenses in Hebrew, 2d ed. § 198) is ignored (Method, p. 83). Other similar small defects might be enumerated; but they will only slightly diminish the usefulness of works which show upon every page the evidence of conscientious use of the latest authorities upon the Hebrew language, directed by a natural genius for teaching.

ATHEISM IN PHILOSOPHY and other Essays. By Frederic Henry Hedge. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1884. (pp. 390. 5½×3¼.) \$2.00.

The literary character of this book is, like all Dr. Hedge's writings, above criticism. Always lively and entertaining, seasoning his soberest discussion with Attic salt, clear, even when profound, he carries his reader on with increasing interest to the end. The title of the book is derived from the first group of essays, on Epicurus, Schopenhauer, and v. Hartmann. We have been particularly interested in that on Schopenhauer. After a biographical introduction, which has its value as contributing an important element to the judgment of Schopenhauer's philosophy by imparting a knowledge of the man himself, the main elements of the system are drawn out very clearly and satisfactorily. There are large quotations from Schopenhauer, that he may "be heard in his own cause;" and many exceedingly happy commentaries in Dr. Hedge's own words. Some of these contain

volumes of argument in the turn of a sentence, as when he says of the "unconscious will everywhere struggling into being," that "finally, it wanted to see itself, to understand thoroughly its own essence and working, and it became SCHOPENHAUER. Then it saw all the works that it had made, and—Schopenhauer being a pessimist—behold, it was very bad!" In its critical part the essay, while not especially profound, presents clearly the main and fatal objection to the system.

In questions of philosophy, ethics, and natural philosophy, Dr. Hedge is generally happy, though we observe that he joins in the common, cheap depreciation of Paley's argument from design. But when, in the miscellaneous essays which follow, he dips into the history of theology, as in his essay on Augustine, the shallowness and blindness of his school of thought painfully appear. As a literary production this essay has the excellencies of the other, but what shall we say, theologically, to the following: "In spite of his war against the Manichees, he remained to the last, unconsciously, but virtually and essentially, Manichean in his theory of human nature. . . . Converting Paul's rhetoric into logic [he] substantizes sin, and thus reproduces in altered form the Manichean theory of two natures and souls. What the good and evil principle are in the doctrine of Manes, that nature and grace are in the doctrine of Augustine; nature in man, antecedent to conversion, being wholly and only evil." He "recognizes but two agents, but two intelligencies, in the universe,—God and the Devil." We will venture to say that a blinder and more superficial judgment of an ancient writer was never uttered.

An essay on Leibnitz follows, and then a translation of his *Monadology*. Then comes an essay on Kant, which finds many things to say which are new to the ordinary reader. The volume closes with several more strictly literary essays, e. g., one on *Genius*.

BACCALAUREATE SERMONS. By Andrew P. Peabody, D.D., LL.D., Preacher to the University and Plumer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard College. Boston: D. Lothrop and Company. 1885. (pp. 292. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ×3 $\frac{1}{2}$.) \$1.25.

A wide circle of readers outside the alumni of Harvard College will welcome these stimulating discourses of Dr. Peabody. The nineteen sermons mark as many eras in the graduating classes from 1861 to 1883, and are upon a wide range of subjects—from *Hospitality* and *The Choice of a Profession* to the *Voice out of the Cloud* and *Christo et Ecclesiae*. In the sermon on the *Choice of a Profession*, Dr. Peabody speaks strongly in favor of rendering aid to college students, but in opposition to the systematic aid of theological students—arguing that such aid is a bribe to bias the judgment, and that it urges into the ministry many who have not energy enough to make their own way in the world. "The graduate or professional student," he urges, "has passed the age of natural dependence, and, if he be unpropped by kindred, it is best for him that he should be thrown upon his own resources. If he be fitted for the pulpit he will work his way to it

without any organized system of charitable aid,—a little later, perhaps, but, if so, only with a maturity of character, a knowledge of mankind, and a capacity of self-help which will make him wiser, more prudent, and more independent in his profession" (pp. 113, 114).

SOME OF THE GREAT PREACHERS OF WALES. By Owen Jones, M. A. (London) Newtown. London: Passmore and Alabaster. 1885.

The characteristics and phenomena of the Welsh pulpit are most interesting in themselves, and most suggestive to the student of pulpit oratory. To one who desires to obtain a comprehensive and sympathetic insight into the secret of its unique power, the volume before us will furnish an invaluable aid. The author brings to his task special qualifications in culture, research, and sympathy with his theme. The Introductory Essay on Welsh Preaching is an admirable summary of its essential elements and conditions of success, distinguished by judicial moderation, analytic acuteness, and a devout recognition of the supernatural factors of its power. The method of the book is well adapted to the end in view. The author has selected seven of the "Great Preachers of Wales," among them Daniel Rowlands, Christmas Evans, John Elias, whose names are already more or less known to the American religious public, the other four being in every way worthy to be associated with them. By a felicitous combination of biographical incident, selections from their discourses, and critical analysis we are presented with a series of representative pen pictures of the Welsh pulpit in some of the most notable exhibitions of its power, as well as with a fascinating chapter in the remarkable religious movement inaugurated by Whitefield and the Wesleys. The result is a volume of absorbing interest, which cannot be read otherwise than with profit and delight.

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF PHILOSOPHY: A Critique on the Basis of Conduct and of Faith. By Josiah Royce, Ph.D., Instructor in Philosophy in Harvard College. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. 1885. (pp. xix. 484. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ × 3 $\frac{1}{4}$.)

Dr. Royce has succeeded in doing what comparatively few philosophic writers succeed in. He has asked himself a definite question. He is thoroughly conscious of the problem which he is endeavoring to solve. Whether he has succeeded equally well in discovering the conditions of the problem may be doubted. It is, however, a distinct advantage to philosophy to have any problem so definitely developed as Dr. Royce has developed this. We certainly shall not settle any questions till we know what they are. Dr. Royce's problem is rather one concerning the prerequisite conditions of

it must give, if religion is to be *theoretically* justified. Dr. Royce's book accordingly divides itself into two parts, one ethical, the search for the ideal, the other metaphysical, the search for the reality answering to the ideal.

In the search for the ethical ideal, the author starts with a disjunction: Shall we find it by going to the actual universe, and discovering there an objective basis for the distinction between right and wrong, or shall the ideal be demonstrated as the only true moral ideal, without making it to depend upon the physical universe? Dr. Royce has no great difficulty in showing that the former method will not work. The physical universe shows what is, not what ought to be. And even when you read the theory of evolution into the world, your law is a physical one, not an ethical one. But if the law is to be established without reference to objective reality, what shall free it from individual caprice? What shall we say to the sceptic who declares that each individual man is the measure and maker of his own ethical ideal, and that the inquiry for a universal ideal is absurd? The first half of Dr. Royce's book is in answer to this question. Dr. Royce shows the extreme difficulty of finding an ethical ideal without recourse to fact; he thinks that he shows that ethical philosophers who have attempted it have actually fallen back on some physical or metaphysical fact, and he surely shows that the current ethical scepticism and pessimism are due to the conflict of aims and ideals, without an ultimate ideal to determine their relative worth. The search inevitably leads to scepticism. We must hurry over this part of the book, remarking, however, that the discussion of the ethics of evolution is especially satisfactory, showing that it is really physics, not ethics; and that his arguments are fresh and readable to a degree to surprise one who thinks that moral discussion is of a crabbed and abstract nature. Dr. Royce nowhere appears better than when illustrating a philosophic point by apt literary criticism.

Dr. Royce finds the solution imbedded in the heart of the scepticism. For this scepticism he finds to be the result of an attempt by a will to realize conflicting wills, opposing aims, at the same time. One who doubts as to the worth of opposed ends must realize both ends in his consciousness. He must reproduce both wills in order to realize the doubt. "Scepticism is a hesitation resulting from the realization of several opposing ends, and from a simultaneous reproduction of the wills that aimed at them." "I desire to realize all these aims at once." Otherwise there would be no doubt, no hesitation. "But I, therefore, desire *harmony*. That is the one good that comes up before my fancy as above all the various conflicting goods of the various separate aims." In realizing the conflict, in short, we bring the various wills into our consciousness, we make them our will, we unify them. We thus pluck out of the very core of our scepticism an absolute ideal, that

fore, to suffer the consequences of all acts. Be a truly universal will.

Now we do not doubt the worth of Dr. Royce's ideal, which is, for substance of doctrine, Kant's, although an attempt is made to fill up its formal outline with a concrete content. We cannot but doubt, however, whether this ideal follows in the way in which Dr. Royce thinks that it does. There are three questions to be asked: Does the ethical scepticism involve within itself its own solution, the absolute ideal? Is this ideal arrived at *as* an ideal, or as a psychological *fact*? Does it, in the way in which Dr. Royce reaches it, constitute a possible ideal of action? All these questions must, we conceive, be answered in the negative.

First, faith cannot be identified with a complete development of scepticism. Dr. Royce fails to distinguish between desire and choice. It is true that doubt, or the mental representation of conflicting aims, does involve desire for their harmony, but this does not constitute their harmony. Only choice can do it. What the sceptic realizes is not the unity of all wills, but the impossibility of realizing them: this constitutes the conflict. One may present to himself, for example, the idea of a selfish and of a self-sacrificing life, so far as he desires both. But he does not harmonize them. He must choose one or the other to do this. And the scepticism consists simply in the refusal to choose, or in case the choice is actually made, in the belief that no ground can be given for choosing. Dr. Royce perhaps would say that, if one really doubts, he must choose. But the sceptic will say that choice is the contradiction of his doubt. His scepticism is to refuse to choose, and to demand a rational ground for choosing, which, he says, cannot be supplied. Dr. Royce fails to supply the ground. At most, he only says, you *must* choose, and as matter of fact, he does not say that. He only says you must desire a unity. But the sceptic knows that better than Dr. Royce can tell him. It is this *desire* for a unity which constitutes his conflict, while the inability to find an ideal by which to settle it, is his scepticism.

Secondly, the ideal as presented is one of *fact*. Dr. Royce states its essence when he says: "You cannot get away from that ideal save by repeating the very process which has brought you to it." Alas, that *cannot*! The sceptic after all gets, "you *must* will the harmony if you are a sceptic." Not you *ought* to will it. Dr. Royce has to fall back upon a fact in the psychological constitution of our natures; the absolute ideal "ought" becomes the paltry "is."

Thirdly, the idea, if accepted, would be only a psychological ideal, not an ethical. It is to realize the will of all men in your will. If I see a man intent on murder, am I to realize that, and do what lies within me to aid him? The victim's will strenuously objects, and I must realize that too. I must aid him. I reproduce both wills in myself, and, according to Dr. Royce, thereby realize both, and unify them! Would not Dr. Royce say

to admit that there is an ideal by which we determine which of our neighbor's ideals *are* universal. It is to admit that our ethical ideal is not to unify the wills of all men, but certain ones of these wills. We have as yet no information as to how we are to know what is the universal will, what is to be our criterion in deciding which of our neighbor's ends we shall choose. We are only told that we do desire so and so; not how we ought to desire.

Dr. Royce confesses to the influence of Hegel. If Hegel teaches any thing, it is to beware disjunctions. We think we can trace the origin of Dr. Royce's failure to determine the ethical ideal by a neglect of this warning. It starts with a disjunction between an ideal discovered by examination of physical fact, and an ideal discovered without reference to fact. But the true ethical ideal is the reality of the universe. We are to find out what the world really (not physically) is, and in discovering that we discover what we are to be, if we are to *be* at all. The teaching of Christ that God is Love, does not, as Dr. Royce supposes, found duty on physical or metaphysical truth. For this "fact" is also the *meaning* of the world and of experience. It is a truth in which fact and meaning, the ideal and the real, are at one; a fact in which the contradiction between the "ought to be" and the "is" has no existence. Only the ideal which is the absolutely real is the ethical ideal, and the search for any other is vain. A man may say that self-realization is the ideal of ethics, but he must add that the true self of man is God, if he is to furnish an ideal which is not, after all, physical. It is this demonstration that the true being of man is the life of God, and that this unity is the source of the "ought" in man's life, which would make the arguments of Dr. Royce cogent beyond appeal. The ethical content would be then just where Christianity puts it, in the act of choice, or faith. The choice that man's life be one with the life of God in Jesus Christ—that is the ethical element, according to Christianity and according to any philosophic theory of ethics.

Our limits of space will not allow us to examine the second part of Dr. Royce's work. We regret that these limits have made it necessary for this criticism to be so largely opposed in tone. It would be a greater pleasure to point out its suggestiveness, its stimulating character, its firm grasp upon the factors of the ethical and metaphysical problem. But it has well been said that the highest compliment which can be paid to a book is not general praise, but the critical consideration of its arguments. No one can read the book without being forced into a reconsideration of the grounds of his belief.

CORRESPONDENCIES OF FAITH. By Henry T. Cheever. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph and Company.

In the first part of this book Mr. Cheever brings to view, in a very clear and interesting manner, a great fact of Christian experience the world over. Men may differ theologically, they may be of different languages, different centuries, and different races, they may be Catholics or Protestants, but in the attributes of a living faith they are in harmony. After a full discussion of the nature and manifestations of faith, some parallels are brought together

side by side from two works, *The Windings of the River of Life*, and the *Writings of Madame Guyon*, as we have them in the translation and *Memoirs* by Professor Upham. This in prose, but still more do the hymns and all the sacred poetry of the ages bear witness to the unity of all believing souls.

The second part of this book is concerned with Madame Guyon herself. No one can read it without the conviction that she was the most remarkable woman that history makes known to us in the Catholic church. She was one of the saints of the Most High in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth. Her faith, her conflicts, persecutions, sufferings, her extravagances even, enchain the reader's attention. She carried her doctrine of "Perfect Love" to extremes as did also Professor Upham, but no Christian can peruse the second part without great spiritual profit. It takes hold of the deepest experiences of the soul. The whole history discloses the implacable hatred of Rome to everything that would take the soul to God instead of the church.

Mr. Cheever has executed his work with great literary skill and true spiritual insight. All who wish to cultivate more of the inner life of faith will derive great help from reading it.

CELESTIAL EMPIRES. By Rev. E. F. Burr, D.D. New York: American Tract Society. 1885. (pp. 302. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$.)

This book treats, in the author's attractive style, of the Numbers, Distances, Sizes, Natures, Motions, Orbits, Periods, Perturbations, Systems, Populations, and Mysteries of the heavenly bodies. It is amply illustrated, and contains chapters upon the Instruments used in astronomical observations. Altogether, it is one of the author's most stimulating, wholesome, and useful books.

THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FIRST ELEVEN CHAPTERS OF GENESIS, with some discussion of the New Criticism. By the Rev. D. N. Beach. With an introduction by Edwin B. Webb, D.D. Boston: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. 1884. (pp. xx. 66. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$.)

THE ORIGIN AND VARIETIES OF THE SEMITIC ALPHABET WITH SPECIMENS. By John C. C. Clarke, Professor of Greek in Shurtleff College. Second edition. Chicago: The American Publication Society of Hebrew. Morgan Park, 1884.

From Phillips and Hunt of New York; **OUR MISSIONARY HEROES AND HEROINES**; or, Heroic Deeds done in Methodist Missionary Fields. By Daniel Wise, D.D. 1884. (pp. 291. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3$. \$1.00.) **POSSIBILITIES OF GRACE.** By Rev. Asbury Lowry, D.D. 1884. (pp. 472. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$. \$1.50.) **SPIRITUAL LIFE: Its Nature, Urgency, and Crowning Excellence.** By Rev. J. H. Burr, D.D. 1884. (pp. 302. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 3\frac{1}{4}$. \$1.00.)

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

PASTORS AND ACTING PASTORS IN THE CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES.

BY THE REV. A. HASTINGS ROSS, D.D., PORT HURON, MICH.

WHEN the Secretary of the National Council, Rev. Alonzo H. Quint, D.D., in his triennial official report, given in 1880, raised the question whether the distinction between "pastors" and "acting pastors" ought not to be removed from the statistical tables of Congregationalists, he started an issue which has not yet been settled. It were well, if all Congregational churches and ministers would study the problem thoroughly before the meeting of the next National Council that the action there taken may be right.

In presenting the question the Secretary said: "It remains to consider whether the invidious distinction of 'p.' and 'a.p.' in our statistics should remain unamended and unqualified. Many a brother, as efficient, as permanently settled as any other, is called 'acting pastor.' Is it not wise to consider whether there is not as safe a way in considering as *pastor* a minister called by a church, accepting the call, entering upon its duties,—not for a month, of course, but with a view to permanence,—as much as a formal installation by council, taking care that there be some suitable recognition by his neighbors?"¹ His report was referred to a committee, which reported

¹ Minutes Nat. Council, 1880, pp. 52, 53.

at that session. The matter was then referred to a committee to report in 1883. This committee reported and presented a resolution obliterating "the invidious distinction." But the committee to which this last report and resolution were referred opposed such action on the ground that "the churches at the East have depended entirely upon the action of councils for ordination and installation as the safeguards of the purity of the ministry."¹ The question and the reports were sent to a fourth committee, to report in 1886.

We will trace this distinction between pastors and acting pastors to its occult sources. It is not found, we believe, in any land but ours, and here only in churches of New England origin. It springs, therefore, from some peculiarities of early New England.

1. *The union of church and state has indirect connection with its birth.* It is not to the discredit of the early New England churches, that they did not at once emancipate themselves from all the errors of their day. Everywhere else church and state were united, and so naturally they were joined together in the leading colonies; and being united in one body, acting in the double capacity of church and state, it was also natural for the church to seek and find protection from heresy and schism in the coercive power of the magistrate. Our New England fathers, therefore, made the ultimate ecclesiastical appeal, not to councils, but to the civil power.² Relying on the sword, they failed to provide adequate ecclesiastical safeguards; and, when the sword in the course of time failed them, they were left unprotected, like a citadel whose wall on one side has crumbled down. Many were the attempts to remedy the defect, but, as we have shown in another place,³ they were only partially successful. The fact of

tom of the distinction between pastors and acting pastors. That theory identifies the ministry with the pastorate. The ordained are ministers only while pastors of particular churches. Ceasing to be pastors they demit the ministry and become laymen. From this pastoral theory came the early ecclesiastical usages of New England, and on it the Cambridge Platform was built. This is not only conceded, but it has been said in our own day that it is "the necessary verdict of the principles of Congregationalism." We shall show, in due time, the inadequacy and consequent invalidity of this theory, which may be called the pastoral theory of the ministry; but here and now we will give the corollaries of the theory:—

a. That a pastor must be re-ordained, that is, installed, every time he changes pastorates; for through the change he becomes a layman again, though only for one hour.

b. That a pastor of one church is a layman beyond his parish, though preaching on exchange. He should not therefore administer the sacraments out of his own church.

c. That all missionaries are laymen unless pastors.

d. That there can be no ministry until a church has been organized to call to the pastorate and ordain.

e. That a pastor can be deposed from the ministry by a vote of the church he serves removing him from the pastorate, when he can be disciplined as any layman.

f. That the ministerial standing of the pastor is held in his own church composed of laymen. That church gave it in ordination, retains it, and may end it by majority vote, calling a council or not at its own discretion, unless the law interpose to enforce dismissing councils.

Here is the root of installation. When the state gave to any two churches the power to prevent ordination by a local church or by a council, as in early Massachusetts, or when a council of advice came to be made necessary to

Thus, this theory of the ministry then and now, whenever ordination or installation has been used as a safeguard, has worked danger to liberty. This we shall show more fully hereafter. Here we would note the fact that this pastoral theory of the ministry has never covered the facts it should explain. Indeed, it cannot be made to harmonize with the facts. It is impossible to exclude ordained missionaries from the ministry of the word. Two years after the Cambridge Platform was framed, and while it was before the churches for approval, a man began to preach in Exeter, N. H., in 1650, and continued preaching there as minister of that town for thirty-three years; but no church seems to have been organized therein for fourteen years after his death. What was he, a layman or a minister? The theory makes him a layman; the town treated him as a minister. Punchard gives this and other similar cases,⁹ which the Cambridge Platform was inadequate to cover. No theory can be true which does not explain all the facts. Hence we are not surprised to find:

3. *A True Theory of the Ministry Supplanting the Pastoral Theory.* The pastoral theory is so far from being the necessary verdict of the principles of Congregationalism, that the Congregational churches of England refused, in 1658, —ten years after the New England churches had put it into the Cambridge Platform,—to incorporate it in the Savoy Platform. Nor have those churches since then adopted it. Nor have the Congregational churches of any other country embraced it; and, it is believed, that few Baptists have recognized it. It was soon questioned and rejected in New England; for, in 1702, Cotton Mather said that few in this country held it fully;¹⁰ and, in 1708, it found no place in the Saybrook Platform of Connecticut.

of God to preach the gospel and are set apart to that work by ordination.”¹ Hence one called of God and ordained by the churches is a minister, whether a pastor, or a missionary, or a professor, or a secretary, or an editor, or retired from active service. A minister's function and standing no longer depend on the vote of a local church. This late theory is scriptural, reasonable, adequate. It covers all possible cases. It develops into the following corollaries:—

a. That re-ordination, that is, installation, is not essential to a second, third, or any subsequent pastorate, since ministerial character or function is not lost by the change.

b. That the ordained are ministers, whether missionaries, professors, secretaries, editors, or any thing else, until deposed.

c. That a pastor is a minister called to the highest office in a church, who accepts, and exercises his function in that office, as he might have exercised it as a missionary or an evangelist.

d. That his standing as a minister is not identical with his pastorate, nor can it be held in a local church, but must find a lodgement in some responsible body suitable to his wide recognition as a minister of the word, lest damage be done to the churches by ministers recognized as such but irresponsible.

e. That his church membership does not logically follow his ministry. For it cannot go with him into mission fields, until a church has been organized. The minister of Exeter, and others, above referred to, could not have taken their church membership with them, for they ministered to no churches. The writer knows a minister who was an installed pastor of a church for twenty years, whose church membership was in another and distant church all the time. We say nothing against the importance of a minister's belonging to the local church he serves, but when it is demanded of him as essential to the office of a

¹ Boston Plat., p. 66.

pastor, then, we say that recourse is had to that pastoral theory of the ministry which has been rejected after full trial. A pastor's membership in his own church, however important for fellowship and example it may be, does not belong as an essential to the true theory of the ministry.

We must dwell upon ministerial standing. As ministers under this theory are ministers whether pastors or not, they must have ministerial standing somewhere. Treated as ministers, they must be held accountable as ministers. We can no longer say of a dismissed pastor: "He is a layman, and must be disciplined as a layman, if at all, and solely by the local church to which he belongs;" for he is still a minister and recognized as such. The churches are affected by his conduct, and on this acknowledged relation between churches and ministers rests the ministerial accountability of ministers. As the standing of a minister is wider than any local church,—unlike the case under the pastoral theory,—his accountability is also wider, and naturally rests in the Association of churches in his locality. Indeed, it cannot be properly held anywhere else.*

This standing belongs to all the ordained, and is consequently wholly independent of the pastoral office. Hence installing and dismissing councils can neither give nor destroy it. They may ascertain it, in a certain sense, but they do not control it. Councils of deposition furnish only *prima facie* evidence on which the body in which ministerial standing is held may act.

This standing should be held in bodies which are themselves accountable to the fraternity of churches. Ministerial bodies are not thus accountable; but Associations of churches, united in State Associations and the National

But is not this standing subversive of church independence? No; by no means. For each local church has the right to choose whom it will as pastor, and to dismiss him when it will. It retains as complete control over its pulpit as over its records and discipline. It can call a council of installation, dismissal, or discipline, whenever it needs one. Neither a minister not a member, nor a body of ministers not members, can enter a church meeting and speak or vote. They have no authority in or over a church in virtue of their ordination. Nor has an Association of churches any right or authority over the local church. Its sole jurisdiction is exhausted when it adjusts its fellowship in accord with the internal management of each local church in connection, and the conduct of each minister in connection; that is, the Association is formed, and all join it, on some understanding as to beliefs and conduct, which understanding is called a covenant by the courts, whether written or not. Now, if a member violate that covenant, it is no usurpation of power, or infringement upon rights, for the Association to make inquiry sufficient to ascertain the fact, and then treat that member accordingly. Nor does this theory make the ministry a priesthood, nor elevate them essentially above the laity. It simply recognizes as ministers of the Word those whom God has called and the churches have ordained. And this theory, in spite of the profound influence of the New England fathers, has grown upon our churches, until they have adopted it, and that too without damage to their liberties.

4. *The first appearance of "the invidious distinction."* We have stated that it grew out of a false theory of the ministry, and that its birth was fostered by the union of church and state. It does not appear in form in Upham's *Ratio*, published in 1844, nor does the *Congregational Dictionary* (1853) say anything about the distinction. It appeared first in 1857, in the general statistics of our churches then first published. Ministers in pastoral work were divided

into "pastors" and "stated supplies;" but New York, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Kansas reported no such distinction. New York began to report it in 1862; Michigan, in 1867; the others, in or before 1870. The distinction is not hoary with age. In 1865 "stated supply" softened into "acting pastor."

In consequence of the early theory of the ministry, the pastorate involved, as we have seen, installation, or re-ordination. The theory changed, but habits prevailed. No one but the installed was a full pastor, though called and entering upon his official work. The simple "inauguration" of the fathers began to assume the nature of an essential to the idea of the pastorate, in spite of the Cambridge Platform; and it became a guard of purity, when the civil safeguards broke down, and the magistrate refused any longer to draw his sword against schism and heresy. An emergency at last came upon the churches in the Unitarian defection. Connecticut had prepared against the evil by the Saybrook Platform. Massachusetts had neglected to do so, but began immediately to seek security through installation. We note three stages in the development of this safeguard of purity:—

a. A change in the nature of installing councils. "The letters-missive for installation which passed among the churches of Massachusetts during the first two hundred years of their history," and presumably among the churches in other parts of New England, except as modified by Consociationism in Connecticut, simply invited the churches in council to give their "assistance" in setting apart a pastor to his work. But when the Unitarian apostasy came in, the letters-missive were altered so as to change the functions of installing councils. They were now invitations to "review" the action of the church issuing them, to "advise" respecting the fitness of its pastor-elect for his office and for the fellowship of the churches, and, "if judged expedient, to assist in the installation service." Against this change in the character of installing

councils, of which we shall speak more fully hereafter, an emphatic protest has recently been uttered.

b. The next step was to distinguish between pastors installed and those not installed; for churches began, for some reason, to omit installation. The Plan of Union of 1801 relieved the ministers west of New England of the need of councils as safeguards, for they all were expected to join the Presbytery. And, if they turned to the Cambridge Platform for guidance, they found that installation and ordination were expressly excluded from the essence of the pastorate, that the essential things constituting the pastorate as there given are a call and its acceptance. The great distance of church from church also operated to decrease installation. When the Plan of Union was abrogated in 1852, and ministers were no longer expected to join the Presbytery, what safeguard of purity was there left, since a growing number were not installed? It was then that safety was sought in "the invidious distinction" between "pastors" and "acting pastors." Had it been made much earlier than the abrogation of the Plan of Union, it would have appeared in the Congregational Dictionary of 1853. It does appear in the statistics in 1857, when even Massachusetts reported sixty "stated supplies." This distinction was made and used to strengthen the safeguard of installation, after the function of installing councils had been changed as above indicated.

c. The enforcement of installation by the pressure of fellowship. To prevent the continuance of acting pastors, the Boston Platform, 1865, declared: "A due respect to the communion of the churches requires that no man assuming to be a pastor of a church shall be acknowledged as such by other churches, unless, after his entrance on the duties of his office, he has been publicly recognized" by an installing council.*

According to this action a church may call a minister to its pastorate, and he may accept the call and enter upon

* Boston Platform, p. 51.

his work, but he cannot be recognized by other churches as pastor until he calls a council of churches to install him.

By this threefold change—turning the installing council from “assistance” into “advice,” then distinguishing between pastors installed and pastors acting, and finally refusing to recognize acting pastors as pastors at all in church fellowship—the safeguard of purity through installations has been carried to the outer limit of church independence. Indeed, some do not hesitate to call it “an usurpation” of church rights.

That we have given the true origin of the distinction between pastors and acting pastors is proved by the fact that no other churches of our order in the world have divided pastors into such or similar classes. The distinction is found only where the rejected union of church and state and the rejected pastoral theory of the ministry have left their trail.

5. *The difference between pastors and acting pastors.*

a. The difference does not lie in the call and its acceptance; for in either case formal calls are given and accepted. A call and its acceptance constitute, according to the Cambridge and Boston Platforms, “the essence and substance of the pastorate;” and where the essence and substance of a thing are, the thing itself is.

b. The difference is not one of permanency in office. Many acting pastors stay longer than pastors. Permanency depends more on character and ability than on installation.

c. The difference is not one of function. Both pastors and acting pastors perform the same official duties. They preach the word, administer the sacraments, marry the living, bury the dead, visit the people, and preside at all church meetings not relating to themselves.

d. The difference is not one of induction into office.

e. There results from installation, in all states where special provisions do not guard against it, a legal relation between pastor and people, which requires a peculiar method of dissolving. The installed pastor in said states, performing duty, can collect his salary until his pastoral relation shall be dissolved (1) by death, or (2) by mutual consent, or (3) by a mutual council, or (4) by an *ex-parte* council, when a mutual council cannot be agreed upon by the parties." This legal relation came out of the union of church and state, and it is looked upon by many churches as of doubtful utility.

And yet ordination or installation has always been held to be an inauguration and not an essential of the pastorate. The essentials of the office are election and acceptance. Let us prove it. In 1637 a council of churches met at Concord, Mass., which resolved that "upon election they [the pastor and teacher] were ministers before they were solemnly ordained."¹⁰ Two years later, in 1639, the ministers of the Bay Colony answered thirty-two questions sent them by their brethren in England. Their reply to the thirteenth question is: "The outward calling of a minister consisteth properly and essentially in election by the people. . . . The right [rite?] of imposition of hands is not absolutely necessary to the essence of a pastor, any more than coronation to the essence of a king."¹¹ Election and acceptance were made in 1648, and again in 1865, "the essence and substance" of the pastorate. Hence ordination or installation becomes, what they called it in the Platforms, the mere inauguration of a man into office whereunto he had right before by his election;" but it was seldom or never neglected.

6. *The difference between pastors and acting pastors is not*

¹⁰ Buck's Mass. Eccl. Law, 212.

¹¹ Felt's Eccl. History, i. 275.

¹² Felt's Eccl. History, i. 384.

¹³ Camb. Plat., ix. 2; Boston Plat., pt. ii. chap. v. 4; Cong. Dictionary, articles: "Calling of a Minister, in what does it consist?" "Ordination, none besides election indispensable;" Upham's Ratio Disciplinae, § 69.

regarded, except in our statistics. After the action of the Boston Council, in 1865, a few attempts were made not to recognize acting pastors as pastors, but they soon ceased. The Brooklyn Council of 1874 enrolled five as acting pastors, but accorded them the same rights and privileges on the floor. The Brooklyn Council of 1876 had twenty-two acting pastors in it, not distinguished from pastors on the roll or on the floor. The Old South Council of Boston for the installation of Rev. Geo. A. Gordon, 1884, enrolled two acting pastors as pastors. And so did the Madison Avenue Congregational Church Council of New York, 1884, enroll two acting pastors as pastors. A council called by the Tower Hill Church, Lawrence, Mass., in November, 1884, to advise in regard to a difficulty, "to avoid any possible doubt as to the validity of the result," allowed two acting pastors in it, when the question was raised, to decline to vote. But these members were invited by vote of the council to assist by their advice in making up the result. Thus generally, East as well as West, no distinction is made in the roll or in the privileges of a council between pastors and acting pastors.

The distinction is also ignored in District and State Associations, and in their choice of delegates to the National Council, where pastors and acting pastors and non-pastors are enrolled without question. It is only the distinction as it appears in the statistics that requires committee after committee to ponder.

The distinction has no bearing upon church membership, since installation cannot make a minister a member of the church he serves or of any other body. The installed and the uninstalled pastor must transfer their church membership in precisely the same way, by letter. Nor can either a pastor or an acting pastor vote in church meetings, unless he be a member, except where a special rule of the church expressly grants to the pastor such privilege.

The distinction is not regarded in respect to presiding

over church meetings. The call to the office of pastor includes the right to preside at church meetings not pertaining to himself, and to discharge the duties of presiding officer. Upham, as early as 1844, said: "The practice of the churches permits him to act as moderator of the church *ex officio*; and that, too, whether he has become a member or not, because holding the pastoral office, he has the implied consent and approval of the brethren in the discharge of that duty."¹⁴ Has he, as moderator, the same implied consent and approval of breaking a tie vote, when not a member? Be this as it may, both pastors and acting pastors are alike in power to break a tie vote, whether as members of the church, or as empowered by custom or special rule of the church so to act.

There is no point where the distinction under consideration is observed except in our statistics, unless by a council now and then; and why should our *Year Books* differ from the English, the Canadian, the Australian, and all others, in this respect? Does security under our liberty require it?

7. *The distinction is neither a safe nor a sufficient guard of purity.*

Without installing councils the English Congregational churches, in the Arian apostasy, which swept nearly all the English Presbyterian churches—ninety-one per cent of them—into heresy, lost only from six to ten. In the Unitarian apostasy in this country, the churches of Connecticut under the Saybrook Platform stood firm, not losing one of their number. But the churches of Massachusetts, rejecting the frequent attempts to mend their rules of discipline, and clinging to the Cambridge Platform after its concluding chapter on the power of the magistrate in ecclesiastical censures had become obsolete, lost ninety-six churches, nearly twenty-seven per cent of the whole number, besides thirty parishes. They did not

¹⁴ Ratio Discip. § 85, (2).

seem to have a clear conception of the adjustment needed when both the theory of the ministry was changed and the church parted company with the state. At last, when compelled to protect themselves, we have seen how they changed the nature of installation and relied upon it. This had been well, had it been adequate and in consistency with our principle of independence. But, requiring a church to call a council of installation or have no recognized pastor, the change gave color to the charge that the fellowship of the churches has therein been perverted into "an usurpation." For, if a church has power to call a pastor, it has power to inaugurate him as pastor, that is, install him. The act of calling can be consummated by itself in installation, otherwise a church cannot manage all its own affairs. True, a church may ask for advice in determining the fitness of a man for its pastorate,—this is one thing; but to say to it, "You shall ask said advice or have no recognized pastor at all," is quite another thing. To choose and inaugurate its pastor belong to the essentials of an independent church. Nor does fellowship demand any surrender of this independence in the interests of purity, since that purity can be secured in a better way, as we shall soon see.

But, if installing councils were safe as regards liberty, they would not be sufficient for purity, to say nothing of their great cost in some of the States.¹⁵ After the most persistent advocacy of installation for years, only about one-third of the ministers in pastoral work are at the present time installed; and the number is absolutely less than in 1857, when the distinction was first published,

¹⁵ A council called to recognize a church was recently held at Little Rock,

while relatively the decrease has been rapid. In 1857 there were 216 reported as "unspecified;" supposing one-third of these were pastors and two-thirds were acting pastors, we have the following statement:

1857....	Pastors,	1,025;	Acting Pastors,	706;	Ministers,	2,350.
1870....	"	901;	"	"	1,269;	" 3,097.
1885....	"	932;	"	"	1,831;	" 3,889.

Even in New England pastors and acting pastors are nearly equal in numbers, while there are only 601 pastors among 1,595 ministers reported. Not one-half the ministers there are within the safeguard of installing councils.

It has been claimed that the membership of churches with pastors installed exceeds that of churches with pastors uninstalled. After a careful count we present the following figures as substantially correct:

Membership of churches in U. S. with pastors, 166,802.					
"	"	"	"	acting pastors,	161,930—4,872.
"	"	out of N. E. with pastors, 59,732.			
"	"	"	"	acting pastors,	104,873—45,141.
"	"	out of Mass. with pastors, 101,427.			
"	"	"	"	acting pastors,	144,760—43,333.

We do not like this appeal to the membership of the churches, since our polity rests on the principle that one church of Christ is essentially equal to any other, that a smaller church can manage its own affairs as safely under Christ as a larger one. Hence all comparisons must be made between churches, and not between the lists of membership; and we have gone beyond churches to membership solely because a comparison of members was referred to in a report made to the National Council in 1883. On either comparison it must be evident that installation is not an adequate safeguard of purity in any part of the country. Nor can it be in the future, since this great decadence has followed the most urgent advocacy of installation.

8. *The normal safeguard of purity is in our polity.* This safeguard rests on the true, though common, theory of the ministry. The ministry is wider than the pastorate; hence

logically ministers are amenable as to standing, not to the churches they respectively serve, as was the case under the rejected pastoral theory, but to the wider association of churches in the vicinity. They are accountable as to ministerial standing to the neighboring churches, and that, too, in their associated capacity. Councils will not do, as they are selected according to the will of those calling them, and die on adjournment. Ministerial Associations are not the proper place for such standing, for therein ministers are amenable to themselves, and not to the churches, and a class rule results.

This wider standing and accountability may strike some as uncongregational, but it has been long recognized. In 1812 the New Haven West Association of Ministers in Connecticut favored by majority vote the affirmative of the question: "Is a minister, dismissed without recommendation, amenable to his former pastoral charge?" "The question was modified into: "What is the standing of a dismissed minister?" and carried to the General Association, which referred it to a committee. The committee reported the next year, saying, among other things: "By ordination, the official commission of an evangelist is conferred." "The ministerial office not being affected by the dissolution of the *pastoral* connection, a dismissed minister can be no less amenable to the Association, subsequent, than previous, to his dismissal. The obligation of the Association to him, and his obligation to them, must be maintained as remaining unchanged."

. This wider standing of ministers has acceptance as right and Congregational. With only one dissenting vote, the National Council declared, in 1880, "that the body of churches in any locality have the inalienable right of extending ministerial fellowship to, or withholding fellowship from, any person within their bounds, no matter what

church, and to be conducted with due regard to equity.”¹⁸ This had reference to bringing unworthy men, claiming to be ministers, to accountability; but the inalienable right has the same relation to all ministers, and can be asserted by the churches in any locality through their Associations as properly as through special councils.

Indeed, church Conferences or Associations, which were first coming into existence at the time when the Unitarian controversy was raging most fiercely, now embrace all the Congregational churches of the nation, with possibly here and there an exception. And what is their bearing on ministerial standing? We propounded four questions to the proper officers, and from the replies we tabulate the facts as follows:—

IN NEW ENGLAND.

1.	Number of Ministerial Associations.....	81
2.	“ Church Conferences.....	75
3.	“ Consociations (in Conn.).....	4—160

IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.

1.	Number of Ministerial Associations.....	13
2.	“ Church Associations with ministerial membership in them.....	125
3.	“ Church Associations not having ministerial membership in them.....	2—140

If these answers are substantially correct,¹⁹—and we have no reason to doubt their substantial correctness,—there is a great difference between New England and the rest of the country, in these matters, that ought to be heeded. Ministerial standing in Connecticut is held in Ministerial Associations, as declared by vote of the General Association. In Vermont the civil courts hold that membership in a Ministerial Association is evidence among the churches

¹⁸ Minutes, 17.

¹⁹ The questions asked were: 1. What is the whole number of local

and on conviction to administer the proper punishment."* The covenant in the above case was unwritten. It is hardly to be believed that in Massachusetts the courts would hold that Ministerial Associations are mere clubs, in which membership is no evidence of ministerial standing. But whatever membership in Ministerial Associations may mean in New England, membership in Associations or Conferences out of New England—obtained as it is on credentials and by vote of the body receiving—means accountable standing. The member, whether church or minister, can be tried, expelled, dropped, or transferred to a co-ordinate body, as facts may warrant. And when dropped or expelled, that church or minister loses both standing and connection with our communion.

9. *This safeguard is not Presbyterian.* There is not a single element of Presbyterianism in it. Good order is not peculiar to the polity of Calvin, and our churches may have good order and not be Presbyterian. The Presbytery holds both the church membership and the ministerial standing of its presbyters. It has control over the local churches that are members of it, to review and correct their records, to issue cases of lay discipline that are appealed to it, to put ministers into their pulpits and to take them out of those pulpits, and to cut off offending ministers and churches.

Congregational Associations of churches and ministers have no authority over the records, discipline, pulpits, or property of the churches in connection; but they have the right of self-protection. They can cast out from membership, and so cut off from responsible standing in our denomination, any minister or church that has violated the covenant on which Congregational fellowship rests. To deny them this right of self-protection, is to put it into the power of a single minister or church to

of ministerial standing; that, "if it be suspected that a wolf in sheep's clothing has invaded their ranks, it is not only for the *interest* of all the members of the Association to know the fact, but it is their *imperative duty* to make inquiry and *ascertain* the fact;" and that, "under its covenant and rules, it had rightful jurisdiction to investigate charges of unministerial conduct affecting its members, of churches and ministers has, therefore, the right of self-protection, the power and duty of clearing itself of unfit members; and that, too, without becoming in the least degree Presbyterianized. It is "the inalienable right of the churches in any locality" to do this, and they can do it better in stated Associations than in occasional councils.

If an Association wrong either a church or a minister in its action, full relief can be found in a mutual council, one-half chosen by the aggrieved and one-half by the Association, or, if this be denied, in an *ex parte* council. If an Association itself lapse from the faith, the faithful in it can come out and form another, which can be recognized by the other churches, while the apostate Association can be cut off from fellowship. Thus all cases and conditions are covered, and church independence is conserved.

Here, then, is a safeguard covering all churches and ministers in connection, comprehensive, consistent, impartial, Congregational, insuring liberty to each church, while giving security to all. It does not give power to an irresponsible installing council of two or three churches to bind the fellowship of four thousand churches. It holds those who admit to fellowship accountable for those admitted. In view of which better safeguard the distinction between pastors and acting pastors may safely be removed from our statistics. But how shall this safeguard be exhibited in place of the present "p." and "a. p."?

10. *Ministerial designations.* It follows from the above

designation, if they be in connection with Congregational Associations or Conferences within the State, and whose membership therein has been effected by vote on proper credentials; that all other ministers in pastoral work should be designated according to fact, as connected with some other Association, Conference, or denomination, as unconnected, or as expelled or dropped; and that all ministers in responsible connection within the State should be enrolled under tables of associational connection, and in an alphabetical list.

Such designations remove "the invidious distinction" complained of, and rest all distinctions on principle and fact. Then all who accept calls and serve churches are pastors, as in the days of the apostles, as in our two Platforms, and are designated according to fact. It will be easy for secretaries and registrars to make the needed certification for the Year Book of all ministers in connection, and the anomaly would no longer occur of recording in the Year Book as in good standing and connection the names of ministers who have been expelled from connection and fellowship by the churches of the vicinity, in the exercise of their inalienable right, or have withdrawn from fellowship. In such case each local body would hold itself responsible for all ministers and churches in connection whose names its proper officer officially reports, and for no others. Against this method no principle of our polity can be urged in justice, but only a recent custom which the churches by a large majority are neglecting.

This is the method, in substance, we believe, of all Congregational Unions and Associations outside the United

terial standing with greater or less clearness, two doubtfully, and four, among which are Utah and North Carolina, make no distinction. Our Year Book also records, with noted exceptions, the distinction between those in such associational connection and those not members of any district Association.

We have indicated a way of uniformity. All that is needed to complete it is to define more fully what ministerial standing is under the common and true doctrine of the ministry. This we have done in another place." A list of all such as are in connection by membership in some accountable Association could then be easily made for the Year Book. Even the New England States, with the exception of Maine, report all members of Ministerial Associations, but not of Congregational clubs. So in the other States, all members of Church Associations, whether churches or ministers, are generally reported in separate lists. There is not, then, much remaining to be done, to reach the needed uniformity and security.

The National Council has prepared the way for both. At its formation in 1871, the Council declared "that all ministers in our denomination ought to be in orderly connection with some ministerial or ecclesiastical organization which shall be able to certify to their regular standing in the ministry," and "that churches be urged not to employ, as preachers, unsettled ministers without such evidence of their good standing in the ministry." In 1880 it declared it to be "the inalienable right of churches in any locality to extend or to withhold ministerial fellowship." If it shall define ministerial standing to be such membership in district Associations as makes the Associations responsible for their members in the sense above given, and then enroll only such without a star (*) in the alphabetical list in the Year Book, the work is done. The States are nearly all in line with such action.

11. *There is urgent need of uniformity among our*

** Pocket Manual, §§ 80-5.

churches. The continuation of local and peculiar usages causes confusion; and hence we have written this paper in the interest of peace. We have shown that the New England way is not the Old England way, nor the way of her colonies, nor the way of the West. It is not the way of the Presbyterianizing Saybrook Platform. It is not the way of the Boston Platform, which, however, is not consistent with itself. Hence it is no wonder that there is a mixture of conflicting views, which engenders strifes. One cannot attend a council where grave questions are raised without seeing the confusion of opinion thus arising. Books are quoted and usages insisted on that rest on a rejected theory of the ministry or on the early union of church and state. Thus the attempt is made to put the new wine into the old wine-skins, as though there could be possibly no other or better way. Yet our churches are not going to reject the true and adequate theory of the ministry, and part company with all the other Congregational churches in the world, that they may practise customs born of errors. The only harmony that can be had in usages must come from the carrying out in logical consistency of the true theory of the ministry, in a free church, into accountable ministerial standing in Associations of churches. The church and the state have been separated. Installing councils fail to be safe and sufficient guards of purity. Why shall they not be made simply councils of recognition, while reliance is had for security on a safeguard which comes logically from the theory of the ministry now held, and which is both safe and adequate? This accountable ministerial, as well as church, standing, in Associations of churches, with appeal to mutual councils, is Congregational, and it has power to make us one. Shall we not hasten to build upon it an ecumenical unity?

ARTICLE II.

PROBATION—ITS CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

BY THE REV. JAMES H. FAIRCHILD, D.D., PRESIDENT OF OBERLIN COLLEGE.

THE idea of probation as pertaining to human life involves two distinct elements: the first, and perhaps the most prominent, thought is that of trial—a testing of fitness or qualification for some contemplated privilege or responsibility. Thus a pupil is admitted to a school on probation, or a young man is received to a business establishment as a candidate for some permanent position, the result to depend upon the manifestation of character or abilities already in possession. In this view a probation is, what the word most distinctly suggests, a trial.

A second element of probation—rather implied than expressed, is an opportunity to attain a character and qualifications which shall fit the possessor for some contemplated or proposed condition, or career, or responsibility, for which the probationer is not qualified at the outset. Thus a young man is taken into a telegraph office to qualify himself for a responsible position as an operator, or enters upon a course of education for the ministry. The leading idea here is that of training or preparation for the contemplated position. But the idea of test, or trial, is still present, because in the result it may appear that the youth does not attain the character, or other qualification, for which the position calls, and thus the candidate must at length be rejected. Probably in all forms of probation which fall to human experience both these conditions appear in ever varying proportions. Where the element of trial is predominant, the term *probation* is natural and appropriate; where training or preparation stands foremost, some other term might be better. Of the young

man passing his first six months in college before matriculation, we naturally say, He is on probation; of the young man aiming at a profession through years of study, we do not so naturally use the word; yet the probation is there.

In the case of a human soul looking forward to an endless life, the conditions of which are to be determined by the fidelity with which he shall employ his opportunities and meet his duties during the earlier years of that life, the trial and the training are almost equally prominent. The fact that a certain character is required as a preparation for that future, and that character is a growth dependent both on external conditions and on the man's voluntary, responsible adjustment to those conditions,—this fact makes opening life a period of culture or training for the life that is to follow. Every finite moral being must become by his own voluntary activity, under the conditions in which he is placed, what he needs to be, in order to a blessed future. Destiny comes primarily from character, and character is the outcome of the man's free action. He comes into being with the possibility of character, with the powers of a moral agent, and the opportunity, the necessity even, for their exercise. These capacities and this opportunity are from the hand of God. They come to him without any responsibility of his own. These are factors in his destiny, but the determining factor is in the voluntary attitude he shall take and maintain, the use he shall make of his powers and his opportunities. No divine intervention, no exercise of power or providence on God's part can save him from this responsibility. We sometimes, in view of the risks and failures in human life, blindly wish that men had come from the hand of God with the moral character which they need to have

eignty merely that the moral being must have the responsibility of his own character. The necessity lies in the very nature of a moral being; and, to set aside the necessity, the moral being must cease to be. To create, or not to create a moral being, belongs to God's sovereign pleasure, but that when created he must have the responsibility of forming the character on which his destiny turns,—this comes with his existence as a moral being. Thus probation, as implying the responsibility of forming his own character, comes by the necessity of the case to every moral creature. There can be no other method of providing for the attainment of his destiny. If God had created the race in heaven, instead of on the earth, the same problem of their moral character would have remained. He did place them in paradise, but even there they could not be saved from this responsibility. Thus opening life, from the necessity of the case, must be to every human being a season of training in moral character.

But since there is liability of failure in this forming of character, and thus of failure in destiny, this same period of training is a trial in reference to the future; and in our use of the term *probation* as applying to human existence we must include both these facts. That mankind in their earthly life are passing through such a probation is implied in all that is said in the Scriptures of human action and its outcome, and is manifest in the facts of human life as they pass before our eyes.

Theological speculation has sometimes, under the pressure of a theory, ruled out this idea of probation, yet the practical fact has never been lost from the convictions and consciousness of the Christian church, and upon this fact all efforts for the salvation of men have depended. There have been speculations in reference to the fall and its

into the world under condemnation, and that no man has a probation for himself, or will ever have. Sovereign grace elects the subjects of salvation, and transforms them into a fitness for heaven, apart from any responsibility of their own. Such views as these have corrupted the doctrinal teaching of the church, until the idea of probation has been left in the background, and at times almost lost sight of; but practically the gospel has been presented to men with the distinct apprehension that the question of salvation must turn upon their acceptance or rejection of the offer.

To this condition of probation some things are essential and others incidental,—some dominant and controlling, others subordinate. The one element essential to a probation is a sense of obligation,—a knowledge of somewhat which one ought to do or to be. To this duty the reason or conscience of the man bears witness, and to this duty his moral nature, with more or less intensity, urges him. But by the side of this same sense of duty there is in the man the pressure of desire, or impulse, or passion, tempting to self-indulgence, and the neglect of duty. This prompting of the sensibility, the impulse to do what one wishes instead of what he ought to do, is an essential part of the constitution of a moral agent. It belongs to the moral being, in every stage of development or advancement, in every degree of darkness or of light. Between these two forces, the pressure of obligation and the impulse to self-indulgence, the moral being stands in his freedom of choice involving the power of determining which of these forces, whether of duty or impulse, shall control his actions and his life. This is the prerogative of personality, the responsibility which rests upon every moral being,—upon every man by virtue of his moral nature. In this determination he takes upon himself a moral character—righteous if he yields to the claims of duty, sinful if he surrenders to

choosing to which of these forces he will surrender, but not the privilege of withstanding both. "Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?" (Rom. vi. 16.)

The conditions of this conflict exist in the constitution of every moral being, and under such a pressure all moral character is formed. The simple fact that moral character must be formed, even in this lowest condition in which a moral being can be conceived as existing, shows that *probation*, in this lowest form, must begin with the beginning of moral agency, and must continue until some natural or providential limit is reached. It is not necessary to inquire whether the being has any adequate conception of the facts of the spiritual world. As a moral being he must know duty, and thus the conflict, or the probation, begins. The fact of his probation may not be known to him, or even the fact of a future life for which this life is a preparation. He knows duty, and stands face to face with its claims, and thus must take his position and establish a moral character. The child, preparing for the responsibilities and honors of manhood, knows little of what is before him, and of the dependence of the future upon the present; yet the duty of the hour is before him, and in this duty lie his opportunity and his test. When manhood comes it finds him prepared or unprepared, and his probation is past before he recognizes the fact that it is present. He knew his duty and made his choice between fidelity to duty and a life of self-indulgence. In that choice was his probation. He knew his duty, and he did it, or did it not.

Under these simplest conceivable conditions every man has not only a probation—he has a *fair* probation; that is, there is nothing in his situation of which he can reasonably complain. The duty that claims his regard is a reasonable duty, and in conduct nothing can be reasonable but to accept that duty. If he fails, he has failed to meet the

requirements of his own highest intelligence—has incurred his own disapprobation. He may not apprehend that back of this duty there is a Law-giver and Ruler who will bring him into judgment. It would help him to know this, but not knowing it, he is still under obligation. As a moral being he is a law unto himself, and the duty to which he is held is that which his own reason imposes. Nothing unreasonable to him, can be duty to him, and the demand made upon him is nothing of which he can complain. It might help him to know that all his future is dependent upon the present, but ignorance of that fact can never stand as an excuse for neglected duty. The duty was plain although some of the consequences of not doing it were unknown.

We are not to accept the idea that a moral being slips into a sinful character and a sinful life by any accident. Sin is not a mistake or an accident. A man does not find himself a sinner, confirmed in sinful character, without essential knowledge of what is going on in himself. Before the sin, came perception of duty, and every duty and every sin had its note of admonition and warning. Every man confirmed in sin has passed through this experience of conflict in his own moral nature. He has consciously made his choice between duty and inclination; and if there is any unfairness in the result it is because he has dealt unfairly with himself. An *unfair* probation in the establishment of moral character would seem to be, in the nature of the case, impossible. A youth entering a school or a mercantile establishment, on probation, may be hardly dealt with. Too heavy burdens may be laid upon him, and unreasonable taskmasters may set down against him his unwilling failures, or at the last he may find himself

is a reasonable probation and therefore a fair probation, and there can be no other in the sphere of moral character.

But other factors besides the simple, original elements of a moral nature enter into this probation. A *fair* probation is not necessarily the most *favorable*, or the most *desirable* probation. Human beings at the beginning of their moral agency, standing between duty and inclination, find themselves under the operation of other forces, aside from those which belong to their own moral nature. These are not dominant or controlling forces. The control is and must be with the man himself by virtue of his moral agency. But these forces gather about him in the form of motives addressing him through his intelligence or his feelings, and prompting to the performance of duty on the one side, or to self-indulgence and the neglect of duty on the other. These motives come from all the sources through which human beings can be moved to action. Truth and light urged upon the soul by the spirit of God and by his faithful servants, would move to righteousness on the one side, and the world, the flesh, and the devil present temptations to sin on the other. Thus the conflict is broadened, but not essentially changed. The man still stands, in the exercise of his free-will, master of the situation, arbiter of his own destiny. He can ally himself with any of these forces, on the one side or on the other, and the duty he meets is still only what is reasonable tested by his own intelligence. "It is required" of him "according to that he hath, and not according to that he hath not." It is still a fair probation. Even in the most unfavorable conditions, "God's commandments are not grievous."

But the probation will be more or less *favorable* or *desirable* according as the motives which act upon the soul, on the side of righteousness, are abundant and persuasive. Observe, I do not say, according as these motives *preponderate*. The motives to righteousness always preponderate, in the case of every moral agent, provided the motives be estimated by the reason or the understanding,—and to

our rational thought there is no other test. Other motives may excite the impulses, or passions, and thus induce action; but the man always knows that action thus determined is unreasonable and wrong, harmful to himself and to others, and that the true reasons for action lie on the other side. Yet there is a general expectation that the soul beset with constant temptation to evil, will form a sinful character, and fail in his destiny, and that under abundant and persistent influences to righteousness, a righteous character will be formed; and this expectation is the result of experience and observation. The probation is not set aside in either case; but in the one case it is a favorable, and in the other an unfavorable, probation. There are dark regions of the earth where we do not expect to find a righteous man—that is, a man who walks according to the light he has, and makes it his aim to do the duties he knows. There are conditions in the most favored Christian community from which we expect nothing better; the influences are too unfavorable. Yet the righteous man may be found in Sodom, and the sinner among the Saviour's chosen twelve. The question of character is determined, not by any outward conditions, but by the responsible action of the man himself.

The conditions however, which surround the man are so important that we are called upon to make every effort to improve them. We set ourselves against the forces of evil, and do what we can to re-enforce the good, that we may help men in the conflict of life, and secure to them a desirable probation. Under the best conditions ever attained in this world, the risks are so great that all the good look on with anxiety, and "there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth." Beyond all question the motives derived from the knowledge of God, his

Lord Jesus Christ," through which the world is crucified to the believer, and the believer to the world. Thus gospel light and Christian civilization afford the most desirable conditions of human probation, and under these conditions the best results in character are obtained. The man is favored to whom these glad tidings have come, and for this reason we are commanded to "go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." When we have brought this gospel to men we have done the best we can do to help them in their probation.

But even the gospel does not save men from the necessity of forming character for themselves, nor from the risks and dangers involved in probation. Men failed in the very presence of Christ, with the crucifixion and the resurrection before their eyes. Under the preaching even of Paul the cross proved "unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness,"—to some "the savor of death unto death," to others "the savor of life unto life." If there be in the universe any form of gracious influence which can be brought to bear upon human souls so effectively as to set aside all danger in probation, it has not yet been revealed to men. The rich man in his torment, yearning over his brethren, imagined that if one went unto them from the dead they would repent. The Saviour speaking as Abraham replied: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." The gospel is the fulness of Moses and the prophets; but even this great salvation may be neglected. The risks of failure and loss remain after the gospel has been preached to men "with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven." The most favorable probation which God has been able to give to men leaves essentially the same conflict to the human soul. "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all," cannot be supposed to have in reserve some more precious gift which he grudges to bestow. Abraham, at the beginning of the gospel revelation, had his probation when he was called

of God to leave his home and go out into a strange country, and by faith he obeyed. Moses too met the test when called to choose between the reproach of Christ and the treasures of Egypt, and "he endured as seeing him who is invisible." Thus all the good men of old endured, "not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off."

In all the varying light of the progress of revelation, men were called upon to take their portion with God or with the world, and they made their choice; and this was true not only of the few conspicuous examples appearing in the sacred record, but of the undistinguished multitudes that were gathered about them. The evidence seems to be that all the generations past have had their probation, and that the same work is going forward over the face of the earth to-day, wherever human beings exist. Men wherever found have moral character, and are establishing themselves in their own chosen course of righteousness or sin. That under certain conditions of life the result seems to be uniform, so that no one breaks away from the prevailing drift of moral depravity and rises above the dead level of degradation, does not set aside the fact that each one has chosen for himself, and thus furnished the determining factor of his own destiny. The fact that they have a settled moral character is unquestionable. That they have formed this character for themselves, is undeniable; there can be no other source of moral character. That on that character their destiny must turn, seems to be a natural necessity as well as a divine appointment. In the facts as they stand before us, and in the general testimony of the Scriptures on the subject, we find no sure ground for a different conclusion.

Every effort on the part of Christian men to escape this conclusion has been based upon the general fact of the goodness of God, involving the assumption that nothing can be admitted in the appointments of God to men which is not in harmony with perfect goodness, directed by

infinite wisdom. In the light of this principle, which must be granted as unquestioned and unquestionable, some have ventured to hope and believe that the opportunities of probation are not limited to this world, that the ways of God cannot be justified to men without assuming a further trial hereafter for those who have been least favored here, and especially that there must be further probation for those who have not been blest with the knowledge of Christ, the Saviour of men.

There is only one difficulty in this effort to add to the light which revelation affords on this question—the obvious difficulty of testing the ways of God, in the details of his providence, by the human understanding. God has made us the judges of his ways, in reference to the great purpose that controls him, and the grand outcome of his administration. The goodness of God must be a simple and transparent principle that a child can understand, but the wisdom of angels becomes foolishness in the attempt to forecast the *methods* of his goodness. We may hope to understand them when fully disclosed. If we should encounter any clear injustice, any unreasonable dealing with men, we should have a right to say with Abraham, “Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?” But in a question of ways and means we must cry out with Paul, “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!” The fact that the world as we find it is not what we should have anticipated, as the work of an infinite and perfect creator, should check our speculations as to what must be in the world unseen. Yet it may not be out of place to consider some of the difficulties of the situation which it is supposed a future probation might relieve.

One of the most obvious of these difficulties is the inequality of the advantages granted to men in reference to the attainment of the true end of life. There is an unequal distribution of the gifts of God's grace. But we are to

remember that an unequal distribution is not an unjust distribution, provided there are good reasons for the inequality. The diverse conditions of men on the face of the earth are not determined simply by the sovereign act of God. He never made a heathen nation or a Christian nation, by any mere exercise of his power. Each is the result of the moral forces generated among men, limited, and restrained or guided, by God's overruling providence—that providence itself more or less shaped by the exigencies arising from the character and conduct of men. Thus the foreseen character of Abraham is represented as determining in a degree the divine action in his case: "Shall I hide from Abraham that thing which I do, seeing that Abraham shall surely become a great and mighty nation, and all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him? For I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him" (Gen. xviii. 17-19). This was the planting and growth of a favored people. Paul tells us, in the first chapter of Romans, how heathenism grows: "Because that, when they knew God, they glorified *him* not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, . . . to dishonor their own bodies between themselves: who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator." The heathen nations of our day have not arisen by God's direct purpose and power. Human intervention and responsibility have come in at every step, and the present darkness and degradation, so pitiful and hopeless, are the outcome of apostasy and

rejection of the light, in generations past. God "visits the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generations of them that hate him." Or, to listen again to Paul: "Even as they did not like to retain God in *their* knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient." Thus heathenism is the natural growth of human sinfulness, left of God to yield its natural and necessary fruit.

Passing from these broader national or racial facts to those that pertain to the family and the individual, we shall find that their favorable or unfavorable conditions, embracing even tendencies to evil communicated by heredity, are almost wholly the result of personal activity and responsibility more or less remote; so that whatever there is in the conditions of human probation less favorable than those of our first parents in the garden, has been brought in by the activity of men, in the free exercise of their moral agency.

We must remember, however, that these unfavorable conditions do not imply an unfair probation in the case of any mortal. They imply inequality, but not injustice. Are we warranted, by any rational principle, in the demand that men should have equal opportunity and equal inducement to "make their calling and election sure"? and does the inequality which we observe in the present life afford any ground for the expectation that the probation of the less favored will be continued in another life? This would imply a divine overruling and counteraction of all the mischief of sin, so far as it affects others than the sinner himself; and thus all the motives drawn from our responsibility for the character and destiny of others must be set aside by a special divine arrangement. The unfaithful parent would no longer apprehend that his unfaithfulness may ruin his children. They are not to suffer a disadvantage from his sin. They must have opportunities equal to those of the most favored. Those who make a spoil of the bodies and the souls of men can

comfort themselves with the thought that their victims are soon to die, and will awake to opportunities such as this world could not afford them. A worldly and self-indulgent church might say, The heathen need the gospel light, but if we neglect them they will soon pass out of this darkness into the life beyond, where some angel shall be commissioned to preach to them the everlasting gospel. It would be selfish and sinful so to reason and to act, but it is not difficult to see that, on the scheme proposed, all the high motives drawn from the sense of responsibility for others must lose their grip upon the human conscience; and if human speculation can be trusted upon a theme so complex and profound as God's administration of the moral world, we must decide that he cannot afford to guarantee to all his creatures equal opportunities in advance of the final judgment. Such an arrangement would essentially set aside all the moral relations existing among men,—would morally isolate the individual, making each man responsible for his own soul, and in no practical sense his brother's keeper. It would set aside the great facts of the world as they pass before us, and destroy the chief significance of life. In considering the problem of probation in reference to particular cases, therefore, we may dismiss, as utterly groundless, the claim for equal opportunities. Every man must have a *fair* probation—not necessarily as desirable as the most favored have. It is safe to say that each must have the best opportunity that God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, can give.

The three classes of persons, in reference to whom more or less difficulty or perplexity is felt, in connection with the generally accepted facts of probation, are infants, the young, or those called away in the midst of life, and

leave them in the hands of God, to whom all the souls that he has made are precious, confident that, in the end, he will justify his own ways. Where the Scriptures have withheld light, it would seem appropriate to accept their silence as proof that light would not be useful. But men are given to speculation, and it is not necessarily presumptuous for us to bring our thought to bear even upon questions pertaining to the ways of God. Abraham, as he went up Mount Moriah to the sacrifice, was permitted to comfort himself with the thought that God might fulfil his promise by raising Isaac from the dead. God's method was simpler than that, but there was no harm in his speculations. Ours may be as wide of the mark, but if we hold them in the same spirit of faith and submission, we shall be walking in his footsteps.

In reference to infants there is not a word of revelation. We repeat to ourselves the Saviour's words, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," and dismiss all anxiety. The Roman Catholic would make his assurance more sure by baptism—the strict Calvinist, by election, and thus Dr. Alexander Hodge, in the *Century* magazine for the month of March, represents the church universal as embracing all mankind, of all centuries, dying in infancy. The prevailing Christian thought unquestionably is that the infant dying before the opening of his moral agency, is saved from all the hardships and risks of probation, and this result we may accept without misgiving. But there seems no reason for supposing that infants, taken into another life, will escape the law of growth and development, and the establishment of moral character, which applies to all moral beings. They are probably not to exist in a state of perpetual infancy. They must at length awake to the fact of obligation, and must adjust themselves to that obligation, and thus the test of character must come to them. Will their situation be better than that of our first parents in the earthly paradise? How absolutely without knowledge we are on this subject, and how vain our con-

jectures! Their mode of existence as mere spirits, without the body, would seem a favorable condition. But that this would relieve them from all temptation we do not know. The Scriptures hint of "angels who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation—reserved in darkness to the judgment." Whence came their temptations? But there is relief in the thought that these infants will be received into the great family of redeemed human souls, those who have had experience of sin and of salvation,—guardian spirits who will guide their steps, and shelter their inexperience, and lead them on, in ways of obedience, to established character, without risk of failure. Such service as this, in the heavenly paradise, would be worthy of the great family of departed saints, the spirits of the just made perfect—apostles and prophets and mothers in Israel; and thus, perhaps, a second fall, like that of Eden, may be avoided. All this is mere conjecture, but it is a great possibility, perhaps even a probability, and we are warranted in dismissing all anxiety in reference to these early-gathered infant souls.

The case of those dying in early years, after the obligations of life have been apprehended, and before settled and established character has been reached, presents occasion for anxiety and perplexity. The goodness of God is still our refuge; but God's infinite goodness cannot secure the moral world from all trial, disappointment, and loss. The thought that oppresses is that the soul cut off by an early death, unrepentant, unforgiven, might have attained eternal life if a few more years had been granted him. If the question comes, Has he suffered injustice at the hand of God? we must answer, No. He has had an oppor-

ground that God could have wisely afforded him a more extended opportunity. No wisdom less than divine can decide that point. We have no Scripture that bears upon it. There are rational considerations that may give us some light. There is a *natural* limit to probation, involved in our conception of a probation complete and full. When the character has become fixed, so that motives on the one side or on the other are powerless to induce a change, further trial is useless and out of place. The man has taken his position, and his destiny is determined. Continued probation, in this world or another, is of no avail. A *second* probation is essentially a contradiction. It involves a breaking down of the moral constitution, setting aside all the results of past activity, and starting the man anew—not the same man, but another. There is no second probation.

Of course no mortal eye can trace the line which marks the natural limit of probation. That there is such a limit we must infer from the tendency to a fixedness of character which is clearly indicated in human experience. The rapidity of movement toward it must vary with the varying pressure of motives acting upon the soul, and which are accepted or resisted. That it may be reached within the period of ordinary human life, is by no means incredible. The shortness of this period, as compared with the everlasting existence that is to follow, can afford no reason for doubt. Even a thousand years would be equally insignificant compared with that endless life. The tendency must be regarded as establishing the fact, and the fact is generally recognized and accepted.

In the case of early death, the man has not reached the natural limit of probation; shall his probation be continued? God alone can tell. It may be necessary for the moral universe that there should be a *providential* limit of

attain that limit! The great majority drop off in the progress from infancy to maturity; and a few pass on beyond the natural limit of life. No thoughtful man can question the fact that this uncertainty of life, secured by causes that no human foresight can evade, is most wholesome. No one of us, in entering upon life, could be trusted with the knowledge that he shall live to threescore and ten. Such knowledge would insure the wasting of our lives. For the same reason no human soul can be trusted with the assurance that he should be allowed to reach the natural limit of probation, either here or hereafter. It would be the surest means to make probation a failure. "Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set in them to do evil." A providential termination of probation should not be understood as a suppression of moral agency. There seems to be no evidence that such an act of sovereign power is to be exercised. It is probable that the moral nature will survive the appointments of the judgment, in the case even of the lost soul. But it is entirely conceivable that all helpful and favoring influences may be withdrawn, and the soul left to its own chosen way and to its inherent tendencies to evil,—“cast out into outer darkness,” “having no hope and without God.” That such a necessity for terminating probation in advance of the natural limit may exist in the kingdom of God seems altogether probable, and that God, in his unerring wisdom and goodness, should so adjust the forces on which life depends as to meet this necessity, may be a part of the administration of his kingdom.

In the case of the unenlightened nations of the world, we are not left to mere human speculation. No one, probably, ever faced the problem more distinctly than Paul, or had better opportunity, as a man, to understand

gospel he says (Romans i. 18): "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold [hinder] the truth in unrighteousness." And he tells us how they know the truth (v. 19): "Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed *it* unto them," not by special revelation, but by the light of nature (v. 20), "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, *even* his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Then follows the record of their apostasy from this knowledge of God, the terrible setting forth of their moral degradation—their shameful vices, exhibited not as stupidities or blunders, but as loathsome crimes, brought home to their own consciences in the closing verse of the chapter: "Who, knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them." In the following chapter Paul speaks of the judgment of God which must overtake these wilful sinners—the doom that awaits them "in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ:" (vs. 3-15) "And thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them which do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering; not knowing [not recognizing] that the goodness of God leadeth thee [invites thee] to repentance? But, after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath, against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every man according to his deeds. For there is no respect of persons with God. For as many as have sinned without law [shall have further probation? No,], shall also perish without law, and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law. For not the hearers of the law *are* just before God, but the doers of the law shall be

justified. For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and *their* thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing, one another."

The reasoning, therefore, as well as the authority of Paul seem to sustain the doctrine that the heathen have their probation in this life, and until some better reasonings and higher authority shall reach us, we do well to stand by the doctrine.

ARTICLE III.

THE BY-WAYS OF INFIDELITY.

BY JOHN T. PERRY, ESQ., OF EXETER, N. H.

As the manifestations of certain bodily diseases vary with the constitution and surroundings of the patient, so the symptoms of the great spiritual malady of indwelling sin are perplexing in their diversity. We read in the Gospel of Mark that many bore false witness against Christ and that "their witness agreed not together." Yet every one of these slanderers and perjurers was actuated by the same malignant disposition. He was bound to secure a conviction at all hazards.

An interesting volume might be written on the variations of unbelievers, and, if properly arranged, would be far more effective than Bossuet's arraignment of the diversities of Protestants. We should find atheism defended both as the foundation and the logical outcome of a rejection of the Scriptures, and again, them maintained as an

while not divine, was the noblest of philanthropists and philosophers; that he was an impostor and a fanatic; and finally that he never existed,—the whole story of his life being an astronomical myth, or a new version of an Oriental fable. These theories and numberless blendings of them have all had their supporters. Yet the advocates of each show that none of the others will account for all the facts in the case, and real scholarship, saying nothing of man's spiritual needs, finds them all defective.

Men are strangely credulous when their interest, real or fancied, inclines them toward any special line of belief. They are peculiarly so when seeking an opiate for the conscience. Charles II said of Isaac Vossius, the erudite but sceptical Canon of Windsor, "This learned divine is a strange man; he believes everything but the Bible." The students of our theological seminaries must often pass a like judgment when considering the wild hypotheses to which German and other radical critics resort. Starting with the postulate that the miraculous and supernatural must be fabulous, no theory is deemed extravagant if it will only support a naturalistic interpretation. Yet these elaborated fallacies, and the objections dealt with in our standard defences of the faith, are not the main arguments which the pastor may have to encounter. If his labors are among the mechanics of our manufacturing cities and towns; if he runs across one of those studious but opinionated farmers or professional men in the country who are known to their neighbors as infidels or spiritualists—he will find him crammed with assertions and arguments that will astound him. He may easily recognize their falsity, but if not thoroughly well read, or the possessor of a good library, he may be compelled to restrict himself to a simple denial of his adversary's correctness.

The psalmist exclaimed, "I said in my haste, all men are

attained a very wide circulation, though a somewhat obscure one, akin to that of the obscene publications absolutely prohibited by law. Houses in Boston, New York, Chicago, and other cities are constantly sending forth this class of literature. Every wild fancy uttered by some crack-brained man of learning is borrowed and emphasized as demonstrated truth; quotations from the Fathers and from modern theologians are garbled, and even forged, and facts admitted by all honest unbelievers to be undeniable, are set down as utterly fabulous.

The well-instructed man, minister or layman, will not be deceived by these impudent pretences. The coarseness and flippancy with which they are generally urged, and the blasphemy with which they are often accompanied, will also disgust many who might otherwise yield to the weight of apparent testimony. Comparatively few persons, however, are profoundly versed in religious history, and those who read to quiet their apprehensions are at least half perverted before they begin their studies. A more minute survey of the field may be of service to Christian workers imperfectly cognizant of this state of things.

A favorite field with unbelieving quacks is that of comparative mythology. Before modern philology had detected the fallacy of assuming that similarity of name proved the identity of entirely different persons,—that there was a connection, for example, between Manu Menes and Moses; that Abraham and Brahma, Sarah and Sarasvati were every one related—writers like Jacob Bryant and George Stanley Faber, while intending to support revelation, furnished many useful weapons to unbelievers of the conscienceless school. Sir William Jones and his associate pioneers in East Indian literature also did a great deal of harm by their ready acknowledgment of the antiquity claimed by the Hindoos for writings since found to date back only to the eighth or even twelfth century of our era. Egypt, Assyria, Chaldea, and also our Teutonic fatherland have been ransacked for the prototypes of

Bible narratives, and even Hesus, the Mars of the Celts, has been declared a Saviour, simply on account of his name. Bible Myths, a volume published in New York two or three years ago in sumptuous octavo form, and which has reached a third edition, is one of the most outwardly decorous of the compilations of infidel falsehood, and yet one of the most dishonest. By its side Dr. Inman's far from candid or trustworthy works become fairly respectable. A score of less pretentious books of the class might be mentioned. The design of all is to show that scriptural history is largely the repetition of heathen myths, and often to fix upon revelation some of the most abominable doctrines and symbolism of the old Gentile systems. The subject is too broad and varied for detailed treatment here. It is enough to say that the Mosaic code carried no doctrine from the land of the captivity except its assertion, otherwise derived and greatly emphasized, of that unity of the Godhead which the earliest Egyptians seem faintly to have perceived, but had generally abandoned long before the Exodus. Some resemblances of ceremonial have been pointed out, but they are few and superficial. The Osiric myth, claimed by some to be an anticipation of the incarnation and crucifixion, may have embodied a recollection of the prediction respecting the seed of the woman and the serpent's head. As Wilkinson says: "This being the divine goodness, his [Osiris'] manifestation upon earth, his death and resurrection, and his office as judge of the dead in a future state, look like the early revelation of a future manifestation of the Deity converted into a mythological fable."

Still, the traces of Egyptian influence upon Israel are rare and unimportant, while modern archaeology is constantly strengthening the proofs of the genuineness and authenticity of Genesis. The tombs of Beni Hassan and manifold documents and inscriptions show that where Scripture and Herodotus are at variance Scripture is always right. No wandering Jew, five or six centuries

after the events recorded, could have avoided some, at least, of the errors into which the sharp-sighted Grecian fell. Yet unbelieving quackery is still dispensing fables about Egypt.

India has not ceased to be a favorite field with this class. "Bible Myths" makes much of it, and repeats many old and oft exploded falsehoods. Krishna, unfortunately admitted by the Rev. Thomas Maurice, ninety years ago, to date—in the modern phase of the story—hundreds of years before Christ, was probably an historical character. Yet in the pre-Christian books he is simply a scholar and hero. In the old Buddhist Sutras he is not mentioned among the gods worshipped when Buddhism arose. The legend grew, and in the later episodes of the Mahabharata he had become a wonder worker, though here and there in the main poem his deity is denied. In a still later episode, the philosophical Bhagavad Gita, he has risen to supreme God. Dr. Lorinser claims that traces of John's Gospel are to be found in the Bhagavad, and the general voice of modern scholarship ascribes it to the third Christian century. The full-blown Krishna of infidelity, between whose life and that of Christ there are a few partial coincidences, but many more glaring discrepancies, is the theme of the Harivansa, a long post-Christian supplement to the Mahabharata, and especially of certain Puranas, none of which are earlier than the eighth century, while others are scarcely mediaeval. There can be no remarkable antiquity in documents that refer to Mahomet and to post-Christian dynasties of Kings. These Puranas were claimed by the Hindoos to be of hoary age, and were accepted as such by the English scholars of the "Asiatic Research" era. Modern scholars, however, like Weber, Barth, and Monier Williams, see that the Puranic era is as remote and as different from the Vedaic as is Tennyson from Caedmon or the Venerable Bede. Yet some well-meaning defenders of the faith, like Dr. J. P. Lundy in his Monumental Christianity, virtually surrender everything to unbelief by mak-

ing mediaeval Krishnaism a primitive cult and anticipation of Christianity. They are wholly unconscious of their mistake, but, starting with a preconceived theory, turn and twist everything to agree with it.

Astronomical interpretations of religion seem to have originated in Dupuis' *Origine de Tous Les Cultes*, and Volney's *Ruines*, based upon the first-named work though actually published a little earlier. Sir William Drummond gave it countenance in his *Oedipus Judaicus*, and later the eccentric Godfrey Higgins combined it with Krishnaism in his ponderous *Anacalypsis*, a monument of perverted industry and wrong-headed scholarship, as also a quarry from which innumerable fallacies have been dug. The stars can be made to speak both for and against Christianity. While Dupuis and Volney have racked celestial phenomena to make them the origin of anti-Christian incidents and doctrines, and these, in their turn, the foundation of Scripture, writers like Miss Rolleston, in her *Mazzaroth*, and Dr. Seiss, in his *Gospel in the Stars*, find the constellations to be records of patriarchal orthodoxy and of the earliest Messianic prophecy. Senart has applied the same process to Buddhism, but the facts have been too much for him. Goldziher and others have attempted to revive the method in connection with Jewish history, and the Sun myth hypothesis, so popular with a certain school of thinkers, is its latest modification. The best proof of its fallacy lies in the completeness with which both Washington and Napoleon have been shown to be myths by the legitimate application of its principles. Borrowed chiefly from Dupuis and Volney, Astro-Theology will be found to constitute a main source of the arguments of the notorious Rev. Robert Taylor, of "Diegesis" and "Devil's Pulpit" fame, and of many humbler imitators. The hypothesis would seem too extravagant to need refutation, yet an exposure of one of its chief points, made long ago in Faber's *Difficulties of Infidelity*, is as applicable to-day as when first written :

"Mr. Volney gravely assures us that the divine personage, whom Christians, during the space of well-nigh eighteen centuries, have ignorantly revered as their crucified Redeemer, is neither more nor less than the sun in the firmament; that the Virgin Mary is one of the Zodiacal signs, the constellation Virgo to wit; and that Christ's crucifixion by Pontius Pilate and his resurrection from the dead on the third day are nothing more than the sun's declension to the winter solstice and his subsequent return to the summer solstice through the vivifying season of spring. . . . Mr. Volney [Dupuis does the same], to rid himself of the troublesome evidence of Tacitus, who flourished only about seventy years after the time, is willing to imagine that he wrote from the false depositions of the Christian prisoners, . . . Hence, according to Mr. Volney, it very easily happened that the unlucky historian was shamefully befooled by a set of gross liars, who themselves chose to be worried by dogs and to be crucified and to be burned alive in support of what they all the while knew to be an absurd falsehood."

Buddha has succeeded Krishna in the field of reputable scepticism, but he has been appropriated also by the forgers and pretenders. Over fifty years ago, Bouvier, a French author, held up Samanacodam, a half Buddhist, half Christian demi-god, much revered by the Siamese, as the foundation of what he deemed the Christ-legend. He appears to have derived many of his facts from the very uncritical narratives of the Jesuit fathers sent to Siam by Louis XIV. St. Jerome mentions the report that Buddha was born of a virgin, and General Cunningham declares that the sculpture on the Bharavat tope, dates back to the third century before Christ, and represents Buddha's incarnation. Yet this incarnation proves to have been in the form of a white elephant, and is in no way biblical in its accompanying circumstances. Moreover other Buddhist sculptures do not begin to be biblically suggestive till shortly before Jerome's time, say the third or fourth century. The unquestionably pre-Christian rock-cut inscriptions of King Asoka, the Buddhist Constantine, mention Buddha as a man and an ascetic reformer, not at all as a wonder worker or divine incarnation. Most of the alleged

be traced back of the fifth century of our era, three hundred years after Christian missionaries are known to have visited India. How would our unbelievers treat the claims of a life of Christ written A. D. 900? Yet Buddha was born some four or five centuries before Christ, a thousand years earlier than the existing narratives and after Isaiah had proclaimed that a virgin should conceive and bear a son. The German Seydel has labored hard to prove that the first versions of several New Testament miracles occur in primitive Buddhist legend, but the attempt is pronounced a failure, by the illustrious Albrecht Weber, and has been shown to be such in the lately published volume of Professor Kellogg of Allegheny Seminary. So much for the Buddha of scholarly unbelief. In the works of the dishonest virtuperators the Christian resemblances are multiplied and intensified, and Buddha is even said to have been crucified, though according to all trustworthy accounts he died from eating improper food, at the age of fourscore.

Passing to the early Christian era, we find these worthies repeating the old story that the canon of the New Testament was settled at Nice by a vote. A few have discovered that Laodicea was a more likely place, but all pretend that there was canonical confusion before, the Gospel of the Infancy being in as high repute as that of Matthew or John, and an alleged story of the obscure synodist Pappus is repeated that the Gospels and Epistles finally adopted mounted upon the table. We are gravely informed that the passage respecting Christ in Josephus is universally recognized as spurious, and that there is no other evidence of our Lord's existence than a doubtful passage of Tacitus, a passage which, though pronounced unimpeachable by Gibbon, we shall soon see is dismissed as an

Ross published a volume to show that the works of Tacitus were forged by Poggio Bracciolini, early in the fifteenth century. The idea was not altogether new, for two hundred years ago, Father Hardouin conceived the notion that most of the classics were mediæval inventions. Later, Semler, one of the fathers of modern rationalism, endeavored to prove that the celebrated letter of Pliny to Trajan respecting the Christians of Bithynia was spurious. Mr. Ross fortified his theory by some plausible statements of alleged facts. He was taken in hand, however, by a contributor to the *Edinburgh Review* of October 1878, and convicted of stupid blundering, if not of positive dishonesty.

He may, or he may not have been influenced by the desire to get rid of the important testimony of Tacitus to the crucifixion, and to the sufferings of the Christians under Nero. Whatever may have been his motives there can be no doubt respecting an anonymous American already author of one of those lists of alleged biblical contradictions which suggested the important defensive work of the Rev. J. W. Haley. This person, having taken the very appropriate pseudonym of "Antichrist," proceeded to erect a remarkable structure on the foundation laid by Mr. Ross whom he accepted as infallible. He also gave his approval to that Jewish mediæval libel, the Toldoth Jeschu. By this he attempted to make it appear that the historical prototype of an almost fabulous Christ, of whom no Tacitus ever wrote, lived eighty or one hundred years before Pilate's administration. The accuracy of the Toldoth is evinced in its declaration that David, not Solomon, was the builder of the first temple, and also in its making King Jannæus, who died in the year 675 after the building of Rome, the husband of Helena, who actually

have found one branch of his argument refuted as early as 1687. Of Mr. Ross' overthrow, and the consequent rehabilitation of Tacitus, he seems never to have heard.

Many a pastor may find his efforts blocked by such reckless compilers as, "Antichrist." The youthful or illiterate unbeliever whom he is desirous to reclaim, and who remains impervious to approved statements of the evidences, may have been misled by what we may style the apocrypha of infidelity, rather than by better known influences. Be the case as it may, heads are turned and consciences are paralyzed.

We may be charged with unnecessarily delving in a moral and intellectual garbage heap, but bad books are as slow to die as are bad influences in general. A curious evidence of the longevity of a worse than worthless volume is afforded by George Bethune English's Examination of Christianity, a work of which probably few of our readers have heard. Early in the present century its author, after graduating from Harvard College, began to study for the ministry. From a theological student he became a violent sceptic, setting forth his new unfaith as above mentioned. The book created a great, though temporary, stir in the religious circles of Boston and Cambridge. Its argument was one that Lardner and Paley failed to meet. Prophecy, it held, was almost the sole evidence of the claims of Jesus to the Messianism, and he was not the fulfilment of prophecy, unless in a figurative and indefinite sense. The religion of nature was also contrasted with revelation, much to the advantage of the former. One or two efforts at refutation were not very successful. English passed for a learned wonder until Edward Everett, then in the first triumphs of his ministry, discovered that the new Celsus was a plagiarist. He had found his weapons in the writings of the English deists of the eighteenth century, largely in Collins' Grounds and Reasons, and Tindal's Christianity as Old as the Creation. Having thus traced the borrowings to their sources, Mr.

Everett's task was not a hard one. He only had to quote, with modern improvements the arguments of Leland, Chandler, Conybeare, and the other opponents of deism, to silence his adversary. The rout was complete; English entered the Egyptian service, and is reported to have died a Mahometan. For the truth of this last rumor we will not vouch. His book did not die with him. Though forgotten in Christian circles, it is among the standard issues of a Jewish publishing house at Toronto, and as such was exhibited in the Canadian department of the Philadelphia centennial. It passes, we suppose, for an able Gentile proof of the Jewish doctrine that Jesus was not the promised deliverer of Israel.

Where Thomas Paine or Colonel Ingersoll or modern pseudo-science has drawn one from Christian beliefs and observances, the minister's task is comparatively simple. The standard treatises on natural theology and the popular defences of the genuineness and authenticity of the Scriptures may help to clear the wanderer's head. Different treatment is required, however, when it has been filled with positive fables. When one has come to believe that the world has had traditions of sixteen crucified Saviours, with nearly parallel lives, he needs to be reminded that his informant has mistaken Alcides and Hercules for different personages, is unable to identify Romulus with Quirinus, and garbles quotations from Gibbon and other writers, to make them read precisely opposite to the author's intent. Such stupidity and wilful falsehood, and even worse examples, can be found in the very widely circulated writings of the late Kersey Graves!

It is a remarkable and honorable exception to this dishonest tendency of unbelievers that Professor W. E. Coleman, of San Francisco, an accomplished Orientalist, though far from orthodox believer, fearlessly exposed and sternly

needed work. The writer and the paper have brought upon themselves a flood of bitter denunciation from the detected criminals, and the books are still circulated, just as if they were as unanswerable as their authors pretended at the start.

Judge Waite, of Chicago, cannot escape the imputation of fraudulent literary pretension, though his much bepuffed *History of the Christian Religion to the year 200* is more decent in tone than most of the works to which we have referred. It is a labored attempt to demonstrate that the miraculous element did not enter into Christian tradition until late in the second century. It is refreshing to find in his pages that points deemed strategic by even advanced representatives of the Tübingen School are not at all doubtful, and he exceeds, if possible, the anonymous author of *Supernatural Religion* in brushing away as a cobweb every troublesome fact. The chief danger of the work lies in its positiveness. Half learned readers are very likely to become its victims, for its dogmatism often has the semblance of demonstrated truth. That he is not competent to discuss his subject is apparent both from his seeming ignorance of German, and from his mistaking a *Catena Patrum* for the name of a veritable church father! Yet he has displayed a lawyer-like skill in the selection and arrangement of his fallacies.

The practical lesson which we would draw from the existence of this unpleasant and disgraceful class of writings is that infidelity is largely a disease of the moral nature. Sceptical publications are used as opiates for the conscience, rather than as guides for the intellect. As the physician is on the lookout for abnormal appetites and the contagion of bad drainage, so the spiritual healer must push his inquiries beyond the circle of merely intellectual difficulties. The foreign missionary deems it necessary to

on entering the shop of an intelligent but imperfectly educated man, the other day, happened to mention the Bible. "Which Bible do you mean?" was the immediate reply. The question was doubtless inspired by the study of Kersey Graves or some equally trustworthy authority of the low infidel school.

Yet not the illiterate alone fall a prey to the irresponsible anti-Christian propagandists. When Jacolliot's Bible in India, pronounced by Max Müller, and other competent critics, an outrageous fraud, was published about sixteen years ago, not a few educated persons accepted its pretended quotations from the Vedas as genuine. They really thought that Jezeus Christna was the proper name of Krishna and that Adimo and Heva of Ceylon were the originals of Adam and Eve. It may not be necessary that all pastors should be profoundly read in the ethnic faiths, but there is every reason that they should become familiar with their outlines, and able to trace out their relations to Christianity and to the deliverer promised to our first parents. Such general surveys as Hardwick's Christ and other Masters, and, with due qualifications, Freeman Clarke's Ten Great Religions, and special treatises like Kellogg's Light of the World and Light of Asia, will be found very useful. Several small but excellent monographs by Rhys Davids, Monier Williams, and other scholars, published by the London Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, will at least serve as the foundations of more minute investigations. Monier Williams' Indian Wisdom, Whitney's Oriental and Linguistic Studies, Barth's Religions of India, Weber's History of Indian Literature, Döllinger's Gentile and Jew, and Legge's Religions of China may assist the student over later stages of his inquiry. At all events, the tillers of the Master's field should be fully aware that tares of an unsuspected variety are being sown; should make themselves competent to recognize them and, when possible, to uproot them. Philanthropy deems it no unworthy condescension to

relieve the sufferers in the slums, and certainly spiritual maladies, as much as physical afflictions, should arouse our pity and stimulate our efforts.

ARTICLE IV.

THE BOOK OF JUBILEES.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ETHIOPIC BY PROFESSOR GEO. H. SCHODDE, PH.D.,
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY, COLUMBUS, O.

CHAP. XII. 1. And it happened in the sixth week, in the seventh year thereof, Abram said unto Tarah, his father, saying, "Father!" And he said, "Behold, here I am, my son!" 2. And he said: "What assistance and what pleasure have we from all the idols which thou dost worship and before which thou dost prostrate thyself? 3. For there is no spirit in them, but they are dumb statues and a deception of the heart: do not worship them. 4. Worship the God of heaven, who sends down dew and rain upon the earth and does everything upon the earth and has created everything through his word and all living things are from before his face. 5. Why do ye worship those who have no heart and spirit in them; for they are the works of hands, and upon your shoulders do ye carry them, and ye have from them no help, but a great disgrace to those who make them and a deception of the heart to those who worship them: do not worship them!" 6. And Tarah said: "I also know it, my son; but what shall I do with this people who command me that I should serve them? 7. If I tell them the truth, they will slay me; for their soul clings to them to worship and to glorify them. 8. Keep silent, my son, lest they slay thee!" 9. And these words he spoke to his two brothers, and they became angry at him, and he kept silent. 10. And in the fortieth jubilee, in the second week, in the seventh year thereof, Abram took to himself a wife, and her name was Sara, the daughter of his father, and

she became to him a wife. 11. And Arân, his brother, took to himself [a wife] in the third year of this week, and his wife bare him a son in the seventh year of this week, and he called his name Lot. 12. And Nachor also, his brother, took to himself a wife. 13. And in the [sixtieth] year of the life of Abram, that is, in the fourth year of the fourth week, Abram arose in the night, and burned down the house of his idols, and burned all that was in the house, and there was no man that knew it. 14. And they arose in the night and desired to save their idols from the midst of the flame. 15. And Arân ran in order to save them, and the fire burned over him and he burned in the midst of the fire, and he died in Ur of the Chaldees before Tarah, his father, and they buried him in Ur. 16. And Tarah went away from Ur of the Chaldees, he and his sons, in order to come into the land of the Lebanon and into the land of Canaan; and he dwelt in Haran, and Abram dwelt with his father Tarah in Haran two weeks of years. 17. And in the sixth week, in the fifth year thereof, Abram arose and sat in the night at the new moon of the seventh month, so that he might observe the stars from the evening to the morning, so that he might know what would be the character of the year with regard to the rains, and he was sitting alone and observing. 18. And a word came into his heart, and he said: "All the signs of the stars and the signs of the sun and of the moon are all in the hand of the Lord; why do I search them out? 19. If he desires, he causes it to rain, morning and evening; and if he desires, he causes it to descend, and all things are in his hands." 20. And he prayed in that night, and said: "My God, God Most High, thou alone art a God to me, and thou hast created all things, and all things that are are the works of thy hand, and thee and thy godship have I chosen. 21. Deliver me from the

say, shall I return to Ur of the Chaldees, who seek my face, that I should return to them; or shall I remain here in this place; the right path before thee prosper in the hands of thy servant, that he may follow it and not walk in the error of my heart, O my God!" 23. He completed his words and prayer, and, behold, the Lord sent a word to him through me, saying: Up, go thou out of thy country, and out of thy kindred, and out of the house of thy father, into a land which I will show to thee, and I will make thee in the land which is great into a great and numerous people. 24. And I will bless thee and will make thy name great, and thou shalt be blessed in the land, and all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in thee; those that bless thee I will bless, and those that curse thee I will curse. 25. And I will be a God to thee and to thy children and to thy children's children and to all thy seed, and behind thee will be thy God. 26. Fear not, from now on to all the generations of the earth I am thy God." 27. And the Lord God said to me: "Open his mouth and his ears that he may hear and speak with the language which has been revealed;" for it had ceased from the mouths of all the children of men. 28. And I opened his mouth and his lips, and I opened his ears, and I began to speak with him in Hebrew, in the tongue of creation; and he took the books of his father, and these were written in Hebrew, and he copied them, and he began to learn them from then on, and I made known to him every thing he was incapable [of understanding], and he studied them the six months of the rainy period. 29. And it happened in the seventh year of the sixth week, and he spoke with his father, and informed him that he would go from Haran to go to the land of Canaan to see it and to return to him. 30. And Tarah, his father, said to him: "Go in peace! the God of the worlds make straight thy path, and the Lord be with thee and protect thee from all evil, and give to thee good will and mercy and grace before those who see thee; and may none of

the sons of men come over thee to do thee evil; go in peace! 31. And if thou seest a land pleasant to thy eyes to dwell in it, then up, and take me with thee; and take Lot with thee, the son of Arân thy brother, as thy son, and God be with thee. 32. But Nachor thy brother leave with me until thou returnest in peace and we go with thee together."

CHAP. XIII. 1. And Abram went from Haran, and took Sara, his wife, and Lot, the son of his brother Arân, to the land of Canaan, and he came into the land of Asur, and proceeded to Sakimôn, and dwelt near a great oak.' And he saw the land, and, behold, it was very beautiful from the entrance of Emêt to the great mountains. 2. And the Lord said to him: "To thee and to thy seed I will give this land." 3. And he built an altar there, and brought upon it a sacrifice to the Lord who had appeared to him. 4. And he arose from there, with the hill Bethel toward the sea [west], and Ai to the east, and fixed his tent there. 5. And he saw, and, behold, the land was pleasant and extended and very wide, and every thing grew on it, vines and figs and pomegranates and terebinths and oil trees and cedars and Lebanon trees and cypresses and all the trees of the field; and water was upon the hills. 6. And he blessed the Lord who had led him out of Ur of the Chaldees and brought him to this hill. 7. And it happened in the first year, in the seventh week, at the new moon of the first month, that he built an altar on this hill, and called upon the name of the Lord: "Thou art my God, the God unto eternity." 8. And he placed upon the altar a sacrifice unto the Lord, that he should be with him and should not desert him all the days of his life. 9. And he arose from there and went toward the

north of Boa-Lot, and there was a famine in the land, and Abram went into Egypt in the third year of this week, and he dwelt in Egypt five years before his wife was torn away from him. 10. But Tanâi⁴ in Egypt was then built in the seventh winter after Hebron. 11. And it happened that when Pharaoh seized Sara, the wife of Abram, the Lord punished Pharaoh and his whole house with large plagues, on account of Sara, the wife of Abram. And Abram was very conspicuous by wealth in sheep and oxen and asses and horses and camels and in man-servants and in maid-servants and in silver and in gold exceedingly, and Lot, also, the son of his brother, was wealthy. 12. And Pharaoh brought back Sara, the wife of Abram, and sent him out of the land of Egypt; and he came to a place where he had first fixed his tent, at the place of the altar at Agê to the east of Bethel, and he went and blessed the Lord his God who had brought him back in peace. 13. And it happened in the forty-first jubilee, in the third year of the first week, he returned to this place, and placed upon it a burnt sacrifice, and called upon the name of the Lord, and said: "Thou, O Lord, Most High God, art my God to all eternity." 14. And in the fourth year of this week Lot separated from him, and Lot dwelt in Sodom; but the men of Sodom were great sinners. And he grieved in his heart that the son of his brother had separated from him, for he had no children. 15. And in that year when Lot was taken captive, the Lord also said to Abram, after Lot had separated from him, in the fourth year of this week, and said: "Lift up thine eyes from the place here where thou art dwelling toward the north and south and west and east. 16. For the whole land which thou seest I will give to thee and thy seed to eternity, and I will make thy seed like the sand on the sea; and when man is able to count the sand on the sea, then thy seed will be counted. 17. Arise and go through it in its length

⁴ I. e., תַּנַּי, *Taviv*. Num. xiii. 22.

and breadth and see it all, for to thy seed I will give it." 18. And Abram went to Hebron and dwelt there. 19. And in that year came Kôlôdôgômôr, the king of Elam, and Emâlphele, the king of Sinâr, and Ariôk, the king of Sêlâsar, and Tirgâl, the king of the Gentiles, and slew the king of Gomorrha, and the king of Sodom fled, and many fell by wounds in Sêdêmâv and in the salt-district, and they took captive Sodom and Adam and Shêbôêm, and Lot, also, the son of the brother of Abram, and all his possessions, and went to Dan. 20. And one who had escaped came and told Abram, that the son of the brother of Abram had been taken captive.' 21. And the house-servant brought for Abram and his seed the first tenth to the Lord, and the Lord ordained it as an ordinance to eternity, that they should give [this] to the priests who served before him, that they should possess it forever. 22. And to this law is not a limit of days, but it is ordained to the generation of eternity, that they should give the tenth to the Lord, of their seed and of their wine and of their oil and of their oxen and of their sheep. 23. And he gave it to his priests to eat and to drink in joy before him. 24. And the king of Sodom came to him and bowed down before him, and said: "Our lord Abram, give us the souls thou hast saved, but let the booty be thine." 25. And Abram said to him: "I lift up my hands to God on high, from a thread to a shoe-latchet I will take nothing from all that is thine, so that thou sayest not, 'I have made Abram rich,' only except what the youths have eaten and the portion for the men who came with me, Avnân, Eskôl, and Mâmre, these shall take their share."

CHAP. XIV. 1. And after these events, in the fourth year of this week, in the new moon of the third month, the voice of the Lord came to Abram in a dream, saying: "Fear not, Abram, for I am thy defender and thy exceeding great reward." 2. And he said: "O Lord, Lord, what

wilt thou give me, and I have no son; and the son of Mâsêk, the son of my maid-servant,* this Eleazer of Damascus, he will be my heir; but to me thou hast not given any seed." 3. And he said to him: "This one will not be thy heir, but he that comes from thy body, he will be thy heir." 4. And he took him without and said to him: "Look upon the heavens and see the stars of heaven, if thou art able to count them." 5. And he looked at the heavens and saw the stars; and he said to him: "Thus shall be thy seed." 6. And he believed the Lord, and it was accounted to him for righteousness. 7. And he said to him: "I am the Lord thy God, who have brought thee out of Ur of the Chaldees, that I might give thee the land of Canaan for an eternal possession, and I will be to thee and thy children after thee a God." 8. And he said: "O Lord, Lord, by what am I to know that I shall inherit it?" 9. And he said to him: "Take to thyself a heifer of three years, and a goat of three years, and a sheep of three years, and a turtle-dove and a pigeon." 10. And he took all these in the middle of the month, and he dwelt near the oak Mâmre, which is near Hebron, and he built there an altar, and sacrificed all these and poured their blood upon the altar, and divided them into halves and laid them opposite each other; but the birds he did not divide. 12. And birds descended upon the pieces, and Abram drove them away and would not suffer the birds to touch them. 13. And it happened when the sun had set, a stupor fell upon Abram, and, behold, a great horror of darkness fell upon him, and it was spoken to Abram: "Know in truth that thy seed will be a stranger in a strange land, and they will make them servants and oppress them four hundred years. 14. But the nation which they serve I will judge, and after that they will go out from there with

the sins of the Amorites completed." 17. And he awoke from his sleep, and he arose, and the sun had set, and there was a flame, and, behold, an oven was smoking, and a flame of fire passed through between the pieces. 18. And on that day the Lord made a covenant with Abram, saying: "To thy seed I will give this land from the river of Egypt unto the great river Euphrates, the Kenites and the Kenizzites and the Kadmonites and the Perizzites and the Rephaimites and the Ewites and the Amorites and the Canaanites and the Girgashites." 19. And Abram went and took up the pieces and the birds and the fruit and the drink offerings, and the fire devoured them. 20. And on that day we made a covenant with Abram according to the covenant which he had made in this month with Noah; and Abram renewed the festival and ordinance for himself unto eternity.* 21. And Abram rejoiced and told all these things to Sara, his wife, and he believed that he would have seed; but she did not bring forth. And Sara advised her husband Abram, and said to him: "Go in to Hagar, my Egyptian maid; it is possible that he will raise up for thee seed from her." 22. And Abram obeyed the voice of Sara, his wife, and said to her, "Do it," and Sara took her Egyptian maid Hagar and gave her to Abram, her husband, that she should become his wife. 23. And he went in to her, and she conceived and bore him a son, and he called his name Ishmael, in the fifth year of this week: and this was the eighty-sixth year of the life of Abram.†

CHAP. XV. 1. In the fifth year of the fourth week of this jubilee, in the third month, in the beginning of the month, Abram celebrated the festival of the first of the grain harvest; and he brought new offerings beside offering of the first-fruits to the Lord, an ox and a goat and a sheep upon the altar as a sacrifice to the Lord, and their fruit offerings and their drink offerings he placed upon the altar together with frankincense. 2. And the Lord

* Cf. note on Chap. vi. 15.

† Gen. xvi. 16.

appeared to Abram and said to him: "I am the omnipotent God; be pleasing to me and be perfect, and I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and will increase thee exceedingly." 3. And Abram fell down on his face. 4. And the Lord spoke to him and said: "Behold my ordinance is with thee, and I will make thee the father of many nations, and thy name shall no longer be called Abram, and thy name henceforth and to eternity shall be Abraham, for I will make thee a father of many nations, and I will make thee exceedingly great, and will cause nations and kings to proceed from thee. 5. And I will establish my covenant between me and thee and between thy seed after thee in their generations, as an ordinance of eternity, that I will be a God to thee and to thy seed after thee in their generations, [and I will give thee] the land where thou art a stranger, the land of Canaan, that thou shalt be ruler over it to eternity, and I will be their God." 6. And the Lord said to Abraham: "And thou, preserve my covenant, thou and thy seed after thee, and circumcise all your foreskins, and let it be a sign of my ordinance unto eternity between me and thee and for thy descendants. 7. On the eighth day ye shall circumcise all the males in your generation, the members of the household, and him whom ye have bought with gold from all the sons of the strangers whom ye have as your property, who are not of thy seed,—they shall circumcise the children of the household, and whomsoever ye have bought shall be circumcised. 8. And my covenant shall be on your flesh as an eternal ordinance; and whosoever is not circumcised, all of thy males the flesh of whose foreskin is not circumcised on the eighth day, his soul shall be rooted out of his generation, for he has overthrown my covenant." 9. And the Lord said unto Abraham: "Sara, thy wife, shall no longer be called by her name Sara, for Sarah shall be her name;" for I will bless

¹⁰ The actual change made, according to the Ethiopic, is from Sôrâ to Sârâ, which is the same as made in the best MSS. of the Ethiopic Bible in

and give to thee a son from her, and I will bless him and he will become a people, and kings and nations shall proceed from him." 10. And Abraham fell upon his face and rejoiced, and he said in his heart: "Should there be born a son to one of a hundred years, and shall Sarah, who is ninety, yet bring forth!" 11. And Abraham said to the Lord: "O that Ishmael might live before thee!" 12. And the Lord said: "Yea, and Sarah also shall bear thee a son, and thou shalt call his name Isaac, and I will establish my eternal covenant with him and with his seed after him. 13. And also in reference to Ishmael have I heard thee, and, behold, I will bless him, and I will make him great and will increase him exceedingly, and twelve princes he will beget, and I will make him a great nation; but I will establish my covenant with Isaac, whom Sarah will bear for thee, in these days, in the second year." 14. And having ended speaking with him, the Lord ascended from over above Abraham. 15. And Abraham did as the Lord had said to him, and took Ishmael his son, and all the members of his household, and those whom he had bought with gold, all the males that were in his house, and circumcised the flesh of their sexual member. 16. And at the time of these days Abraham was circumcised, and all the men of his house and all whom he had bought with gold from among the sons of the strangers were circumcised with him. 17. And this is the law for all the generations of eternity, with no change of days and no deviation of day from the eighth day, for it is an eternal ordinance, ordained and written in the tablets of heaven. 18. And every one that is born, the flesh of whose member is not circumcised upon the eighth day, is not of the children of the covenant which the Lord made with Abraham, but is of the children of destruction; and he has no sign upon

Gen. xvii. 15. Really, throughout the text, before this, the Book of Jubilees has been using the word *Sôrâ*, for which now *Sârâ* is employed. In Ethiopic this involves no change in the meaning of the name. The LXX. changes from *Σάρα* to *Σάρρα*.

him that he is the Lord's, but he is for destruction and slaying from the earth and for rooting out of the earth; for he has broken the covenant of the Lord our God. 19. For all the angels of the face and all the angels of glorification were thus created from the day of their creation;" and he looked upon the angels of glorification, and he sanctified Israel that they should be with him and with his holy angels. 20. And thou command the children of Israel and let them observe the sign of this covenant, and for their generations as an eternal ordinance that they be not rooted out of the land. 21. For it is ordained as a command of the covenant that they should observe it forever among all the children of Israel. 22. For Ishmael and his sons and his brothers and Esau the Lord did not permit to approach him and did not choose them, for the sons of Abraham are those he acknowledged, and he chose Israel to be his people. 23. And he sanctified it and collected it from among all the children of men, for there are many nations and many peoples, and all are his, and over all has he appointed spirits to rule, that they should lead them astray from him, but over Israel he did not appoint any ruler, neither an angel nor a spirit, but he alone is their ruler, and he preserves them, and he contends for them against the hands of his angels and his spirits and all; and they shall keep all his commandments, and he will bless them, and they shall be his, and he will be theirs, from now on and to eternity. 24. And from now on I will announce to you that the children of Israel will break faith with this ordinance, and will not circumcise their sons according to this whole law, for they will omit this circumcision of the children on the flesh of their circumcision, and they all, the sons of Belial, will leave their children without circumcision as they were born. 25. And the wrath upon the children of Israel will be great from the Lord, for they have deserted his covenant,

¹¹ The angels even are circumcised, or rather created in that condition. One of the MSS. upon which D. bases his Ethiopic text omits this sentence.

and have departed from his word, and enrage him and blaspheme him, as they do not observe this ordinance according to this sign, for they make their members like the Gentiles for being torn and rooted out of the land. And no longer is there forgiveness or pardon for them that all their sin may be forgiven and pardoned for this error to eternity.

CHAP. XVI. 1. And at the new moon of the fourth month we appeared to Abraham at the oak of Mâmrê, and we conversed with him, and we announced to him that a son would be given him from Sarah his wife. 2. And Sarah laughed, for she heard that we spoke these words with Abraham; and we admonished her, and she became afraid and denied that she had laughed on account of the words. 3. And we told her the name of her son as it is written on the tablets of heaven, namely, Isaac, as his name. 4. And when we returned to her in a fixed time then she was pregnant with a son. 5. And in this month the Lord carried out the judgments of Sodom and Gomorrah and Sebrûêm and all the circuit of the Jordan, and burnt them with fire and brimstone, and demolished them unto the present day, according to what we have made known to thee concerning all their actions, that they were terrible and very sinful and they defiled themselves and committed fornication and uncleanness over the earth. 6. And accordingly the Lord inflicted judgment upon all the places by the hand of his servants, according to the uncleanness of Sodom, according to the judgment of Sodom. 7. But Lot we saved, for the Lord remembered Abraham, and led him out of the destruction. 8. And he and his daughters committed sin on the earth, such as had not been from the days of Adam until now, for the man lay with his daughters. 9. And, behold, it is commanded and engraven concerning all his seed on the tablets of

the day of judgment. 10. And in this month Abraham migrated from Hebron, and dwelt between Kades and Shur in the mountains of Gêrârôn. 11. And in the middle of the fifth month he migrated from there and dwelt at the well of the oath." And in the middle of the sixth month the Lord visited Sarah, and did to her as he had said to her, and she conceived and bore a son. And in the third month, in the middle of the month, in the days which the Lord had said to Abraham, on the festival of the first harvest, Isaac was born; and Abraham circumcised his son on the eighth day: he was the first one circumcised in the covenant as it was ordained forever. 12. And in the sixth year, in this month, of the fourth week, we came to Abraham to the well of the oath, and we appeared to him as we had told Sarah, that we would come to her, but she became pregnant with a son, and we returned in the seventh month and found Sarah pregnant before us, and we blessed her and told her all things that had been commanded us concerning him [Abraham] that he should not die until six sons had been born to him, and that he would see them before he should die; but that in Isaac his name and seed should be called. 13. And all the seed of his [other] sons will become Gentiles and will be numbered with the Gentiles; but from the sons of Isaac one shall become a holy seed and shall not be numbered among the Gentiles. 14. For he shall become the portion of the Most High, and among those of whom God is ruler will be his abode and all his seed, that it become a seed of the Lord, a nation of inheritance among all the nations, and that it may be a kingdom and a priesthood and a holy nation. 15. And we went our way, and we announced to Sarah all that we had told him; and these two rejoiced with an exceeding great joy. 16. And he built there an altar

which he had built at the fountain of the oath; and he built tents for himself and his servants on this festival, and he was the first one to celebrate the festival of tabernacles on the earth. 17. And in these seven days Abraham would bring every single day upon the altar a burnt offering to the Lord, two oxen, seven sheep, one young goat, on account of his sins that thereby these might be forgiven him and his seed, and as an offering of salvation seven rams, seven goats, and their fruit offering and their drink offering; over all the fat thereof he burnt incense upon the altar as a sacrifice chosen to the Lord as a sweet savor. 18. At mornings and evenings he burnt frankincense, galbanum, staklē and wood and myrrh and spice and costum; all these seven he brought, united with each other in equal parts and clean. 19. And thus he celebrated his festival seven days, rejoicing with his whole heart and his whole soul, he and all those that were in his house; and there was not any stranger with him nor any bastard. 20. And he blessed his Creator who had created him in his generation, for according to his pleasure did he create him; for he knew and observed that from him would come the plant of righteousness for the generations of eternity, and that from him should also come the holy seed, like him who had made all things." 21. And he blessed his Creator, and he was glad, and he called the name of this festival the festival of the Lord with a joy acceptable to the Most High God. 22. And we blessed him forever and all his seed after him in all the generations of the world on this earth, because he celebrated this festival in its house according to the testimony of the tablets of heaven. 23. On this account it is ordained in the tablets of heaven concerning Israel that they shall

And to this there is no limit of days, but it is ordained over Israel as a festival that they shall observe it, and shall dwell in tents, and shall place wreaths upon their heads, and they shall take a willow branch with foliage from the brook. 25. And Abraham took the heart of the palm and good fruit of trees, and every day and day he would go around the altar with the branches, seven times a day, and in the morning he praised and thanked his God for all things in joy.

CHAP. XVII. 1. And in the first year of the fifth week Isaac was weaned, in this jubilee, and Abraham made a great feast in the third month on the day his son Isaac was weaned. 2. And Ishmael, the son of the Egyptian Hagar, was before the face of his father in this place; and Abraham rejoiced and blessed the Lord, because that he could see sons to himself and had not died without sons. 3. And he remembered the words which he had spoken to him on the day that Lot separated from him; and he rejoiced, because the Lord had given him seed on the earth to inherit the land; and he blessed with his whole mouth the Creator of all things. 4. And when Sarah saw that Ishmael was playing and growing, and that Abraham was rejoicing exceedingly, she became jealous of Ishmael, and she said to Abraham: "Drive away this slave and her son, for the son of this one shall not inherit with my son Isaac." 5. And these words were grievous in the eyes of Abraham, on account of his maid, and on account of his son, that he should drive them away from him. 6. And the Lord said to Abraham: "Let it not be grievous in thy eyes concerning the child, and concerning the slave; all that Sarah says to thee, hear her words and do them, for in Isaac shall thy name and thy seed be called for thee. 7. But the son of this [slave] I will make into a great nation, for he is of thy seed. 8. And Abraham arose early in the morning and took bread and a bag of water and put them upon the shoulders of Hagar and of the boy and sent them away. 9. And she went wandering about in the

desert Beer-Sheba ; and the water was finished from the bag, and the boy was thirsty, and was not able to walk, and he fell down. 10. And his mother took him, and going, threw him under an olive tree, and she went and sat down opposite him, the distance of an arrow shot, saying : " I cannot see the death of my child ;" and she sat weeping. 11. And an angel of God, one of the holy ones, said to her : " Why dost thou weep, Hagar ? arising, take the boy, and lead him by the hand, for the Lord has heard thy voice." 12. And she looked at the bag and opened her eyes and saw a well of water, and she went and filled the bag with water and gave her boy to drink, and she arose and went toward the desert of Paran. 13. And the boy grew and became a horseman, and the Lord was with him. 14. And his mother took for him a wife from among the daughters of Egypt, and she bore him a son, and he called his name Nâbêmôth, for she said : " The Lord was near to me when I cried out to him." 15. And it happened in the seventh week, in the first year thereof, in the first month of this jubilee, on the twelfth of this month, there was a word in the heavens concerning Abraham, that he was a believer in all that the Lord told him, and that he loved him, because in all temptations he was faithful. 16. And the prince Mastêmâ approached and said before God : " Behold Abraham loves Isaac his son, and esteems him more than all other things ; say that he should bring him as a burnt offering on the altar and thou wilt see if he will do this word, and thou wilt know if he is a believer in everything with which thou triest him." 17. And the Lord knew that Abraham was a believer in all trials which he spoke to him ; for he had tried him in his country, and in the strange land, and had tried him with the wealth of kings, and had tried him again with his wife in that she was torn from him, and with the circumcision, and had tried him with Ishmael and Hagar his maid, when he sent them away, and in all in which he had tried him he was found faithful, and his soul did not become impatient, nor

did he hesitate to do it, for he was faithful and a lover of God."

CHAP. XVIII. 1. And the Lord said to Abraham, "Abraham." And he said to him, "Behold, O Lord, here I am." 2. And he said to him: "Take thy son Isaac whom thou lovest, and go into the high land, and take him upon one of the hills which I will show thee." 3. And he arose in the morning from there and saddled his ass, and took two young men with him, and Isaac his son, and split the wood for a sacrifice, and he came to the place on the third day, and saw the place from afar. 4. And he came to a well of water, and he said to the young men: "Remain here with the ass, and I and the boy will go on and will worship, and after worshipping will return to you." 5. And he took the wood for the sacrifice and put it upon the shoulders of his son Isaac and he took in his hands the fire and the knife, and the two went together to that place. 6. And Isaac said to his father: "My father." 7. And he said to him: "Behold, here I am, my son." 8. [And he said] "Behold here is the fire, and the knife, and the wood; but where, my father, is the sheep for the sacrifice?" 9. And he said: "The Lord will show me the sheep for the sacrifice, my son." 10. And he came to the place of the hill of the Lord, and he built an altar and laid the wood upon the altar, and tied Isaac his son and placed him upon the wood over the altar, and he stretched out his hands to take the knife to sacrifice Isaac. 11. And I stood before him [God] and before the prince Mastêmâ, and the Lord said: "Tell him not to lay his hand upon the boy and to do him no harm; for I know that he fears the Lord." 12. And the Lord called to him from heaven and said to him: "Abraham! Abraham!" and he was frightened and said: "Behold, here I am." 13. And he said to him: "Do not lay thy hands upon the boy, and do him no

harm, for now I know that thou fearest the Lord, and hast not spared from me thy first-born son." 14. And the prince Mastêmâ was confounded; and Abraham lifted up his eyes and looked, and behold a ram held fast with his horns. 15. And Abraham went and took the ram and brought him as a sacrifice in the place of his son Isaac. 16. And Abraham called this place "The Lord seeth," so that it is said "The Lord saw it" for Mount Zion. 17. And the Lord called Abraham by name a second time from heaven as he had appeared to us that we should speak to him in the name of the Lord. 18. And he said: "By my head, I swear, saith the Lord, because thou hast done this thing and hast not spared from me thy first-born son whom thou lovest, therefore I will surely bless thee and will surely increase thy head like the stars of heaven and like the sand of the shore of the sea. 19. And thy seed shall inherit the cities of their enemy, and in thy seed shall be blessed all the nations of the earth, for this that thou hast listened to my voice and hast shown unto all that thou art faithful unto me in all that I say to thee; go in peace." 20. And Abraham went to his young men, and they arose and went together to Beer-Sheba, and Abraham dwelt near the well of the oath; and he celebrated this festival in all the years, seven days in joy, and called it "the festival of the Lord," according to the seven days in which he had gone and returned in peace. 21. And thus it is, and it is engraven and written in the tablets of heaven concerning Israel and its seed to keep this festival seven days in joy.

CHAP. XIX. 1. And in the first year of the first week in the forty-second jubilee Abraham returned and dwelt opposite Hebron, that is, Karjâtârbôk, two weeks of years. 2. And in the first year of the third week of this jubilee the days of the life of Sarah were completed, and she died in Hebron. 3. And Abraham went to mourn over and to

was found patient in this, and was not shaken. 4. For in the patience of his soul he conversed with the children of Kêti that they should give him a place that he could bury his body in it; and the Lord gave him grace before all who saw him, and he asked with modesty of heart of the children of Kêti, and they gave him the land of the double cave opposite Mâmre, which is Hebron, for forty pieces of silver. 5. But they begged him, saying: "We will give it to thee;" and he did not take anything from them for nothing, for he gave the price for the place, perfect silver; and he bowed down before them twice, and then he buried the body in the double cave. 6. And all the days of the life of Sarah were one hundred and twenty-seven years, and this is two jubilees and four weeks and one year; those are the days of the years of the life of Sarah. And this was the tenth trial with which Abraham was tempted, and he was found faithful and of patient spirit. 8. And he did not speak a single word concerning that God had said that he would give him and his seed after him this land when he petitioned that he might bury his body there, for he was found faithful and patient and was written down as a friend of the Lord in the tablets of heaven. 9. And in the fourth year thereof he took a wife for Isaac his son, and her name was Rebecca, the daughter of Betuel, the son of Nahor, the brother of Abraham. 10. And Abraham took to himself a third wife, and her name was Keturah, from among the sons of his household, for Hagar had died before Sarah. 11. And she bore him six sons, Zambari, and Joksan, and Madai, and Ejazbok, and Sachai in the second week of years." 12. And in the sixth week, in the second year, Rebecca bore to Isaac two sons, Jacob and Esau: but Jacob was pious and righteous and Esau was a rough man, a tiller of the field and hairy, but

Jacob learned writing : but Esau did not learn it, for he was a man of the field and a hunter, and learned war and all rough deeds. 14. But Abraham loved Jacob, but Isaac loved Esau. 15. And Abraham saw the deeds of Esau, and he knew that his name and seed should be called for him in Jacob, and he called Rebecca, and commanded her concerning Jacob, for he saw that she too loved Jacob much more than Esau. 16. And he said to her: " My daughter, watch my son Jacob, for he shall be in my stead upon the earth as a blessing among the sons of men and to all the seed of Shem, and for an honor, and I know that the Lord has chosen him for himself as a people secluded from all those upon the face of the earth, and behold, Isaac, my son, loves Esau more than Jacob, and I see that thou lovest righteousness for Jacob ; add yet to do something good for him and let thine eyes be over him as the beloved, for he shall be to me a blessing over the earth, from now on and to all the generations of the earth. 17. Let thy hands be strong, and thou shalt rejoice in thy son Jacob, for him do I love exceedingly above all my children ; for to eternity the Lord will be blessed in him, and his seed shall fill all the land. 18. If a man can number the dust of the earth, then his seed will be numbered. 19. And all the blessings with which the Lord has blessed me and my seed shall be to Jacob and his seed all the days, and in his seed shall my name be blessed and the names of my fathers, Shem, and Noah, and Enoch, and Mahaalel, and Seth, and Adam ; and these will serve to a founding of heaven and a strengthening of the earth and for a removal of all the stars upon the firmament." 20. And he called Jacob before the eyes of his mother Rebecca, and he kissed him, and blessed him, and said to him ; " My beloved son Jacob, whom my soul loveth, may God bless

and Shem, and all that he has conversed with me and all that he has said that he would give me, may he fasten these to thee and to thy seed to eternity, according to the days of heaven over the earth. 21. And the spirits of Mastêmâ shall not become masters over thee and over thy seed to remove thee from the Lord who is thy God, from now on and to eternity. 22. And may the Lord God be thy father, and thou his first-born son, and his people for all days: go, my son, in peace!" 23. And the two went together from Abraham. 24. And Rebecca loved Jacob with all her heart, and with all her soul, exceedingly more than Esau; and Isaac loved Esau exceedingly more than Jacob.

CHAP. XX. 1. And in the thirty-second jubilee, in the first year of the seventh week, Abraham called Ishmael and his twelve sons, and Isaac and his two sons, and the six sons of Keturah and their sons. 2. And he commanded them that they should preserve the path of the Lord to do righteousness and should love each his neighbor, and that they should be thus in all the wars that they go into against every one that is against them, and do justice and righteousness over the earth, and that they circumcise their sons according to the covenant which he had made with them, and that they should not transgress neither to the right hand nor to the left from all the paths which the Lord had commanded them, and that they should preserve themselves from all uncleanness, and that we should remove from our midst all uncleanness and fornication. 3. And if any woman or maid commit fornication amongst you, burn her with fire, and do not commit fornication after their eyes and hearts; and that they should not take unto themselves wives from among the daughters of Canaan, for the seed of Canaan shall be rooted out of the land. 4. And he spoke to them concerning the judgment of the giants and the judgment of Sodom, that these had been judged on account of their wickedness, and on account of fornication and uncleanness and destruction

among each other. 5. "But be on your guard against all fornication and uncleanness and contamination of sin, so that ye do not make our name a curse and bring your lives and your sons to destruction by the sword and ye become accursed like Sodom, and all your remnant like the sons of Gomorrah. 6. And I call upon you as witnesses, my sons, love the God of heaven and submit to all his commandments, and do not walk after their idols and after their uncleanness, and do not make molten gods for yourselves nor wooden ones. 7. For they are vanity, and have no spirit, but they are the work of hands, and all who depend upon them Do not worship them nor bow down to them. 8. But worship ye the Most High God and bow down to him ever, and hope upon his face at all times, and do rectitude and righteousness before him, that he may find pleasure in you and give you his mercy, and send down rain to you morning and evening, and bless all your work which ye do on the earth, and bless thy grain and thy water, and bless the seed of thy body, and the seed of thy land, and the herds of thy oxen, and the herds of thy sheep. 9. And thou shalt be for a blessing over the earth, and all the nations of the earth shall desire for you and will bless thy sons in my name that they be blessed as I am." 10. And he gave to Ishmael his son and to the sons of Keturah a gift and sent them away from Isaac his son. 10. And Ishmael and his sons and the sons of Keturah and their sons went together and dwelt from Pharmon (Pharan) to the entrance of Babylon, in all the land which faces toward the east opposite the desert. 12. And these mingled with each other, and their name was called Arabs and Ishmaelites.

remembered the Lord and sought with all my might that I might do the will of my God, and that I might walk aright in all his paths. 3. My soul hated idols so that I could be on my guard to do the will of him that created me, for he is the living God, and he is holy, and he is faithful, and he is just above all, and no evil is with him to have regard for persons and to take presents, for he is a god of righteousness, and a doer of judgment over all who transgress his commandments, and all that violate his covenant. 4. And thou, my son, observe his commandments and his ordinance and his judgment, and walk not after the unclean and after the wooden images and after the molten ones. 5. And do not eat any blood of an animal, or of a beast, or of any bird that flies in the heavens. 6. And if thou slaughterest, slaughter as a pure sacrifice that is acceptable; slaughter it and pour out its blood upon the altar and all the fat of the sacrifice place upon the altar with flour and fruit offering, mixed with oil together with drink offering; place all this together upon the altar as a sacrifice of sweet savor before the Lord. 7. Like the fat of the thank offering lay them upon the fire, like the fat of the belly, and all the fat upon the entrails, and the two kidneys and all the fat that is upon them, and upon the thigh pieces, and the liver, together with the kidneys wrapped up in them; bring this all as a sweet savor which will be acceptable before the Lord together with fruit and drink offerings, thou shalt bring them all together for a sweet savor as the bread of the burnt offering for the Lord. 7. And the meat eat on that day and on the second day, and do not let the sun go down on it on the second day until it is eaten and nothing shall be left over for the third day, for it is not acceptable nor chosen, and it shall no longer be eaten, and all who eat bring sin upon themselves. 8. For thus have I found it written in the books of my forefathers, in the words of Enoch and in the words of Noah. 9. And upon all thy sacrifices thou shalt put salt, and thou shalt not violate the covenant of salt in all thy sacrifices before

the Lord. 10. And watch all the wood of the sacrifices, that thou dost not bring sacrificing wood besides the following: cypress, fir, and almond, and pine, and fir, and cedar, and savin, and citron, and olive, and myrrh, and balsam." 11. Of these kinds of wood lay upon the altar, under the sacrifice, having examined its appearance, and do not place any broken or dark wood; hard wood and unbroken, perfect, and nearly grown, and not old, for its savor is gone and there is no more savor in it, as at first. 12. Besides these kinds of wood thou shalt place no other kinds, for its savor has departed, and thou shalt send up the smell of its savor to heaven. 13. Observe this commandment and do it, my son, that thou mayest be right in all thy actions. 14. And at all times be clean in thy body and wash thyself with water, before thou goest to sacrifice upon the altar, and wash thy hands and thy feet before thou approachest the altar; and when thou art done sacrificing, return and wash thy hands and thy feet. 15. And let there not appear upon any one of you any blood, nor upon your clothes: be on thy guard, my son, guard thyself exceedingly against blood; bury it in the ground. 16. And do not eat any blood for it is the soul, eat no blood whatever. 17. And do not receive any present for any blood of man that it should be spilt in vain without judgment, for this blood which is spilt causes sin upon the earth, and it cannot be cleansed of the blood except by blood being shed; and do not receive a present or any gift for the blood of man; blood for blood; and ye shall become acceptable before the Lord God Most High, and he will be the protector of good, and that thou mayest be preserved from all evil and be saved from all death. 18. I see, my son, all the deeds of the sons of men, that they are sin and evil, and all their deeds are uncleanness, and re-

the Most High God, lest he hide his face from thee, and return thee into the hands of thy transgression and root thee out of the land, and thy seed from under heaven, and thy name be destroyed and thy seed from all the earth. 20. Preserve thyself from all their deeds and from all their uncleanness, and observe the observance of the Lord Most High and do his will and do right in all things. 21. And he will bless thee in all thy deeds, and will bring forth from thee a plant of righteousness in all the earth, in all the generations of the earth. And my name shall be known, and thy name, under heaven, in all the days. 22. Go, my son, in peace. May the Most High God, my God and thy God, strengthen thee to do his will, and may he bless all thy seed and the descendants of thy seeds to the generations of eternity, with all the blessings of righteousness, that thou mayest be a blessing on all the earth." 23. And he went out from him, rejoicing happy.

CHAP. XXII. 1. And it happened in the first week of the forty-third [fourth] jubilee, in the second year, that is the year in which Abraham died, Isaac and Ishmael came from the fountain of the oath that they might celebrate the festival of the seven days, that is, the festival of the first-fruits of the harvest, with Abraham, their father; and Abraham rejoiced because his two sons came to him. 2. For Isaac had much possessions in Beer-Sheba, and Isaac went out to see his possessions and returned to his father. 3. And in these days Ishmael came to see his father, and they all came together, and Isaac offered up a sacrifice as a burnt offering, and brought it upon the altar which his father had made at Hebron. 4. And he offered a thank offering and made a feast of joy before his brother Ishmael, and Rebecca made new cakes out of new grain, and she gave thereof to Jacob, her best son, that he should bring to Abraham, his father, from the first-fruits of the land, that he might eat and bless the Creator of all before he died. 5. And Isaac, too, sent by the hand of Jacob, who excelled, a thank offering to Abraham, that he

should drink and eat. 6. And he ate and drank and blessed the Most High God, who had created the heavens and the earth, and had made all the fat of the earth and had given it to the children of men to eat and to drink and that they should bless their Creator. 7. "And now I humbly thank thee, my Lord, that thou hast shown to me this day: behold, I am one hundred and seventy-five years old and full of days, and all the days were peace. 8. The sword of the hater did not overcome me in all that thou hast given me and my children all the days of my life until the present day. 9. My God, thy grace be over thy servant and over the seed of his sons, that he may be to thee a chosen nation and an inheritance from amongst all the nations of the earth, from now on and to all the days of the generations of the earth unto all eternities." 10. And he called Jacob and said to him: "My son Jacob, the Lord of all bless thee and strengthen thee to do righteousness and his will before him, and may he choose thee and thy seed that ye may be a people for his inheritance, according to his will in all the days. 11. And thou, my son Jacob, come hither and kiss me." 12. And he approached and kissed him, and he said: "Blessed be Jacob, my son, and all his children to the Lord Most High in all eternities; may the Lord give thee a seed of righteousness from among thy sons, to sanctify him in the midst of all the earth; and may all the nations serve thee and bow down to thy seed. 13. Become powerful before men, as thou rulest over all the seed of the earth and among the seed of Seth, when thy path and the path of thy sons is just for being his holy nation. 14. May the Most High God give thee all the blessings with which he blessed me and with which he blessed Noah and Adam; may they rest upon the sacred head of thy seed to all the generations and to eternity. 15. And may the Lord preserve thee clean from all unclean defilement, that thou mayest be forgiven of all the sins which without knowledge thou hast committed, and may he strengthen thee and bless

thee, and mayest thou inherit the whole earth. 16. And may he renew his covenant with thee, that thou mayest be to him a nation for his inheritance to all eternities, and he may be to thee and to thy seed a God in reality and in truth in all the days of the earth. 17. And thou, my son Jacob, remember my words and observe the commandments of Abraham, thy father; withdraw from among the Gentiles and do not eat with them, and do not according to their actions, and be not their companion; for their actions are unclean and all their ways are defiled and their sacrifices an abomination. 18. They sacrifice to the dead, and the evil spirits they worship, and in the graves they eat, and all their doings are in vain and for naught. 19. They have no heart to think and no eyes to see any of their actions and when they err, saying to a piece of wood, "Thou art my God," and to a stone, "Thou art my Lord and my saviour," and these have no heart. 20. And thou, my son Jacob, may the Most High Lord aid thee, and the God of heaven bless thee and preserve thee from all their uncleanness and from all their error. 21. Be thou on thy guard, my son Jacob, that thou takest not a wife from among all the seed of the daughters of Canaan, for all its seed is to be rooted out of the land; for on account of the sin of Ham and the transgression of Canaan also all his seed will be destroyed from the earth, and none will be left and escape of them on the day of judgment. 22. And all those that worship idols and all haters will have no hope in the land of the living, for they will descend into Sheol and will go unto the place of judgment, and there will not be any remembrance of them on the earth; just as the children of Sodom were taken away from the earth, there will be taken away all those that worship idols. 23. Fear not, my son Jacob, and do not tremble, son of Abraham; the Most High God will protect thee from all destruction, and from all the paths of error he will deliver thee. 24. This house I have built for myself, that I might place my name above it upon the land which is given to

thee and to thy seed forever, and that it should be called the house of Abraham; it is given to thee and to thy seed forever, since thou wilt build up my house and wilt establish my name before God unto eternity, and thy seed and thy name will stand in all the generations of the earth."

25. And he ceased speaking and commanding and blessing. 26. And the two lay together on one bed, and Jacob slept in the bosom of Abraham, the father of his father, and his thoughts kissed him seven times, and his love and his heart rejoiced over him. 26. And he blessed him with his whole heart and said: "The Most High God, the God of all, the Creator of all, who has led me out of Ur of the Chaldees, that he might give me this land as an inheritance to eternity and that I should establish a holy seed, may the Most High be blessed to eternity." 28. And he blessed Jacob and said: "My son, who is in all my heart and in all my thoughts, may I rejoice in him, and may thy grace and thy mercy be extensive over him and over his seed all the days. 29. And do not desert him and do not neglect him from now on and to the eternity of days, and may thy eyes be open over him and over his seed, that thou protectest him and blessest him and sanctifiest him, to be a nation for thy inheritance. 30. And bless him with all thy blessings from now on and to all days to eternity, and renew thy covenant, and be merciful with him and with his seed, in all thy will to all the generations of the earth."

CHAP. XXIII. 1. And he laid two fingers of Jacob upon his eyes, and he blessed the God of gods, and he covered his face and stretched out his feet and slept the sleep of eternity and was gathered to his father. 2. And during all this, Jacob was lying on his bosom and did not

Rebecca, his mother, and Rebecca went to Isaac in the night and told him, and they went together and Jacob with them, and a lamp was in his hand, and going they found Abraham as a corpse. 5. And Isaac fell upon the face of his father Abraham, and wept and blessed him and kissed him; and the words were heard in the house of Abraham, and Ishmael, his son, arose and came to his father Abraham, and wept over Abraham, his father, he and all the house of Abraham, and they wept exceedingly. 6. And his sons Isaac and Ishmael buried him in the double cave, near to Sarah, his wife, and they mourned over him forty days, all the people of his house, Isaac and Ishmael and all their children and the children of Keturah in their places; and the lamentation and weeping over Abraham was ended. 7. And he lived three jubilees and four weeks of years, one hundred and seventy-five years, and the days of his life were completed, and he was old, perfect in days. 8. For the days of the lives of the first fathers were nineteen jubilees, and after the flood they began to decrease from nineteen jubilees, diminishing the jubilees and becoming speedily old and satisfying their days on account of the many sufferings and the wickedness of their ways, with the exception of Abraham. 9. But Abraham was perfect in his deeds with the Lord and well pleasing and in righteousness all the days of his life; and behold, he did not complete four jubilees in his life until he grew old on account of wickedness, and satisfied with days. 10. And all the generations that arise from then and unto the day of the great judgment age die speedily before completing two jubilees. 11. And it will be since their knowledge leaves them on account of their old age that also all their knowledge ceases. 12. And on that day if a man lives a jubilee and a half jubilee, they say concerning him, "He has lived long;" and the mass of his days are sufferings and pain and trouble and no peace, for punishment follows upon punishment, hostility upon hostility, trouble upon trouble, wickedness upon

wickedness, sickness upon sickness, and all evil judgments of this kind, as sickness and inflammation and hail and ice and snow and fever and suffering and becoming stiff, and sterility and death and sword and captivity and all the punishments and sufferings. 13. All this comes in the evil generation which sins upon the earth with the uncleanness of fornication and defilement and the abomination of their deeds. 14. And then they will say: "The days of the fathers were many, even to one thousand years, and were good, and behold the days of our lives, if a man has lived many, are seventy years, and if he is strong, eighty years, and all were evil and no peace will be in this evil generation." 15. And in that generation the children will be about to upbraid their fathers and their sires concerning the sin, and concerning the injustice, and concerning the words of their mouth, and concerning the great wickedness which they do, and concerning their deserting the ordinances which the Lord had covenanted between them and him, that they should observe and do all his commandments and his ordinances and all his laws and not depart to the right or to the left. 16. For all are wicked, and every mouth speaks transgression, and all their deeds are unclean and an abomination, and all their paths are contamination and uncleanness and destruction. 17. Behold, the earth will be destroyed on account of all their deeds, and there will be no seed of wine and no oil, because all their deeds are unbelief, and they all will be destroyed together, the beasts and the animals and the birds and all the fish of the sea, on account of the sons of men. 18. And they will contend with each other, the young with the old and the old with the young; the poor with the rich, and the lowly with the great, and the haggard with the prince, on account of the law and on

them back to the path, but they will not return until the blood of many has been spilt upon the earth, one over the other. 20. And those who escape will not return on the path of righteousness from their wickedness, for they all will arise for a robbery for wealth, that each one may take that which is his neighbors' and be called by a great name, but not in reality and in truth, and the most holy will be defiled in the uncleanness of the destruction of their defilement. 21. And a great punishment will be over the deeds of this generation from the Lord, and he will give them over to the sword and to judgment and to captivity and to robbery and to devouring. 22. And he will awaken over them the sinners of the Gentiles, who will have no mercy or grace for them, and who regard the face of none, neither old nor young nor any one; for they are wicked and powerful that they act more wickedly than all the children of men; and in Israel they practise violence and sin in Jacob, and the blood of many will be spilt on the land; and there will be none to gather and to bury. 23. And in those days they will cry aloud and call and pray that they be saved from the hands of the sinful Gentiles, and there will be none to save them. 24. And the heads of the children will be white with gray hair, and a child of three weeks will appear as old as a man of a hundred years, and their standing will be destroyed by trouble and oppression. 25. And in those days the children will begin to seek the laws and to seek the commandments and to return to the path of righteousness. 26. And the days will begin to increase and grow many, and the children of men generation by generation and day by day, until their days approach to one thousand years and to a multitude of years and days. 27. And no one will be old or satisfied with days, for all will be [like] children and youths. 28. And all their days will be in peace, and in joy they will end them and live, and there will be no satan nor any destroyer, for all their days will be days of peace and healing and blessings. 29. And

at that time the Lord will heal his servants, and they will arise and will see great peace and will cast out their enemies; and the just shall see it and be thankful and rejoice in joy to all eternity, and shall see judgment and curses upon all their enemies. 30. And their bones shall rest in the earth, but their spirits shall increase in joy, and they shall know that the Lord is the doer of judgment, and gives mercy to the hundreds and thousands and to all that love him. 31. And thou, Moses, write down all these words, for thus are they written, and they have raised them upon the tablets of heaven to the generation of eternity."

ARTICLE V.

THE FAMILY AND THE CHURCH.

BY THE REV. EDW. TRUMBULL HOOKER, LOS ANGELES, CAL.

THIS theme might be treated as applying to the life and habits of the single home and the work and services of its local church in their power to help or hinder one another, to co-operate for the same great ends, or to counteract each the other's good influence.

But, in order to arrive most intelligently at this special view of their actual, practical relations, we shall first consider the nature and fundamental conception of these two institutions of God, as his thought is revealed to us in them—the ideal family state and the church spiritual and entire, the body of Christ developing on earth and perfected in heaven. This view, if properly taken, will serve to explain and emphasize more clearly the nature of the

visible church, while setting before us the ends for their mutual attainment.

A few obvious points may be fixed upon as signal stations in this wide region of thought from which to construct its survey.

The family is the first institution of God on earth. It has in it the germ and something of the development of the church. It has in it the germ and something of the development of the state. It is for a long time all the visible church there is, and is as truly such, as those early churches in the separate households of the New Testament saints. It is for a long time all the civil state there is—the patriarchal. A congeries of families from one patriarch becomes a tribal state, and several tribes a nation or united state. A congeries of household churches becomes an organic body of common religious life, a community of faith and fellowship in the Old Testament dispensation; even as the churches of the new dispensation are the organic society of Christ.

The family, as such, is first in the order of nature, and not of the supernatural strictly. It bounds the conception, for a time, of both natural and supernatural society on earth. The Old Testament church begins with the first true worship or sacrifice in the household. The visible church of many families begins with the tabernacle in the wilderness. The church of many families and nations begins with the Christian dispensation. Its perfecting is not yet, but will embrace all the Ecclesia of those who are redeemed from humanity by its second Adam. This is the kingdom of God in man.

When that is come, and his will is done on earth as in heaven, we may expect either a pure theocracy—God dwelling in men and walking in them, they his people and he their God, without forms of government—or that the methods of national existence will be in harmony, though not identical, with the methods of spiritual or church life universal; and they both in harmony, though

not identical, with the perfect family life. So that, as in the beginning, when the three were not visibly separable, in the end also their interests and moral structure shall not be separable in the millennial world.

But, as related to the final, heavenly kingdom of God, the family and the nation are temporary, while the church perfected in the resurrection is eternal. Its realization, as the organ of God's pleasure and glory in a humanity incorruptible, is the last and consummate offspring of probation.

Its original conception, therefore, as we must think and speak, was first and supreme in the mind of God. The family is for the sake of the final church,—the kingdom of God,—and not the church for the family; saving and except as God has made nothing for itself alone, but, especially in the case of two such great creations of his wisdom, every thing to act and react upon each other, with mutually augmenting and reduplicated blessings. The conception of the church from eternity, as we are permitted to speak of the divine thought, must have been primary, as its realization is more lasting. That is last in developing which is chief and central in conception; as the full corn to the blade, as the doctrine of God's love in Christ to the dispensations of force, of fear, and of law.

In heaven "they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels" of God. Nevertheless, it is true that, with great emphasis, elaboration, and consistency of thought, the relation of divinity to humanity in the redeemed society—of Christ to his sanctified church—is set forth in revelation under the forms and terms of the connubial or family relation here.

God's government is that of a father. Sin is the rebellion of a child. Salvation is by the only begotten Son of God and Elder Brother of man. The children are heirs. The

counterfeit, the false, disloyal, treacherous wife, is the adulterous Israel in the Old Testament, and the last consummation of organized and ripening sin before the judgment, in Babylon the Great Whore. Then, "blessed are they which are called unto the marriage supper of the Lamb." "The marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath made herself ready." And across the centuries the eyes of prophets are captivated with the perpetually recurring imagery of all revelation as they break forth in behalf of the Spirit of their Lord. "The king's daughter is all glorious within: her clothing is of wrought gold. She shall be brought unto the king in raiment of needle-work: the virgins, her companions, [i. e., the angels whose nature Christ did not assume] shall love her." "Hearken, O daughter, and consider, . . . forget also thine own people and thy father's house. So shall the king greatly desire thy beauty."

But more soberly and meaningly still, with explicit philosophical intent, Paul says to the Ephesians, "For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall be joined unto his wife; and they two shall be one flesh. This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the church." As if, indeed, he were using the structure of the family not so much to detail thereby the duties and give the theory of it, as to convey the most fundamental and correct conception of the church and Christ in their mutual relation. "Thy Maker is thine husband," as the woman "was taken out of man." "For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church; and he is the saviour of the body. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it; that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it shall be holy and without blemish. . . . He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever yet hated his own

flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it even as the Lord the church. For we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." "This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the church." The apostle seems to say—as elsewhere, in interpreting Scripture; "Doth God take care for oxen? or saith he it altogether for our sakes?"—Doth God care for the family chiefly, or saith he it altogether for our sakes as members of his spiritual, mystical body? For our sakes, no doubt, this is written, that we might grasp, under the form of our most important earthly relation, the mystery of our participation in the once incarnated, divine humanity of Christ.

If, as we must suppose, all nature is but the materializing of God's thought before creation, the revelation in form and method of his substantial force or will,—then is the family, though itself mysterious and beautiful with the complex riches of God's loving intent, but the hieroglyphic of his holiest thought concerning the sanctuary which he will make for himself in the bosom of humanity redeemed by his Son. Then the home, the centre and pivot though it be of all organized community of well-being here, is but the humbler and temporary tabernacle in the wilderness, made according to the pattern in the mount of eternity of the heavenly things themselves to come. Its shape is a clay model of the house of many mansions, not made with hands. Its moral threads spun of human affection are made to answer over against the very warp and woof of his divine relations with man and even with himself as triune. The impression of the creating fingers is found in the lower clay of material evolution as in the higher; and this central organism of paradise completed is so plastic to the permanent divine idea of God's

things. For, justly paraphrasing Scripture again, we may say, If God has told us earthly things so nearly and incessantly touching our earthly happiness and perennial life in the home and we are unbelieving and dull in understanding them, how shall we believe and understand if He tells us the heavenly things themselves which are purified so far above these? And conversely, if we will by the help of those better things seek to redeem the family and perfect our knowledge and enjoyment of it, it shall then more and more interpret the divine relations to us in their increasing preciousness and identity in spirit with the human.

To be convinced that these things are so, we have but to look into the depths of our best knowledge of the structure of the kingdom of God as usually set forth in plain doctrinal statements, and we shall find the motives and methods of the moral life of the family anticipated there as in archetype, and they again the antitype of the kingdom demonstrating the necessity and wisdom of its realization in the future. We shall find that the two revelations in thought reflect, repeat, and rehearse each other in principle and in spirit.

The family is the natural and organic basis of the *material* of the church at large. Upon its beginning and continuance depends, under God, the extent, in number of membership, of his society in man. His first direction was that they be many, as many as would most perfectly subdue the earth and earthly forces to his behests. This involves the necessity of great numbers, and yet some limitation certainly, with mightiest, broadest culture and self-mastery.

The family being made free in its choice of co-operation with God for the enumeration of the possible constituency of his human society, its moral and intelligent basis is *freedom*. This brings us at once to the supernatural and organic basis of God's society, as the family in its physical aspect is the natural basis of the same. These will act and react upon each other through time, until the super-

natural has perfected the natural, and the latter has done all its work for the other in begetting and beautifying the children of men.

We have, first, natural instinct impelling to moral unity of two wills. We have moral purpose of agreement, that is, love impelling to its expression. Freedom is the pivotal element in a moral system, and freedom for the sake of the widest community of greatest good, is the law of that system—the law of love or benevolence. The first knowledge of strongest love that comes to man is by the family state. The first notion of sovereignty of will over will, that is government, of power by love or, without love, by coercion, comes here also. Hence also the first complete theory of sin, of rebellion, of moral disorder, of hatred, of misery by separation and self-destruction or mutual destruction. The relation of moral choices, of love and hate, to their expression and material effects comes most vividly and constantly in this same circle of the family. Here the matter of punishment and possible atonement for sin will enact itself again and again, with the keenest incentives, from tender, yearning love, to a true theory of their adjustment. The power of direct benevolence—or purely moral, spiritual love—to nourish, cherish, give life to, the bodies even of those beloved, will receive repeated demonstration; as will the opposite feeling show its power to deplete, to pinch and pale the life of its objects. Thus the giving or refusing of love, which is the fundamental act in a moral system and the supreme province of free wills, is especially set forth in all its cardinal relations and consequences in the family.

And just about this same pivot of action hinges the scheme for spiritual redemption which constitutes the

suffering and the loss. This is redemption. Redemption is completed in the new creation of a spiritual embodiment for the new love.

Let us examine now a little more fully, at their common axis in the chief concrete embodiment of earthly love, the principles of moral and affectional choices which determine the features of both these kingdoms, the natural family and the supernatural church. As preliminary to the family state, the stronger will desires the acquiescence of the stranger will and first loves it. This must not be by coercion or the drawing of merely natural forces. Such is the way of the profligate with his victim, or of the unwise. God will not coerce the will of the sinner. He will exert the power of his natural good to lead the sinner to him. But the good has not reached its end, and God is not reached by the soul, except as it comes intelligently and freely, loving God not for a reward, but for his own sake.

In both cases the submitting will gives itself up to a certain exclusive method; so far limited only, that it excludes license and includes all best and consistent good. But it is a surrender to a certain way of life, manifold in its possibilities of diversified happiness, which cannot be tortured into anything better than what God has marked out in either case. Still it is a surrender. The woman is bound by the law of her husband so long as he liveth. If both are wise, she realizes and rejoices in what Miss Austen compares to the sameness of the moon's face toward the earth:—"The one-sided aspect of love." And the soul that surrenders to God gives up the false liberty of lawlessness, is at last convinced that there are no pastures of real pleasantness, no fascinating wildernesses even for the chase of real joy, which are not included in the preserves of God's royal estate.

God has prevailed upon the sinner to make this surrender by allowing him to take his own course; warning of real danger, showing wrathful jealousy enough to express

true love, and not lukewarmness; but relying chiefly and at last upon the simple, sun-clear protestation and evidence of love, prior love, self-surrendering love on his part, in Christ Jesus;—this, with all the accessory manifestations of his attributes of benevolence and power, which may go to fill the eye and soul of the saved with rest and satisfaction. And so in “true love,” one soul will lead another to itself by giving itself with the evidence of excellence and fidelity, for the sanction, not the compulsion, of the other’s choice. Christ lifted up will draw men unto him by the “attractions of the Cross,”—a different inducement than natural good, or gifts conferred, or power of the stronger will by mere superiority of magnetism. The holiness of God in his dealing with the soul is in this also, that he will not paralyze its freedom by mere power. The obedient are chosen of God, but this election of them is not consummated without their free choice, or, so to speak, election of him as their sovereign. So two human wills, choosing the supreme earthly state of united affection, mutually elect to a partnership in each other, in mutual good and service rendered, from the highest kind of expression in personal preference, to the most material and evanescent good.

The choice to love by the party of the first part is for the sake of reciprocal affection and appreciation; and also of excellence perceived, beauties admired, and fitness of mind (which is a deeper beauty) to draw out and contain the shared self given. So God has seen, in the work of his hands in his own image, a beauty and largeness, a symmetry of design for possible filling up by redemption, which led him to take not the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham as a vehicle forever. The espoused humanity of his church, redeemed by the blood of Christ into identity with him who is the brightness of the Father’s glory and express image of his person, is so far a not-self, a non-ego, as to be loved unselfishly, by reason of its once possible capriciousness of freedom. There is a certain

audacity, but truth, in the lines of Julian Hawthorne:

"In man succeeds or fails the great creative plan.

His liberty to sin

Makes worth God's winning the love even God may not compel.

Shall I then murmur and repine at nature's peace?

I hold one link of the chain of his happiness in my hand."

These are the old problems of a metaphysical theology? Yes, but they nowhere make so clear a diagram of their relations, entire and succinct, as in this old domestic framework of the heart's casuistry, in the first intelligent human love known to be in any sense equal, and so free as to be open to the possibility of life-long disappointment. The Edwardean mystery of liberty and necessity is involved here. In the spirit of the Lord there is liberty; in sin there is self-caused necessity, bondage, servitude. In righteousness there is service, not servitude, and there is love, exulting that it is not its own, but bought, in a figure, like a slave, a willing slave—bought, not with corruptible things, but with the love of its Friend. So in the ideal union of hearts, which we must recognize as the family, with or without offspring. Each heart chooses to yield, or not to yield, to attractive excellences which it will allow to be the strongest motive, determining and final; so that, when that yielding is complete, the freedom of choosing over again is gone; the life-long rest of safety and approving experience, the strength of freely ruling, and the sweetness of being ruled in freedom, begins.

This position of the parties brings into view immediately the analogue of Christian prayer, and of fellowship in co-working with God by communion of understanding and community of interest. "Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you." In the light and scope of this fellowship God desires to be inquired of by the house of Israel, by his people who have espoused his cause, to do for them and for himself

things which they are to help in doing and in prevailing upon him to undertake. He submits to be reasoned and pleaded with by Moses in the closet of the clouds of Sinai, as a diplomat in the audience room of Deity, dissuading him, as he would be dissuaded, from his first righteous purpose of vengeance, and persuading him to another kind of righteousness, even mercy by an Atoner, whom Moses himself typified, and whom God would set forth at last. And every truly praying Christian takes, by the violence of importunate faith, the King's part, in prevailing upon the King to work for his own pleasure in us to will and to do for our own salvation and the world's.

Can any other relation on earth so verify and explain these mysteries of sovereignty and of power by prayer with an unchangeable love, as that of queenly and regal devotion between those who walk in the light that beats about the throne of strongest and wisest earthly affection? which says, in effect, as in the old manner of true chivalry in every age, "Command me. Let me know your pleasure. It shall be mine to do it." It is an indication that the affectional life of society is somewhat shrunken and weak when there is much debating and demurring at that one word *obey* in the marriage service, and the theory of home life which it contemplates. Deepest, truest love is not even known to those who cannot understand the joyful empire of a love that obeys and is obeyed forevermore.

Then, in this relation, as in that between the Head of humanity and the body, between Christ and his church of redeemed souls, there is one more thing besides the excellence of wisdom and the harmony of affectionate will; there is *power* to execute the wisdom and express the love by good conferred—to be by the receiving party rearranged, distributed for the profit of the whole family. The church is nourished and fed by the power of Christ's life, and sanctified, that is, perfected, in her unity with him, by his truth. She is to feed the sheep and the lambs.

She is to break unto the multitude the bread of life. This, by the strength of her love, and faith in his wisdom and truth. He gives life to his church by which the number of redeemed souls shall increase,—souls are born again, sanctified humanity increases, the personal forces of life and of good in the world are multiplied.

Now in the government of sons and daughters not on a plane of entire equality with the parent, first emerges another method of love necessarily accomplishing its will, with or without the consent of the object of it. The central and highest method of government, in God's kingdom of society and in the home is with the consent of the governed, by love that casteth out fear and force. But in the development of history toward that final freedom and order of self-rule, we have all degrees of monarchy, partial and absolute. There are tyrannies and there are empires over an ignorant people for their greater good or lesser evil. And until that final or approximate perfection, in all forms of government, civil, domestic and divine, while any of the subjects are imperfect or undeveloped, the question of rule will constantly resolve itself into this—of the proper adjustment of freedom to coercion. It is this which plagues Bismarck: How can the iron hand co-operate with general suffrage? It is rending Russia with the problem: How shall the ferment of liberty, begun by the emancipation of the serfs and the well-meant reforms of Alexander II., be repressed by the bands of absolutism without bursting the nation? How much vent shall Gladstone give to "Home Rule" in Ireland? In our own country the question recurs: How shall democracy and license become legislative wisdom and executive thoroughness as well as republican clemency. So in the home, the strife in the parent's mind is often and often again between severity and goodness, love and laxity, freedom and legal restrictions, force and fear.

chastening to caressing, from promise to threatening. He doth not afflict willingly, yet he visits transgressions with the rod and iniquity with stripes. Again he lays his anger by. "He will not always chide." "Why should ye be stricken any more? ye will revolt more and more." This, as if in despair of their recovery by chastening. "Thou art full of wounds and bruises," from the rod. "Come now and let us reason together, saith the LORD; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool." "Is Ephraim my dear son? Is he a pleasant child? For since I spake against him, I do earnestly remember him still." How does the divine Parent thus condescend to our parental mood in the unveiling of his heart, quaking between wrath and tenderest yearning!

Either extreme of love or law, solely employed, makes a failure of any government. Those earthly parents who remember only the verses in the book of Proverbs which uphold "the rod," and those who settle down upon the principle of ruling always "by love," without law, make equally a mistake. The family will not be managed like a machine, from one centre of power and inexorable thought alone. Nor will it run itself without law, except it runs down hill. In the childhood of the family and of the race, in the childhood of the ancient Israel and of the spiritual Israel, there must be even taskmasters and schoolmasters compelling obedience by fear, a *vis a tergo*, up to a certain stage, beyond which the drawing forces of love and adoration, admiration of the excellent, will act powerfully and pleasurably forever. A revered teacher of moral philosophy, still living, said once in a notable discourse in Chicago, "Fear never converted any man."

appeal to the flesh, either by pain or pleasure, is always a provisional stage of God's government until a better is reached. And so it is in the family. The united head of the family in its best state gives the type, as we have seen, of consummate rule by loving consent,—intelligent, happy co-operation; and between that and the most unavoidable bearing upon the arms of the youngest, weakest child, there are all degrees of wise and needful doing for, or compulsion of, the weak or ignorant or rebellious child. All the while, the state to be aimed at and dwelt in as much as possible is after the type of the "perfect love" between the parents, between the good citizen and his government, the righteous soul for whom "the law is not made" and God.

But now we are brought to the problems which arise in all governments upon the act of disobedience. Men can and do disobey God. Children can and do disobey their parents. God's directions to his children are none too many nor unreasonable. Here is room for improvement in some domestic governments, which, beyond certain limits, are better the less they govern. They can lop off some methods of dictation and command with advantage. There is a limit here which it requires an exquisite balance of wisdom to determine.

When disobedience occurs, the loving parent will chastise, remind the child of the sin in some way, in order to recover him to the complacency of the parent displeased, to the child's proper complacency in himself and confidence in the parent, and so, to love again. This can only be by the repentance of the child upon the consciousness, somehow aroused, of the degree and nature of his sin, so that the parent's love, both of benevolence and complacency, may again flow into his heart to renew its loyalty and love. There must be punishment of the child, or demonstration of the evil, sufficient to induce repentance. With this will come the conviction of the wisdom of the command and the benevolence of the author of it. Now the

sinner against God cannot take all the consequences of his sin without destruction. If the law can be so executed in the person of one who suffers as the lover of the sinner, and suffers because of his sin; the sufferer being Almighty will not be destroyed, the keenest possible inducement to repentance will be given, with the strongest possible proof of the love of the lawgiver and sufferer in one and of the wisdom and inviolability of the law. The demonstration will be complete that the law is spiritual and hangs upon love. Righteousness and order and the ecstasy of co-working intelligent love will be restored to the universe.

Baptism, the symbol of the need and nature of repentance and regeneration, is the rite of separation of the church from the world in its espousal of Christ. And the Eucharist is the symbol of its nourishment and life by his death for love of man and of holiness. Those who do not accept the facts so set forth must deny the evil of sin and the way of restoration evidenced by the death of Christ, and they will continue in disobedience. So the incorrigible child is tending toward merited disowning and banishment from the parental support, help, home.

By the side of the problem of disobedience of children and its remedy or perpetuation, of which the doctrines of the church furnish a diagram in large and a solution, emerges also that other possibility of falsity within the connubial state, which revelation so constantly uses to typify the hypocrisy and worldliness of an unfaithful church. Her whoredoms and adulteries, her leaning on other lovers, Egypt, Assyria, the arm of flesh, the corrupting temporal power as the Romish Church, again and again, instead of resting on her Lord and his spiritual power,—the inspired description of these, her fornications, is the trying refrain for tingling ears all through sacred history and prophecy. "Mother of harlots and abomi-

husband and from her own vows, of the rightful spouse of Christ, to wit, the spiritual side of humanity, make a chapter, a history, a library, which, if burned, would leave no sin to be mentioned, no abomination to be fathered.

So there is no sin against God or man, or our own flesh, which does not follow in so-called society (but soon to be anarchy) where the home becomes hollow or discordant with heartless selfishness, deceit, false and capricious choosings of alien affections, notwithstanding two have vowed to give themselves to each other. That mutual giving should be so entire and sincere that both wills shall be impotent to make another choice in life, or do an alien act.

So closely has God knit together, as one incarnation of the same truths in two spheres, the body of the Christian home with his own body, the church, that in the nature of their central motive, love (and all its outworking of fellowship, obedience, atonement, and knowledge of fearful alternatives) there is a plain and constant reflection of the one in the other, a repetition of the image of the one in the eye of the other. The church sanctions and illustrates the philosophy and power of the family. The home sanctions and illustrates the doctrine and life of the church. Nowhere else, not even in the State, do the principles of God's government find their complete analogue. His moral macrocosm, its microcosm. Let the holiness wherewith Christ loves his church, and gave himself for it, let the strength and the beauty of his sanctuary in her, be the inspiration of the characters and the forms of life that shall be the mutual joy of all home affections. Let the wisdom of God's patient and long-suffering culture of his children of men and of his church, in their crudeness, childhood, quarrels, cross purposes, doubtful loyalty even, be the pattern for human jealousy, domestic justice of administration, clemency of teaching and ultimate peace that passeth understanding. Find a home where the rule of love is fundamental, pure and

perennial for a lifetime, and you will find one that is not far from the kingdom of God, a church in itself. So true is it that the ideal, natural happiness of the family is a

"bliss of paradise
That has survived the fall."

and springs from the supernatural as well. For not without the shedding abroad there of the divine love of the human Christ can the natural love in its various relations be kept intelligent and faithful. So will it be clarified and translated into the higher church-wide and world-wide motives for which it exists. All those affections, philanthropy, patriotism, the love of the kingdom and of home, are pivoted in the same natures upon the diamond verge of God's system of government and redemption in its cardinal principles, its radiating doctrines and duties.

Or, to change the figure, their anchorage there is trebly quadrupled, in the Church, the State, the Family, the World—of these four ramifications of power, love and knowledge. Therefore it is that, with all the divorces and loose theories of modern times, so many homes where unknown convulsions have come and passed still retain their integrity in a deepening unity of life. And therefore it is that, when the fabric of life's tapestry on every stage of action has been worn threadbare of its brilliant patterns, and faded out of its deepest colors down to the warp and woof of the old home feeling only, then mother-love almost challenges to comparison the divine redemptive patience.

Now, because this physical home and centre of material interests, and of ideal interests to be made actual, is so monopolizing and centripetal in its sway, it needs all the more, and can afford to allow the balancing against it of other claims, the centrifugal movements of social, Christian, civil, commercial, wider ecclesiastical and cosmopolitan life. The family needs for its own perfecting the offsetting diversion of its energies and its love appropriate

to those general spheres. It will be in some sense the touchstone of their quality, the visible fountain-head of their legitimate streams. The effort of society and of individuals, even the most consecrated and affectionate, to balance justly these forces has not always been a success. There are homes here and there which are wrung dry of much sweetness and robbed of much light, that public walks, however useful, may be moistened and irradiated with that costly offering. And there are alleys and avenues for social, human, Christian intercourse, which are unvisited because of pride, reserve, selfishness, or the grinding monopoly of treadmill cares, for which last, in their excess, some one within or without the home is to be blamed.

Now, the local church, by the side of the individual family, in its scheme of work and worship, of social and intellectual improvement in the community, is to be the point of attachment and base of regulation for certain forces otherwise pent up, and tiresome, self-consuming in the domestic circle only. There is evidence to show that with some most prominent churches and their pastors in several denominations in New England and elsewhere, social life churchwise, and distinctly Christian, is in great measure neglected, as it is too much so in all our churches. "Society," so called, i. e., more or less fashionable, and by elective affinity, is upon a worldly basis, primarily selfish, and not distinctively Christian. In it men and women "love those who love them," even as the publicans do. If they speak of the things most vital to religious life they may be esteemed canting or morbid. If the minister speaks of them there, he is "talking shop."

But shall there be no circle for the informal flow of Christian affection toward those not in "society," so called? If some city pastors do no pastoral work, partly perhaps because of some awful example of its alleged abuse, and some others dare not have a picture taken for indiscriminating admirers, it may be that these are times of ignorance and hardness of heart at which God winks. But

the time will certainly come for repentance from such irresolution and confusion of thought.

"Though foul things put on the brows of grace,
Yet grace must still look so."

We have seen that the doctrines of the church will find corroboration to Christian minds in the experiences of the family. On the other hand, parents and children will need the wider outlook and more transparent, cooler atmosphere of calm within the sanctuary in which to repent of any littleness, illiberality, wilfulness or sin at home. And then, too, in the latter, the frequent proof, by *argumentum ad hominem*, of certain difficulties in applying a merely abstract theory of government, will serve to correct and perfect ideas of church government, of doctrine, and of methods of religious zeal. The knowledge of real love at home will serve to mellow and make practical those things, while it tests and more clearly defines them.

The writer has seen a Romish family whose gentleness and truly Christian spirit made them a more Catholic church in the household than that which they espoused in public. Let the church local and general see to it, that it is not outdone by private sanctuaries of worship and of love, in the sincerity, the wisdom, the large-mindedness of its cardinal principles and motives. And let the domestic sanctuary bring to its altars ever new and holier fire from the public temple, from the larger shrine.

To this end, the Sabbath-school must be attractive to the little ones by the sweetness of Christ's name and attributes simply understood and diversely illustrated. It must be tenacious, but with no teasing, begging hold of capricious sons, wise beyond their years, and stately maidens. This chiefly by parental example and competition in Bible study, enlarging continually the interested apprehension of all minds in the word of God, both read and preached. Let music and social friendliness, the pleasure inseparable from the company of youth among

themselves, be translated into heart work in the worship of the benignant all-appreciating Divine Man. Our present forms and methods in this department are many of them fortunate as to externals, in their adaptation to the true end, which should be to cause the week in the home to climb up to the Sabbath as the last, best day of it; and again descend from the public sanctuary as the first fountain of a new dispensation of domestic life and world-wide thought of every kind.

We have seen that the home can render to the church a greatly needed service in interpreting its principal terms of love and law, salvation and upbuilding, by the ever witnessing sincerity and intensity of the legitimate passions and forces that are elemental and domestic. How often is it true that a stale, long unbottled enthusiasm, is our only, insipid and half-hearted reason for engaging in Christian or church work. When shall we *know* that we love dying men, our brethren in the humanity which Christ assumed, as consciously, if not as keenly, as we love our children and our wives? Do we know what the Christian love is with any constant vividness? If God would teach us anything by the family, it is to know love when we feel it; and that mere knowledge puffeth up, but charity buildeth up. Our Orthodox Christianity has been far more stiffly intellectual than warmly and rightly emotional. We shall not greatly improve the kernel of doctrine within the husk of its older theological forms. Certainly there will not be anywhere such a change of view as would constitute a signal epoch or new departure in belief. Neither can the methods of modern evangelists, steadily and periodically, as they have done occasionally, trouble the pool while impotent wills are lifted into the healing waters.

But, as it were, a subterranean heat of molecular vibration in the church, increased by steady heart-beats in the pulpit and in the pews, will give us a religious life as sincere as home love and best social love, but more unselfish and persuasive of men to "taste and see that the Lord is

good." Let there be a system of lay-pastoral work and visitation in all our fallow fields, and let ministers and people not be too proudly squeamish or cold to ask families to the sanctuary and to the Sabbath-school. Thus the chronic theme of conversation and public discussion; viz, non-attendance at church in the older settled communities, would be laid upon the shelf. For it is not without remedy; though discussing or preaching, alone, will not remedy it. Then let methods change refreshingly, rather than men in the pastorate frequently. For no method is best forever; but every proper method is best at some time. The tonic, genial air of the church and Sabbath-school can correct the too astringent spirit or the lack of spirit in the home. And anon the earnest love and enthusiasm of the latter may shame the lack of those things in the ceremony and conscience work of the church. So will the church local and universal become the very household of faith and love and every grace, as the ideal household is the very first church and state of man. These three divine institutions, with the other great systems of human employment and enjoyment, will be severally like the nervous, the circulatory, the muscular, and the other systems in the human anatomy which mutually interlace and define each other, while they fill out with shapely strength and gracious beauty "the human form divine." Then will humanity on earth be the partner of its Redeemer's love, the sanctuary for his indwelling, the very body for the manifestation of his mind, his will and pleasure.

ARTICLE VI.

THE REVISION OF GENESIS.

BY THE REV. CHARLES R. BROWN, PROFESSOR IN NEWTON THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY.

WHEN the writer set about the fulfilment of an engagement made before the Revised Version was issued, the following seemed to him like suitable working rules:—

1. He resolved to be as frank in his criticism of the Version as though it had fulfilled his expectations.

2. He endeavored to fortify himself against allowing his keen disappointment at the extreme conservatism of the Revision to prejudice his judgment against the real excellences of that version.

3. He decided that he must not allow his inexperience even to excuse him for silence on disputed questions; and he reflected that in any objection he might make he would not knowingly call in question the opinion of any individual scholar on the Revision Committee, but only the corporate opinion, and, indeed, not that, absolutely speaking, but only relatively to the question of change. Furthermore, in preferences he might have for marginal readings, he knew that, in most cases, he would carry with him the vote of more than half of the English Revisers. He could not presume to suggest that his own preferences in every case were not considered by the Committee, for that would be to condemn them at the outset. The Revisers were scholars, and had before them the tools of scholarship. The issue to be drawn, then, must be on the question of judgment. Certain renderings being desirable on general principles, was it worth while to alter the A. V.?

4. He assumed that all alterations should be consistent with each other, and with what is left unaltered.

5. He concluded that a change should have been made whenever the balance of probability is in favor of a different rendering. That different rendering need not be certainly correct, provided the A. V. be certainly, or even probably, incorrect.

6. While slight changes are often desirable, the writer felt that he ought not to criticise the Revision for any failure to make these, even though they may have done so in many other directions. Only when a change would

involve manifest improvement will the failure to make such change be noticed.

7. It was thought better by the writer to make a careful and minute examination of a small portion of the Old Testament, and he therefore selected the Book of Genesis as the basis of his estimate.

In considering the Revision of this book, the present estimate will be made clearer by arranging the alterations made by the Committee in one column, and the further alterations which in the opinion of the writer are desirable, in a parallel column. In so doing changes are grouped under the four heads of *Text*, *Grammar*, *Lexicon*, and *English*. Of course these divisions will run into each other, from the necessities of the case. Occasionally there is given the entire translation of a brief selection embodying the aforesaid preferences. In the first column appear the changes which the Revisers have introduced, and in the second those which in the opinion of this writer they should have introduced. Under the first head, however, the columns are given up, because the Revisers did almost nothing in the way of change of text.

I. TEXTUAL CHANGES.

i. 7. The peculiar position of "and it was so" might well have been referred to, if, indeed, the words should not be placed at the close of vs. 6.

i. 11. "*and*" should certainly be "*and.*" It is the practice of Rev. to use ordinary type where a word is clearly to be supplied (and see vs. 12), and the readings of *Sam.* and LXX. ought to leave no doubt that such is the case here.

i. 26. The peculiar position of "over all the earth," considered with the reading of *Pesh.* and vs. 25, should lead to the adoption of "the wild beasts of" after "all."

ii. 2. The reading "sixth" for "seventh" in first clause (LXX. *Sam.*, *Pesh.*) merits at least a place in the margin.

iv. 8. "Told" should become "said unto." There should follow "brother" either (a) empty brackets, (b) "Let us go into the field," in brackets, (c) the same without brackets, probably the last. The only consideration against the reading is its exceeding naturalness (apparently considered decisive by Dr. Toy, as quoted by Dr. Osgood in *Independent*).

iv. 18. "Mehijael" is changed by A. V. to "Mehu—," a change adopted by Rev. without remark. Rev. were right, but they should have applied a

especially as it is found in the Heb. of vs. 20, and as חָרִשׁ (instead of חָרִשׁ) occurs here.

v. The differences of reckoning found in LXX. and *Sam.* ought to have been noted in the margin.

vii. 23. Of seven editions of Genesis belonging to the writer, five have וַיִּכְרֶה and two have וַיִּכְרֶה. The = of ordinary texts makes the inference strong that Qāl was originally intended (even by Mass.). The better texts, by omitting Dāghēs, make this certain. Were it not so, the occurrence of וַיִּכְרֶה later on would naturally force us to assume a preceding Qāl.

x. 3. In the opinion of the present writer, it would have been better to omit marg. here, and to adopt Riphath in the text of 1 Chron. i. 6.

x. 4. Rodamni should be adopted as the text. Rev. neglected to note the fact that 1 Chron. i. 7 is here supported by LXX. and *Sam.*

x. 7. In the parallel passage, 1 Chron. i. 9, Rev. have changed first Raamah to Raama, but א final is there as much a vowel letter as ה would be. The change is therefore not good, and, though in itself the decision of Rev. is not very important, it indicates their attitude toward the Mass. text.

x. 23. Under "Mash," Rev. have not referred to "Meshech," 1 Chron. i. 17, though there they give "Mash" in marg.

x. 28. It might perhaps have been said that "Ebal" is the reading here, according to *Sam.* and *Vulg.*

xi. 31. וַיִּצְאוּ אֲנָחַם. Some change is necessary, and variations are found in the versions which are not referred to by Rev.

xiv. 22. The omission of יִרְחָה by some of the versions might well have been mentioned.

xxi. 20. Both A. V. and Rev. have emended the text, presumably on internal grounds and the testimony of ancient versions; and this in spite of the allowable rendering given in Rev. margin. Rev. have done right in this, though it seems inconsistent with their avowed practice.

xxii. 13. The margin is here of very great value, and, in the opinion of the writer, should exchange places with the text. See the grounds in Professor H. P. Smith's art., *Pres. Rev.*, Oct. 1885.

xxiii. 1. The last clause is not found in LXX, a fact not noted by Rev.

xxiv. 10. The omission of first וַיִּלְכֶּה in LXX. should have been noted.

xxiv. 62. It is impossible to explain מִבּוֹא. *Sam.* and LXX. present the suitable reading.

xxvii. 5. The reading of LXX., לְאֶבְרָהָם, would be helpful.

xxvii. 46. מְבֹנֶה-חֵת is not found in LXX., and could be omitted with manifest advantage to the text.

xxix. 27. "I will give," LXX., *Sam.*, should at least have a place in marg.

xxix. 30. The second בָּנִי should be omitted with LXX. and *Vulg.*

xxix. 34. For "therefore was his name called Levi," substitute "therefore she called his name Levi." It is as good as certain that masc. verb is a corruption of the text. LXX., *Pesh.*, and *Sam.* are against it.

xxxi. 13. LXX. and *Sam.* have וְאִשְׁרָא for second אִשְׁרָא, a reading probably to be preferred.

xxxi. 29. LXX. and *Sam.* have "thy father" for "your father," a reading which deserves at least a place in the marg.

xxxi. 34. The reading, "and searched," of LXX. and *Sam.* is worthy of a place in the margin. So also is their omission of "didst thou require it," in xxxi. 39.

xxxi. 36. For מָה וְכֵן is attested by *Sam.*, LXX., *Pesh.*, *Targ. Palest.*, and many Heb. codices, and undoubtedly should be admitted to the text.

xxxi. 42. The second אֶלֶּהי should be omitted, as in LXX. and *Vulg.*

xxxi. 53. "The God of their father" seems like a gloss. It is wanting in some Heb. MSS., in LXX., and is not favored by the *Sam.* substitute.

xxxii. 5. For "and," "and" would seem to be demanded in accordance with a principle of the Rev. Moreover, ׀ is found in some Heb. MSS., LXX., *Sam.*, *Vulg.*, *Pesh.*

xxxii. 21. אֵל is attested by *Sam.*, LXX., a fact not noted by Rev.

xxxii. 24. For "that he had," "all that he had" is found in *Sam.*, LXX., *Pesh.*, *Vulg.*, a fact not alluded to in Rev.

xxxiii. 13. The reading, "I overdrive them," of *Sam.*, LXX., *Pesh.*, should be mentioned.

xxxvi. 2. חָרִי is probably the true reading, instead of חָרִי. Cf. with vss. 24 and 20, and see LXX. of Josh. ix. 7. Correction here would lead to the same elsewhere where the word is found.

xxxvi. 26. וְיִשְׁעֵן is to be read here, in accordance with LXX., *Pesh.*, *Vulg.*, and 1 Chron. i. 41. The margin should then be omitted.

xxxvi. 39. הָרָד is the true reading, judging from MS. evidence, 1 Chron. i. 50, *Pesh.*, *Sam.*

xxxviii. 3. Last verb should be feminine, in accord with Heb. MSS., *Targ. Palest.*, *Sam.*, and internal reasoning.

XXXVIII. 5. For "he was," LXX. has "she was." The reading should have at least a place in the margin.

XXXVIII. 33. "*Corn for*" need not be in italics. The expression is certainly demanded by vs. 19, and the reading is attested by LXX., *Pesh.*, *Onk.*

XLIV. 31. אֶתְּנוּ is supported by LXX., *Sam.*, *Pesh.*, *Vulg.*, and by xlii. 38. "*With us*" should be "with us."

XLVI. 16. Marg. ⁶ has the evidence of Num. xxvi. 15, LXX., *Sam.*, and should be received into the text.

XLVII. 5, 6. The arrangement in LXX. should have been mentioned, if not adopted in the text.

XLVII. 21. The margin is almost certainly correct.

XLVII. 26. Rev. follow the reading, הִחָזֵשׁ, of *Pesh.*, an act of daring from which they would have refrained, were it not for the example of 1611. Some such change is, of course, necessary.

XLIX. 20. Omit מֶן, with LXX., *Vulg.*, *Pesh.*, *Onk.* The internal evidence is corroborative, since the other names have such a construction and וְ is needed for the previous verse. So Professor Smith in art. aforesaid.

XLIX. 21. The versions are not alluded to; and yet we must change the vowels of two words (אֵלֶּהָ to אֵלֶּהָ, אֶמְרִי to אֶמְרִי) to conform to the direct or implied testimony of several of them: we should then render, "N. is a slender terebinth who sets beautiful tops in motion."

XLIX. 24. For רֹעֶה, רֹעֶה seems to be demanded by the absence of the article or its equivalent. Translate "the shepherd of the Stone of Israel."

XLIX. 25. For וְאֵל adopt וְאֵל, with some Heb. MSS., LXX., *Sam.*, *Pesh.*, (*Vulg.* has neither), and render "God Almighty," instead of "by the Almighty."

XLIX. 26. "My progenitors" is almost certainly wrong. If הוֹרֵי be changed to הוֹרֵי, or better הִרְרֵי, we get the acceptable meaning found in Deut. xxxiii. 15; Hab. iii. 6. Hence the margin is here by all means to be preferred.

II. GRAMMATICAL CHANGES.

No grammatical changes.

i. 1-3. 'When God created at the first the heaven and the earth, the earth being waste and empty and darkness being upon the face of the deep and the Spirit of God brooding

i. 5. 'And there was evening,' etc., for 'and the evening,' etc.; 'one' for 'the first.'

i. 8. As in vs. 5 a; 'a second day' for 'the,' etc.

i. 11, 12. 'herb' for 'the herb'; 'fruit tree' for 'the f. t.'; 'wherein is the seed thereof' for 'whose seed *is* [*was*] in itself' (last two twice).

i. 13. Changes similar to those in vs. 8: the same are made in vss. 19, 23, 31.

i. 16. 'the two' for 'two.'

i. 20. 'and let fowl fly' for 'and fowl *that* may fly.'

i. 21. 'kinds' for 'kind.' This change was made, notwithstanding the fact that Ewald and others with

The use of the construct רִאשִׁית in vs. 1 renders it probable that the latter is not an independent sentence, but a temporal conditional clause dependent upon vs. 3. The particular form of its translation has been suggested by the Revisers' treatment of Hos. i. 2.

Verse 2 is a 'circumstantial clause' descriptive of the state of things when the creative voice was heard.

i. 6. 'a divider' for 'divide.' The writer would prefer, also, 'that it may become a divider' to 'let it divide.' For this preference, cf. vs. 14, where the Rev. correctly translate } converse with the perfect.

i. 9. 'that the dry land may appear' for 'and let,' etc.

i. 11, 12. 'wherein' or 'in which is its seed' for 'wherein is the seed thereof' (twice).

i. 16. Omit '*he made*' and insert 'also the stars' before 'to rule the night'—for the stars are included in this service; 'for dominion over' is more accurate than 'to rule,' which is expressed by לָ and the inf. (see vs. 18).

i. 20. The marginal renderings* are by all means to be preferred, and the first of these is more consistent with verses below than is the text of the Revision.

i. 21. It would seem desirable to distinguish, as far as possible, between בִּין when followed by the arti-

cision here shows that where there is uncertainty they claimed the right to accept the *more probable* rendering, even though it differ from the A. V.

i. 25. 'the cattle' for 'cattle.'

i. 27. 'And' for 'So.'

ii. 1. 'And' for 'Thus.'

ii. 3. 'rested' for 'had rested;' 'had created' for 'created.'

ii. 4. 'earth and heaven' for 'the earth and the heavens.'

In vs. 5 the negative form has been assumed for the awkward 'and every . . . before it was;' 'sprung up' for 'grew.'

ii. 9. 'the knowledge' for 'knowledge.'

ii. 10. Omit 'into.'

latter in the R.V.). This applies also to i. 25, 26, 29, 30; ii. 16.

i. 25. 'all creepers' (or creeping things) 'of the ground' is more accurate than 'every thing that creepeth upon the ground;' 'their' should be 'its,' as in many other verses.

i. 26. } with impf. should be rendered 'that they may have dominion.'

i. 27. 'a male and a female' should be substituted for 'male and female,' if, as is probable, the allusion be to a single pair.

i. 29, 30. At the end of vs. 29 should be a comma, since every living creature is included with man in the possession of all green herbage; cf. also ix. 13.

ii. 4 a belongs to preceding paragraph.

ii. 4 b-7. 'When Jehovah God made earth and heaven, no plant of the field having yet appeared in the earth, and no herb of the field having yet sprung up: for Jehovah God had not sent rain upon the earth, and man there was none to till the ground; but a mist used to go up from the earth and water all the face of the ground; then Jehovah God formed the man of dust from the ground,' etc.

The construction is much like i. 1 ff., the apodosis beginning with vs. 7 (cf. v. 1); vs. 6 contains customary imperfects, which Rev. does not distinguish from part. in vs. 10; 'dust' for 'the dust.'

ii. 9. 'knowing' is more accurate than 'the knowledge of;' so in vs. 17.

ii. 10. 'was proceeding' is better than 'went out,' for the latter does not convey the idea of the Hebrew

ii. 19, 20. 'the man' for 'Adam' (three times); 'man' for 'Adam.'

ii. 21-23. 'the man' for 'Adam' (twice); 'the man' for 'man.'

iii. 1. 'any' for 'every' (tree); marg. 'all the trees.'

iii. 2. Verb placed last, as in the Hebrew.

iii. 5. 'God' for 'gods.'

iii. 6. 'a delight' for 'pleasant'; 'and that the tree was' for 'and a tree'; 'she gave' for 'gave.'

iii. 8. 'the man' for 'Adam.'

iii. 9. Same as 8.

iii. 14. Emphatic 'cursed' placed before 'art.'

participle; 'it divides itself and becomes four heads' is preferable to 'it was parted,' etc.

ii. 16. 'all the trees' for 'every tree.'

ii. 19, 20. 'might call' is probably better than 'called'; 'was to be,' than 'was;' for 'every' substitute 'a,' add 'the' before 'man' and omit margin; 'he did not find' for 'there was not found;' vs. 20 is temporal, looking forward to vs. 21; the latter itself has a temporal clause which may be rendered 'and when he had slept.'

ii. 23. 'has been' for 'was.'

ii. 24. A general truth: 'Therefore a man leaves . . . and they become,' etc.

iii. 1. Rev. is ambiguous; translate 'most subtle of all the animals of the field;' also carry margin 'all the trees' into the text.

iii. 5. Substitute 'of your eating' for 'ye eat;' omit marg. 'gods;' 'knowers of' better than 'knowing.'

iii. 6. 'to become wise' or 'to get wisdom' better than 'to make one wise.'

iii. 7. 'Then' seems preferable to 'And,' unless, indeed, 'And' is to be omitted. Cf. the reading *וְאָכַל* (plur.) which LXX. and *Sam.* found at close of vs. 6.

iii. 8. If 'when' be inserted after 'and,' the rendering becomes strictly accurate and greater variety is secured.

iii. 11. 'not to eat' is better than Rev. 'that thou,' etc.

iii. 14. 'above' should be 'from among' (as in marg.); 'all beasts' better than 'every beast.'

iii. 17. 'the man' should probably take the place of 'Adam,' so in vs. 21

- iii. 20. Same as 8.
- iii. 21. Principal clause placed first, as in the Hebrew.
- iii. 24. 'the Cherubim, and the flame of a sword' for 'Cherubims, and a flaming sword.'
- iv. 1. Same as iii. 8.
- iv. 2. Change of order.
- iv. 11. 'Cursed' has been given its emphatic position.
- iv. 14. 'whosoever findeth' for 'every one that findeth.'
- iv. 22. 'the forger of every cutting instrument' for 'an instructor of every artificer.'
- iv. 23. 'for wounding me' for 'to my wounding;' 'for bruising me' for 'to my hurt.'
- iv. 25. Change of order; 'for Cain slew him' for 'whom Cain slew.'
- v. 4. 'begat' for 'had begotten.'
- vi. 2. 'that' for 'which.'
- vi. 3, 4. Change of order; 'strive with man for ever' for 'always strive with man;' 'the men' for 'men.'

(cf. ii. 20); for 'hast hearkened . . . hast eaten,' 'didst hearken . . . eat' seems desirable.

iii. 20. For 'all living' substitute 'every living *person*.'

iii. 24. 'the flame of the revolving sword' is more strictly accurate than Rev.

iv. 4. 'fat pieces' preferable to 'fat.'

iv. 6. 'Why has thine anger kindled and why has thy countenance fallen' is better than 'Why art thou,' etc.

iv. 7. Adopt margins; substitute 'is a lurker' or 'is lurking' for 'croucheth.'

iv. 17. 'was building' for 'buildeth.'

iv. 20. 'and by cattle' for 'and have cattle.'

iv. 23. Omit margins.

v. 24. 'had taken' for 'took.'

vi. 1. 'had begun' for 'began.'

vi. 2. 'such as they chose' or 'whatever they chose' is better than 'of all,' etc. The writer means to say, not that a larger number were first chosen and then a selection made from these, but that the selection in each instance was from the whole number. *h* here emphasizes the idea contained in the sentence, and its use is illustrated by vii. 22; ix. 10; xvii. 12. It is, of course, not quite pleonastic, but nearly so.

vi. 3, 4. '... My spirit shall not be low (or abased) in mankind for ever, in their going astray they are flesh: therefore shall their days be a hundred and twenty years. The N. were in the earth in those days and also after that; because the sons of God

came in (were in the habit of going in),' etc.

Rev. has left this passage practically as it was. But difficulties in it should not lead us to retain any rendering known to be incorrect, even though we must exchange for one which is at most only probable. It is possible to derive יָרָן from a root יָרַן which occurs in Arabic with the meaning here adopted. This meaning fits the present connection best of all the proposed renderings, and is supported, as the present writer thinks (though he can cite no authorities for the view) by יָרָן in 1 Sam. ii. 10: 'Jehovah shall abase [Rev. 'judge'] the ends of the earth; but [Rev. 'and'] he shall give strength unto his king, and exalt the horn of his anointed;' marg. ⁵ is to be adopted as a probable improvement; 'therefore' for 'yet' seems better to suit the context; that יָשַׁךְ introduces a reason—'because'—follows both from the Massoretic accentuation and from the (customary) imperfect following it.

vi. 5. Substitute 'the whole form' for 'every imagination.'

vi. 7. 'creeping' for 'the creeping;' 'fowl' for 'the fowls.'

vi. 9. Omit 'and' before 'Noah.'

vi. 15. 'how' for 'the fashion which . . . of;' omit 'shall be.'

vi. 16. 'upward' for 'above.'

vi. 17. 'the flood' for 'a flood;' 'every thing' for 'and every thing.'

vi. 18. 'with thee' placed correctly at end of clause.

vi. 20. 'the fowl' for 'fowl;' 'the cattle' for 'cattle.'

vi. 21. 'gather' for 'thou shalt gather.'

vi. 13. 'am about to destroy' is better than 'will destroy.'

vi. 16. Substitute margin 'from above' for text.

vi. 17. Read 'I am about to bring;' for 'of waters' substitute 'that is waters.'

vi. 19. 'And of all which lives, of every sort of flesh, two of each,' etc.

The essential proposal here lies in the substitution of 'every sort of' for 'all;' 'male and female' belongs before 'they shall be.'

vii. 2. 'seven and seven' for 'by sevens;' 'the beasts' for 'beasts;' 'two' for 'by two.'

vii. 3. 'the fowl' for 'fowls;' 'seven and seven' for 'by sevens;' 'male and female' for 'the male,' etc. The last also in vs. 9.

vii. 9. 'commanded' for 'had commanded.'

vii. 10. 'the seven days' for 'seven days.'

vii. 11. Insert 'on' (the seventeenth etc.); 'on the same day' for 'the same day.'

vii. 16. 'commanded' for 'had commanded.'

vii. 18. 'increased' for 'were increased.'

vii. 21. Omit 'of' before each sort of creature.

vii. 22. 'breath of the spirit of life' for 'breath of life.'

vii. 23. 'creeping thing' for 'the creeping things;' 'fowl' for 'the fowl.'

viii. 3. 'an hundred' for 'the hundred.'

viii. 17. As in vii. 21.

viii. 19. Omit 'and.'

viii. 21. 'the sweet' for 'a sweet.'

vii. 2. If 'the' is to be retained before 'male,' it should be in italics.

vii. 4. The participial construction may be brought out by a rendering like this: 'For after seven days I shall be bringing,' etc.

vii. 6. "When the flood came as waters upon the earth" is more strictly in accord with the Heb. than Rev.

vii. 9. 'had commanded' is better.

vii. 14. The strict use of כָּל may be retained by changing each 'every,' except the last two, to 'all.' The last clause may be rendered 'every winged bird of whatever sort,' and this is consistent with i. 21.

vii. 22. 'everything which was in the dry land whatsoever died.' See note on vi. 2.

vii. 23. מִכָּל־ is certainly Qāl, and the subject is almost certainly יְהוָה (of vs. 16). Cf. under I.

viii. 3. The *two* infs. may be rendered 'more and more.' So in vs. 5.

viii. 7. 'went repeatedly forth and back,' or some such expression, is needed to express the force of the infinitives; subs. 'drying up of the waters' for 'waters were dried up;' add 'the' (raven).

viii. 8. Add 'the' (dove).

viii. 9. Subs. 'water was' for 'the waters were.'

viii. 11. Carry margin into text.

viii. 17. 'and let them swarm' is better than 'that they may breed abundantly.' Rev. has rendered verb as a volutative with י.

ix. 2. 'with all wherewith the ground teemeth and all' for 'upon all *that* moveth *upon* the earth and upon all.'

ix. 5. Add 'even' after 'hand of man.'

ix. 10. Omit 'of,' as in vii. 21; 'of all' for 'from all;' 'even' for 'to.'

ix. 11. 'the flood' for 'a flood.'

ix. 19. 'These three were the sons' for 'these *are* the three sons;' 'of these' for 'of them.'

ix. 20. Omit 'he' before 'planted.'

ix. 26. 'the LORD, the God of Shem' for 'the LORD God of Shem;' 'and let Canaan' for 'and Canaan shall.'

ix. 27. 'enlarge' for 'shall e.:' 'let him' for 'he shall;' 'let Canaan' for 'Canaan shall.'

x. 9. 'a mighty hunter' for 'the mighty hunter.'

x. 11. 'he went forth into Assyria' for 'went forth Asshur;' 'Rehoboth-Ir' for 'the city Rehoboth.'

x. 12. '(the same is the great city)' for 'the same *is* a great city.'

x. 19. 'goest toward Gerar' for 'comest to Gerar;' 'toward Sodom' for 'unto Sodom,' omit 'even' (unto L.)

x. 20. Omit 'and.'

x. 21. 'the elder brother of J.' for 'the brother of J. the elder;' 'to him also' for 'even to him.'

x. 30. 'toward Sephar' for 'unto Sephar;' 'the mountain' for 'a mount.'

xi. 2. 'east' for 'from the east.'

xi. 6. 'they are one people' for 'the people *is* one;' add 'is what;' 'purpose' for 'have imagined.'

xi. 9. 'was' for 'is.'

xi. 28. 'in the presence of' for 'before.'

ix. 10. A change seems desirable similar to that proposed in vi. 2.

ix. 12. 'which I am about to grant' expresses more nearly than Rev. both the meaning and syntactical force of the participle.

ix. 13. מִן־הָאֵשׁ should be expressed by same English tense here and in i. 29; xv. 18. The *present* is preferred by the writer.

ix. 23. 'his garment' or 'the garment' should take the place of 'a garment.'

ix. 25. 'let him be' for 'shall he be.'

ix. 27. Marg. 'he shall' should certainly be omitted.

x. 21. Marg. 'brother of J. the elder' should be omitted.

xi. 3. Force of article may be expressed by translating 'The brick became their stone and the bitumen their mortar.'

xi. 5. 'builded' should be 'had builded.'

xi. 30. 'and Sarai' for 'but Sarai.'
 xii. 1. 'said' for 'had said;' 'the land' for 'a land.'

xii. 2. 'be thou a blessing' for 'thou shalt be a blessing.'

xii. 3. 'and him that curseth thee will I curse' for 'and curse him that curseth thee'—change of order to suit the Hebrew; 'the families' for 'families.'

xii. 8. 'the mountain' for 'a mountain.'

xii. 12. 'and' for 'Therefore.'

xii. 13. 'that my soul may live' for 'my soul shall live.'

xii. 19. 'so that I took her to be my wife,' for 'so I might have taken her to me to wife.'

xii. 20. 'gave men charge' for 'commanded his men;' 'and they brought him on the way' for 'and they sent him away.'

xiii. 11. 'So' for 'Then.'

xiii. 12. 'and moved his tent as far as Sodom' for 'and pitched his tent toward Sodom.'

xiii. 13. 'Now' for 'But.'

xiii. 17 b. Change of order to suit the original.

xiii. 18. 'And' for 'Then.'

xiv. 2. '(the same is Zoar)' for 'which is Zoar.'

xiv. 3. Omit 'were;' '(the same is the Salt Sea)' for 'which is the salt sea.'

xiv. 7. '(the same is Kadesh)' for 'which is Kadesh.'

xiv. 9. 'four kings against the five' for 'four kings with five.'

xiv. 10. 'Now' for 'And;' 'they fell' for 'fell.'

xii. 3. It is quite likely that the Niph'al has the same meaning here as has the Hithpa'el in xxii. 18; xxvi.

4. If so, 'bless themselves' should find a place in the margin here as well as in the other passages. Indeed, good reasons could be given for substituting this expression for 'be blessed' in all.

xii. 11. 'as he drew near to Egypt' is better than 'when he was come near to enter into E.,' and the two verbs express but one idea.

xii. 18. 'What, then, hast thou done' would express the adverbial use of אָמַר better than R.

xiii. 6. This verse may be rendered much more concisely than in A. V. and R. thus: 'And the land could not suffer them to dwell together: for their possessions were great, so that they were not able to dwell together.'

xiii. 7. Change 'dwelled' to 'were dwelling.'

xiii. 13. This *circumstantial* clause should be rendered so as clearly to connect the verse with preceding verses, rather than with vs. 14. The latter by change of tense makes this clear. The translation, 'the men of S. being,' etc., would answer the requirement of the connection.

xiii. 16. Clearly 'may' should be substituted for 'shall.'

xiv. 13. 'now he dwelt by the oaks' for 'for he dwelt in the plain.'

xiv. 15. Change of order to suit the Hebrew.

xiv. 17. '(the same is the King's Vale)' for 'which is the king's dale.'

xiv. 18. 'priest of God Most High' for 'the priest of the most high God;' so in vss. 19, 20, 22; 'a tenth' for 'tithes.'

xv. 2. 'and he that shall be possessor of my house is Dammesek E.' for 'and the steward of my house is this E. of Damascus.'

xv. 11. 'the birds of prey' for 'when the fowls.' For what reason 'when' is omitted does not appear.

xv. 15. 'But' for 'And.'

xv. 16. 'And' for 'But.'

xvi. 2. Change of order.

xvi. 5. 'gave' for 'have given.'

xvi. 6. 'that which is good in thine eyes' for 'as it pleaseth thee;' 'when' omitted, why, in view of vs. 5 and many others, is not evident.

xiv. 10. The circumstantial clause may be connected as follows: 'Now the vale of Siddim being full of bitumen pits, when the kings of S. and G. fled, people fell there,' etc. That 'they' (the kings) is not subject of 'fell' is shown by vs. 17 et. al.

xiv. 13. 'the fugitive' is more literal and exact than Rev., see xv. 11;

xiii. 6 is circumstantial—'while he was dwelling,' etc.

xiv. 18. The circumstantial clause at the end may be placed in apposition with 'Melchizedek.'

xiv. 22. Better 'I lift up.'

xiv. 24. 'they may take' is more consistent with vs. 21 than is 'let them take.'

xv. 1. 'in the vision' or 'by vision' is better than 'in a vision;' the failure to adopt marg. ¹ can be explained only upon the supposition of a slavish devotion to the A. V. The reply of A. can be explained only by this marginal reading.

xv. 2. 'Damascus of Eliezer' should have received at least a place in the margin; 'go hence,' or some other alternative would relieve the verse of an ambiguity.

xv. 12. 'And when the sun was about to go down, a deep sleep having fallen upon Abram, behold a terror, a great darkness, was falling over him.'

xv. 13. 'Thou oughtest certainly to know' is better than rendering of Rev.

xv. 14. 'I am about to judge' for 'will I judge.'

xv. 17. 'had gone down, had become dark,' render correctly the original constructions.

xv. 18. Better 'I give.'

xvi. 8. 'goest thou' for 'wilt thou go.'

xvi. 12. 'shall be as a wild-ass among men' for 'will be a wild man.'

xvi. 13. 'Thou art a God that seeth' for 'Thou God seest me.'

xvii. 1. 'God Almighty' for 'the Almighty God.'

xvii. 4. 'a multitude of' for 'many.' So in vs. 5.

xvii. 8. 'of thy sojournings' for 'wherein thou art a stranger.'

xvii. 9. 'And as for thee' for 'therefore.'

xvii. 11. 'be circumcised in' for 'circumcise;' 'a covenant' for 'the covenant.'

xvii. 14. 'who is not circ. in the flesh of his foreskin' for 'whose flesh of his foreskin is not circ.'

xvii. 16. 'moreover I will give thee a son' for 'I will give thee a son also.'

xvii. 19. 'Nay, but' before 'Sarah' for 'indeed' after 'son;' 'for' for 'and with.'

xviii. 1. 'as he sat' for 'and he sat.' Here the circumstantial clause has been rendered into English as such by the Revisers. They thereby invite criticism in similar passages where they have not seen fit to make a change. Let the reader, e. g., compare this verse with xix. 1 and say if there be not equal reason for altering the A. V. there.

xviii. 2. 'to the earth' for 'toward the ground.'

xviii. 4. 'let now a little water' for 'let a little water, I pray you.'

xviii. 5. 'heart' for 'hearts;' 'forasmuch as ye are' for 'for therefore are ye.'

xviii. 6. Omit 'upon the hearth.'

xviii. 7. 'the servant' for 'a young man.'

xvi. 8. 'Am I fleeing' is more literal than Rev.

xvi. 11. 'art about to bear a son' preserves the force of the participle.

xvii. 10. 'must be circumcised' is better than 'shall be circumcised.' See. vs. 13.

xvii. 24, 25. These are circumstantial clauses and might be rendered as such.

xvii. 27. Substitute 'a stranger' for 'the stranger.'

xviii. 2. Substitute 'standing' for 'stood.'

xviii. 5. Margin not needed here nor in connection with xix. 8 any more than with xxxviii. 26, except to preserve an opinion of the A. V. discarded by Rev. Illustrations of this are not few.

xviii. 10. 'when the season cometh round' for 'according to the time of life;' so vs. 14; omit 'it.'

xviii. 11. Omit second 'and;' 'had ceased' for 'ceased.'

xviii. 17. 'that' for 'that thing.'

xviii. 19. 'have known' for 'know;' 'to the end that he may' for 'that he will;' 'that they may keep' for 'and they shall keep;' add 'to the end.'

xviii. 22. Omit 'their faces.'

xviii. 23. Omit 'also;' so vs. 24.

xviii. 25. 'that so' for 'and that.'

xviii. 28. Change of order.

xviii. 29. 'the forty's sake' for 'forty's sake. So vss. 31, 32.

xviii. 30. Omit 'unto him.'

xix. 1. 'the two angels came' for 'there came two angels;' 'saw them, and' for 'seeing them;' 'to the earth' for 'toward the ground.'

xix. 4. Change of order.

xix. 6. 'unto them to the door' for 'at the door unto them.'

xix. 7. Add 'he;' add 'my.'

xix. 8. 'forasmuch as they are come' for 'for therefore came they.'

xix. 9. Omit 'again.'

xix. 12. 'whomsoever' for 'whatsoever;' 'the place' for 'this place.'

xviii. 8. 'he standing beside them under the tree' would bring out the force of circumstantial clause.

xviii. 10. 'and S. was listening,' etc., would do justice to the part.

xviii. 11. This is circumstantial, used to explain Sarah's conduct in vs. 12.

xviii. 13. 'Why then' is nearer to the original than 'Wherefore.'

xviii. 16 b. This clause is circumstantial.

xviii. 17. Substitute 'am about to do' for 'do.'

xviii. 18. See xii. 3.

xviii. 19. It surely must have been by oversight that 'and' between the two verbs was omitted by Rev. See their practice from xii. 13; Deut. vi. 18, etc. The mistake is unfortunate, as it tends to help on the confusion of weak and the impf. with strong and the perf.

xviii. 20. Carry marg. 'verily' into the text.

xviii. 22. 'while A. was still standing,' or a similar expression, is needed as the last clause.

xviii. 33. 'as soon as he had ceased to speak unto A.' is more literal and not less elegant than the Rev.

xix. 1. See xviii. 1. In the second member there seems to be no good reason for avoiding the construction of xviii. 2.

xix. 8. 'that ye may do to them' for 'and do ye to them;' omit margin as in xviii. 5.

xix. 9. 'will continually play the judge' is better than 'will needs be a judge.'

xix. 13. Omit 'face of.'

xix. 14. 'the city' for 'this city;' change of order.

xix. 16. 'But he lingered; and the men' for 'And while he lingered, the men.'

xix. 19. Omit 'some.'

xix. 21. 'the city of which' for 'this city, for the which.'

xx. 1. 'the land of the South' for 'the south country;' add 'he.'

xx. 3. 'of the night' for 'by night.'

xx. 4. 'Now' for 'But;' 'even' for 'also.'

xx. 5. Add 'himself.'

xx. 6. 'the dream' for 'a dream;' 'thou hast done this' for 'thou didst this'—as well as change of order here; 'and I also' for 'I; for I also.'

xx. 7. 'man's wife' for 'man his wife.'

xx. 8. 'And' for 'Therefore.'

xx. 9. 'wherein have I sinned against' for 'what have I offended.'

xx. 12. 'And moreover she is indeed' for 'And yet indeed *she is*;' omit '*she is*.'

xx. 16. 'it is for thee' for 'he *is* to thee;' 'and in respect of all thou art righted' for 'and with all *other*;' thus she was reproved.' A serious error of A. V. is thereby corrected.

xxi. 2. 'And' for 'For.'

xxi. 4. 'when he was' for 'being.'

xix. 13. 'are about to destroy' is the strict meaning of the participle.

xix. 14. Carry marg. 'were to marry' into the text; 'is about to destroy' expresses the force of the participle.

xix. 20. 'that my soul may live' accurately represents the original.

xix. 23. 'The sun had risen upon the earth and Lot had come unto Zoar, (24) when,' etc., is the proper rendering.

xix. 28. 'had gone up' for 'went up;' 'the furnace' for 'a furnace.'

xix. 29. 'had dwelt' for 'dwelt.'

xix. 30. 'the cave' for 'a cave.'

xix. 32. 'let us lie with him' is more strictly accurate than Rev. In the connection, the latter would be misleading to an English reader.

xx. 3. 'but' is unnecessary.

xx. 4. 'righteous people' is better than 'a righteous nation.'

xx. 7. 'that he may pray for thee and thou live' is to be preferred to Rev.

xx. 10. 'What didst thou have in view' is demanded by the context.

xx. 11. The literal meaning of פְּנֵי, 'only,' 'to say the least,' should have been given, and preferably, in the text.

xx. 12. Add 'so' after last 'and.'

xx. 16. 'and with them all' seems better to suit the context than 'and in respect of all.'

xxi. 6. 'every one that heareth' for 'so that all that hear.'

xxi. 7. 'should give' for 'should have given.'

xxi. 8. 'on the day' for 'the same day.'

xxi. 11. 'on account' for 'because.'

xxi. 12. 'saith' for 'hath said.'

xxi. 15. Change of order.

xxi. 25. 'the well' for 'a well.'

xxi. 27. 'they two' for 'both of them.'

xxi. 30. 'These' for 'For these;' 'it' for 'they.'

xxi. 32. 'So' for 'Thus;' 'and A.' for 'then A.'

xxii. 1. 'Here am I' for 'Behold, here I am.'

xxii. 2. Change of order, and so 'even' is added.

xxii. 4. Omit 'Then.'

xxii. 5. Add 'we will.'

xxii. 6. Slight change of order; 'the knife' for 'a knife.'

xxii. 8. Change of order; 'the lamb' for 'a lamb.'

xxii. 9. 'the altar for 'an altar.'

xxii. 13. 'the thicket for 'a thicket.'

xxii. 15. Change of order, and 'a' for 'the.'

xxii. 16. Omit 'for.'

xxii. 20. Change of order.

xxiii. 1. Add 'the life of,' and omit 'old.'

xxiii. 2. Add parentheses.

xxiii. 9. 'for the full price let him give it to me' for 'for as much money

xxi. 6. Substitute marg. for text, and 'at me' or 'over me' for 'with me.'

xxi. 12. 'may say' is more accurate than 'saith;' לֵךְ יִרְעֶה is not the equivalent of יִרְעֶה.

xxi. 20. If we accept the Massoretic text, we are forced to adopt marg. reading. Cf. under I.

xxi. 22. 'art doing' for 'doest.'

xxi. 23. 'do thou do' would here express the impf.

xxi. 24. 'will' should be omitted.

xxi. 25. Two pluperfects seem in place here.

xxi. 26. 'And A. said, I do not know who did this thing: neither didst thou tell me, neither have I heard of it, except to-day.'

xxi. 31. 'he' should at least be in italics, according to a pronounced principle of Rev.

xxii. 3. 'his two young men' is probably the thought in the original.

xxii. 8. 'will select for himself' is better than 'will provide himself.'

xxii. 14. 'so that to-day it is said, In the mountain where Jehovah is seen' is good syntax and good theology.

xxii. 17. 'is blessing' is not the usual formula for rendering the intensive infinitive.

xxii. 18. Carry margin to text.

as it is worth he shall give it me.'

xxiii. 10. 'was sitting in the midst of' for 'dwelt among.'

xxiii. 13. 'wilt' for '*wilt give it;*' 'the price of' for 'thee money for.'

xxiii. 15. 'a piece of land worth' for 'the land *is worth*.'

xxiii. 17. 'So' for 'And;' 'border thereof' for 'borders;' parentheses added.

xxiv. 2. 'servant, the elder' for 'eldest servant.'

xxiv. 7. Add 'the' before 'God.' So in vss. 12, 27, 42, 48.

xxiii. 13. 'that I may bury my dead there' is most decidedly to be preferred to 'and I will bury my dead there.' Both A. V. and Rev. allow it in vss. 4 and 9. It is here proper to say that the Rev. have been satisfied, for the most part, to deal with this construction as did the A. V. before them. Phrases like 'that I may be,' 'and let me be,' 'and I will be,' are perhaps equally current for the same Hebrew phrase. The idea may have prevailed that one of these translations is as good for the English reader as another; but instances can be cited where positive error results from this confusion of tenses. Let even the English reader compare Rev. of Isa. xxv. 9: 'we have waited for him, and he will save us: this is the LORD; we have waited for him, we will be glad and rejoice in his salvation,' with the true rendering, 'that he might save us,' and he will see that, though salvation has already come, the Rev. place it in the future. (See Driver, *Hebrew Tenses*, p. 80.) Justice demands, however, that the Rev. be given credit for the instances in which the English future has been changed to the jussive, and the reverse, and for a few, like xxx. 3, where the telic force is restored.

xxiii. 20. Add 'so' (the f.).

xiv. 1. Is circumstantial, the narrative beginning with vs. 2.

xxiv. 4. Unless 'that' be repeated it is not easy to catch the thought.

xxiv. 7. Use jussives. The English is hardly reverent.

of his master's in his hand' for 'for all the goods of his master *were* in his hand.'

xxiv. 11. 'the' for 'his;' 'the' for 'a' (well); omit 'the' (evening); omit '*even*.'

xxiv. 12. Change of order.

xxiv. 13. Omit '*here*.'

xxiv. 17. 'Give me to drink, I pray thee' for 'Let me, I pray thee, drink.'

xxiv. 21. 'looked stedfastly on her; holding' for 'wondering at her, held.'

xxiv. 27. 'forsaken his mercy and his truth toward my master' for 'left destitute my master of his mercy and his truth;' 'as for me,' etc., for 'I *being* in the way, the LORD led me to the house,' etc.

xxiv. 28. Omit '*them of*;' 'according to these words' for 'these things.'

xxiv. 30. 'the bracelets' for 'bracelets.'

xxiv. 32. 'the' for 'his.'

xxiv. 41. Omit '*this*;' 'her not to thee' for 'not thee *one*.'

xxiv. 43. 'Let it come' for 'it shall come;' 'the maiden which' for 'when the virgin;' 'to whom I shall say' for 'and I say to her.'

xxiv. 52. 'he bowed himself down

have left such a construction in 1 Sam. xiv. 36; 1 Kings ii. 6.

xxiv. 12. 'Let it happen thus, and thereby shew kindness,' etc., or something similar, would better suit the original.

xxiv. 13. 'am standing' is better than 'stand;' 'are coming out' or 'are about to come out,' than 'come out.'

xxiv. 14. The cohortative after 'Drink' might be expressed in English; 'Let me know' is desirable.

xxiv. 15. 'was coming forth' for 'came out.'

xxiv. 16. 'whom no man had known' is strict syntax, and might replace an awkward expression.

xxiv. 21. A circumstantial clause.

xxiv. 29. 'whose name is Laban' or 'named Laban' is better.

xxiv. 30. 'was standing' for 'stood.'

xxiv. 31. 'since' better than 'for.'

xxiv. 36. 'after she had become old' is nearer the original than 'when she was old.'

xxiv. 37. 'I am dwelling' for 'I dwell.'

xxiv. 42. 'art about to prosper' and 'am going' would properly render these participles.

xxiv. 43. 'am standing' for 'stand.'

xxiv. 45. 'was coming' for 'came.'

xxiv. 49. 'If ye are to deal,' etc.—a similar expression is found in vs. 42, though not so treated by Rev.

to the earth unto the LORD' for 'he worshipped the LORD, *bowing himself* to the earth.'

xxiv. 60. Omit 'Thou art.'

xxiv. 62. 'land of the South' for 'south country.'

xxiv. 63. 'there were camels coming' for 'the camels *were* coming.'

xxiv. 65. 'And she said' for 'For she *had* said;' omit second '*had*;' 'and' for 'therefore;' 'her' for 'a' (veil).

xxiv. 66. Add 'the' (things).

xxv. 8. 'And' for 'Then.'

xxv. 9. Change of order; So vs. 11.

xxv. 20. 'Rebekah . . . to be his wife' for 'R. to wife,' etc.; 'of Laban' for 'to Laban.'

xxv. 22. 'wherefore do I live' for 'why am I thus.'

xxv. 23. 'peoples' for 'manner of people;' add 'even.'

xxv. 26. 'had' for 'took.'

xxv. 28. 'Now' for 'And;' 'and' for 'but.'

xxv. 32. 'the' for 'this.'

xxv. 34. 'so' for 'thus.'

xxiv. 60. The last clause is telic,— 'that thy seed may,' etc.

xxiv. 62. 'had come' to be preferred; 'since' for 'for.'

xxv. 1. See xxiv. 29; 'whose name' for 'and her name.'

xxv. 22. 'why, then, do I exist' is the full translation of apodosis.

xxv. 26. 'his hand was holding' is literal.

xxv. 32. 'why then should I hold a birthright,' or a similar expression, would be better than Rev.

ARTICLE VII.

A FOUNTAIN-HEAD OF ENGLISH ETHICS.

BY THE REV. GEORGE F. MAGOUN, D.D., IOWA COLLEGE.

RICHARD CUMBERLAND, D.D., bishop of Peterborough in the county of Northampton, England, 1691-1718, was born in London, 1632, educated at St. Paul's School and at Magdalen College, Cambridge University, fellow of Magdalen about 1655, vicar of All-Hallows and rector of Brampton, before he was made a bishop. As a general datum in philosophical chronology, Cumberland came about a century after Bacon and about ninety years before Adam Smith. More particularly, he was forty-four years younger than Hobbes, thirty-six younger than Descartes, fifteen years younger than Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists. He was born the same year with Spinoza and Locke. Shaftesbury, his disciple, came thirty-eight years later; Hutcheson, the disciple of Shaftesbury, sixty-two; Bishop Butler, seventy; President Edwards, seventy-one; Dr. Reid, seventy-eight; and Hume, seventy-nine. Cumberland's intellectual vigor was shown at the age of eighty-three by his becoming a proficient in the Coptic language. Our popular English speech is in debt to this well-nigh forgotten English prelate and philosopher for the phrase, "better to wear out than to rust out."

The moral philosophy of Cumberland is to be found in his treatise *De Legibus Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica*, 1672. The book is now a rare one: frequent searches in the London book market have failed to discover a copy.

ment of ethical theory." Of his treatise President Porter says, in Ueberweg's *Hist. Philosophy* (vol. ii., American translation), that it is "memorable as being the first English treatise in philosophical ethics as distinguished from the treatises on casuistry,"—as "the first from that numerous school of ethical writers which was called into being by antagonism to Hobbes,"—and as "the first of modern treatises which dares to assert that certain ethical conceptions and beliefs obtainable by reason are required in order to be able to interpret and defend revelation." Few books are memorable for reasons of such a character, and we are manifestly drawing here from a fountain-head—if stronger words cannot be used—of English ethics. Many ideas will flow out at this source which have been long since made familiar to American religious thought by our own writers, who probably drew from the successors of Cumberland in the mother country, rather than from himself. The book was "Made English from the Latin by John Maxwell, M.A., Prebendary of Connor, and Chaplain to his Excellency the Lord Carteret, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland," London, 4to, pp. 774, 1726–7, with Introduction and Appendix,—the former filling 168 pages, the latter 167, and Cumberland's own work, 377. Our citations are from the original edition of 1726–7, which was not perhaps the only one. "I cannot but acknowledge," says the translator, in his preface, "that his periods are very perplexed and intricate, and that his language is too scholastic and philosophical. The reading of his valuable work is a laborious task." We have found it so;

¹ Mr. Maxwell's notes, says Whewell, "often complain of the author's obscurity, and sometimes give an explanation which is at variance with the system." (*Hist. Mor. Phil.* p. 83.) Cumberland himself says: "being extremely solicitous about the *Matter*, I was but too negligent of its *Dress*. It was written by starts at intervals, such as an uncertain state of health, and the weighty cares of my holy function would permit." (*Introd.* p. 35.) He ascribes his venturing into print to the "importunity of some friends at Cambridge, principally Dr. Hezekiah Burton and Dr. John Hollings." Prof. Croom Robertson says, "Cumberland, by his discursiveness and confused handling, falls

but the task is lightened by some thirty-two pages of well-made analysis and index. And it is a pleasure in any investigation to go to sources as high up as one can.' "The treatise *De Legibus Naturae*," says President Porter, "is of the greatest significance in the History of Philosophy for its ability,"—"Cumberland's psychology and ethics are highly instructive, for the reason that he anticipated Locke in conducting his inquiries in respect to Human Nature in general, in the inductive spirit." "His work," says Dr. Whewell (*Hist. Mor. Phil.* p. 83.), "was the basis of much of our succeeding moral philosophy."

There are nine chapters in this "Philosophical Inquiry into the Laws of Nature, in which their Form, chief Heads, Order, Promulgation, and Obligation, are deduced from the *Nature of Things*: Also, the Elements of Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy, as well *Moral* as *Civil*, are considered and refuted." One reason why it was translated from the Latin was, that "the poison, which Mr. Hobbes and other writers of his stamp spread far and wide, subversive of the principles of all morality and religion, strongly infected many [in England] who do not understand that language." (Tr. Pref. p. 2.) Dr. Whewell describes it as, "the first extensive attempt to construct a system of morals, which, being founded on the consideration of the consequences of actions, should still satisfy those moral

as much below the level of endurable philosophical style as Hobbes rises above it."—(*Phil. Class. for Eng. Readers*, Hobbes, 1886, p. 219.) Chambers says: "This modest and erudite, but verbose production (of which two English translations have appeared) contains many sound, and at that time novel views on moral science, with others of very doubtful soundness." (*Cyclop. Eng. Lit.* II. 427.)

judgments and feelings of man in his usual social condition, which had been revolted by many of Hobbes's doctrines and modes of reasoning." (Hist. Phil. p. 75.) "The whole work is constantly made tedious and confused by the insertion of criticisms of Hobbes in every part." (Ib. p. 83.) A sufficient running account of these nine chapters at the outset is: Chap. I. The laws of nature reduced to one. II. Explanations of terms—man, nature, etc., with psychological and physiological statements. III. Natural good. IV. Moral laws set forth in the consequences of actions. V. Law, obligation, reward and punishment. VI. Relation of laws to human happiness. VII. The right of dominion, or authority. VIII. Obligation to virtue flows from the law of nature. IX. Corollaries as to the Decalogue, civil government, the family, society, etc., with special reference to the errors of Hobbes. "The title of this treatise indicates its leading purpose," says Dr. Porter, "viz., to vindicate the proposition that there are laws of morality made known by nature, in opposition to the doctrine of Hobbes, that those laws originate in civil society alone, and derive from society their sole sanction." (Ueberweg, p. 362.) It is one object of this paper to disentangle Cumberland's own views, so far as possible, from his arguments against those of Hobbes; but along with this to show the debt to him of later philosophers. Very pertinent to this are the remarks of two English metaphysicians that come to hand while we write. "No student of English ethics," says Professor Andrew Seth of the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire, "could avoid acknowledging that both the Intuitional and the Utilitarian lines of thought begin essentially as a reaction against Hobbism."⁴ "Cumberland, Cudworth, and Clarke," says Professor Croom Robertson of

⁴In *Contemp. Rev.*, March, 1886. Robertson's Hobbes, p. 214. "Hobbes," adds Prof. Seth, "deriving apparently nothing from Bacon, stands directly connected with the 'mechanical' philosophy" and Galileo. So Robertson, pp. 17 seq. 35 seq.

University College, London, "who, next to himself (Hobbes), are the first important figures in English moral philosophy, had each in view the establishment of principles directly antagonistic to principles of his."

We shall come to a readier and clearer understanding of our author, if we do not take first what is first in his own order, so far as he has one. He discusses laws of nature at once, indeed does so in his Introduction, but first defines them in the fifth chapter, the first four only "preparing the way." An exhaustive, or even extensive psychology is not here to be expected. Man, he says in the second chapter, "is an animal endowed with a mind." To animals at large belong the powers of increase by nourishment, of beginning motion, and of propagating their species, and a power of sensation, as we may bestow the name on the motions impressed upon the organs by their objects, and thence transmitted by the nerves to the brain,^a and sometimes thence communicated to the muscles, where they excite motion, or to the heart or lungs, and perhaps to other intestines by means whereof various affections are excited." "The most active parts of the blood assist the imagination and memory." "To the mind we ascribe understanding and will; to the understanding we reduce [ascribe] apprehending, comparing, judging, reasoning, a methodical disposition, and the memory of all these things, and of the objects about which they are conversant; to the will both the simple acts of choosing and refusing, and that vehemence of those actions which discovers itself in the passions, over and above that emotion or disturbance of the body which is visible in them." In another place the operations of the mind are said to be, "1. Invention, which consists in

^a This confusing together of physical motion and intellectual action, re-

the observation of things present, and the pertinent recollection of things past; and, 2. Judgment, whether intuitive or discursive, which consists in the deduction and methodical ranging of truth: we may hence infer, that nature recommends to us the use of true logic."⁴ He held that "the mind of man, and every faculty thereof, especially the intellectual [ones,] is prone to such actions as are proper thereto, as often as occasion is offered, and matter suggested, either from without, or from the body." The use of the senses is instanced: "Simple apprehensions, the more obvious comparisons of ideas among themselves," etc. "Nor can the will at all put a stop to such actions, though it may indeed promote them." This has a bearing upon the question whether "all our actions proceed from the love of our own pleasure only, and therefore discover nothing but mere self-love," or whether many of them occur "disinterestedly," i. e., without any previous, or inducing action of the craving for enjoyment. Later he declines to discuss "the power which determines us to action," (as if there were but one in the opinion of philosophers then,) contenting himself with saying: "All however, I think, acknowledge that a practical dictate of reason is previously necessary to our *deliberate* acts, and does in some manner direct the determination of our future actions."

⁴ Bowen (Logic, p. 77.) and others give clearness, distinctness, and adequacy as the three excellencies of concepts, Cumberland wrote more than two centuries ago: "We ought to take care, that our simple ideas be both *clear*, from strong and frequent impressions of the same thing known in various circumstances; and *distinct*, by a separate observation of the parts singly; and *adequate* also, by the assistance of the memory and the understanding, added to the discoveries of sense." The mind's power of forming universal ideas, or general concepts, in modern language, is asserted—"omitting those accidents by which particular things are distinguished. For the mind can easily apply to innumerable individuals and their various circumstances, properties agreeing to one or a few natures considered in themselves, whether those properties respect their inward frame, or their causes and effects. Hence, all sciences take their rise as composed of universals" (confounded here, as in Plato, with generals).

The sensibilities have no distinct place above, co-ordinate with intellect and will, as they had none in the writings of contemporaries, or of President Edwards. When Cumberland treats, then, of benevolence, we shall understand that both wishing good and willing good are meant, a complex state of mind, composed of sensibility and will united, but without discrimination between them. Emotion, it will be noticed, is physical, not mental. Affection he also uses in the sense of an impression on the nerves passively received, as was then common. It is quite true to say that will, as generic, ~~was~~ distinguished from feeling, as *feeling*, deemed specific, was ~~not distinguished~~ from will, and the latter is often recognized as controlling the former.¹ "There is no power in men greater to effect anything," it is said, "than a will determined to exert its utmost force." "In human passions, what is produced in man by a necessity arising from the impulse of external objects, cannot be forbid by any law of nature, because laws direct only such actions as are in our power." "No cause can be assigned to human actions beside the consent of the will." That we cannot will to act otherwise (than for our own preservation) he pronounces "contrary to every man's manifest experience. For my own part, I profess that I can will to act otherwise, and believe that great numbers have willingly laid down their lives for the

¹ Once affection is said to depend upon the imagination. Cf. Day's *Aesthetics*.

Special instances of psychological confusion are these: "Our acts of will—whether choosing or refusing—according to the degree of good or evil and other circumstances, are called by the names of several passions; on the one hand, of love, desire, hope, joy; on the other, of hatred, fear, aversion, grief." "I judge it requisite to the natural perfection of the human will, that it follow the most perfect reason, both in its calmer resolutions—which are simply called desires and aversions—and in those more vehement ones which usually go under the name of passions." On such a

common good." "We are conscious that we can divert our minds from such thoughts and affections as respect only our own private good, and fix them upon the care of the public good, in which liberty principally consists." He goes on, however, to resolve liberty pretty much into the use of judgment, memory, and other intellectual powers. The words "voluntary," "voluntarily," "volition," are used apparently in the senses which they now bear. But when words for acts of sensibility are employed, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts disappears. It is not surprising, therefore, that voluntary states are sometimes called affections (which are also sometimes called "motions of the blood"), and at others are said to govern them. Cumberland distinctly disavows materialism, notwithstanding his confusion of thought, or at least of language, and his once calling the powers of mind "properties of the brain." After a good deal of physiology, then new, but not now pertinent to moral philosophy, if true, he "thinks proper to add, That though in the human head there are so many helps to the imagination and the memory, which are of great service to the mind, these are no way sufficient to resolve [its] operations into the mechanical powers of matter and motion. On the contrary, I think Malpighius's observation very just: 'That the better we understand the nature and functions of the brain, the more we shall despair of explaining the operations of the mind by its motions.' See *Malpigh. de Cerebri cortice* cap. 4."

Cumberland's position as to the intuitions is confused, not to say inconsistent.* "The Platonists," he observes, "clear up this difficulty [about moral laws] by the supposition of innate ideas as well of the laws of nature themselves as of those matters about which they are con-

* Pres. Porter says that he "does not accept the doctrine of innate ideas and principles as held by Descartes, Lord Herbert or the Cambridge Platonists." and on the same page quotes this from him: "Human nature is endowed with certain innate principles," etc. Ueberweg, vol. ii. p. 362.

versant ; but truly I have not been so happy as to learn the laws of nature in so short a way." This in his Introduction. But in the first sentence of his first chapter, he recognizes "certain propositions of unchangeable truth." "Such truths are necessarily suggested to the minds of men ;" he adds that certain "ideas necessarily enter into the minds of men, and when they are they are necessarily connected"—which looks like the well-founded distinction between intuitive ideas and intuitive propositions,—he instances "those universal ideas of cause and effect and their connection,"—"the evident connection between causes and effects leads men to form propositions affirming that connection ;" "right reason," he affirms, "comprehends as well first principles, or self-evident truths, as conclusions thence formed ;" "it is of advantage to observe these universal ideas and propositions, both speculative and practical, which are naturally formed by the mind of man, because from such universal notions are formed unchangeable, and consequently in some sense eternal, rules of human action." He even calls these "innate principles of action." This last principle he makes use of largely. We cannot, however, be quite sure of that on which he rests it, though he recognized nearly all the ordinary tests of intuitive truth. For he cautions us "not only to avoid false deductions, but especially the rash admission of any thing as self-evident *without proof*." This is capable of a clear and sound meaning, but hardly carries it on its face. What is proof of the self-evident? Further, he nullifies his own rejection of even "innate" ideas (in a sense of the phrase which no one seems now to accept), when he declares in the introduction, that "such ideas might be both [!] born with us, and afterward impressed upon us from without."* Such a thinker, with

* In another place he asserts that "both things external, exciting thoughts

all his acuteness, might well add: "It seems necessary, especially at this time, to trace more distinctly after what manner the powers of things within us conspire to imprint these conclusions [of reason in moral matters] upon our minds, and to give a sanction to them. Our countryman, the Lord Verulam, has reckoned such an inquiry among the things which are wanting." And this want Cumberland did nothing to supply.

No one will expect, then, any recognition in our author of a fundamental, intuitive moral idea of right as simple, necessary, original. He uses the word, of course. He could not avoid doing so. "The knowledge of right and laws," he acknowledged "to be proper to man alone." But "neither right reason nor right are [is] pliable to every man's pleasure." "Practical reason is called right when it determines truly what is every man's best and most necessary end, and what are the most proper means of attaining it;" intellectually correct being manifestly the sense given here to the adjective right. He quotes Cicero's language, "the incorrupt voice of those who form a true judgment of eminent virtue," but he nowhere defines virtue, though he pronounces it "in its own nature amiable," and to some extent classifies specific concrete virtues. The nearest approach to a definition are the following: "Virtue consists in obedience to law;" "things morally good are only voluntary actions conformable to some law;" "it is sufficient to make actions virtuous, if the mind of the agent has a general inclination to do those things which are acceptable to God and to all men." The moral idea of right he constantly confounds with that of a prerogative right or rights, as did Hobbes."

least—that experience and reflection are the occasions of the rise of intuitions in our minds. It will be noticed that he does not apply all the criteria of intuitions to his "necessary" propositions: he does not call them orig-

"Right is the liberty of acting anything granted by law. . . . right reason grants to every man the use of things and services," etc. "Hobbes openly acknowledges that by the name of right he understands a liberty left by the laws;" "he defined right to be a liberty of using the natural faculties according to right reason;" he "does not extend right [where he purposely defines it] beyond" this liberty. All which leaves rightfulness, rectitude, moral right, untouched. When he mentions willingly surrendering the right to life for the common good, he implies that this is ethically right, though he does not say so. In this meaning of right as prerogative, which passes into constitutional, common, and statute law, right is frequently mentioned.

Conscience is thus described: "Our mind is conscious to itself of its own actions; it naturally sits a judge upon its own actions and thence procures to itself tranquillity and joy or anxiety and sorrow. In this consists the whole force of conscience by which it [the mind] proposes laws to itself, examines its past, and regulates its future conduct. Nor appear any traces in other animals of so noble a faculty. Great are the powers both to the formation and increase of virtue, [and] to the erecting and preserving civil societies, both among those who are not subject to the same civil power and among fellow-subjects." But he furnishes this noble faculty with mere non-ethical ideas, such as prerogative right, and others to be noticed hereafter. Philosophy, he declares, will make it to appear, "both how our mind is by the light of nature let into the knowledge of the will or laws of God, so as that it cannot be free from the warning of conscience; and what that rule is whereby the justice and rectitude of the laws of particular states is to be measured, and their injustice and imperfection to be corrected and amended by the supreme authority. Hence also (that it may appear that morality is not the artifice of ecclesiastics or politicians), is further shown that there is something in

the nature of God, of other men, and of ourselves, which in good actions affords present comfort and joy, and a well-grounded expectation of future rewards. On the other hand, that there are causes that must naturally produce the most violent grief and fear after evil actions; so that the sentence of conscience may be justly looked upon as armed with scourges against impiety." The rule of duty," or, as his phrase always is, the law of nature, "is sometimes expressed in the form of a command: 'Let that action which is in thy power, and which will most effectually of all those which thou canst exert, promote the common good in the present circumstances, be exerted;' often also in the form of a gerund, 'Such an action ought to be done.' In my opinion, these several forms of speech relating to the law of nature, mean the same thing, whether the understanding judges this best to be done, or commands it, or tells me in the form of a gerund that I am bound to do it. For the understanding (which in this affair is called conscience), sufficiently hints the natural obligation, when it says, 'This is best to be done both for yourself and others.' For in omitting what is declared best for me, it is evident that I bring mischief (which may be called punishment) upon myself." This will hardly be deemed strongly ethical language: to many it will sound like the language of expediency rather than of ethics. It is difficult to decide whether our author regarded conscience as anything more than the discernment of our acts as means to ends, or of the results of acts, pleasant or painful.¹⁸ One other passage in which the

¹⁸ I cannot find the word duty used more than once, or righteousness at all in this treatise, and infer that their Latin equivalents were not used. The word rectitude is used, I think, but once, as quoted above. This is one respect in which Cumberland's work is very unlike a modern ethical work.

¹⁹ Cumberland's translator in some "general remarks" favors us with this morsel of precious wisdom: "A man of an enlarged understanding may, in most moral actions, have an *intuitive knowledge that it is highly probable* [!] the action will be for his advantage; although he has not a pre-

word is used is the following, the last in the volume, perhaps the most ethical one: "He who esteems nothing a great good but what contributes *much* to the common happiness, will never *inordinately* desire anything; and consequently will never so offend against the public good as to be disturbed with the conscience of any crime: nor, if human affairs suffer by the wickedness of others, or by causes superior to the power of man, will this rob him of his tranquillity; partly, because he knows these things to be out of his power, partly because—being well aware of that inconstancy to which all human affairs are subject—he expects many such events daily: but especially because it is certain, from the experience of so many ages, that the innumerable revolutions of human affairs have left us the world in a better rather than in a worse state, whence we have reason to hope that it can hardly happen otherwise with our posterity."

One will look in vain through this leading treatise in English ethics for any discussion of the relations of right or conscience to obligation, either as idea or as feeling. The longest of its chapters, a hundred and fourteen pages, is on the law of nature and its obligation. His definitions of the latter are these: "Obligation is this: That the legislator has annexed to the observance of his laws, good, to the transgression, evil; and those natural, in prospect whereof men are moved to perform actions rather agreeing than disagreeing with the laws." "Moral obligation may be thus universally and properly defined: Obligation is that act of a legislator by which he declares that actions conformable to his law are necessary to those for whom the law is made. An action is then understood to be

cise knowledge of the degree of probability or value of the chance." Butler's view of conscience is a very different one from this. Cumberland intimates that obligation arises from simple fear of punishment, and attach-

necessary to a rational agent, when it is certainly one of the causes necessarily required to that happiness which he naturally and consequently necessarily desires." "There is nothing which can superinduce a necessity of doing or forbearing anything upon a human mind deliberating upon a thing future, except thoughts or propositions promising good or evil to ourselves or others consequent upon what we are about to do. But because we are determined by some sort of natural necessity, to pursue good foreseen especially the greatest, and to avoid evils; hence those dictates of reason, which discover to us that these things [good and evil] will follow from certain of our actions, are said to lay upon us some kind of necessity of performing or omitting those actions, and to oblige us." There is here a manifest lack of distinction between oblige and obligate. The rational and fixed connection between means and ends constitutes moral obligation. This grows out of Cumberland's theory of good presently to be noticed. If we are to secure good by action then we must act thus and so. "Obligation is the proper effect of laws and becomes known to our senses by the rewards and punishments consequent upon the observance and violation of those laws, and is therefore a proper evidence that they are laws." "Moral obligation and the nature of a debt thence arising is unintelligible without a respect to a law, at least of nature." And whether a law of nature is anything more than a discovered or disclosed natural and rational connection between means and ends to this Christian moralist, we shall see ere long. I can find no higher view of obligation stated than has been already cited. He proposes in his Introduction to reverse the method of Grotius and prove the obligation of the laws of nature by arguing from the cause to the effect: the

good effects." In this sense "the laws of nature are the foundation of all moral and civil knowledge," and teach what is here meant by obligation,—the rational and necessary connection between causes [and means] and effects [and ends] on the side of good. As Whewell says, "his system of morals [is] founded on the consideration of the consequences of actions." "Virtue is in a peculiar and eminent manner the condition of [man's] well-being," and is considered in this light throughout, and in this only.

For Cumberland substitutes throughout for the idea of right as formative in ethics that of natural good. In some sense he was a Socratic moralist with modern improvements. "The whole ethical philosophy of ancient times," says Dr. Calderwood, "was encumbered by discussing the question of morals under the general conception of *the Good*, as a character of things, rather than under the conception of *the Right*, as a quality of actions. It commonly led to an estimation of moral good by its utility, as in the part taken by Socrates in the Protagoras; or to the use of good and evil in a double sense, as when Socrates makes the *doing* of injustice a greater evil, and the *enduring* of it [i. e. of its effects in things or natural results in experience] a less. Plato's Gorgias, 509." That knowledge is virtue, and that obligation is the rationally known necessary connection between acts and good effects, are kindred ideas. "Knowledge which makes virtue," says Zeller, "is knowledge about the good, but what is the good? The good is the conception of a thing viewed as an end. When

¹⁸ "Common to both [Grotius and Hobbes] is the modern determination to connect the inquiry into public law with a theory of morality as grounded in the facts of human nature." "Cumberland stands much nearer to Hobbes in method of inquiry than any other of his opponents. He, more than Grotius or Clarke, is the true successor of Hobbes upon the subject."

asked whether there could be a good which did not refer to a definite end, he [Socrates] distinctly stated that he neither knew nor desired to know of such an one; every thing is good and beautiful in relation to the special needs which it supplies. He declared in the most emphatic way that the good is nothing else but what is advantageous, the beautiful nothing else but what is useful, and that every thing is accordingly good and beautiful in relation to the objects for which it is best fitted."¹⁰ In the same spirit Cumberland says: "It is of the last consequence to establish a well-grounded and irrefragable notion of good: because if this totters and wavers, we must necessarily be fluctuating and uncertain in our opinion of happiness, (which is the greatest good of every particular person), and of the laws of nature, and of particular virtues, justice, etc., which are *nothing else but the means of obtaining that good*, and in some respects the causes in part thereof."

"The object of the will is good, for evil is rated from the privation of good." "Seeing the promulgation and execution of laws are good, that is conducing to the happiness of all rational beings, it may hence be proved, that there are things which are good necessarily and naturally." "Things are first judged to be good, and they are afterwards desired, only so far as they seem good." "I concur with all philosophers that I know of as affirming that the first apprehensions of things, and the desire of good and aversion from evil in general, are necessary; for the innate activity of the divine nature of the mind permits it not to be perfectly idle."¹¹ "By the word good I

¹⁰ Socrates and the Socratic Schools. Translated by Reichel, pp. 123, 125. "In the dialogues of Xenophon he almost always grounded his moral precepts on the motive of utility." "It is certainly a contradiction to call virtue the highest end of life, and at the same time to recommend it because of the advantages it brings. From such a theory it is impossible to deduce definite moral actions, (only) to discover them by a reference to well-known consequences." 127, 128.

¹¹ The intuitive faculty seems to be here recognized as innate, while its products are sometimes admitted to be, but sometimes denied to be so.

understand that which by the philosophers is usually called natural good, and, with respect to created beings, that which preserves or renders them more perfect or happy." "The causes generating or preserving man, by efficacy of which he continues for some time and flourishes with faculties, as well of body as mind, enlarged and determined to their proper functions, are called good to him." But he does not confine natural good to happiness or the means of happiness. "Good is that which preserves or enlarges and perfects the faculties of any one thing, or of several." "For in these effects is discovered that particular agreement of one thing with another which is requisite to denominate anything good." "So that is good to man which preserves or enlarges the powers of the mind and body, or of either, without prejudice to the other. 'That is good to anything which preserves it,' says Aristotle (Pol. 2:1) speaking of cities." "Anything is truly judged good, because its effect or force truly helps nature." "The constituting, preserving, and perfecting causes of things or men are those things which we call good, and the contrary to these evil, whether their efficacy reaches one only, many, or all." Moral good is often distinguished from natural as consisting in voluntary acts, and not in effects. But these acts are regarded as morally right, not in themselves, but only in relation to the production of some kind of good, whether it be happiness, improvement, or some other good, as consequence." "The good which is called *moral* is ascribed only to such actions and habits of rational agents as are agreeable to laws, whether natural or civil, and is ultimately resolved into the *natural* common good." The

¹⁸So our latest American ethics: "Moral good is the voluntary choice of the highest natural good possible to man, as known to himself and by himself, and interpreted as the end of his existence and activities." "A morally good choice is a choice that selects or prefers the best natural good."

particular virtues "are indeed in their own nature good, though there were no law, because they conduce to the good state of the Universe." The clause, "Though there were no law," seems quite superfluous here, since law in the author's meaning simply means relation to the good state of the universe, discovered by effects of virtues. So large a place is occupied in this treatise with this relation, and with the showing how happiness and other forms of good are the effects of virtue, that it hardly can be classified in moral philosophy proper, but rather falls into the methodology of morals. Its true successor, among notable English works of late, is Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*.

In such a system the term law must bear the meaning of a rule of personal action, requiring such action as conduces to some form of good. Nature means chiefly human nature, but not exclusively. Things material and non-material, the lower animated creation and God are included. But it is from the experiences of human nature that we learn whatever we know of these. Laws of nature, then, are substantially laws of human nature in respect to the production of forms of natural good, or generalized truths as to acts which are necessary to produce good, regarded as of authority over conduct. But this authority is not at all ascribed to conscience, as by Butler. Their truth and fitness to secure, if observed, well-being, are deemed to be evidence of the authority and will of God, and to carry these with them. E.g., "Propositions of unchangeable truth which direct our voluntary actions about choosing good and refusing evil,"—"conclusions of right reason concerning actions necessary to the common good, promulgated by God,"—"dictates of reason, naturally laying down clear and general precepts concerning the common good are justly esteemed divine laws."—"Propositions naturally carry along with them the force and obligation of laws to direct men's actions [which] point out what is necessary to be done to obtain that end which na-

ture has determined men to pursue."—"To direct such actions in such manner as that they may best promote the best end is the business of all the laws of nature." For "laws are nothing but practical propositions, with rewards and punishments annexed, promulged by competent authority."—"Certain universal practical propositions which give us a more distinct idea of the utmost possible happiness of mankind, and pronounce by what actions of ours, in all variety of circumstances, that happiness may most effectually be obtained, these are the rules of action, these are the laws of nature."—"In dictates concerning the supreme end, and the means of conducing thereto, does the whole law of nature consist."—"The laws of nature have an intrinsic and essential proof of their obligation taken from rewards and punishment."—They are affirmed to be proper to man alone, "because they are propositions concerning consequences depending upon the influence of actions." The most comprehensive definition is the following: "The law of nature is a proposition proposed to the observation of, or impressed upon, the mind, with sufficient clearness by the nature of things from the will of the First Cause, which points out that possible action of a rational agent which will chiefly promote the common good, and by which only the entire happiness of particular persons can be obtained." It is a rationale for well-being.

It is apparent at once what ethics must be in the view of such a thinker and teacher. "Ethics is the art of living, or of directing the whole of all human actions, to the best end." "The truth of moral philosophy is founded in the necessary connexion between the greatest happiness human powers can reach and acts of universal benevolence or of love towards God and men." "The best abridgement of ethics is the idea of that true happiness

ing good is the art of enjoyment. It is not necessary that the laws of right should be made imperative — “pronounced in the form of a gerund, This or that ought to be done,—as some Schoolmen teach: because that fitness which is expressed by a gerund wants explanation, which is to be fetched, either from the necessary connection of the means with the end, or from the obligations of a law.” The bishop of Peterborough could hardly have denied more clearly and expressly the binding force of moral principles as inherent in themselves, than he has in these words. Method of ethics becomes method of happiness.

We are now prepared to see what he held virtue or moral rectitude in concrete action to be. And here begins his special relation to later ethics, to his successors, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and to their divergent successors in England and this country, Butler and Edwards.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE REVISED VERSION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.¹

BY THE REV. SAMUEL IVES CURTISS, D.D., PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THERE can be no question that a revision was needed, not because the style could be improved, for hardly any period could be more favorable for producing a faultless English than the early part of the seventeenth century. Indeed, there was the same danger of marring the classic beauty of the version as there would be of injuring the masterpiece of some great painter by retouching the canvas. But this view of the question would be to exalt the

¹ This paper was read before the State Congregational Association of Michigan at Flint, May 20th, and is published at the request of that body.

style of a particular version above fidelity to the text itself, and to demand for the Scriptures what even the Divine Spirit did not think requisite in the choice of those who wrote the sacred books, for while many portions of the Old Testament are models of beauty in the original Hebrew, others are not. No consideration, then, of preserving a classic like our English Bible should deter us from desiring a revision. God's truth is a jewel of infinitely more importance than the casket in which it is contained.

The need of such a revision was at least threefold:

1. On account of changes in the English language. Numerous words which were current two hundred and fifty years ago are obsolete, and the meaning of them is not understood even by people of more than ordinary intelligence. If for no other reason, a revision was needed in which words should be substituted which are commonly known.

2. On account of mistranslations. Dr. Chambers, in his admirable work entitled a Companion to the Revised Old Testament, gives a list of over sixty cases of words incorrectly rendered, some of which are of great importance.' Besides, there were entire passages which were wrongly translated, as, for example, Isa. ix. 1, which read in the King James' Version: "Nevertheless the dimness *shall* not *be* such as *was* in her vexation, when at the first he lightly afflicted the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali, and afterward did more grievously afflict *her* by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan, in Galilee of the nations." This translation is not only obscure, it is absolutely incorrect. Compare with it that of the Revised Version: "But there shall be no gloom to her that was in

messianic prophecy, indicating the honor that was to be put on Galilee by the revelation of the Messiah there.' This honor is contrasted with the contempt which God at first brought on the regions occupied by these tribes.

3. A revision was needed on account of the vastly superior helps for understanding the original meaning of the text. The process of translating the thoughts of writers who lived from twenty-four hundred to more than three thousand years ago into the conceptions of the present day is not an easy one. All their surroundings, their customs, and modes of life, and their religious views, were different from ours. Just as the painters and engravers of the sixteenth century did not know how to represent the persons and scenes of the Scriptures except as they saw men and things around them, but transformed patriarchs, prophets, and apostles into Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Germans, or Italians, according to the stand-point of the artist, so we are likely to conceive of Old Testament worthies from the stand-point of our time. This constitutes a difficulty in the reproduction of the color of the original. We must to a certain extent see them thus so far as all men in every age are alike, and at the same time in their true light. Modern exegetes should try, like modern painters, to reproduce the children of the East. Another difficulty in the rendering of the Hebrew is that no other contemporaneous Hebrew literature has been preserved to us, hence there may sometimes be a question as to what certain words mean which occur only once.

(1) We have much purer forms of the ancient versions which are of great importance in the preparation of such a translation. As has been intimated, the most ancient Greek manuscripts of the Old and New Testaments have been discovered or made available since then. and on these

tant part of this work still remains to be done by Lagarde.⁴ The version of Jerome, who was a good Hebrew scholar, and which was made in the last part of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, is of great value as showing the probable condition of the Hebrew text at that time, but the Latin Vulgate text which was accessible to those who prepared our English version was corrupt. For several years the text of Jerome has existed in a better form, although not in its pristine purity.⁵ The Syriac version, called Peshitto, which was not published in 1611, has been brought to light in almost its original condition through a photolithographic copy of the Ambrosian codex dating from the sixth century, edited by Ceriani.

(2) The study of Hebrew grammar was almost in its infancy at that time. The treatises of Reuchlin and of Sebastian Münster were in existence, and Buxtorf's work was issued in 1609, perhaps a little more than a year before our Authorized Version went to press. But there has been an incomparable advance made in these studies within the present century, and Hebrew, read in the light of the latest grammatical research, becomes a new language in its flexibility and beauty.

(3) So, too, there has been a very marked improvement in lexicography, owing to the scientific study of the cognate languages, such as Arabic, Ethiopic, Syriac, and Assyrian.

(4) The science of sacred geography was still in embryo. The works of Pocock, Reland, Burckhardt, Buckingham, Robinson, and many others, had not seen the light. Probably those who prepared King James' Version had not then dreamed of a survey of western Palestine which should cover every acre of ground, now happily accomplished.

(5) Along with those studies the whole science of sacred antiquities has taken on an accurate form.

⁴ Cf. *Current Discussions in Theology*, Chicago, 1885, p. 23 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Now, when we view this vast field which is opened before us, we must all admit that there was need of a revision.

The question may be raised, whether the plan of the revision was suited to the wants of two great English-speaking countries, not to mention the dependencies of Great Britain. There can be no doubt that the work proposed was of a very conservative character. It was limited to a revision,—a revision which required as few changes as practicable in the Authorized Version. Would it not have been far better to have attempted an entirely new version? It seems to me not. Our Authorized Version, considering the time in which it was produced, was unsurpassed by any. Its phraseology is endeared to millions of hearts. To have made a radical change in the translation would have been to produce a book which probably would not have been adopted by English Christians. While this conservatism was wise, it has been carried too far, as it seems to me, in rejecting many of the readings suggested by the American company. But of this later.

The execution of this plan was committed to the most competent and representative scholars that could be found in England and America, with perhaps one or two exceptions.

The English company comprised the finest Hebrew grammarians in Great Britain, such as Professor A. B. Davidson, of Edinburgh, known by his *Introductory Hebrew Grammar*, and his work on the accents, besides his admirable commentary on the Book of Job, and Professor S. R. Driver, of Oxford, author of *Hebrew Tenses*, of whose knowledge and critical acumen Professor Dèlitzsch speaks in the highest terms.

Text Criticism was represented by Dr. Field, editor of *Origen's Hexapla*,—a work which is without a rival on the Continent, and by Dr. Ginsburg, author of a monumental work on the Massora, which represents not only

herculean industry, but also British enterprise and capital, and which is the forerunner of a critical text of our Hebrew Bibles.

Cognate Semitic languages numbered such English scholars as Dr. Robert Payne Smith, Dean of Canterbury, who is preparing an extensive Syriac lexicon, of which five parts have been issued; Professor William Wright, of Cambridge, eminent for his attainments in Arabic and Syriac, and Professor A. H. Sayce, of Oxford, who is honored among Continental scholars as an Assyriologist.

The best commentators belonged to the company, including Cheyne, whose work on Isaiah ranks with the most scientific productions of German exegetes, and Perowne, whose commentary on the Psalms is not excelled by any other work extant.

There were also in this company the brilliant scholar and critic, Professor W. Robertson Smith, and Dr. W. A. Wright, of Cambridge, chief contributor to Smith's Bible Dictionary in biblical geography and biography, who was enough of a Shakesperian scholar to be co-editor of the Cambridge Shakespeare and the Globe Shakespeare.

The American company, comprising such scholars as Drs. Chambers, Conant, Day, De Witt, Green, Mead, Strong, and Van Dyck, while not so eminent as the English company, with a few exceptions, was certainly respectable, and well fitted for the work.

Our next inquiry is as to the character of that which was accomplished by these Revisers. It is worthy of our highest respect, not only on account of those engaged in it, but also on account of the time devoted to this purpose. It represents fourteen years' study by the most eminent scholars that could be chosen for this purpose in England and America, with perhaps one or two exceptions.

The arrangement of the poetical books in such a way as to indicate their character is of great advantage. Some

books, as Lowth has done in his translation of Isaiah; but they say they have not done it because the language of these books is rather of the nature of lofty and impassioned prose.

The critical scholarship is found more commonly in the marginal readings. These are of great value, but some of them must be rather surprising to the ordinary English reader. If we turn to the messianic passages in Genesis, we find four where the promise reads in the text, "in thee and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed," but in two other places in the margin we find the reading, "bless themselves" (Gen. xxii. 18; xxvi. 4). This is a concession to what is claimed to be an established grammatical principle, that the Hithpael is never translated as a passive, except in very late Hebrew.

Again, in the noted passage in Gen. xlix. 10, "The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his feet, until Shiloh come," where "Shiloh" is regarded as a person, the Messiah, but in the marginal note we have the alternative reading, "till he come to Shiloh," making it the name of a place.

In the books of Samuel, where the text is quite corrupt, there are at least thirty-one references in the margin to readings of the LXX., and some passages are marked as not occurring there, as 1 Sam. xiii. 1, where we read in the Hebrew text, בֶּן שָׁנָה שְׁמֹאל בְּכִלְכּוֹ, "a son of a year was Saul when he reigned," or in English, "Saul was a year old when he reigned." The LXX. omits this; also xvii. 12-31, and xvii. 55-xviii. 5, thus excluding the passage according to which Saul did not recognize David after his victory over Goliath, although he had previously been in his household. Our American Revisers did not approve of indicating any of these variants, but, as it seems to me, without sufficient reason, unless we can prove that the massoretic text has especial claims to be inspired, and this cannot be proved when we remember what use was made of the LXX. by New Testament writers.

The critics have had considerable discussion about Ps. ii. 12, which reads in our Authorized Version, "Kiss the Son, lest he be angry." This is an important messianic passage in one of the chief messianic psalms; the marginal note indicates the reading, "Worship in purity," נִשְׁקִיבֵנוּ בְּטָהוֹרָה, which is the way Jerome read the text.* We should expect in ordinary Hebrew, נִשְׁקִיבֵנוּ בְּרֵאֵנָה. The introduction of the Aramaic word בֵּר for "son" makes a more euphonious sentence, נִשְׁקִיבֵנוּ בְּרֵאֵנָה.

In Ps. xii. 16 King James' Version reads, "They pierced my hands and my feet." This is the reading of the LXX., the Vulgate, and the Syriac, but we have in the marginal note of the Revised Version, "Like a lion" my hands and my feet, which is really the form of the Cethibh in the Hebrew text. In Ps. xlv. 6 the critics have found a place in the margin. The passage, as also found in Heb. i. 8, reads, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever." The marginal note, "Thy throne is the throne of God," has arisen from the view that this psalm was originally an epithalamium, in commemoration of the marriage of a royal pair, and which was afterwards adopted for the worship of the temple service.

Turning to the prophets, we still read in Isa. vii. 14, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." The margin, however, reads, "maiden." This marginal reading is a concession to the modern critical view that the word *'almah*, which is not the specific term for "virgin" in Old Testament usage, simply means a "marriageable girl."

Great conservatism has been manifested in the alterations. None have been made except where the Revisers were clear that they were actually necessary.

The Revisers have been very sparing in their application of the principle, now generally accepted by leading

* Adorate pure. Cf. *Biblia Sacra Latina Veteris Testamenti*, Lipsiae, 1873.

English' and German' Hebrew grammarians, that the Hebrew verb is not used to mark distinctions of tense, but rather of action, as perfect and imperfect, or complete and incomplete. In Gen. ii. 6 we still read, "But there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground." But here we have an imperfect, and the force of the verb would have been more exactly given by the rendering, "And a mist was going up, and was watering the whole face of the ground." By not observing this principle, the Revision fails to reproduce the Hebrew of Gen. xxix. 2, 3: "And he looked, and behold a well in the field, and, lo, three flocks of sheep lying there by it; for out of that well they watered the flocks: and the stone upon the well's mouth was great. And thither were all the flocks gathered: and they rolled the stone from the well's mouth, and watered the sheep, and put the stone again upon the well's mouth in its place." According to this translation, we should conclude that the stone was rolled away and the sheep were watered then and there; but an observance of the doctrine of the imperfect gives us a translation which does not indicate a fact that then occurred, but rather a custom or habit. These verses should be translated: "For from that well they were wont to water the flocks, and there was a great stone upon the mouth of the well, and all the flocks were wont to gather thither," etc. In these verses, as I have said, the custom is described, the actual watering of the flocks is indicated further on.

There are, however, not a few passages where the modern theory of the Hebrew perfect and imperfect is recognized. Ps. iii. 4, "I cry unto the Lord," instead of "I cried," where the imperfect is used, and in vs. 5, "I awaked,

¹ Davidson's *Introductory Hebrew Grammar*, Edinburgh, 1876, p. 114 ff. Driver, *A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew*, Oxford, 1881, p. 1 ff.

² *Smith's Anglo-Hebrew Lexicon*, London, 1848, p. 114, col. 1.

for the Lord sustaineth me," hence the imperfect, where God's continual care is considered the ground of his preservation in the midst of enemies. Ps. v. 2, "Unto thee do I pray," instead of "will I pray;" so in vs. 6, "The Lord abhorreth the bloodthirsty and deceitful man," instead of "The Lord will abhor," etc.

There is at least one very interesting instance in a marginal reading in which the force of the imperfect as indicating customary action is brought to light. It is in 2 Sam. xv. 32, where David is regarded by Delitzsch as a type of Christ. In the fifteenth chapter we have an account of David's flight from Absalom, and in the thirtieth verse it is said that he went up by the ascent of the Mount of Olives, and in the thirty-second verse we read, "where God was worshipped," but in the margin, "where he was wont to worship God." According to Professor Delitzsch, this passage may be interpreted to mean that David, like his greater Son, was accustomed to worship in the Mount of Olives.*

The spirit of conservatism has led the Revisers to retain the old version of Gen. vi. 3, "My spirit shall not strive with man for ever," which is generally supposed by those not acquainted with the text to have a theological significance. But neither the Hebrew original nor the ancient versions favor this meaning, but rather, perhaps, that the Divine Spirit, as the source of life, shall no longer be the medium of long life in man. The passage rather means, according to the marginal reading, "My spirit shall not rule in man," etc.

The English company seem to have clung unnecessarily to certain obsolete words, notwithstanding the suggestions of the American company. In Gen. xl. 17 we read of "all manner of bakemeats for Pharaoh," where the Hebrew is simply the indefinite word for food.

And this leads me to remark that it seems to me that

* Cf. Delitzsch, *Old Testament History of Redemption*, Edinburgh, 1881, p. 90.

most of the suggestions of the American company should have been introduced into the text, instead of being placed in the appendix. There would certainly seem to be a gain in substituting the name "Jehovah" for "Lord," although there was probably a very good reason in the minds of the English Revisers for retaining this term, since the Jews always read the Hebrew word for "Lord," 'ādhoḏy, when they had the consonants of "Jehovah" in the text. There is, besides, no evidence that "Jehovah" is the correct pronunciation of the ineffable name of the God of Israel.

The euphemisms suggested by the American Revisers were certainly desirable, instead of the rank words which offend American sensibilities, although they may not grate on English ears.

The question may now be raised as to the merits of the Revision, whether the spirit of conservatism has been so great as to prevent the Revisers from doing what they ought to have done, whether, after all, the Revised Version of the Old Testament differs essentially from that of King James.

This query has partially been answered in the points that we have passed in review. The Revisers have, to a great extent, removed obsolete words, have corrected passages that were wrongly translated, and have embodied the results of modern Semitic scholarship, at least to a useful extent, in the revision of the Old Testament.

While all parts exhibit the changes made, some present more changes than others. Perhaps the improvements are most numerous in the Book of Job, where they amount to several hundred. They also abound in the Psalms and in the Prophets. In almost every case the Revision more clearly reflects the meaning of the original, or, in passages which admit of a twofold translation, a better rendering is given.

A few quotations will show the merits of the Revision in giving a closer translation. In the first Psalm we have "wicked" instead of "ungodly;" "streams" instead of

"rivers;" "its" instead of "his." In the second: "nations" instead of "heathen;" "peoples" instead of "people;" "I will tell of the decrees" instead of "I will declare the decree;" "for his wrath will soon be kindled" instead of "when his wrath is kindled but a little." In the third Psalm: "Lord, how are my adversaries increased" instead of "how are they increased that trouble;" "but thou, O Lord, art a shield about me," instead of "thou, O Lord, *art* a shield for me;" "I cry unto the Lord with my voice, and he answereth me," instead of "I cried unto the Lord," etc. In the fourth Psalm: "Answer me" instead of "Hear me;" "thou hast set me at large" instead of "thou hast enlarged me," and, to pass over other changes, "Thou hast put gladness in my heart, more than *they have* when their corn and their wine are increased," instead of "thou hast put gladness in my heart, more than in the time *that* their corn and their wine increased." In the fifth Psalm: "For unto thee do I pray," instead of "will I pray;" "in the morning will I order *my prayer* unto thee, and will keep watch," instead of "in the morning will I direct *my prayer* unto thee, and will look up;" "Evil shall not sojourn with thee" instead of "neither shall evil dwell with thee;" "the arrogant" instead of "the foolish shall not stand in thy sight;" "Hold them guilty, O God," instead of "destroy thou them, O God."

In the tenth Psalm: "In the pride of the wicked the poor is hotly pursued," instead of "the wicked in *his* pride doth persecute the poor:" "And the covetous renounceth, *yea*, contemneth the Lord," instead of "For the wicked boasteth of his heart's desire, and blesseth the covetous, *whom* the Lord abhorreth;" "The wicked, in the pride of his countenance, *saith*, He will not require *it*. All his thoughts are, There is no God," instead of "The wicked,

hast said unto the Lord, Thou *art* my Lord; my goodness *extendeth* not to thee."

Ps. xix.: "There is no speech nor language; their voice cannot be heard," instead of "There is no speech nor language *where* their voice is not heard."

Ps. xxxvii. 3: "Trust in the Lord, and do good; dwell in the land, and follow after faithfulness [marg. "feed on faithfulness"]; instead of "Trust in the Lord, and do good; *so* shalt thou dwell in the land, and verily thou shalt be fed."

In Isa. liii. we have an important change in the tense, which brings out the true stand-point of the speaker. We read, "For he grew up before him as a tender plant," etc., instead of "For he shall grow up," etc.; that is, the stand-point of the speaker is among the repentant Jews of the future, who, in accordance with the prophecy in Zechariah (xii. 10), shall mourn their rejection of the Messiah, and are here represented as giving the reasons why they did not recognize his messiahship.

These are a few examples of a great number of changes which have evidently been made with great care, and with a desire to conform to the literal meaning of the text.

Let us next consider the criticisms that have been made on the Revision. They are mainly twofold, textual and grammatical; that is, critics of the Revision claim that the Revisers should have prepared a new, critical text of the original, or should at least have amended the text that they used; and that they should have brought their translation into stricter conformity with the latest established principles of Hebrew grammar.

The text which the Revisers used was the so-called massoretic¹⁰ or traditional text. Inasmuch as the massoretic pointing was not brought to perfection before the seventh century of our era, and Hebrew was originally written before the massoretic period only with consonants, and as the ancient versions which antedate the massoretic

¹⁰ Cf. *Current Discussions in Theology*, Chicago, p. 18.

period from three to nine centuries present considerable variations from the massoretic text, especially in the LXX., it is inferred that they are based on a more ancient form of the text, and that the Revisers should have prepared an eclectic text prior to the work of revision, as was done by the New Testament Revisers. The difficulties, however, in the way of such an attempt were very great. New Testament text criticism has flourished more or less since the beginning of the century, especially subsequent to 1831," and in it English scholarship has taken a most honorable part. Old Testament text criticism, since the labors of Kennicott and De Rossi in the last part of the eighteenth century, and Holmes and Parsons in the beginning of the nineteenth, has made no great advance. The principles as to the sources for the formation of the New Testament text are well established. This, however, is not the case with the Old Testament. Scholars are not yet agreed what use shall be made of the text of the LXX. The sources of a new text, if the demands of the critics should be regarded, would be as follows: (1) The Septuagint; (2) the fragments of Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion; (3) the Samaritan Pentateuch and Targum; (4) the Peshitto; (5) the Targums; (6) Jerome; (7) readings from the Talmud, and (8) of prime importance, a critical, massoretic text. In almost every case a critical revision of these sources needs to be secured, before the principles on which a new text can be founded could be established. The formation of a critical text of the Septuagint is a matter of peculiar difficulty, far more difficult than the formation of a critical text of the New Testament. That can be reasonably assured through a comparison of the most ancient manuscripts; but, by reason

found largely through the medium of cursive manuscripts which go back to certain classes of ancient uncials. The difficulty of establishing such a text may be understood when it is remembered that Lagarde, after more than twenty years' labor, has succeeded in publishing only half of the text of Lucian. It is needful that he should also prepare the texts of Hesychius, and Origen, before he can issue the critical text that is to be based upon them. A critical text is also needed of the Peshitto, of Jerome's version, and of the massoretic text of the Old Testament. Had the Old Testament Revisers attempted this work, or waited for it, they might have entirely resigned the expectation of producing any revision of the Old Testament in this century. Such being the case, it is wise that they did not attempt to form a critical text. They have been blamed, however, for not making a greater use of the versions, and of the oldest dated Hebrew manuscript from the year 916 A.D., but on what principles should they use them? It seems an unreasonable expectation that with such an inadequate critical apparatus they should attempt a miscellaneous, undefined, emendation of the Hebrew text. The course pursued seems to be worthy of praise on the whole.

With reference to the grammatical conservatism of the Revision, it must be remembered that some of the Revisers were distinguished for their discriminating knowledge of Hebrew grammar. While the Revision does not exhibit those changes which they would undoubtedly have made if they had had entire freedom of action, it exhibits all that their co-laborers, who represented the conservative majority of American and English Christians, would allow. These colleagues stood for a large majority of Bible students in our English and American churches, who would not have accepted the Revision if too great changes had been made.

The question may be raised, in closing, what effect the Revision has on modern critical theories of the Pentateuch,

and on doctrines for which proof-texts have been found in the Old Testament. We reply:

1. Some of the changes and marginal notes are rather favorable to the theories of the modern critical school. In Deut. i. 1 we read, "These be the words which Moses spake unto all Israel beyond Jordan;" cf. i. 5; iv. 46. In King James' Version we read, "on this side" (*cis* instead of *trans*). This, to be sure, would not prove that Moses did not write Deuteronomy, but it would seem to indicate that he did not write these verses. There is at least one case (1 Kings iv. 24) in which the Hebrew word is translated as signifying "on this side," where it refers to the Euphrates, and yet the marginal note even here has it "beyond."

It is evident, however, that these changes have not been made in the interest of any school of critics, but rather from a sincere desire to reproduce the meaning of the original.

There are some changes which are quite as favorable to the conservative view of the Pentateuch. The modern critical school holds that the Israelitish priesthood did not begin with Aaron, but that it was gradually developed, and that the Book of Deuteronomy marks a certain stage in that development; namely, that of Levitical priests, for it is a fact that wherever priests are mentioned in Deuteronomy we do not read of priests and Levites, as sometimes in those parts of the Pentateuch which the critics hold to be of a late origin, but simply of priests Levites, or Levitical priests. From this the critics argue that any Levite may be a priest. The passage, however, in Deut. xviii. 1, which fairly represents the original, is not favorable to this theory. It reads, "the priests, the Levites, *even* all the tribe of Levi," and in the margin, "and all the tribe of Levi."

2. The Revision clearly shows to the ordinary reader, what has long been clearly recognized by Hebrew scholars, that the Bible is not a dead level from Genesis to

Revelation. It is rather an ascent from Paradise to the New Jerusalem. It is not a legitimate use of the Old Testament to seek in it proof-texts for all the doctrines that are found in the New Testament. It is a mistake to suppose that the Patriarchs had any such clear views of the plan of salvation, and of the life beyond this, including the resurrection, as New Testament Christians have.

It would seem as though some supposed that since the Revision has appeared, hell and retribution have been destroyed, because the Hebrew word *Shedl*, indicating the abode of bad and good alike, has been transliterated.

Undoubtedly passages in the Old Testament where the word "hell" occurred were used in an illegitimate way to prove that there is a place of torment on account of the use of the word "hell," which is now always understood to mean a place of torment, but which, according to Bishop Horsely, in its primary and natural meaning signified the unseen and covered place; and which he says is properly used both in the Old and New Testament to render the Hebrew word in the one, and the Greek word in the other, which denote the invisible mansion of disembodied spirits, without any reference to sufferings.¹³ It is unfortunate that the English company did not accept the suggestion of their American brethren, and transliterate the word *Shedl* throughout. Some object to the use of this term as one that requires definition, but any word that might be chosen would need to be defined.¹⁴

In closing, I may express my conviction that the Revised Version of the Old Testament should be adopted, and will be adopted, by all English-speaking Christendom. It must stand or fall on its merits. But as the version of Jerome overcame every prejudice and supplanted the old Latin Version, because of its superiority, so I believe that this work will finally be adopted by the churches. I do

¹³ See Richardson, *A New Dictionary of the English Language*, London, 1867, sub voce.

¹⁴ The Revisers have defined *Shedl* in connection with Gen. xxxvii. 35.

not see how a better plan for a revision could be devised, or how more competent men could be found to carry it out, or how they could be more industrious, patient, and charitable in its execution.

While the English company represented superior scholarship, it would have been well had they paid more heed to the clear discernment and common sense of the American Revisers. This, however, is a matter of minor importance. It is desirable every way that the great English-speaking commonwealth, which is making new conquests every year, should have one version.

The execution of this work is a noble tribute to the Christian scholarship and brotherhood of the nineteenth century, and is at the same time a clear evidence that those who would explore the treasures of God's Word and display them in their unalloyed richness must still have recourse to the Hebrew and the Greek, and that, for the minister at least, these should not be dead languages.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTES ON THE NEW DEPARTURE.

THE PROPOSED "DOGMA" OF PROBATION AFTER DEATH.¹

There is candor, and some help towards a critical conclusion, in the admission, made by Professor Smyth, that the idea of future probation is a mere human tenet,—confessedly not a "doctrine" of Scripture, not "explicit divine teaching," not "an article of faith." But to call it a "dogma," on the other hand, is to carry an implication of its having been already imposed by some human authority upon men's minds—for this belongs to the meaning of "dogma"—and certainly it is not yet so imposed upon any one. Nor is the after assertion that it "falls within the acknowledged limits of *the Christian faith*," either warranted by the facts, or consistent with the admission that it is not an article of faith, etc. The few who advocate it do indeed assert that probation after death is an inference from something else which is claimed to fall within those limits, and to belong to "explicit divine teaching."

That something else, is what is termed "the absoluteness and universality of Christianity." From this the proposed dogma is claimed to be "deducible."

Now "Christianity" has some four or five current meanings: (1) What Christ himself and his apostles taught. (2) This teaching as received in men's minds, or believed. (3) An historical institution growing out of this belief or reception of inspired teaching. (4) The systematized whole of accepted doctrine, equivalent, generally, to Christian theology. (5) The experience, spirit, character—one, or all—of an individual, a people, or an age: as, the Christianity of Paul or of Luther,—German, English, or American Christianity,—that of the sixteenth century, or that of the nineteenth. It is the first sense alone, of these five, that approximates absoluteness or universality. This is the faith once for all delivered to the saints. But this of itself does not save at all, not to say universally or absolutely—it actually saves no one. Christ alone saves men. It is indeed quite true that if we substitute Christianity for Christ, a body of divine truth for a personal Saviour, and as truth benefits no one any way unless known, and so far only as known, it may be inferred that Christianity must some time be known by all men. But restore Christ to his place, instead of his doctrine, and the inference fails evidently. For a personal Saviour is so much more than truth or doctrine, that he can benefit men to whom he is not known,—even to the extent of personally atoning for their sins. At any

¹ A criticism upon the article of Professor Egbert C. Smyth in the *Homiletic Review* for April, 1886; read before the General Association of Iowa, June 3, 1886, by request.

rate Christianity cannot do for men what he does. The class of divines who are pressing their new-old ideas of probation upon us, claim specially to exalt his person above his doctrine. This open substitution of Christianity as absolute and universal, for the Person, whom alone Scripture sets forth as such, cannot be adduced as justifying such a claim. The efficacy which belongs to our Divine Lord alone cannot be transferred to the faith delivered to the saints. Our human knowledge of his merits is no part of his merits; they avail without dependence (in moral government) on our historic or theologic views of them. His is the only name given under heaven among men which will avail, and for all; but absoluteness and universality cannot be, either scripturally or logically, transferred from him to the knowledge of his work. Men can forsake sin without knowing how they will be forgiven, and are perfectly bound to do so. It is *repentance*, as a subjective precedent, that makes his atonement available for a sinner, and this may be available though unknown. Justification by faith is not to be over exalted so as to belittle and displace justification by Christ alone. Substituting Christianity for Christ really, though unobservedly, begs the question at issue, by laying an unauthorized basis for the inference (if it is such) whose validity is to be decided. It is perhaps really a theory, or hypothesis, proposed to relieve certain minds, like Dr. E. Beecher's hypothesis of pre-existence—honor and right in God being supported in the latter by locating part of our moral existence in the unknown period *before birth*; in the former, by locating part of it in the period unknown *after death*.

Much of Professor Smyth's defence of the new dogma, inference, or hypothesis, is on account of the tendency of some minds to hope that it is true. This is making a feeling, which is itself to be judged of by the truth, a judge of the truth which judges it! Moreover, this feeling tends to universal salvation, rather than to any approximation of it, more or less, by probation hereafter.²

This inconsequent feeling and this unauthorized substitution of Christianity for Christ being set aside, the new dogma is seen to *rest on three assumptions*:

I. That human probation is—now, at least—"a gracious and *not* a legal state," excluding God's moral law as the characteristic element of it. The divine building and testing of character dispenses with his law. Professor Smyth is here—as in respect to dogma and faith—inconsistent with himself, for he describes it, again, as "not of moral law exclusively," and then makes the still further change, "*including* a relation to moral law and personal character."

Now, whatever probation essentially is, or ever was, it always is. A is

always A. It is now and must be what it was before known Christianity. If it ever was a testing of character distinct from redemption of character, redemption is not, and never was, part of it. Christ did not make probation what it is, any more than, by his coming, he made sin a previous necessity of his coming. We have no reason to imagine that he has altered or infringed upon its essential nature; or that to do so would do us or the moral universe aught but harm. If grace comes to any race of beings after it has morally failed under law, it must be (1) as a substitute for law, or (2) as an addition, a supplement, to it. (1) If as a substitute, it excuses us from the requirement of being holy. This is antinomianism.³ When Paul says, "not under the law, but under grace," does he deny his being "not without law to God, but under law to Christ," or that all of us will be judged "by the law," written or unwritten? Evangelical religion holds to no change in the supremacy of moral law, or in obligation to it. But grace, (2) if added to law *within probation*, changes its nature: added to law, it leaves probation unchanged under law, as it was from the beginning. While salvation is by grace alone, *salvation is not probation*. Is probation, then, as to the formation and testing of character, still under moral law? or is it now under grace instead?

(a) Analogy forbids any essential change. We use no analogies but those of our Lord. The remedy for the disease never becomes part of the physiological system under which the disease occurred, any more than a part of the disease itself. A is always A. A man's chance to obtain and apply a remedy, after catching a disease, is additional to his previous opportunity to avoid catching it at all. To be provided with a physician is over and above provisions for preserving the health he is called in to restore. The latter in each case is implied, but distinct from the former. Grace, in like manner, implies probation under perfect eternal moral law, and therefore is no part of it.⁴

(b) There is no sin or condemnation save under moral law, even for those to whom grace has come. Then if all are sinners, all are under moral law. It is not grace or indignity to grace that makes wrong-doing sin; it is not grace that condemns men or is ground of condemnation—it is moral law; and by moral law alone can the misimprovement of grace even be a sin. So men are not condemned only for rejecting Christ: God sent not his Son to condemn the world. There is no sin in rejecting Christ, save as this is made such by moral law. Unbelief offends God in all points, because it offends *his law* in one. Our destiny turns still on moral action alone. The universal, absolute law *includes duty to Christ* and to the Spirit. Then our relation to law is not included in Christianity, as a scheme of grace, but exists distinct from it, as it did from the creation before Christ came.

(c) *Ever* if it were otherwise, and law had ceased to be essential to pro-

³ This is openly avowed in Rev. E. White's address to Cong. Union of Eng. and Wales.

bation, human recovery, as purely of grace, could be only *one* of the objects of probation. It would be no such object at all to unfallen men or angels. Then probation is complete to them without recovery from sin, or grace offering pardon. And to decline so great a blessing as a recovery could not further harm a moral agent, at least, unless it involved moral wrong under law. But those who reject Christ incur "sorer punishment:" therefore, to reject him is more than mere declining of grace, or foolishly missing a blessing; viz., an offence against moral law. It is increasing sins; it is rejecting a Lord and King; it is preferring moral rebellion, essentially, whatever follows about losing a Saviour and eternal happiness.

(d) There can be no salvation in any world, except in probation under law. If there is to be another (chronologically a second one) after death, it will be just such a probation as before, continuing under law, with supposed advantages of gospel and grace for a successful result. No moral law after death, then no sin, no salvation. Heaven itself is under eternal law, with all its vaster advantages.

(e) If we all are to be judged by the law, written or unwritten, as Paul assures us, then law must have been *the* element (so far as relation to a holy God is concerned) of that probation necessary to the formation of the character by which we are to be judged. "We do not say that men are to be judged," says Professor Smyth, "*simply* by their personal relation to Christ, if by this be meant an exclusion of their relation to moral law and of character; but we claim that this relation to Christ—the Revealer of God, the Son of Man, the only sacrifice for sin, the giver of the Spirit—is, *for all men alike* [italics in the *Review*], the ultimate and decisive test, and that includes a relation to moral law and personal character." On the contrary, the evangelical position is, with Paul, that man's relation to moral law is the ultimate and decisive test, and this whether the judgment process convicts of unfaithfulness to him, as in one portion of Matt. xxv., or of inhumanity and undutifulness to the least of his human brethren, as in another portion of it. God and holiness are supreme ends. Grace is means. He who provided for our return to right, will decide accordingly concerning us, *under law*, before he delivers up the kingdom to God, even the Father, and the Son also becomes subject that God may be all in all.⁵ As we protested at the outset against exalting Christianity above Christ, so here we protest against exalting him above the law of his Father, which he ever held supreme. The distinction may seem to some trivial: to us, seeing how much else is at stake besides probation after death, it cannot seem so.⁶ The new dogma

⁵ The inconsistent view here held probably amounts to this, that moral law is not the integral, essential element of probation which we understand God's word to show that it is.

⁶ The most severely contested and fundamental issue of the future is to be at this point. The supremely ethical character of Christ's salvation is here at stake, and the question of

will never stand, unless it can overthrow what has here been maintained as to essential probation being under moral law alone,—all else associated with it, advantages of providence or grace (which Butler calls moral providence) being additional, and not permanent and essential. "No man is condemned to eternal punishment by Christ," says Professor Smyth, "who has not had an opportunity to be saved by Christ." To this all will heartily assent. It is old-time accepted truth. But every man who has had an opportunity to choose right towards God, and repent of wrong, *has had* his opportunity to be saved by Christ; for his atoning blood answers for every one in every nation who feareth God and worketh righteousness. He exercises his almighty divine power for some in Christian lands even, who deny that he is almighty or divine. Men are forgiven any way, not for the sake of an accurate dogmatic Christianity—not to say an exhaustive one—nor for their knowledge of a personal Christ even, but *for his own sake*, for the sake of his sacrifice for the sins they renounce. Every personal test, then if such are applied in judgment, must be more than personal, viz., ethical; therefore the ethical test (the moral law test) of character, is the decisive, essential one.

II. Another assumption on which the new dogma rests, is, that, over and above the essentials of probation—a moral nature and a divine moral law—we are competent to decide what is a full, fair, and equitable condition for men, individually and relatively, under grace. We are able to say what grace should be.

Essential probation consists in what man is in himself, and in his necessary relation to a holy God. Grace is matter of condition, additional thereto,—it is supplement and adjunct. It is an aid to probation. The law is perfect, says David. It is, in its nature and in its own proper strength, fitted to convert the soul. It is successful, says Paul, in convicting of moral wrong as sin. God sends his Son to do what else the law could not do through the weakness of the flesh. But what measure of this additional and advantageous, this extra-probational, agency shall be granted, it is beyond men or even angels to know. No intuition concerning it is written on the heart. Reasoning avails nothing. It is high, we cannot attain unto it. We know well that, as fact, since the first sin, grace has been exercised by an offended Lawgiver. But how to apply equity to grace we know not. Those who are dealt with in legal justice are not wronged if others are munificently rewarded in grace. So teaches our Lord in the parable of the laborers in the vineyard. Those who are dealt with in what appears to be

"largely of the nature of the counsels of perfection, not of ordinary moral laws." That is, Christ merely advises men as to doing right, utters no commandment, speaks not with authority, but as the scribes! So thorough a formal renunciation of Christ's kingship by a Congregational minister has perhaps never been seen. On the contrary, Bishop Butler declared (Analogy, Part II., chap. i.) that in the teachings of Christ and his apostles, "other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost are revealed. We are *commanded* to be baptized in the name of" both. From the relations revealed "arise the obligations of duty to them." And virtue, in his account of probation, is obedience to commands.

one measure of grace—over and above what law would award—are not to complain of him if he awards what appears to be a larger measure of grace to others. "Friend, I do thee no wrong. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?" A human tribunal or standard of equity, by which the God of grace is to be tried, is inadmissible.

In the loose way in which we commonly use the word "probation"—including a variety of concomitants, as well as what properly belongs to it—it may be maintained that it differs with different people. But the difference is altogether in the concomitants, not in probation itself. Whatever essential probation may be—of whatever elements it is properly and really composed—this is obvious. That it is an equal probation in this, that we all have a moral nature, constituted like that of our fellow men, and all have the moral law, at least written on the heart, is just as obvious. That any thing more—any increase of instruction, experience, opportunity, advantage—is needful to make it equitable for any one, is more than we can determine. Whatever assumption we may make is liable to prove a fallacy. If any thing bearing on the subject has been revealed, this forestalls all our assumptions, of course. Sodom and Capernaum alike perished: if Sodom would have escaped and survived, had the exhibition of Christ been made there which was made at Capernaum, we might be tempted to judge that Sodom had not a fair or equitable chance. What our Saviour has said forbids us to thus judge, or to intimate that Sodom was unjustly overthrown, because it seems to us it did not have one, as to the adjuncts of probation. On the reasoning of the advocates of second probation, it may be said that Tyre and Sidon should have seen our Lord's mighty works, as Chorazin and Bethsaida did, if they would have repented in sackcloth and ashes. He assures us that *they would*, and who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? He declares only this, that it would be more tolerable for the two unevangelized cities in the day of judgment than for the two evangelized ones; but not one word about Tyrians and Sidonians not having had a fair relative probation, though it was simply and only under moral law. Does not this imply that Christianity, or a knowledge of Christ, was not essential to probation at all at Tyre or Sidon? or even at Sodom? or anywhere else? These declarations of Christ, then, forbid this third assumption, that we are competent to decide what is a fair and equitable probation for any one, beyond essentials.⁷

⁷ Since this paper went to the press, a sermon preached in the chapel at Andover Seminary by Professor John P. Gulliver, D.D., on the amount of light which men have by nature, has been published in the *Golden Rule*, weekly, Boston, June 10, 1886. Dr. Gulliver maintains that "light (not the historic Jesus of Nazareth) is come into (the whole world), and by it the heathen know (1) That this world was made for a moral conflict, in which the right and the wrong are offered to every man: (2) That they have taken the wrong side, and punishment is to be expected; (3) That forgiveness and propitiation are possible; (4) What the terms of forgiveness are, repentance, atonement, faith. He intimates that a world created by Christ must needs "reveal Christ," (though "not the historic Jesus of Nazareth,") "whether He be visible or hidden, whether his human personality be familiar or unknown." He therefore concludes that the responsibility for each man's salvation or condemnation is fastened "upon himself, be he where he may or what he may." He asks:

III. There is a third assumption on which the dogma of future probation rests, viz., that the influences of a future probation would save more souls than will be saved if probation is confined to this life.

Infants who die before any moral action are held by evangelical Christians, so far as I know, to be saved by Christ without probation, not through a better one after death. So Christ teaches. We have, then, only older ones to consider, who—it is assumed without warrant—have had no sufficient moral probation. They are under the moral law, i. e., have had essential probation, but have not had the benefits additional (or not all the benefits) of the gospel. Will the future world save more of them, if probation is continued there? Who is competent to say this? Here, again, if any thing bearing on the subject fell from the lips of Christ, it forestalls and precludes our assumptions, and shows them to be fallacious. Now, He put into the lips of Abraham the language, in respect to the brothers of Dives: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded if one rise from the dead." Such an one would bring with him from the world of the disembodied dead just what one whose probation in life is deemed insufficient would learn by going to the dead—the very influences of a future probation. Our Lord says it would be of no avail, if the sinner refused to listen—not to him and his apostles, gospel teachers, whom they never had heard—but to Moses and the prophets, teachers of moral law. A messenger from the scene of their proposed future probation could have told the rich man's brothers a great deal not known on earth in their day,—and, among other things, why not, that an absolute and universal Saviour had appeared in the world they had left? But their probation under law, without these or any advantages of the gospel,—if, in Hades, they would be advantages,—was enough, as our Lord gives us to know. A disclosure like this, fitted to govern the assumptions with which we approach the "dogma," is especially damaging to it, because it closes up that "widening of hope,"—that expectation or hypothesis of many being willing to repent hereafter who clearly are not here,—which we should all be glad to cherish, if there were any grounds for it. These grounds lacking, the hope itself is relied upon, instead, to float the proposed dogma into wide acceptance. This decision as to the rich man's brothers forbids any judgment whatever of ours beforehand as to probable issues of such an imagined probation among the dead who sinned here—"neither would they be persuaded"—though it is for the logical advantage of such a judgment that they would be, that the assumption of our being competent to form it is entertained.

If these three assumptions are fallacious, what can support the dogma against the trend of Scripture and the inherent reasonableness of our life here

"Who can know on what principles infinite benevolence and infinite wisdom should apportion to each nation the degree and the form of the light, some degree and some form of which surely 'enlightens every man that cometh into the world.'" Professor Gulliver

being the one and only probation for all? Christ being restored to his place as the only absolute and universal Saviour, instead of a substituted Christianity, what datum or premise for the inference, hypothesis, or proposed dogma can be found? What but some explicit declaration of our Lord that some sinners will have a better probation hereafter will save it from the fate of the hypothesis of pre-existence? Confessedly there is no such declaration, no "doctrine" to this effect, and no basis for a speculative hypothesis, even, as we see. "To the Law and to the Testimony."

But if any single soul in all the ages ever repented under moral law, and was saved by Christ, not having heard of him, this one fact decides the fate of the dogma. It is not necessary that many should be thus saved. One is enough.⁸ His fearing God and working righteousness; his repenting of sin so that he "might believe," as Christ said, on hearing of Him,—(for without repentance, as the divinely required "condition precedent," hearing or believing would do no man any good),—would prove that for him probation beyond this life was altogether unnecessary, over and above all other objections to it, moral, theological, and biblical. But if needless for him, then for others. When its advocates admit that Christ has ever saved even one penitent without doctrinal knowledge of an "absolute and universal Christianity, or (better and more correctly), of Himself personally as the one living, absolute, universal Saviour," they surrender their whole case, as Hume surrendered his against miracles when he admitted that one might be wrought and proved, if for some other object than to support a religion. And, plainly, clear thinking, and thinking according to Christianity, require them to do so. But they do admit this, and that more than one has been thus saved by what Christ has done for all who repent, though comparatively few, as we all believe.

The faith of our churches, then, with all its solemn and tender relations to "them that perish," and to those who hold forth the word of life, stands unshaken.

GEO. F. MAGOUN.

"PROGRESSIVE ORTHODOXY" AND MISSIONS.

I.

Perhaps the most noticeable chapter in Progressive Orthodoxy is the elaborate discussion entitled Christianity and Missions. This chapter is the application of the new Andover-Dornerian views to Foreign Missions.

⁸ "There are, I say, such examples here; not a great many, as compared to the whole population, but enough so that we may hope that among these millions there are at least hundreds, if not thousands, who are saved without a knowledge of the historic Christ in this world; enough to show that the heathen can be saved without such knowledge in this life. Men and women who have been mourning over their sins and seeking deliverance from them for months or years," etc., etc.—Rev. Jerome D. Davis, D.D., *Future Probation in The Light of Asia*, pp. 9, 10.

Apparent contradictions of this testimony (cf. Dr. Gulliver's sermon) are not real ones.

It proposes a change in the basis of missions of a revolutionary character. This proposition is not a mere suggestion. It is the firm outline of a policy which is already being urged with pressure upon at least one great Mission Board. It is definitely proposed, we understand, to make up an Andover band to transport this new theory into Japan, and practically reorganize the Mission of the American Board on the lines of the "New Departure." Let us attempt to get definitely before us the views and assumptions of the chapter, and estimate the probable results if they should shape the missionary policy of the future. The views are clearly stated in the following passages:

"The question of the salvation of the heathen is simply one aspect of the fundamental religious question of our time: the claim of Christianity to be the one perfect and final religion for mankind. Involved in this issue are inquiries such as these: Is the final judgment universal? Do the ultimate destinies of men turn on their personal relation to Christ? Is Christianity essentially ethical and spiritual? Is its salvation mediated by motives, including personal influence, addressed to and operative in the human reason, affections, and will? Is there one system of salvation for Jew and Gentile, as one final judgment? Is God's purpose of creation and redemption fulfilled, except as He manifests himself to every human being as Redeemer as well as Judge? What inference upon this question is legitimate from the universality of Christ's Person in its constitution, the universality of Christ's atonement, and the universality of Christ's judgment? How and why is He the Son of Man, the second Adam, the Creator, Mediator, and Ruler of the universe?

"We cannot but think that the interests of missions to the heathen require a readjustment of pleas in their behalf in the light of the Scriptural and rational answers which must be given to such questions. If this is not done there is danger not merely of the loss of a particular motive to missions, but of a loss of faith in the principles which underlie the whole missionary movement" (pp. 178, 179).

"But a universal atonement limited in its operation by the being who made it was a contradiction too palpable and violent to remain concealed. The great forces of progress which had helped to bring in a new missionary age worked against such limitations. The sentiment of humanity, itself a child of gospel, protested against them. More thorough acquaintance with the Scriptures under improved methods of interpretation, the heightened influence of the gospel, bringing men's minds into larger knowledge of the mind of Christ and deeper sympathy with his love to men, clearer and higher consequent conceptions of the true character of God, gradually changed the tone of Christian thought about the heathen. Their moral degradation was even better understood than before. Their need of the gospel was no less clear. But God's purpose concerning them was less and less dogmatically affirmed" (p. 174).

"We believe, and we think there is need of asserting the principle, that the author of Christianity will give it in time, as in all other respects, a fitting opportunity for its operation" (p. 182).

"The cause of missions hitherto has rested, as we have said, on the postulates of universal sinfulness, universal atonement, and the indispensableness of faith. It rests ultimately on the divine command (Matt. xxvii. 18-20), which implies the universality and absoluteness of Christianity. The dogma of the damnation of the heathen is not one of these postulates, nor is it a biblical teaching, but a corollary which now depends upon a dogma which is no part or presupposition of the gospel—that of the limitation of probation for all men to the present life. This dogma is now working, as do all untruthful exaggerations, with a disturbing and injurious effect" (p. 179).

These statements are certainly intelligible. They are fortified by assumptions of whose foundation the reader must judge.

"For ourselves we accept the doctrine of the fathers of modern missions that men everywhere need for recovery the means of grace, but the conclusion that all are lost who do not receive them in this life is another matter. Even when such a dogma is theoretically held it is no longer pressed in pleas for missions. The secretaries of our missionary societies, so far as we are aware, with possibly here and there an exception, do not now touch this chord" (p. 175).

"The intelligence and heart of the Christian church not merely decline to accept the old dogma of the universal perdition of the heathen,—they repudiate it" (p. 176).

"And if the present movement, in certain orthodox circles, to relieve the demand from a larger and more Christian view of the character of God for a wide extension of hope for the heathen, is not freed from the limitations of this inferential dogma about their probation, it will in our judgment become more and more difficult to maintain in effectiveness the principle which experience testifies lies at the very heart of Christian missions—the indispensableness of the gospel" (pp. 181, 182).

"What of the unnumbered generations, the innumerable millions, that have died without the gospel? Once, the advocates of missions had a definite answer. They will not repeat it" (p. 187).

It is assumed, it will here be seen, that such a change has taken place in the convictions of Christians in the direction of such a larger hope for the heathen as requires the adoption of the views previously stated to make our missionary enterprise self-consistent. It is also assumed that without this change the work of missions has to encounter an insuperable obstacle. After following the Andover writer so far we are not unprepared for his conclusion:—

"We would send out missionaries who can ask men to renounce all other systems because they are persuaded that Christianity, and this alone, fulfils all that is good in every other, and meets the deficiencies of every other; missionaries who in the light of all of God's revelations of himself, whether by human reason or human history or special inspiration of prophets and apostles, or by Incarnation, with clear intelligence and perfect assurance of faith will present Christ as the rightful and the only Saviour and Lord;

and we would not weaken their message by loading it with a dogma of the doom of the ancestors of the men to whom they preach, a dogma contradictory [*sic*] to the name they proclaim and into which they baptize, or by accompanying it with an apology for Christianity which lowers it in principle to the level of other religions, or makes it essentially a system operative in some occult way and not the truth as it is in Jesus" (pp. 182, 183).

"It is a noteworthy and auspicious fact that the platforms of the older and the more important missionary societies are pledged by their history to all that is catholic in Christian belief and fellowship. We believe that missions should always be conducted in this large-minded and large-hearted spirit; that young men should be attracted to such service by the grandeur of its aim, and welcomed without scrutiny as to their theological opinions beyond what is necessary to ascertain their full acceptance of fundamental Christianity in their beliefs and in their consecration of purpose. We would raise, as a dividing question, no issue upon the mode in which God will administer his one system of redeeming grace in its application to those of his children who are born in the darkness of heathenism. But all the more are we strenuous that right opinions should prevail as to what the gospel is in its universality and completeness, and that no positions be taken which in the end will inevitably diminish men's convictions of its supreme authority and absolute necessity. And we believe that it is by the prevalence of truer conceptions of its universal character and relations, in connection with the providential opening of the world to its mission and the promised gift of the Spirit, that the coming century—may we not hope and expect, the next quarter of a century?—will show a progress in its extension beyond anything as yet realized" (pp. 188, 189).

Such sanguine expectations are expressed of the result from the adoption of this policy of an extension of missions. Let us attempt calmly to estimate its probable results from another point of view.

1. *Its probable effect upon the minds of heathen.*

We may conceive the following dialogue to take place between the new Andover missionary and an ignorant heathen:

HEATHEN. Why do you come to us?—MISSIONARY. To teach you of Christ as the only way of salvation.

H. Was it God's duty to give me this gospel?—M. Yes; a satisfactory theodicy requires that the proclamation of the atonement, as well as its provision, be universal.

H. What have you to say of my fathers who died before the missionaries came?—M. The historic Christ will be presented to them in the next world.

H. If you had not come would he be presented to me in the next world?—M. Yes.

H. Will a heathen who knows of Christ for the first time in the next world have as good a chance to receive him and be saved as I have in this world?—M. Yes; God is just.

H. If I make the most of the opportunity you bring me, will it be as good an opportunity as you have had who were born and trained in a Chris-

tian home with the Christian church and all its privileges?—M. (The honest missionary must give this answer.) No; I suppose not.

H. But ought not God, our common Father, to treat his children just alike, and so to give me as good a chance as he gives you?—M. (Reviewing his theodicy.) Yes; that is fair.

H. If I should not repent under your efforts, will it not be necessary, then, for me to have a chance in the next world in order to make my opportunity equal to yours?

The missionary will probably reflect before answering a question so wide reaching in its scope, and of such great suggestion in its application, not to heathendom alone, but to Christendom. He will be apt to reconsider the scriptural warrant he has for involving the justice of God in the doctrine that to be just God must give the heathen the gospel. He will be apt also to consider anew whether the opportunity to repent given to all men by God's grace must be an *equal* opportunity, and not rather simply an *adequate* opportunity, which may consist, and must consist, with great inequalities, as is seen in contrasting the opportunity of Mary of Bethany with that of the thief on the cross. What inequality! But each had an *adequate* opportunity, and that not of debt but of grace. While the missionary, in agitation of mind, and trying to recall teachings of his professors which may aid him in his deliverance, still reflects, the heathen resumes his inquiries.

H. If it is settled that I am to have as good an opportunity as you, I have been asking myself, Why should you be at the trouble and expense and sacrifice of coming to me at all? I understand you that I shall receive the gospel in a short time any way.—M. We come to you because the Saviour commanded us to come. Such was his last command.

H. Why did he give you this command?—M. Because of the blessing it would give you in this world to become a Christian.

H. Did he say so? Haven't you said something about being sent to seek and to save that which was lost?

The missionary is silent, and with inward distress tries to recall what was taught at Andover applicable to this difficulty.

H. (Resuming with much impatience.) So far as I can see, all your coming has done for us, if we do not repent, is to reduce our opportunity of hearing of Christ in the next world (though the probability is that we shall hear the gospel there and have another opportunity for repentance, on account of the imperfection of your presentation), and to make sure that we shall have in the judgment a severer sentence if we do not finally repent and accept eternal life.

The ignorant heathen retires. An intelligent heathen takes his place, one who has the Bible in his hands with which to verify the new views. He has been studying it with care. He comes to communicate his results.

(a) The Bible teaches him that he is condemned "already." This is not a dogma, but a doctrine that runs through the Scriptures. He has found in the Epistle to the Romans (which he understands to be a statement of fundamental principles given to and laid down by the great missionary apostle)

that he is without excuse, that he is under the wrath of God, that when he (and his fathers) knew God he worshipped him not as God. They were not willing to retain him in their knowledge. Their doom was put in the forefront of the message sent to them. This doom was not for their treatment of the historic Christ or of the Scriptures if they did not possess them, but of God in the light of the knowledge of his attributes and character given to every man, and sufficient (it was declared) to be the ground of his final judgment. This treatment of the heathen by God (so he further learned) was righteous. The day of wrath was also the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God. This teaching in Romans and the other missionary epistles commends itself to the heathen. A priest in Japan asked a missionary what Christianity taught about sin. These teachings in the opening chapters of the Epistle to the Romans were read to him. "That is right," he said; "that is what we believe;" viz., the guilt and condemnation of every man who holds ("holdeth down," Revision) the truth in unrighteousness. "What is your authority," the educated heathen would naturally ask the Andover missionary, "for throwing doubt upon the doom of such men as I and my fathers have been? Is it in this book?" If the man were not conscientious, what heed would he be apt to give to that religious teaching which he knew was as contrary to the current thought of the Scripture as it was contrary even to the light of Asia?

(b) Again, the instructed heathen would be apt to ask concerning the doom of men in the Old Testament judgments, in particular judgments, and notably in the deluge, Had the Canaanites heard of the historic Christ? or the Egyptians? Were not these judgments declared (or assumed) to be righteous notwithstanding? Were they not made use of to suggest the inference that all men who sin against light (whatever the light they enjoyed) and did not repent, were lost? The judgment doom had actually fallen upon these. The use of the instances of judgment by our Saviour carried his authority for the conclusion that the antediluvians, the Sodomites, the men of Tyre and Sidon then living, were, without the knowledge of the gospel narratives, condemned for their sins, their hardness and impenitency of heart.

(c) Again, the heathen, when told of the indispensableness of the gospel, would most likely be stumbled by such instances as that of Abraham saved before he saw Christ in the vision of faith, and of the Gentiles saved also without the knowledge of the historic Christ by faith in God, by penitence, made availing through the sacrifice on the cross, which was purposed from the beginning and in due time accomplished. If these were thus saved, why might not his fathers be saved on the same conditions?

(d) The intelligent heathen would also be stumbled by the discovery of such teachings of the Saviour as that judgment would be according to knowledge of the Lord's will — few stripes for the ignorant (the comparatively ignorant), many stripes for the man who knew his Lord's will and did it not.

These are suggestions of the probable results of the teaching of the new views upon the heathen.

2. *What are the probable results of the new views upon the missionary spirit of the churches?*

It will not be denied that the mainspring of Christian missions has heretofore been that the heathen are lost, as the mainspring of Christian activity in Christendom has been that all men unsaved are lost. Whenever this motive has been lacking the efforts to save men have slackened. The apostles believed that men were lost. The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost. The Andover writers say that Paul's motive in his labors and sacrifices is found in his own words, "The love of Christ constraineth us." That passage, however, must not be separated from its context. Just before, he wrote, "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men;" and just after, "Because we thus judge that if one died for all then were all dead." Paul was impelled to his self-sacrifice by thought of the doom of the heathen. He had received the Spirit of Christ, whose teachings were weighty with the warning of doom, freighted heavy with the message of judgment. He did not hesitate to tell men that their fathers were lost if they had died impenitent, and that they themselves were lost if they should die without accepting Christ. There were embarrassing questions which could have been asked our Saviour, and which could have been asked Paul and his companions. Probably they were asked with all Grecian acuteness and Roman persistency of logic. But he would not go beyond his message. When he did not know, he would say, "I do not know," and not confuse his message with speculations; but he lifted up Christ and cried, 'God now calleth upon all men everywhere to repent.'

And his message is our message. His limitation limits us. We are not responsible for what we do not know of the mode by which the atonement is made of universal extent. His motive is our motive. If we modify this motive of the doom of the heathen what will be the result? What if the view is generally adopted, that the long-accepted doctrine of the doom of the heathen is exaggerated; and that the heathen who does not *receive the biography* of Christ in this world will have it communicated to him in the next world with the influence of the Holy Spirit to convict him and to lead him to repentance; and that to reveal the truth to him here, practically, in the case of a great number, will be to increase the severity of their final judgment. What will a young man or woman say? Would not one be apt to reason thus: The Lord has indeed commanded the church to go into all the world to preach the gospel to every creature. But I must choose my field. The most needy field is my own country, where the people already know so much of Christ, and will have no opportunity to hear of him beyond

We have the recent eloquent testimony, to this effect, of Dr. J. D. Davis, of Japan; and also of another missionary of sixteen years' experience, who tells us that he was once a Universalist, and that then he felt no concern for the heathen; but when he was converted he saw their doom and went to China to seek to save the lost. And these men are moved to effort, as all our earnest missionaries have ever been, by the doom of the heathen world. If, now, that motive be taken away, or weakened by *whatever* specious line of reasoning concatenated with the professed aim of constructing a theodicy which men will approve, the working motive of missions will be weakened and then lost. The mission band which yields to the present pressure will lose the sympathy of the best part of the churches, which are still, we believe, content to rest with the revelation and the omissions of the Scriptures. Upon such a departure from scriptural principles, the missions and the churches will be divided into factions; the spirit of missions will decline. But the end will not be here. A blight will come upon our work at home. For the motive of our work abroad and at home is one. It is the double motive of Paul, "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men," "The love of Christ constraineth us." Or, if we make it a single word, then it is LOVE like that of Christ made urgent by the view of impending doom.

It is *possible* that the churches are largely abandoning the old views. But the claim that they are *may* be simply the bold assumption which, unfortunately for candor, has not been wanting on one side in this protracted discussion. But if they are thus departing, it is safe to predict that, whatever be the transient prosperity under present excitement and careful mustering of adherents, the result will be spiritual dearth and blight, and the transference of spiritual power and faithfulness to those who are more careful to follow the Scriptures than to construct a new theodicy. G. R. LEAVITT.

II.

Since the question is being forced upon us concerning the policy of sending to the heathen missionaries who believe in the doctrine of "continued probation," we cannot avoid discussing the question from a practical point of view; for with a missionary church the doctrines of grace are both the mainspring of missionary activity and the divinely elaborated product which is to be exported to heathen lands and planted as seed corn for the spiritual harvests of the future. Underlying and giving character to all great evangelistic and missionary movements there are profound convictions of truth. The church first *believes*, then *acts*.

The gravity of the interests at stake in such a discussion permits us to be deeply in earnest without impugning the motives of those who take a different view from ours. The honesty of the builders is not the chief thing at stake. Those who build wood, hay, and stubble into the temple may be sincere, and may themselves be saved, but their work shall be burned with fire and while it stands will greatly increase the painful toil of those who are erecting the true temple of gold, silver, and precious stones.

In their relations to church fellowship and organic church action, the doctrines of grace have to be considered in two aspects: first, there is the question of the truth of each particular doctrine and secondly, there is the question of its relative importance. The doctrines of the church, like the church itself, form a body, consisting of many members compactly joined together. In fixing upon a body of doctrines which shall serve as a working basis of action for a large constituency, we are compelled to give special attention to the *relative* importance of the various elements which go to make up the whole. As in choosing and equipping soldiers we need not insist that each one shall have every perfection of body, and every attainment of mind, and skill in the use of every class of armor, but should only insist on those qualifications which are specially related to their particular responsibilities, so in selecting missionaries, only those qualifications need be insisted upon which bear directly on the work to which they are assigned. But, if those specific qualities are lacking, no other attainments will suffice to make them successful as missionaries.

The fundamental questions, then, facing those who take it upon themselves to send the gospel to the heathen, are, What things are true? and, How central are specific doctrines to the system of truth which it is our duty to propagate? As to the *truth* of the doctrine that to such as attain years of moral accountability in this life the awards of the judgment day are to be according to the deeds done in the body, we need say nothing at this time. It is sufficient to refer to the discussions of that question by various contributors in previous numbers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.¹

We will therefore limit ourselves to a discussion of the central and organic importance of this doctrine in the system of evangelical truth. Upon this question, then, we remark:

FIRST, *that the denial of the doctrine that the probation of those who reach years of moral accountability here is limited to this life, most seriously endangers the doctrine of the sufficiency, the authority, and the intelligibility of the Bible.* A gospel thus severed from connection with its inspired source, cannot long abide. If missionaries take the liberty to eliminate so plain a doctrine from the Scriptures, the heathen will have little respect for what remains. Upon this point one of the most eminent scientific men in America unburdens his heart thus in a private letter. "I wonder at the Andover theologians. They are knocking out their foundations. If I had to shift around the Bible to make it teach probation beyond the grave, I am afraid I should do a little more and shove it overboard; and I think that is a natural feeling with any scientific mind, except that of a foregone Catholic. Believing that God is just, we may be sure that there will be no injustice in his dealings with us, and rest our faith there. Nature's laws, which are God's laws, are all of the inflexible kind, and give little encouragement to the idea of making

up for lost time and lost character after death. As regards the future, trust in Christ while here is the only doctrine a theologian ought to dare to teach, whatever may be his hopes, or his difficulties with the divine government."

SECONDLY, *the denial of this doctrine, in face of the scriptural support of it, magnifies the prerogatives of the human reason beyond all warrant and brings us to the verge of most dangerous presumption.* The practical administration of the divine government is a matter not of reason but of reasoning, and it is the height of presumption respecting such a subject for man to set up his conclusions as the measure of divine wisdom. It is also out of place and an undue strain of fellowship for any body of theorizers to force upon their brethren their own particular plan for justifying the ways of God with man. To attempt to compel the great mass of Christian believers to accept the statement that the ways of God with the human race *cannot be justified* except on the theory that the gospel is to be preached after death to those who have not been made familiar with the biography of Christ in this life, is for these writers to set up their own speculations as infallible. They have no right to demand such consideration for their theories. In due time God will justify his own ways. Of necessity his thoughts are above our thoughts and his ways above our ways. The plan of salvation spans the ages, and is infinite in its comprehension. It is man's business to accept as the guide of his action such light as God has seen fit to reveal. We believe that a segment of God's plan is revealed in the Scriptures; and that he has there unfolded, not only the bare lines of duty, but the overwhelming *urgency of the motives* leading to its performance. The simple command to preach the gospel to the heathen depends for its urgency upon our conception of the relative hazard of heathen nations as compared with those already having the gospel. What is the present urgency of preaching the gospel to the heathen when so many in our own land are unevangelized? *When shall we preach the gospel to the heathen?* Shall we wait until we have more highly cultivated the fields already partially occupied? Or shall we maintain a foreign missionary society at the same time that the demands of the home work are so pressing? If it be said by the advocates of continued probation that we are to be moved by the apparent greatness of the need of the heathen world, it will be readily replied that if the system of divine government is such that all sinners have a right to demand of God that the gospel be preached to them before they are judged, (Progressive Orthodoxy p. 139) and that they have a right to all the privileges of the most favored class, it is difficult to see how there can be any pressing need of our hastening their evangelization during this life. The pressing need would seem to be that we redouble our efforts to save those in Christian lands who, upon this theory, are to have no offered grace in the world to come.

THIRDLY, *to insist that the heathen must have a probation in another world, proceeds upon a false and mischievous conception of their natural powers and their acquired character.* Underlying this doctrine of a future probation for the heathen is the doctrine either that the heathen have not sufficient light to condemn them, or that they have no natural power to discern that light which lighteth

every man who cometh into the world. This strikes a fatal blow at the doctrine of man's native dignity as described in the Scriptures and as revealed in man's own conscience, and this leaves us without proper basis for our doctrine of sin.

When God made man he pronounced him very good ; for he was made in his own image. It stands to reason that a missionary can have no strong hope of success in preaching the gospel to the heathen if he has an inordinately low conception of the native capacities of the human mind. If the missionary brings himself to believe that the heathen have little or no capacity for perceiving the revelation made in nature, he can not be animated with any inspiring hope of getting them to appreciate the written revelation which he brings. The strength of one's expectation of arousing ideas in another mind by the use of language cannot be much out of proportion to his conception of the natural powers of the mind addressed. It would be useless to address the language of the moral law to an animal; for the animal mind is not responsive to such appeals. So, if the heathen are regarded as having such feeble powers that their experience under the light of nature has evoked no deep sense of sin one will have little heart to address them with the lofty moral conceptions of the Bible. The views of the missionaries and of their constituency upon these points cannot but affect and that most seriously, the whole spirit and animus of the missionary work. An essential element of successful work is that we know the nature of the material upon which we bestow our labor. What is man that God should be so mindful of him as to redeem him with the precious blood of Christ? The answer is that man even in his lowest estate, is, as to capacity, most highly exalted. But alas he is sinful. Though God made man upright and in his own image, we can recognize in him now only that image in ruins.

Much mischief is sure to be done by confusing the popular mind with the use of phrases and arguments which assume that the heathen are more unfortunate than wicked. When a writer or speaker complains of the gross injustice which would ensue if God should condemn one to eternal punishment just because he is a heathen, it would be well to explain the full meaning of that word heathen. From much that is said one would suppose that a heathen was an imbecile with no sense of responsibility to God and no knowledge of God. Such however is neither the testimony of missionaries nor of the Scripture—and especially not that of Paul, the great apostle to the heathen.

The heathen as described by Paul are literally steeped in sin of a most revolting and disgusting character. They have given themselves up to vile passions, are full of all unrighteousness, wickedness, covetousness, malice, envy, murder, strife, deceit and malignity. They are insolent, haughty, inventors of evil, disobedient to parents, covenant-breakers, unmerciful and though "knowing the ordinance of God, that they which practise such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but also consent with them that practise them" (Rom. i, 32.) The evil which those do who are to be visited with "indignation, tribulation, and anguish," is expressly said to

be factiousness, disobedience to the truth and obedience to unrighteousness. Again in the third chapter of Romans both Jew and Greek are declared to be under sin, and that not in any passive sense, but as active agents. "Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit: The poison of asps is under their lips: whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness: their feet are swift to shed blood; destruction and misery are in their ways; and the way of peace have they not known: there is no fear of God before their eyes." (Rom. iii. 13-18.) Such is the language of the great apostle to the heathen. But how different from that of "Progressive Orthodoxy." It requires no gift of prophecy to see that those who go to the heathen as Christian missionaries without an adequate sense of the sins of the heathen world can never succeed in adequately presenting the Christian doctrines of grace which are to be set over against these sins. We need not repeat the testimony going to show that the heart of the heathen nations responds to this indictment of the great missionary apostle. This testimony conclusively shows that the heathen themselves are not slow to acknowledge their guilt and condemnation. What they need is the doctrines and motives of grace freely offered to the undeserving.

But *FOURTHLY*, the arguments by which the theory of continued probation must be sustained deny the doctrine of "grace." The authors of "Progressive Orthodoxy" speak of the "rights" which sinners have in the gospel, meaning by this the right a sinner has to demand of God a stay of judgment until he has had the historic Christ presented to him. Such a demand as this completely overturns the gospel scheme, whose fundamental principle is that God, in the exercise of the lawful prerogative of his wisdom, freely bestows the gifts of grace upon the undeserving. In the exercise of his benevolent wisdom he has a *right* to do what he will with his own. The infrequency with which the authors of "Progressive Orthodoxy" refer to the prerogatives of divine wisdom is painfully significant.

FIFTHLY, to force this doctrine upon the Board will produce a division both at home and abroad. In so serious a matter as that of fulfilling the Saviour's last command it scarcely seems proper to speak of policy, yet when properly considered even matters of policy are not to be wholly overlooked. It seems too evident to need statement that missionary ground is not the appropriate arena on which to contend for such a doctrine as that of future probation. Nothing could be more unfortunate than to force a number of young missionaries to live together in such close contact as those are in who are associated in the same missionary field, with widely divergent views as to such fundamental doctrines.

Nothing, we repeat, could be more unfortunate than such disagreement among missionaries, except perhaps agreement in a system of theology incorporating the doctrine of future probation as one of its essential tenets. If experience has shown, as it has, that it is not wise to compel missionaries to work together in foreign fields who differ in the minor matters which separate evangelical denominations from each other, how much greater the unwisdom of putting into the same mission for their life's work those who

differ on so fundamental a matter as the very mainspring of the missionary movement itself. If we would not compel a Baptist and a Methodist, or a Congregationalist and an Episcopalian, to march in the same regiment on mission ground, but would allow them to move under separate captains and to wear their own uniforms, how much more is it important not to compel an orthodox missionary to be yoked for his life's work with a semi-universalist, or to compel a follower of the apostle Paul to lay his brick in the untempered mortar of those who say there can be no justification of the ways of God unless there is a future probation for the heathen.

FINALLY, *What is the object of Christian missions if it be not to give to the heathen nations, so far as it can be done, the gospel in its entirety?* Why do we need an expurgated gospel for the heathen any more than our fathers needed it? The doctrine of future probation for those who have not in our opinion had the gospel properly presented to them would, if generally accepted, take away the source of strength which has characterized evangelical Protestantism in its work at home. For if God in his providence does not give adequate light to every man so that all ground for excuse is taken away, no man will ever be able to tell when such adequate light is furnished. Will any one contend that the mere repetition of the words of Christ's biography are all-sufficient? or that the representation of Christ in connection with the superstitious practices of the Romish, the Greek, or the Abyssinian churches is such an addition to the light of nature that it can close probation where that light was not sufficient to do it? Surely not; but with Dörner the advocates of the new departure views will have to maintain that the heathen are to be found in all our unchurched masses, and very likely, too, in all our Christian congregations. Thus at the outset we shall carry to the heathen this paralyzing and poisonous error, that sinners are not condemned by the light of nature, but only when our stammering accents have made the gospel sufficiently plain to them.

Of course those who believe in the so-called "Progressive Orthodoxy" have a personal right to try the experiment of enlisting missionaries and converting the heathen by preaching their doctrines. But others have a right to expostulate against their forcing themselves upon the existing societies with a view to compel these societies to try hazardous experiments not only at the risk of compromising the rest of the constituency, but at the risk of vitiating the whole work which has been built up with such toil and expense upon the present foundations. True wisdom leads to extreme caution in all great revolutionary movements. Pre-eminently is this the case when it is proposed, to repudiate the beliefs of a great missionary constituency, and to revolutionize their whole conception of the condition of heathen nations before the bar of God's justice. It cannot be wise in such a matter to exchange a "thus saith the Lord" for the utterances of any human oracle.

Such is the gravity of the interests at stake that, were this policy to be adopted, without doubt a large part of the contributions of the churches that now go to the American Board would soon be diverted to those societies

that adhere to the scriptural representations concerning the grounds of future judgment. The effect of forcing such a controversy upon the home constituents of the Board would be ruinous to its financial future. The great body of those who sustain missions is not, and is not going to be, among those who believe that the heathen have rights to the gospel which they can press before the bar of divine justice ; though they do believe that the heathen have claims to the gospel which can be pressed home with imperious force upon a church which is derelict in its duty, and is not moved in compassion for the lost as Christ was moved. These will ever insist upon having their gifts directed as near as is practicable to the dissemination of the gospel, the whole gospel, and nothing but the gospel. They themselves do not wish to be the active agents of sowing tares with the wheat. If the advocates of continued probation can prove beyond peradventure that man in his natural state has not sufficient light to serve as a basis for his eternal condemnation in case he neglects or perverts it, or if they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that God cannot so adjust the awards of the eternal world as to do no injustice to the heathen even though consigning them to eternal and irrevocable punishment for their sins in this life—then we must revise with them our interpretation of the Bible, or throw it aside altogether. But until we are driven to that necessity, we cannot quietly suffer them to force upon the churches the experiment which is involved in the adoption by the Board of such rationalistic and revolutionary theories. For the officers of the Board to abandon the foundations upon which the structure of modern missions is building, would be treason to the churches they represent and treason to the whole church militant.

ARTICLE X.

DANA'S TRIBUTE TO GUYOT.

IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY is found a Memoir of Arnold Guyot prepared by Professor James D. Dana, and read the 21st of April, 1886. As some portions of this Memoir both explain and supplement Professor Dana's recent article in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*, we give, by permission of the author, a summary and a somewhat extended extract.

Arnold Guyot was by Providence peculiarly fitted to write upon the relations between the Bible and science. Being descended from an old Huguenot family, Guyot was naturally inclined to the study of theology, and his early education was directed with reference to a career in that department of investigation. After taking the usual extended course both in philosophy and in the classical and modern languages, Guyot went, at the age of twenty-two (in 1829) to Berlin to pursue a theological course. Here he remained for five years, enjoying the lectures of Schleiermacher, Neander, and Hengstenberg. So that he is one of the comparatively few scientific men who had at the same time a thorough personal knowledge of biblical subjects. But other aptitudes of mind, and association with the leading scientific men of the period, led him at last to devote himself to science. In this department he attained an eminence, especially in the estimation of his peers, that is second to that of no other man of the century. With Agassiz he shares the credit of solving the problem of glacial movements in the Alps. Indeed, his discoveries antedated those of Agassiz, Rendu, and Forbes in this most interesting and important field of investigation; and he had no equal in the department of physical geography to the day of his death. His Lowell Lectures entitled *Earth and Man*, were translated into German, Swedish, and French, and the book is one upon which the celebrated geographer Carl Ritter set the very highest estimate.

Guyot's views upon the parallelism between the cosmogony of Genesis and that of modern science were formed as early as 1840, and were brought to the attention of Professor Dana and substantially adopted by him soon after Guyot's removal to this country in 1848. So reasonable and well supported were these views that they have received the widest acceptance, and may be justly said to have dominated the best thought upon that subject in America for the last thirty years; and, as the recent article of Professor Dana in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* shows, both Dana and Guyot saw increasing evidence of the correctness of those conclusions as science added new facts and theories to her stores of knowledge. The following is Professor Dana's re-statement of the origin and development of this theory in Guyot's mind (pp. 23-27):

The subject came under his consideration at Neuchâtel, in 1840, while

preparing a lecture for his course in Physical Geography. Looking only to the suggestions of science, under which the so-called nebular theory had in his mind a place, he made out a scheme of the successive stages in the earth's development. After its completion it "flashed" upon him that the succession arrived at was just that of the cosmogonic record in Genesis, and this led later to a critical comparison of the two. Harmonizing the Bible and science was, hence, far from his original purpose.

The succession in the scheme so derived was (as I learned it from him) as follows :

First. The endowing of matter in space with forces, whence the beginning of its activity.

Second. The stage of specialization, or that of the subdividing of the original matter or nebula through the forces communicated, and thus the development of systems of spheres in space.

Third. The stage of the individualized worlds—the earth among them—and the commencing preparation of the earth for new developments pertaining to organic nature.

The events thus far are those of the inorganic part of the cosmogony.

In the organic period there was :

First. Life, manifested in the simpler kinds of plants. Next, animal or sentient life under simple forms—the Protozoans. These simple kinds of plants and animals represented the first or germ-like or homogeneous stage in the development of the system of life. He believed it to be probable that both existed before the close of Archæan time.

Second. The stage of specialization, or that of the development of plants and animals of higher and higher grade, under various types and subdivisions, based severally on different structural and physiological qualities.

Third. The stage of the synthetic or harmonic type. Among plants, that of the Dicotyledons, in which the different kinds of tissues in plants, and the stem, leaf, and flowers are for the first time harmoniously combined; and among animals, that of the Vertebrates, in which the nervous system has first its proper commanding position; and, lastly, among Mammals, that of Man, eminently the "harmonic unit" for the system of life, combining the highest of structural qualities and physiological characteristics under the most perfect harmonious development.

It is not surprising that after the conception of such a scheme he should have recognized a relation in it to the record in Genesis. Looking to this record, which announces the grand stages in a few brief sentences, he observed that the "fiat" of the first day, "Let light be," indicated, since light is a result of molecular action, the imparting of activity to matter as the first step in the development of the universe; that the dividing of the waters on the second day appeared to have its only befitting explanation in the subdividing or specialization of the primal nebula, as stated above; and that the fiat "Let the dry land appear," on the third day, indicated the defining of the earth and the preparation of it by the appearance of dry land for its new work. Thus he found the first three works in Genesis to cor-

respond essentially with the first three in the scheme taught him by science. The following works, the creation (*a*) of plants, (*b*) of the Invertebrates and inferior Vertebrates, (*c*) of Mammals—the remaining Vertebrates, (*d*) of Man, have in the record the order of their first appearance as made known by science. It has to be admitted that doubt at present exists as to the earliest birds having preceded the Marsupial Mammals, but none as to their long preceding ordinary Mammals. Future discovery may place them before the Marsupials. Remains of birds are the rarest of fossil Vertebrates.

Guyot recognized also a still deeper concordance between Genesis and science, namely, that not only in the opening verses, but throughout the chapter, the idea of a system of development is taught. The fiat "Let light be" was the commencement of developments before the earth or other spheres had existence, not the creation of an entity. With regard to the earth, the first verse announces that it was formless, empty, waste, or, as the Septuagint translation describes it, "uncomposed and invisible." Then, on the third day, where the second mention comes in, the words are not Let the earth be, but "Let the dry land appear," implying that the specializing changes had gone forward eventuating in the earth and making it ready for future developments. The fiat creating plants was not Let plants be, but "Let the earth bring forth," which words imply development in some way; and a similar idea is to be derived from the fiats "Let the waters bring forth" for the Invertebrates and lower Vertebrates on the fifth day, and "Let the earth bring forth" for Mammals on the sixth day.

Such a system of developments, which, after an initiating fiat, continued on their progress through the ages following, was not consistent with the idea that the days of Genesis were definite periods of time. It teaches that they simply mark the beginnings of new phases or new grand stages in the history of creation.

Guyot's critical eye further discovered that the two triads of days in the record—the first, the *inorganic*, including days one to three, the second, the *organic*, days four to six—have three parallel features which emphasize strongly this subdivision of the chapter, and indicate parallel stages in the developments: first, in each triad, the work of the first day was light; second, in each, the work of the last day comprised two great works; third, the second work of the last day in each triad was the introduction of an element that was to have its full development in the following era; in the first triad this element was life, plants being the second work, and life having its chief display in the succeeding era; in the second triad it was spiritual life, that of man, a planting of the moral world in the material, for the exaltation of the latter in aim and character.

Guyot thus shows that the old document is philosophical in its arrangement, true to the principles of development in history, and essentially true in the order of its announcements, and that the best explanation which science is now able to give on the great subject of cosmogony is also that which best explains, in all its details, the first chapter of Genesis and does it justice.

I have said that Guyot, while adopting the law of development and applying it to all history, still believed that true species came into existence only by divine act. In his later years, as his work on "Creation" shows, he was led to accept, though with some reservation, the doctrine of evolution through natural causes. He excepted man, and also the first of animal life; for in the case of both, while science speaks undecidedly, the record in Genesis teaches, by the use of *bārā* for create, and by not using the word elsewhere subsequent to the first verse in the chapter, that actual creation was intended. He also held that there might be other exceptions; and he objected, moreover, on other grounds to the development of Man through nature alone. Still, as always with Guyot, God's will was the working force of nature, and secondary causes simply expressions of it.

Guyot's views on Genesis, although dating from 1840, and presented by him since that time in occasional courses of lectures, were not published in detail until the last year and hours of his life. With the publication of the volume his work and life ended.

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

GERMAN BOOKS.

The most important works that have appeared in Germany since our last list are the following :

I. EXEGESIS.

Beyschlag, W. Life of Jesus. (Leben Jesu. Halle. 1885-6.) 1886. (xii. 515 S. gr. 8.) \$3.75.) An attempt to produce a critical text.

Keil, C. F. Commentary on Hebrews. (Com. über d. Brief an d. Hebräer. Leipzig. 1885. (420 S. gr. 8.) \$2.00.)

Künen, Dr. A. (Professor at Leyden) has begun an Historical and Critical Introduction to the Old Testament. (German translation by Professor Dr. Th. Weber under the title : Historisch-kritische Einleitung in d. Bücher d. alten Test. hinsichtlich ihrer Entstehung u. Sammlung. Leipzig. 1885. (iv. 96 S. gr. 8.) \$0.62.) This is the first attempt to present this branch anew and completely, from the critical stand-point.

Mangold, Prof. W., has issued a new (fourth) edition of Bleek's Introduction to the New Testament (Einleitung in d. N. T.).

Naumann, O. Critical Consideration of the Method of Wellhausen. (Wellhausen's Methode kritisch beleuchtet. Leipzig. 1886. (166 S. gr. 8.) \$0.50.)

Niese, B., is issuing a critical edition of the text of Josephus, under the title : Jos. Flav. Opera edidit et apparatu critico instruxit Benedictus Niese. Vol. ii. is already out, containing Antiquitatum Judaicarum libri vi.-x. (viii. 392 pp. gr. 8.) \$3.00.

Rhiem, Dr. Ed. (Professor at Halle). The Messianic Prophecies. (Die Messianische Weissagung. Ihre Entstehung, ihr zeitgeschichtlicher Character, und ihr Verhältniss zu der neuest. Erfüllung. 2 Aufl. Gotha. 1885. (vi. 233 S. gr. 8.) \$1.00.)

Schürer, Dr. Emil (Professor at Giessen). History of the Jewish People in the Times of Christ. (Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Ch. 2 neu bearbeitete Aufl. des hehrbuchs d. neuest. Zeitgeschichte. 2 Thl. Die innern Zustände Palästinas u. d. jüd. Volkes im Zeitalt. Jesu Ch. Leipzig. 1886. Hinrichs (x. 884 S. gr. 8.) \$5.00.) This is a thoroughly revised and greatly enlarged edition of the former work. It treats of such topics as : General state of culture ; Constitution ; Sanhedrin ; High Priest ; Legal learning ; Pharisees and Sadducees ; School and synagogue ; Life under the Law ; Messianic hope ; Palestinean Jewish literature, etc.

Spitta, Fr. (Privat-docent in Bonn). The Second Epistle of Peter, and the Epistle of Jude. (Der zweite Brief d. Petrus u. d. Br. d. Judas. Eine geschichtl. Untersuchung. Halle. 1885. (vii. 544 S. gr. 8.) \$2.25.)

II. DOGMATICS.

Dorner, Dr. I. A. Christian Ethics. (System d. christl. Sittenlehre. Hersg. von Dr. A. Dorner. Berlin. 1885. (xi. 560 S. gr. 8.) \$2.25.)

Lipsius, Rich. Adalb. Philosophy and Religion. (Phil. u. Relig. Neue Beiträge zur wissenschaftlichen Grundlegung der Dogmatik. (aus "Jahrbuch fthr prot. Theologie.") Leipzig. 1885. (iv. 319 S. gr. 8.) \$1.25.)

Schlatter, A. The Meaning of Faith in the New Testament. (Der Glaube im N. T. Eine Untersuchung zur neuestsl. Theologie. Eine v. d. Haager Gesellsch. zur Vertheidg. d. ch. Relig. gekrönte Preisschrift. Leiden. 1885. (v. 591 S. gr. 8.) \$2.25.)

Wendt, H. H. (Professor at Heidelberg). The Teaching of Jesus. (Die Lehre Jesu. 1 Thl. Die ev. Quellenberichte üb. d. Lehre Jesu. Göttingen. (ix. 354 S. gr. 8.) \$1.75.)

III. HISTORY.

Becker, B. Zinzendorf and the Philosophy and Church of his day. (Zinz. im Verhältniss zu Philosophie u. Kirchenthum seiner Zeit. Leipzig. 1886. (viii. 580 S. gr. 8.) \$2.00.)

Brandt, Dr. Sam. (Professor at Heidelberg). The St. Gall Palimpsest of the Divinae Institutiones of Lactantius. (Der St. Galler Palimpsest der divinae institutiones des Lactantius. Mit einer photol. Tafel. Wien. 1885. (110 S. Lex. 8.) \$0.50.)

Brosch, M. O. Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution. (O. Cromwell u. d. purit. Revolution. Frankfurt. 1886. (v. 526 S. gr. 8.) \$2.50.)

Denifle, Heinr. The Universities of the Middle Ages. (Die Univ. d. Mittelalt. bis 1400. Berlin, 1885. (xlv. 814 S. gr. 8.) \$6.00.) A work drawn directly from the sources, and of high rank.

Grundemann, Dr. R. Statistics of Missions. (Zur Statistik der evangel. Missionen. Abdruck aus der "Allg. Missionszeitschrift." Gütersloh. 1886. (88 S. gr. 8.) \$0.38.)

Harnack, Dr. A. (Giessen). History of Doctrine. (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. 1 Bd. Die Entstehung d. kirchl. Dogmas. Freiburg. 1886. (xx. 696 S. gr. 8.) \$3.50.)

Harnack, Dr. A. Tatian's Address to the Greeks. (Tatian's Rede an die Griechen, übersetzt und eingeleitet von. Dr. A. Harnack. Giessen. 1884. (54 S. 4.))

Pesch, Chrn. The Concept of God in the Ancient Heathen Religions. (Der Gottesbegriff in d. heid. Rel. d. Alterthums. Eine Studie zur vergleich. Religionswiss. Freiburg. 1886. (xi. 144 S. gr. 8.) \$0.45.)

Rothe, Dr. Richard. Collected Addresses, etc. (Gesam. Vorträge und Abhandlungen aus seinen letzten Lebensjahren. Eingeleitet von Dr. F. Nippold. Elberfeld. 1886. (xvi. 208 S. gr. 8.) \$1.00.)

Schneider, Dr. W. The Nature-peoples. (Die Naturvölker. Missverständnisse, Missdeutungen, und Misshandlungen. Paderborn. 1885. (xi. 310 S. gr. 8.) \$1.00.)

Wächter, Dr. Osk. Bengel and Oetinger. (Bengel u. Oet. Leben und

Aussprüche 2 altwürtemb. Theologen. Gütersloh. 1836. (xii. 236 S. gr. 8.) \$1.00.)

The *Corpus Scriptorum* eccl. lat. presents in vol. ix.: Eugippii *Excerptae* ex operibus S. Augustini. Recensuit . . . Pius Knoell. Wien. 18 . . . (xxxiv. 1149 pp.) \$5.50. Vol. x. we have already noticed. Vol. xi. contains Claudiani Mamerti opera. Rec. Aug. Engelbrecht. Wein. 1885. (xlix. 262 pp. Lex. 8.) \$1.50. Vol. xiii. contains the second part of Cassian's works. (J. Cassiani conlationes xxiv. Rec. M. Petschenig. (711 pp.) \$0.38.)

A new and careful edition of Gerhard has recently appeared, edited by Professor Frank, of Erlangen. (Johannis Gerhardi Loci Theologici, et cet. Editio altera, cui prefatus est Prof. Dr. Fr. Frank. ix. Tomi. Leipzig. 1885.) \$9.00.

Grape-Clusters. Sketches in biography from all ages of the Christian Church. I. *Miescher, E.* The St. Gall merchant's wife, Anna Schlatter. II. *Peyer, G., and Pestalozzi, C.* Stephen Serres and Johanna Terrasson, witnesses for the faith during the persecutions of the Huguenots. (Reben am Weinstock. Lebensbilder, etc. Basel. 1885. viii. 110 und xii. 120 S. gr. 8.)

Among the publications of the Verein für Reformationsgeschichte we note:

Luther, Dr. M. To the German Nobility. (An der christl. Adel deutsch. Nation von des christl. Standes Besserung. Bearbeitet sowie mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen versehen von Prof. Dr. K. Benrath. (xvi. 114 S. gr. 8.) \$1.20.)

Also: *Bossert, Gust.* Württemberg und Janssen. iv. 178 S. gr. 8.) \$0.60.) A refutation of some of Janssen's misrepresentations.

IV. PHILOSOPHY.

Eucken, Rudf. Contributions to the History of Modern Philosophy. (Beiträge zur Geschichte d. neu. Phil. vornehmlich der deutschen. Gesammelte Abhandlungen. Heidelberg. 1886. (iii. 184 S. gr. 8.) \$0.80.) Treats of Nicolas of Cues, Peracelsus and Kepler, Figures and comparisons in Kant, Trendelenburg, and Parties and Partisanship in Philosophy.

Falckenberg, Dr. Rich. (Privat-docent at Jena.) Outline History of Modern Philosophy. (Geschichte d. neu. Phil. von Nikolas v. Kues bis z. Gegenw. Im Grundniss darg. Leipzig. 1886. (viii. 494 S. gr. 8.) \$1.50.)

A cheap edition of the selected works of von Hartmann is being issued. (Ausgewählte Werke. C. Duncker, Berlin.)

Lotze, H. Essays. (Kleine Schriften. I Bd. Leipzig. 1886. (xviii. 397 S. gr. 8.) \$1.50.)

Rée, Dr. P. The Illusion of the Freedom of the Will. (Die Ill. der Willensfrei. Ihre Ursachen und ihre Folgen. Berlin. 1885. (iii. 54 S. gr. 8.) \$0.25.)

Scipio, Dr. K. The Metaphysics of Augustine. (Des Aurelius Augustinus Metaphysik im Rahmen seiner Lehre vom Uebel. Leipzig. 1886. (v. 113 S. gr. 8.) \$0.60.)

Volkeit, Prof. J. Experience and Thought. (Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grundlegg. der Erkenntnisstheorie. Hamburg. 1886. (xvi. 556 S. gr. 8.) \$3.25.)

Catalogues of Arabic MSS. have been recently published by Professor *W. Ahlwardt* of Greifswald, Professor *V. von Rosen*, of St. Petersburg, and *Alfred von Kremer*.

Grimm's German Dictionary has now reached the end of the letter M.

DAS BUCH DES PROPHETEN EZECHIEL. Herausgegeben von Lic. Dr. Carl Heinrich Cornill, Ausserordentlicher Professor der Theologie in der Universität Marburg. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1882. (xii. 515 S. gr. 8.) \$3.50.

While nearly all the critical work done by Old Testament specialists during the past few decades has been in the department of higher criticism, the need of thorough investigations in the field of lower or textual criticism also has been recognized by both the advanced and the conservative sides. However, but one scholar has secured for himself an honorable prominence and reputation in this branch of biblical science, namely, Lagarde, of Göttingen, and he has confined his almost exclusively to preparatory and preliminary work. The discussions carried on in this department were chiefly on ways and means and methods. Only now has an attempt been made to apply with systematic rigor and critical accuracy the principles of textual criticism to the restoration of the text of one of the Old Testament books to what is considered to have been its original shape, in so far as this may be regained with the aid of the most complete critical apparatus that biblical scholarship can secure. For a number of reasons the text of Ezekiel was particularly well adapted for this experiment, and Cornill's work shows that he was well equipped for the difficult undertaking. He works in the spirit and method of Lagarde, and, like him, goes out from the premise that all our Hebrew manuscripts are based upon a single prototype manuscript, dating probably from the times of Hadrian. This he considers settled by the investigations of Lagarde, and upon this basis and from this stand-point he continues his investigations. In order to reach an older form of Ezekiel than that presented by the massoretic text, he examines into the claims of the Septuagint, the Targum, the Peshitto, and the Vulgate, and finds in them all some help for his work. The chief stress is laid upon the Septuagint, and this version is allowed a wide sweep over against the claims of the received text. The discussion of the Septuagint in its various phases, and of its value for the purposes of textual criticism, are, we think, the best portions of the Prolegomena, and probably the best that has been written on this version from this point of view. The other three critical aids are more briefly handled.

Applying the facts and positions taken in the Prolegomena, Dr. Cornill furnishes us with an unpointed text of what he regards as the text of Ezekiel as nearly as it can be restored to its primitive and original shape. De-

partures from the massoretic text are found by the hundreds ; every chapter contains from ten to fifty, and generally there are but few, if any, verses in a chapter in which no changes occur. The most frequent deviations from the old text are omissions, which occur so often that the book is noticeably reduced in length. Many of these omissions are made on the basis of one or more of the critical aids, but dozens of them are introduced for subjective reasons only, and against the unanimous voice of all the witnesses. Then words and forms are changed, verses and parts of verses are rearranged, so that Dr. Cornill's Hebrew text of Ezekiel is quite a radical departure from the common massoretic text, and leaves the impression that he has proceeded in a rather arbitrary manner.

This proposed revision, however, has certainly the merit of being smooth and readable ; the ruts and boulders in the exegete's way are nearly all removed. In fact, the way has been made too smooth, as it seems to us, and this is the leading fault of the work. Changes have been made for entirely insufficient reasons, especially on the basis of style, rhetoric, and language, which cannot command the acceptance of careful critics. The first attempt at a critical restoration of the text of an Old Testament book ought to have been of a careful and conservative character ; instead of this Dr. Cornill has cut wide and deep. Even granting the hypothesis from which he starts, that the Greek version in its original shape naturally must be presupposed to present a better text than the later massoretic, we think Dr. Cornill has been too ready to make changes even from this basis. Instead of loosening the Gordian knots, he proposes to cut them. The reasons for his emendations he has laid down in the critical apparatus printed on the same page with the revised text and the German translation. This apparatus is remarkably rich, and embraces the results of years of careful and accurate scholarly work. It enables the reader to judge for himself of the correctness or incorrectness of the text proposed, and is of permanent importance for the student of Ezekiel both for textual and for exegetical purposes. The revised Ezekiel text will form a valuable addition to the working tools of the biblical scholar, who will await with eagerness also the appearance of the edition of Isaiah and Jeremiah promised on the same plan.

THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF ISRAEL : A discussion of the chief problems in Old Testament History as opposed to the Development Theorists, by Dr. Friedrich Eduard König, of the University of Leipzig. Translated by Rev. Alex. J. Campbell, M. A., Barry. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner & Welford. (pp. vi and 192. 12 mo.)

The German original of this little work was published two years ago and was very favorably received in the critical circles of the fatherland. This reception it merited, as it presents in short and clean-cut outline the leading problems of Old Testament discussion, not however, merely stating the

author, himself well-known through his Hebrew grammar and his work on the Revelation of the Old Testament, is not blind to the kernel of truth lying hidden in the rubbish of hypotheses under which the advanced critics had hidden it. The evident effort of the author to deal fairly with all, friend and foe, places his book above the average of polemical literature. In a number of places he himself goes further and concedes more than cautious scholarship would warrant, but the book as a whole is solid. Its manner, however, is not as good as its matter. The division into sections and chapters, and the arrangement of them, seem to have been made without any controlling idea. The book lacks unity of conception, and therefore does not furnish as clear a bird's eye view of the Old Testament debate as it would, if it had been better arranged internally.

A work of this sort is certainly entitled to a good translation. It is much to be regretted that it has received a very poor one. It has been the writer's privilege during the past eight or ten years to examine quite a number of translations of German theological works, but he unhesitatingly pronounces this the worst that has ever come under his eye. It is only by accident apparently that the translator renders a sentence correctly. An example or two will illustrate this. On page 4 of the German, König quotes from Kuenen the words: "of the various religions, that of Israel is for us but one; nothing more and nothing less." Campbell translates on page 3, "Of these faiths Judaism is to us neither of less nor greater importance." On page 8 of the German we read: "He [Daumer] therefore unjustly calls out to Vatke, who on page 355 had said that out of the antithesis of Jeremiah (vii. 31; xix. 5), we may possibly be allowed to conclude, that the people knew how to combine human sacrifices to Moloch with the worship of Jehovah and did not see in them a direct apostasy," as follows: "Do not be afraid to speak out plainly; have we not a right to do so?" Campbell manages to distort this (page 14) into the following: "He cites also Vatke who (page 355) thus writes: 'From the antithesis of Jeremiah (vii. 31; xix. 5.) we may perhaps conclude that the idolatrous nations knowingly united their sacrifices of human offerings to Moloch with the worship of Jahveh and in doing so saw no glaring apostasy.' How irrelevant! Man goes on his way on his own responsibility, determined to speak, nay, has ever a right to do so!" This latter is not only no sense, but very poor nonsense, and was in all probability caused partly by the translator's mistaking the indefinite *man* for the noun *Mann*. The book is full of such blunders, and as a translation has scarcely a redeeming feature. Even for those who have only a modest knowledge of the German, the original, notwithstanding the complex structure of many of its sentences, will be more intelligible than the translation. The translator of such a work should have three qualities, he should understand German, should understand the subject matter, and should understand English. Campbell is sadly deficient in the first two, and in the third is not what he might be. There are altogether too many poor translations of German theological works in the English market, and it is time to make more exacting demands of this kind of literary work.

JOHN BUNYAN : his Life, Times, and Work, By John Brown, B.A., Minister of the Church at Bunyan Meeting, Bedford. With a fine Steel Portrait, and Illustrations by Edward Whymper. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 8vo, \$4.50.

It is not likely that any one else will ever attempt the biography of the immortal dreamer, now that the pastor of the "Bunyan Meeting" in the English Bedford has done it. Abridgments of his admirable volume of over five hundred pages, for rapid popular reading, may be made : it is to be hoped they will be. But, living on the spot for more than twenty-one years, where Bunyan preached and wrote and suffered, familiar beyond others with the locality and surroundings, indefatigable, pains-taking, and accurate in searching out and verifying traditions and public and private documents in the country, in London, and elsewhere, the Rev. John Brown, B.A., has enjoyed advantages no one else can ever have. Nothing throwing light on Bunyan's "Life, Times, and Work" seems to have escaped him. His volume is rich beyond all previous memoirs (a score of them—besides lectures, essays, and other papers on the subject) in pertinent and unique neighborhood lore. Exhausting all the relations of contemporary history to Bedford, its great citizen, and the church identified with him since 1653, it gives us the picture in its frame, the jewel in its setting.

The author is cautious, candid, and judicial in weighing evidence on disputed points. A good example of his thoroughness and antiquarian skill is shown in his chapter on "The Bunyans of Elstow." No discussion of the rumor that the dreamer was of gipsy descent is needed after this tracing of his lineage. In thirty-four different ways the family name was spelt,—Shakespeare and Raleigh and other eminent surnames were written quite as variously—but the line of kindred is clear. Mr. Brown's style is simple, direct, and unpretending. Not one attempt at "fine writing" occurs. In ease and variety of plain English syntax, his book will rank among the model biographies. The modesty of the writer as to his toil is most praiseworthy. But those who have visited his pleasant manse, looked over the relics which, without being a "relic-hunter," he has gathered there and in the "Bunyan Meeting" place, read the church records in "Brother John Bunyan's" handwriting, gazed upon the bronze memorial doors and statue, wandered with him about Bedford and along the rural road to Elstow, seen the Bunyan Cottage, the village green, the church and tower, the moot-house, and enjoyed the delightful reminiscences, are well aware that so long-continued, conscientious, and thorough work seldom goes into a biography as that which has made this noble and complete one what it is. He has settled a good many questions ; for example, where Bunyan was longest incarcerated ? viz., in the Bedford County prison, and where was *Pilgrim's Progress* written ? viz., in the little town gaol on the Bridge over the Ouse, neither of them now standing. But quite as excellent as his definite and successful research is his reticence of conclusion, or even opinion, where facts now known warrant none. We have read every word of his book with increasing respect for his ability, pains, and faithfulness.

It will be compared most with the "Life, Times, and Characteristics of Bunyan," by Robert Phillip of Moberly Chapel, London. This was written in 1839, nearly half a century ago. Phillip says that then "a century and a half had passed away without producing a Life of Bunyan." He supposed that nothing more complete could ever be produced—a wide mistake. He covers precisely as many pages—but smaller ones—as Mr. Brown. They are filled largely, however, with discursive matter, anecdotes, rumors, criticisms, remarks of others, theological and other comments. These are often interesting, often intrusive. His forty-seven chapters are a series of essays, rather than a memoir. "I gossip away," he observes near the close, "and posterity will thank me for 'gathering up the fragments' with *zeal* as well as *zeal*." And any one will thank whom the reading of Bunyan's own sketch in "Grace Abounding" led to devour his book. But it is notable how independent of his sources and authorities is the present biographer, how many of the topics he draws out at length with guess and surmise Mr. Brown does not even touch.

One of the fresh and strong impressions left by this volume is that of Bunyan's patient, firm, and quiet heroism. His twelve and a half years of imprisonment might have been easily avoided, if he had but said: "I yield, I will not preach." He told the justices on his being arrested: "If I were out of prison to-day, I would preach the gospel again to-morrow, by the help of God." He declared that rather than violate his conscience, he would lie in prison till the moss grew upon his eye-brows. "If any man can lay any thing to my charge that can be proved error or heresy, I am willing to disown it, even in the very market-place. But if it be truth, then to stand to it to the last drop of my blood." Southey and Froude have tried to depreciate this painful experience, but his spirit was the very stuff that Martyrs are made of. He knew and felt that he was acting for all the free churches, and not for himself and his impoverished and suffering family alone. He was fighting for all Nonconforming Protestantism to the end of time.

Large space is given here, of necessity, to "Pilgrim's Progress," its sources, its production, its power, its place in English and universal literature, the genius and grace disclosed in it, the imitations and translations of it, and the unapproachable excellence that makes it a book by itself. Nearly eighty translations are mentioned in the appendix. The great allegory throws light upon the author's life, and his life throws light upon the allegory. All the biographers have in measure appreciated this, but none as the present one. He is successful also in fixing the date of Bunyan's other writings, as many as the years of his eventful life, recovering some which are not in editions of his "Collected Works," and setting aside, on sufficient grounds, some that are. Bunyan had to pay the penalty of extraordinary genius and extraordinary success in being imitated, and the pseudo-Bunyans were many.

THE HEBREW FEASTS in their relation to recent critical hypotheses concerning the Pentateuch. By William Henry Green, Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: Robert Carter and brothers.

This is a little volume of 329 12mo pages. At the head of the title page is the inscription "The Newton Lectures for 1885," the contents of the volume being eight lectures delivered before the members of the Newton Theological Institution. It is pleasant to be thus reminded how our Baptist brethren are pressing to the front, in the matter of facilities for theological education.

The reputation of Dr. Green is familiar to American scholars. It is therefore needless to say that these lectures are scholarly, able, orthodox, and in good literary form; all this follows from the fact that they are by Dr. Green. The first two of the eight lectures sketch the opinions that are held or have been held on the subject in hand. For compactness and intelligibility of statement, these parts of the work possess great merit. The remaining six lectures are a polemic against the views held by Wellhausen and others. These men, in the lectures, are currently called "the critics;" yet Dr. Green is himself too eminent in Criticism to be allowed to plead any excuse for this misleading surrender of the title. The third and fourth lectures are devoted to defending the biblical accounts of the feasts, as they now stand, against the spurious, sifting processes to which erroneous criticism would subject them. That he may be specific, in this part of his work, Dr. Green confines himself to a single representative section of the record, namely that found in Ex. xii, xiii. The fifth and sixth lectures are directly upon the Passover, the seventh upon the Feast of Weeks, and the eighth upon the Feast of Tabernacles.

In his attempts to show that the opinions he opposes are untrue, or at least, unproved, Dr. Green is generally successful; he is very reticent in the matter of positive statements as to what opinions should be held instead of these. The traditional understanding of the biblical account probably is that the regulations for the feasts were not merely in existence, but in actual operation, from the times of Moses. Dr. Green holds that they were inoperative in the time of Samuel. It is not easy to tell whether he intended to have the reader infer that, with this exception, he holds the traditional views. The closing sentence on page 239 is a fair specimen of his method of treatment; after showing that the records do not teach certain views, when we expect him to begin to show what they *do* teach, he contents himself, instead, with the laudable affirmation that their teachings are true. Perhaps we ought not to be disappointed at this. All that Dr. Green knows

they say. On page 36, for example, he says that the house of God in Shiloh, as described in the beginning of I Samuel, is "expressly identified" with the Mosaic tent of meeting. But if words mean anything, what is there called a temple, with doors and doorposts, must have been a permanent structure, connected with the tent of meeting (inclosing it, perhaps) but certainly differing from it. Dr. Green makes very prominent the assertion that what is properly called "the house of god," that is, the central sanctuary, ceased to exist from the death of Eli to the reign of David (pp. 36, 305, 306, 308, 310, 319, etc.). But our Saviour held a different opinion, for he says that David "went into the house of God" in the days of Abiathar the priest, and took the shewbread. An examination of the passages will show that this difference is not merely verbal, but real and important. Doubtless Dr. Green is correct in arguing that the condition of the sanctuary in those times was such as to cause the festival laws to be held in abeyance; but the sanctuary did not become non-existent.

A good many instances of this sort might be cited, but they are not inconsistent with hearty appreciation of this admirable effort of Dr. Green, in the field of Biblical Criticism.

CHRIST IN THE GOSPELS; or, The Life of our Lord in the words of the Evangelists: American Revision, A. D. 1881. With self-interpreting Scripture, Map of Jesus' Travels, and a Dictionary of Proper names. By Jas. P. Cadman, A.M. With an Introduction by Rev. P. S. Henson, D.D. Second Edition. Chicago. American Publication Society of Hebrew. 1885. (pp. 382. 6½ × 3½.) Plain cloth, \$1.50; gilt edges, \$2.00.

Mr. Cadman has rendered all biblical students an invaluable service in the preparation of this volume. With this before him the student can read the story of the Evangelists in continuous narrative. The words of each writer are all introduced either in the text or in parentheses, and in every case numerals indicate in which Gospel the particular words are found. The convenience of this arrangement every one will appreciate.

THE BOOK OF DANIEL, or The Second Volume of Prophecy. Translated and expounded, with a preliminary sketch of Antecedent Prophecy, by James G. Murphy, LL.D. and D. D., T. C. D. professor of Hebrew. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1885. (pp. vii. 206. 12mo.)

This is really a brief and popular sketch of the messianic prophecies of the whole Old Testament, as culminating in the visions of Daniel. Accordingly the revelations to this effect in the earlier books are called the First Volume of Prophecy. The book is not then a commentary on the book of Daniel in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather a estimate of the messianic contents of the book, in their relations to the messianic contents of the earlier books of the Old Testament. The position of the author is conservative. The little volume is an excellent summary for pastors, Sunday-school teachers and others who are not, technically speaking, specialists in Old Testament studies, but yet desire to know what the learning and the faith of Christian scholars have produced on this book and subject.

SOLAR HEAT, GRAVITATION, AND SUN SPOTS. By J. H. Kedzie. Illustrated. Chicago : S. C. Griggs and Company. 1886. (pp. xii. 304. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ × 3 $\frac{1}{4}$.) \$1.50.

The author of this book is an educated gentleman of leisure, a devout Christian, a lawyer by profession, and a very successful business man, and, as the present work shows, possesses a mind of rare speculative ability, and is capable of presenting his views in a singularly clear, forcible, and fascinating style. In some respects his work is to be compared with Judge Stallo's *Modern Physics*, and must command the attention of all people who give serious thought to the ultimate questions of philosophy.

Mr. Kedzie attempts to provide a cause for the law of gravitation. This he thinks he finds in the vibrations of the ether which transmits the forces of light, heat, and electricity. According to his theory the vibrations of gravity fill all space, like those of light, and every body of matter produces a shadow of gravitating force, as of light. Thus, since the universe is supposed to be infinite, so that in whatever direction the lines proceed from a given point they will somewhere strike a world, every body will be held in equilibrium by these forces, except where they happen to be in the shadow of a neighboring body which intercepts the forces from one side. Thus arises the universal law of attraction. The force, however, is not a pulling but a pushing force. For example, the sun prevents a certain amount of these propelling vibrations from reaching the earth from that side. The earth therefore has less resistance on the side towards the sun and tends to move towards the sun by a force equal to the amount of force in the vibrations arrested by the sun. These vibrations arrested in the sun produce its heat, and so the author is not compelled to accept the gloomy hypothesis that the universe is running down and the sun cooling off. The ultimate source of the motions of matter and the vibrations of the ether is in the creative power of God. The author simply attempts to take one step farther back than Newton in his generalization of second causes. His theory is analogous to those which are already accepted concerning light, heat, and electricity, and his presentation of it will repay and merits a careful study and cannot fail to interest any well-informed reader.

NEW STORIES FROM AN OLD BOOK. (Biblical Characters with Modern Titles.) First and Second Series combined and revised, and others added. By Rev. H. L. Hammond ("Laurens"). With an Introduction by Rev. John H. Vincent. D.D., Chancellor of Chautauqua University. Illustrated from Original Designs by True M. Williams. Chicago and New York : Belford, Clarke and Company. 1886. (pp. 278. 6 × 4.) \$2.50.

A portion of these stories was issued in a small volume some years ago ; but it has long been out of print and the plates were destroyed by fire. The attention they attracted was so wide that the author has deemed it best

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

IS TIME A REALITY? AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR BOWNE'S DOCTRINE OF TIME.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR C. M. MEAD, PH.D., BERLIN, GERMANY.

THERE must always be a fascination for metaphysicians, and even for ordinary men of thoughtful mind, in speculating on the problems of space and time. Apparently the most certain and necessary things, they grow more puzzling and evanescent the more one attempts to analyze the conceptions; so that, in fact, there is nothing respecting which more contradictory ideas have been held. In particular, it is remarkable that in some aspects of the question the drift of metaphysical speculation is quite contradictory of the popular impressions. Some years ago I ventured to make an apology for the popular conception of eternity, as being endless time, in opposition to the ordinary metaphysical doctrine that eternity is timelessness (The Metaphysical Idea of Eternity, in the *New Englander* for 1875). It was there shown not only that the metaphysical conceptions are no clearer and more self-consistent than the popular one, but are in hopeless conflict with one another. Having recently examined for the first time Professor Bowne's treatment of the conception of time in his *Metaphysics*, I find myself tempted to make some comments on his doctrine. His writings in general are so admirably fresh and able, and his views so sensible and sound, that one cannot like to disagree with

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him. His crushing demolition of Herbert Spencer's Philosophy and his Studies in Theism are so full of masculine vigor and convincing logic that one comes to his later work with a prepossession in its favor. It is, therefore, a real disappointment not to be able to accede to his theory of the notion of time.

Professor Bowne's general doctrine is that time is not an objective reality, nor a relation of objective realities, but a purely subjective conception. It is "purely a product of our thinking" (p. 237). This conclusion, so contrary to the unsophisticated impressions of men, he reaches by exhibiting the contradictions and absurdities which result from attempting to carry out the vulgar conception of the objective reality of time. This is not a very difficult task. "All our representations of time are images borrowed from space, and all alike contain contradictions of the time-idea" (p. 218). Thus, if we conceive time under the form of an endless straight line, "the conception fails to fit, for the points of such a line co-exist, while of the time-line only the present point exists." Or if we think of time as a flowing point describing a straight line, "we implicitly assume a space through which the point moves" (*ibid.*). So, whether time itself is conceived as flowing, or as that through which events flow, in either case, when we carefully analyze the conception, we find that we cannot carry it out without running into self-contradictions. If time as a whole is regarded as an existent reality, embracing past, present, and future, and things are conceived as flowing through it, then "there would be nothing in this view to forbid the thought that things might co-exist at different points of the temporal sequence. There would also be nothing in it to forbid the conception of a being which should fill out the totality of time, as the omnipresent fills out space, and for whose thought the past and the future should alike co-exist. Thus quite unexpectedly we come down to the notion of the eternal now" (p. 220). But if we abandon this conception, as we

must if we wish to hold the common view, nothing remains but to say that only the present time is real. But here we at once are confronted with the difficulty that "the present has no duration, and is not time at all. It is but the plane which, without thickness, divides past and future. Time, then, is not made up of past, present, and future, but of past and future only; and, as these do not exist, time itself cannot exist" (*ibid.*). The difficulty of making time a reality is greater than so to conceive space (which Professor Bowne also holds to be purely subjective); for we can regard space as made up of parts, since the several parts co-exist as real; whereas in the case of time none of the several parts can be regarded as really existent (p. 221). If now we recur, in order to obviate this difficulty, to the notion that time itself flows, instead of being a fixed thing in which events flow, then the objection at once meets us that "we have a flow, that of time, which is not in time. But if this flow be out of time, why not all other flows?" (*ibid.*) And so, whichever way we turn the conception, we find ourselves unable to carry it out without confusion and self-contradiction. Time, moreover, cannot be regarded as a condition of change and activity. "Change is always an effect, and requires a cause; but no one views time as causal. When the conditions of an effect are present, there is no need of time for its realization, as if the flow of empty time could give to reality some power which it does not possess. . . . Hence in inquiring for the causes of an effect, we leave time out of the question" (p. 223). Consequently we must conclude that "the notion of time as a real existence shows itself on every hand as a congeries of contradictions, and must be given up. As a whole, time does not exist, and reality is not in time any more than it is in space" (p. 224).

Having thus shown that time is not an objective reality, Professor Bowne inquires whether the ideality of time is any more tenable. As compared with space, he finds time

not so easily shown to be purely ideal, since "we have a clear experience of the possibility of thinking and feeling apart from space," whereas "with time the case is different. It enters into our entire mental life, and cannot by any means be escaped" (pp. 224, 225). Nevertheless, having found himself compelled to deny the reality of time, he cannot but adopt some form of idealism with relation to it. He cannot, however, assent to the Eleatic doctrine of the absolute changelessness of things—the doctrine which most readily harmonizes with the non-reality of time. He adopts, rather, the Heraclitic view, that all things are in a state of change; and his conclusion is that "time depends on change" (p. 237). "In the common thought time exists as a pre-condition of change; in our view change is first, and time is but its form. It has no other reality" (p. 237). In coming to this conclusion, the author, of course, finds it necessary to affirm that change does not presuppose time. His view, in brief, is that in the case of any particular change, say from A to A', there is succession, but not time (p. 237). "We have simply a relation of cause and effect, without any admixture of time-elements" (p. 234). "That which is between A and A" is not time, but the intervening numbers of the series, and the corresponding changes" (p. 236). "Succession is not in time, and difference in time means only difference of position in the series" (*ibid.*). "Change does not, indeed, require time; but it results in a new state which excludes, and hence succeeds, its predecessor. This fact of change is basal. It is not in time, and it does not require time; but it founds time; and time is but the form of change" (p. 237). "The rate of change is the rate of time; and the cessation of change would be the cessation of time" (*ibid.*).

This is the doctrine laid down. The author's own statement and elucidation are, of course, fuller and better than this; but I have endeavored to give the doctrine as full and fair a statement as space will allow. What now shall

be our judgment? The doctrine is by no means a new one. It is the favorite doctrine of those philosophic theologians who have argued that God, because immutable, is timeless. But while we must concede the real difficulties which beset the attempt to construe the concept of time without apparent self-contradictions, we must none the less insist that equal or greater difficulties attend the effort to describe and conceive time as purely subjective. Professor Bowne's doctrine rests purely on the alleged difficulties and contradictions involved in the common conception. He does not deny that the first and natural impressions are against his view, and that he is contending for what appears to be almost a contradiction of a direct intuition. His proposition is defended purely by logical considerations: he holds that, because the common view leads one into insoluble difficulties, we must abandon it and assume that time is merely a subjective conception. It is therefore appropriate, in examining his view, to ask whether it is itself any more free from such difficulties.

1. Let us, then, first examine the proposition that change "founds time." The question needs to be considered. Which conception, that of time, or that of change, logically precedes the other? The popular impression, beyond a doubt, is that time is the prior conception. One naturally thinks that a thing cannot change unless there is time for the change, that in an indivisible moment no change is possible. The common conception of change is that a thing is *now* different from what it was *before*; but this presupposes the conception of time. Men would naturally say that it is sheer contradiction and absurdity to say that a thing is different now from what it is now—that two different states of the same thing co-exist. But, says Professor Bowne, they do not co-exist. A and A' are mutually exclusive. A becomes A'; but no time can be said to intervene between the two states; A' succeeds A, but succession does not presuppose time. To this, however, we must reply that succession does presuppose time. No

definition of the notion of succession, as here used, can avoid presupposing the conception of time. If A' *succeeds* A, that can mean nothing but that it comes *after* A; and the word "after" can be defined only in terms which imply the antecedent conception of time. If the succession in question is not temporal succession, then no meaning can be attached to it. Professor Bowne says: "The ceasing of A and the becoming of A' are the same fact seen from opposite sides. Seen from behind, it is the ceasing of A; seen from before, it is the becoming of A'" (p. 84). But the question naturally arises, what does he mean when he speaks of seeing a fact from *before* and from *behind*? What is the front side and the back side of a fact? In short, what meaning can be attached to this language at all unless the term "before" is understood in a temporal sense? If the conception of change simply means that A and A' are unlike, but that the one replaces the other, what can determine us to say that A' succeeds A, rather than *vice versa*? We thus see how the notion of time is really involved and presupposed, even when the most diligent effort is made to eliminate it. And the difficulty with our author's theory is only increased when we find him emphatically denying that A and A' are in any proper sense identical. "When one member passes into another, its being becomes the being of the other. A acts as long as it exists, and A' acts as long as it exists" (p. 92). And when the question is raised, how then A' can be called another form of A any more than of an entirely different thing B, the answer is that A' can be developed from A, but not from B (pp. 90, 94). The cow can be developed from the calf, but not from the kitten. But may not the calf be developed from the cow? What right have we to insist only on the other order? If all we know of change is that it is the unlikeness of two things, one of which can be developed from the other, where do we get the conception of order, of succession, in the relation of the two? If change consists merely in the unlikeness,

then the two may be said to be co-existent as well as successive. If, as Professor Bowne affirms, no time intervenes when A passes into A', then the two, according to all the laws of thought and of language, do co-exist. To say that they are successive, and yet not temporally successive, is to use language that conveys no intelligible meaning. Professor Bowne cannot avoid implying the reality of time, even while denying it. He defines "being" as "whatever can act in any way, even for the shortest time" (p. 91). Again he says, "A acts as long as it exists" (p. 92). What can be the meaning of such language, if time is not objectively real? In attempting to define *being* he must be intending to define it as an *objective fact*, and not merely as a mental affection. Yet in the definition he implies that the existing thing *exists* and acts in *time*—not merely that it is *conceived* as existing in time. When he says that change does not require time, but "results in a new state which succeeds its predecessor" (p. 237), we have at least four words which imply that the conception of time is involved in the conception of change, and presupposed by it. First, change *results* in a state. No definition of "result" can be given which does not involve the conception of temporal succession; a resultant state is one that *follows* a pre-existent state, i. e., comes *after*, at a later *time*. Next, we are told that change results in a *new* state. "New" is antithetic to "old;" and the notion of time is inextricably involved in the conception. Unless the temporal notion is presupposed, the word has no meaning. The two states may be conceived to be *different*; but if time is not a reality, then all we can say by way of defining change is simply that a thing changes, or that two things, or two states of a thing, are different from one another; there can be no sense in calling the one *new* and the other *old*. Again, we are told that the new state *succeeds* its *predecessor*. That is, it comes *after* the one that goes *before* it. But if any one can tell what "after" and "before" mean, except in terms which pre-

suppose the conception of time, he will accomplish an heroic feat. It is simply impossible to speak of change without presupposing time; time is the prior conception.

The impossibility of being consistent in holding this doctrine of the subjective character of time may be still further illustrated by quotations from the chapter in question. Professor Bowne says: "Distinctions of time do not depend on any flow of absolute time, but on the flow of reality, and on the position of things in this flow. To say that there is time between distant members of the series, means only that reality changes in passing from one state to another; and the amount of time is not simply measured by the amount of change, but is nothing but the amount of change. The rate of change is the rate of time; and the cessation of change would be the cessation of time" (p. 237). Now what is meant by "the *rate* of change"? If the only objective fact in the case is simply change, or a variety of changes, whence comes the notion of a *rate*? What is the notion? No meaning can be attached to it except that it denotes the amount of change taking place in a certain *time*. If one train moves forty miles in an hour, and another only twenty, the rate of motion in the former is twice as great as in the other; but there can be no comparing of the two unless the notion of time is presupposed. If time is but a figment of the mind, how can it be said that there is any rate in the *motion*? Let it be supposed that one perceives the two trains in motion. They both start from the same point and reach the same terminus. That is the only objective fact, according to the theory in question. According to it we have no right to say that they actually start at the

a shorter *time*; but this makes time a "pre-condition" of our judgment. The idea of a *rate* of motion, or a *rate* of change of any kind, can have no meaning and no existence, unless the mind has *first* a conception of time which serves as a measure of the rate. This inconsistency in Professor Bowne's treatise is not relieved, but rather emphasized, by his utterance on the next page. "A world of thinking beings only would have no common time-measure; and each one would estimate time by the changes in his own consciousness. Psychologic time, in distinction from objective time, would alone exist. The impossibility of agreement in such a case is shown by the different estimates we form of time according to our circumstances. But the co-existence of thinking beings with an independent reality, which is also in incessant change, enables them to compare their individual times with a common time-piece; and thus the world-process furnishes to our minds a regulator whereby to adjust our time-estimates." What does this mean? "Psychologic time, in distinction from objective time, would alone exist"? Of course it would, on the author's theory; for he has just told us that "absolute time, as an independent reality, is purely a product of our thinking." Time, therefore, can have no objective reality. It is nothing "but the subjective aspect of change or becoming" (p. 229). What, then, could ever lead to the thought of *comparing* the "individual times"? How *can* they be compared? They are compared, we are told, "with a common time-piece." But how can there be such a thing? The vulgar mind has, to be sure, no difficulty. We see the moon revolving around the earth, and we can compare this with the diurnal rotation of the earth. We can make these motions a standard

fact is the change itself, then all comparison of the subjective aspects by a common standard becomes impossible. A common time-piece implies, as a pre-condition, a common notion of time. Different men, in order to have a common standard, must agree that a certain motion is uniform, or that two motions have a fixed relation to each other in point of rate. But that uniformity, or that fixed relation, cannot be conceived at all,—they have no meaning, unless there is antecedently a conception of time. Uniformity of motion means only passing over equal spaces in equal *times*. Difference of rate in motion means only that two motions of equal length in space occupy unequal *times*. We cannot form these conceptions, and so cannot come to the conception of a common time-piece, unless time is presupposed as a reality. The "world-process" cannot "furnish to our minds a *regulator* wherewith to adjust our time-estimates," unless the process itself is *regular*; and regularity in the objective process can have no meaning except there be a uniform relation to an objective *time*. Professor Bowne speaks of "the world-process" as if it were a unit which itself furnishes this unfailing regulator. But the world-process is a combination of the most diverse changes; and we get no time-piece till we have compared these changes with one another; and this comparison is impossible without the prior assumption of time as an objective reality. It is the more difficult to see how this "time-piece" is to be found, when we observe that, according to Professor Bowne, motion itself is only phenomenal, not real (p. 242). Space not being a reality, of course motion, which is conceivable only as a change of place, must also be called a mere subjective appearance. To be sure, he says that "motion is a form of change" (*ibid.*), and change he holds to be real (p. 237). The consequence

ently with his theory of space. But this being so, it is quite impossible to see how different persons can ever come to agree on a "common time-piece." Without it, we are told, each one would estimate time by the changes in his own consciousness. Now how is this to be remedied? Why, by finding a common time-piece in the motions which yet are themselves nothing but changes in each one's consciousness! To be sure, Professor Bowne does not here speak of *motions* as constituting the common time-piece; he goes on to speak of *change* as furnishing it. But it is notorious that it is motion, especially that of the heavenly bodies, which gives us our standard of time; and we cannot allow him to evade, in this way, the difficulty he himself has made.

That the notion of time is presupposed in that of change is furthermore shown by the fact that the opposite of change, viz., *changelessness*, implies the conception of time just as much as change does. To say that a thing does not change can mean only that it is at one *time* the same that it was at another. Professor Bowne's attempt to meet this difficulty is not successful. "The only reason for distinguishing separate times in the changeless would be the sequence of mental states in ourselves; and this sequence itself is change, and hence contrary to the hypothesis" (p. 227). Accordingly, he says, a changeless existence "simply is, and the distinction of past and future does not exist" (*ibid.*). But the fact that there is sequence in the mental states of one who affirms the changelessness of an object is not contrary to the hypothesis of the changelessness of *that object*; it is only contrary to the hypothesis of the mutability of *every thing*, including the thinking person. My judgment that a thing is to-day the same as it was yesterday, does not involve the judgment that *I* am in all respects absolutely changeless. Nor can it be said that the sequence of mental states in me is the only reason for my distinguishing separate times in the changeless; the reason is simply that the conception of time is pre-

supposed in both the conceptions of change and of changelessness. Whether any thing is strictly changeless or not, it is, of course, needless to discuss: we are here only concerned with the *conceptions*. And if, as we have seen, the conception of change presupposes that of time, equally does the conception of changelessness presuppose it. No one can write three sentences about the immutability of God without using language which implies that God exists in time, even while directly advocating the doctrine of his timelessness. Change and changelessness are conceptions contradictory of one another, but both depending on the conception of time, and having no meaning except as time is presupposed.

2. We come to the same result when we ask this question: If, as Professor Bowne affirms, change "founds time;" if "change is first, and time is but its form," what occasion is there for having the notion of time at all? How did mankind ever come to think of time, if change is the only objective reality in the case? What relation has the notion of time to that of change, that the former should be evolved from the latter? How can the notion of time be abstracted or derived from that of change, if change is not only the prior reality, but the only reality in the case? Sometimes time is affirmed to be the relation of motions to one another—the conception apparently being that a comparison of the velocity of motions yields the conception of time. But the notion of velocity presupposes that of time, since velocity means that an object moves a certain distance in a certain time; and the comparison of two velocities, of course, equally involves time as an antecedent condition of the comparison. The general phrase, relation of motions, of itself might refer only to direction in space, and not suggest the notion of time at all. As soon as we limit the term so as to give it other than a local reference, we at once presuppose time in defining velocity. But it is, if possible, still more difficult to see how the notion of time can come out of that of

change in general. Change is of quite various kinds. There are changes of form, of color, of density, of location, of chemical constitution, etc. What is the one common element in this variety of changes which not only suggests, but absolutely compels, the conception of a certain something—time—which is instinctively regarded as the necessary condition of all changes, if yet, in point of fact, change is the antecedent condition of time? If time is so unreal a thing, how should men have come so unanimously to think about it, and talk about it, and be even absolutely unable to think or talk without assuming it to be real? Time cannot be defined as an exact synonym of change; it is not the common feature of all changes; for this common feature the word “change” is enough. What possible explanation can be given of this mental phenomenon, which adds nothing to our knowledge, and seems to exist only for the sake of deluding men in general and of giving metaphysicians an opportunity to exercise their acumen? To say that time is “the subjective aspect of change” (p. 231) is to use words which mean nothing, or at least nothing to the point. The subjective aspect of change is simply the mental conception of change; it is change as viewed by the mind; if we conceive of change as really change, that is the subjective aspect of the matter. In so far as time plays a part in the conception, it takes the form that time is *not* merely the subjective aspect of change, but that the objective change itself takes place in time. And when the metaphysician tells us that this is a mistaken notion, we can only reply, That is possible; but at any rate that is what the notion *is*. The notion that things exist and change in time is as necessary and inexpugnable as that they exist or change at all. Metaphysicians have not been wanting who have declared the latter notion also to be a delusion. This too is thinkable; and very grave difficulties and contradictions can be shown to inhere in the notion of change. Professor Bowne, in the earlier part of his book, has to wrestle vigorously in order to

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overcome the difficulties. We need not consider whether he is wholly successful; for we agree with him that things do change. And we presume that he agrees with us in our reason for this judgment, viz., that we perceive the changes. We must trust *some* of our faculties and intuitions, or else flounder in a boundless and fathomless sea of doubt.

But to come back to our question. If the notion of change logically precedes that of time, whence comes the latter notion at all? Professor Bowne says, "In the common thought time exists as a pre-condition of change; in our view change is first, and time is but its form" (p. 237). But this is still no answer to our question. What is meant here by "form"? This is a "space-metaphor" which sheds absolutely no light on the subject. Of what shape is this form? Does the shape correspond with the various changes, so that we really have, not one form, but numberless forms, of time? Of course no such nonsense is meant. The word, though borrowed from conceptions of space, is not intended in a spatial sense. Very well; what *is* the sense, then? To the mind change is simply change. What is meant by saying that time is the mental form of change? Since time as an objective reality is denied, "time" here must mean simply the notion of time; and the statement then is that the notion of time is the form of change. But, for one, I am utterly unable to attach any meaning to such language. Or if some meaning must be attached to it, it can be only this: that in thinking of change one cannot help thinking of time as implied in the change. But this means that time is conceived to *be* a reality—which Professor Bowne denies. The upshot of the matter, then, is that, by saying that time is the form of space, it can only be meant that time is that delusion of the mind which arises in consequence of the perception of change—the delusive notion that change cannot take place without real time as an antecedent condition of it, a delusion so imperious that it not only overmasters the think-

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ing of the masses, but forces itself into the speculations of the very metaphysicians who are gigantically struggling to eject it. These phrases, "form of change," and "subjective aspect of change," as definitions of time, are mere phrases. They convey no meaning, unless it be the meaning that the universal notion which men have of time is a lying notion. If that is the meaning, it would be better to state it more plainly.

The confusion of thought unavoidable in one who undertakes to carry out a theory which is at war with our fundamental conceptions can be further illustrated in what Professor Bowne says about the *co-existence* of things. He says: "A and Aⁿ, though not separate in any absolute time, are nevertheless not co-existent; for their relations are such that the existence of either excludes the other" (p. 237). "Change is real, and change cannot be conceived without succession. In this sense the world-process is in time" (*ibid.*). How are we to understand this? A and Aⁿ are "not separate in any absolute time," yet, in the sense of succession, the world-process is in time. But what distinction is meant between *absolute* time, whose reality is wholly denied, and this time in a certain sense, which he recognizes? The *succession* which is involved in change, he is careful to say, does not mean that any time intervenes between the two states; neither do they co-exist, for this would imply time; they simply exclude one another; "one member exists to the exclusion of all the rest. Hence the other members do not exist in a non-temporal realm, but do not exist at all" (*ibid.*). Very well; this may provisionally be allowed to pass: yet the question still remains unanswered, why time in *any* sense is assumed. But a greater difficulty looms up. Our author's argument all along proceeds not only on the assumption that change precedes time in thought but

A'; yet one can be developed out of the other; and so, he says, we may have a process by which A becomes Aⁿ. And this process, subjectively construed, yields the conception of time. But though no time, strictly speaking, intervenes between A and Aⁿ, yet, we are told, they do not co-exist: they succeed one another in the sense that they exclude one another. Very well; let this be imagined to be clear and satisfactory. But nothing is more patent than that our notion of time is not limited to the changes in a series represented by A Aⁿ. For we speak and think of *distinct events*, such as Professor Bowne would represent by A and B, as *succeeding* one another. We say, e. g., not only that the infant John Milton preceded the adult John Milton, but that John Milton in general lived on the earth before the recent eruption of Mt. Etna. The notion of time in the one case is just the same as in the other. The fact that the adult Milton was "developed out of" the infant Milton, whereas the eruption of Mt. Etna was in no way developed out of Milton, does not make the temporal succession in the former case any more real or clear than in the latter. If time is nothing but the subjective aspect of change, it is impossible to see why we predicate temporal succession of two events or things respecting which no one thinks of one as having been changed into the other.

But this is not all. We not only speak and think of unrelated events as succeeding one another in time; we also just as naturally speak of unrelated and distinct events as being *contemporaneous*. I may conceive of an apple as falling and a dog as barking at the same time. What "subjective aspect of change" gives me this notion of simultaneousness? The barking of the dog is not "developed out of" the falling of the apple, nor *vice versa*. The two events are *different*, and yet are associated as taking place *together*. Professor Bowne says: "The members of

tween the two series; and this mutual exclusion makes it impossible ever to regard the members of a time-series as co-existent" (p. 236). Here confusion is worse confounded. What is meant by a "space-series"? Things having a causal or inherent connection with each other? Clearly not; for those most generally are successive. All the objects in a room, e. g., the chairs, the table, the books, the lamp, co-exist. They cannot be called a "space-series" in any clearly defined sense; but they certainly co-exist in every proper sense of the word, as much as the members of any space-series can be said to co-exist. But whether they form a space-series or not, the question arises, What is meant by their *co-existing*? Co-existing in time? What can this mean, if the notion of time is purely a mental product and results solely from the observation of changes in things? For change, we are told, implies the mutual exclusion of the states of the changing thing; these states cannot co-exist. The affirmation of co-existence is, therefore, inconsistent with the affirmation of change; but since time, according to our author, is *nothing* but the "form of change," co-existence is a conception which can have no application to it. Consequently the co-existence of the members of a space-series cannot, in Professor Bowne's mind, be a co-existence in time. Are these members, then, co-existent in space? This would be the obvious alternative conclusion; but, inasmuch as space also has been declared to be a purely subjective aspect of things, we are debarred from adopting it. And, indeed, the author himself expressly rejects the proposition. "Are then," he says, "all things together in space? No; they are neither together nor separate, for both of these predicates imply space, and we must not tacitly assume what we have openly denied" (p. 196). What then shall we conclude? Things are not *together* in space, but the members of a space-series (whatever that may be) do *co-exist*! Unless we are quietly to assent to a sheer contradiction, we seem to be driven back to the assumption that the co-existence

is meant in a temporal sense. But if the ideality of space is a sufficient reason for saying that things cannot be together in space, the ideality of time is an equally good reason for denying that things can co-exist in time; and, besides, time has been defined to be merely the subjective aspect of *change*, and change is declared to exclude co-existence; and consequently we are driven from this resting place. All is in confusion, then, on our author's theory; but the simple fact is, as above pointed out, that we affirm the *simultaneousness* of the events just as naturally as their *succession*, according as they appear to us simultaneous or successive. And both simultaneousness and succession are *temporal* conceptions. It is purely arbitrary to make the succession of changes to be the foundation of the notion of time. The fact that we can and do affirm that different things co-exist in time, even when they have no causal or logical connection with each other, is a sufficient disproof of the theory. It would be as sensible to say that the notion of time is the subjective aspect of simultaneity, as to say that it is the subjective aspect of change and succession. The fact that these two *opposite* notions are both equally *temporal* notions, is a demonstrative proof that the general notion of time is not derived from the perception of succession alone. The distinction above considered between space and time reminds us of Ulrici's observation that time is the *Nacheinander* (the After-one-another, the succession) of things, whereas space is the *Nebeneinander* (the Side-by-side-ness, the juxtaposition) of things (*Glauben und Wissen*, p. 106). This sounds, at first blush, very neat, if not even very profound; but a closer examination dissolves it into nothing. Things are both *nacheinander* and *nebeneinander* in time, and both *nebeneinander* and *nacheinander* in space. In time two

of space-relations and of time-relations, so that the two terms do not define the distinction between space and time, but must in each case be defined by that distinction.

3. The doctrine under consideration virtually gives the lie to our necessary intuitions. This has already been intimated, but needs to be more formally stated. I am aware that Professor Bowne has small respect for intuitions, which, he says, are always resorted to when argument fails. Nevertheless, even he will hardly undertake to establish everything by mere logic. There must be some ultimate truths and ultimate intuitions. We need not insist on the term "intuition." The point is to inquire, What is involved in our notion of time? When we have the notion, what is directly or implicitly affirmed? Is it a constituent part of the notion that things, as such, exist in time, or not? There is no question what the popular answer would be. Common-sense answers that events are *really* successive or simultaneous. When it is affirmed that Franklin lived after Shakespeare, but at the same time with Washington, men mean that this affirmation is true to objective reality. They mean that it is inconceivable and impossible that, in conformity with truth, it can be affirmed either that Franklin and Shakespeare were contemporaries, or that, strictly speaking, they did not exist in time at all. To say that a person did not and does not exist in time is to affirm that he exists at no time, i. e., never, i. e., not at all. Of course, one may say that all this is mere appearance, that in another mode of existence we might have no conception of temporal relations at all. Kant, replying to those who affirm the reality of change, as proving the objective reality of time, can do no better than say: "If I myself, or another being, could see myself without this condition of sense, then those same modifications which we now conceive as changes would give us a cognition in which the conception of time, and therefore also of change, would not arise at all" (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, § 7). This appeal to imaginary beings or imag-

inary states can hardly be called a cogent style of reasoning. It would be equally valid to say that, in another state of being, to us now quite inconceivable, we may find all these difficulties which now beset the conception of time to be entirely invalid and due only to the limitations of our earthly and sensuous constitution. Any thing can be made out by this method of dealing with metaphysical problems. J. Stuart Mill's famous conjecture that in some mode of existence two and two may seem to be five, is a good specimen of the use that may be made of it. There is no limit to the number of things which can be proved in this convenient way. Professor Bowne cannot be charged with attempting to evade difficulties by resorting to this device. But since he does not deny that he seems to be in conflict with the dictum of intuition, we must consider how he defends himself. In his chapter on space he meets the charge, which may be brought against him, that his view "makes space a delusion." And his defence is to this effect: That may be real, which exists only in the mind. Love and goodness are not unreal simply because they exist only in the free spirit. So it is found that the world of sense-qualities has no objective existence, but are "only affections of the subject." But they do not thereby become unreal and delusive. "That which exists for thoughtless common-sense as a colored object, exists for reflection as a collection of vibrating elements." So space, which the unreflecting mind regards as an objective reality, is found to be a mental principle. But it "does not become on this account an unreal delusion. All that was true of space and space-relations, and of objects in space-relations, remains true still. For the pure reason, reality exists without

behind them to something which, though their ground, is still without the predicates of the appearances" (pp. 197-9).

Now it is, perhaps, a sufficient reply to all this to say that the same kind of argumentation will serve the cause of pure Berkeleianism. The idealist may say, "I do not deny the reality of all that is real in the world. I only say that the reality is in the mind rather than out of it. Things may *seem* to be external and material; but they are not really so. Reason has found out that this first impression is a mistaken one." But notwithstanding strong leanings to idealism, Professor Bowne can hardly accept this conclusion (pp. 456-472), though his chief reason for hesitation lies in his unwillingness to believe that God would be guilty of "such a tissue of deceit and magic" as this extreme doctrine implies. His own conclusion, however, does not fall much short of this. He adopts what he would call "phenomenalism," by which he means that "matter and material things have no ontological, but only a phenomenal, existence" (p. 466). "The world in itself, apart from mind, is simply a form of the divine energizing, and has its complete existence only in thought" (p. 472). But this seems to be so in conflict with the verdict of common-sense that he is obliged again to defend himself against the charge of holding that we are the victims of delusion. He insists on the distinction between subjectivity and delusion, and again appeals to the admitted demonstration that color, sound, etc., are not the objective facts which the popular and unsophisticated impression conceive them to be, but are only subjective states. Now, once for all, we must say that this talk about the subjectivity of the so-called secondary qualities is itself delusive and sophistical. No doubt, in the full sense, there is no such thing as taste till a tasting animal has the sensation of taste. No doubt the sensation of sound

correct, and the differences of color depend on the differences of undulations. Sound undoubtedly depends on the vibrations of the air. But what of all that? The possibility of correcting, or of explaining, the popular impression respecting sense-perceptions, *itself requires the assumption of a real external world*. Though color be nothing but undulations, yet there must be *something* which undulates. And this something is assumed by the physicist to be a real objective thing; his theory requires it. Furthermore, his theory assumes that there is not only a material external substance which undulates, but that the undulations are *caused by the qualities of other material substances*. The sensation of redness, for example, he explains by assuming that there is something in a given body (assumed to be objectively real) causing a particular kind of undulations, which, when they reach the eye, produce a sensation which is described as perceiving a red surface. Now to say that redness is purely subjective is a grossly mistaken inference from the scientific theory of light. The *sensation* of color is no doubt subjective; but the *cause* of that sensation is conceived to be objective. That which determines that a sensation shall be of red rather than of yellow is *in the objective thing*, not in the percipient person; and those *different qualities* in the things which produce the different sensations are still properly called the *colors* of the *things*. Color, therefore, is not purely subjective; it is no more subjective, from a scientific point of view, than it is from the popular point of view. Science has only explained somewhat of the process through which the color of the things reaches the eye. So with regard to heat. Let it be that heat is only a mode of motion, and that it is not an objective substance distinct from the body which is heated. Still it is a motion of *something*, and of something external to the percipient person. At least the scientists, whose conclusions are appealed to by the idealist or phenomenalist, so view the case. And it is impossible to take any other consistent

view of it. Common-sense may have to accept certain corrections; but those corrections are all founded on the assumption that the general impression concerning the reality of the external world is correct. Without that assumption the correction itself would be impossible. When one, therefore, from the imperfect and inaccurate impressions cherished by plain men infers that the whole notion of an external material world is illusory, he is like one who, in sawing off the limb of a tree, saws off the part he himself is sitting on. No amount of "ethical trust in God" will keep such a man from falling to the ground.

This is our first answer to our author's self-defence against the charge of holding that we are the victims of delusion. Another is, that the intuitions of time and of space are materially different from the sense-perceptions which furnish us with the conceptions of particular objects with particular definite qualities. The principle that whatever takes place must take place in time is an ultimate, general principle, not dependent on the varying impressions yielded by empirical perception. This principle *underlies* all these varying impressions and perceptions; it is as universal and necessary to the mind as the principle of causality, or of right. It is as fundamental as the principles of logic. It even underlies the logical principles themselves. Thus, e. g., the law of contradiction (or non-contradiction) is expressed by the formula, that A cannot be both A and not-A. But, in order to make it strictly true, we must add, "at the same time." It is not unqualifiedly true to say that Paul cannot be both a Christian and a non-Christian, unless we say or mean that he cannot be both *at once*. The notion of time is thus seen to be fundamental even to these most necessary and intuitive laws of thought. This notion is also essentially involved in the principle of *causality*. The cause *precedes* the effect; we cannot reverse the order. Some men have been bold enough to deny the reality of causation as commonly conceived; but it is noteworthy that, while denying this, they

have yet held to the validity of the notion of time. They have tried to resolve cause and effect into a mere relation of *antecedence* and *consequence*; but this implies the reality of time. One may, indeed, attempt to escape the force of this by saying that causality does not presuppose time—that logical, or causal, antecedence is not to be confounded with chronological antecedence. But this does not do away with the fact that men instinctively and everywhere do regard time as presupposed in the relations of cause and effect. The very terms “antecedent” and “consequent” are borrowed from time-conceptions. Now, if a conception which thus forces itself into our most necessary and fundamental intuitions is to be regarded as nothing but an illusion, it must be equally easy to deny the validity of all intuitions. Every thing can be made purely subjective; every thing can be regarded as a mere seeming. And when one attempts to escape from the charge of landing us in universal and hopeless scepticism by appealing, as Professor Bowne does, to the veracity of God, there is this obvious difficulty in the way of regarding the attempt as satisfactory, viz.: If we may deny the validity of the notion of time,—a notion which is found to be essential to all thinking, and forces itself into the thinking and language even of those who are trying to get rid of it,—then how can we be any more sure of the validity of those other mental principles on the strength of which we infer that there *is* a God of veracity? Professor Bowne’s intense and bold theism we must admire. His proofs of the weakness of atheism are worthy of all admiration. But does he not, by his dangerous approach to pure idealism, undermine the structure of his own theistic argument? That argument presupposes the reality

dency to conceive of actions and events as taking place in time. If the latter notion may be pronounced a mere appearance, not true to outward fact, why not the other also? If one chooses, he can conjure up many metaphysical puzzles in connection with the notion of causality; and it is well known that some of the acutest philosophers in the world have denied the reality of causation. There is, in fact, no argument for it except the impossibility of thinking it away; and this argument is equally strong in favor of the reality of time. We have seen that even those who think they can do away with the reality of causation nevertheless assume the reality of time. We have seen that the notion of time is presupposed in that of cause. It is therefore only pure caprice which can single out the intuition of time as illusory, and yet hold fast to that of causation as valid. And a theistic argument which rests on the validity of one intuition, while another, equally or even more ineradicable, is arbitrarily pronounced worthless, can hardly be expected to be conclusive to those who admit the right to deal thus with the intuitions. If time is an illusion, cause may be likewise an illusion; and if cause is an illusion, then the theistic argument resting on the reality of it is also an illusion; and of course it becomes futile to appeal to the veracity of God in behalf of the truthfulness of our impressions concerning the reality of an outward world, after the proof of the existence of such a God has been thus undermined.

We must therefore maintain, in spite of Professor Bowne's disclaimer, that his theory does, if true, prove that men are the victims of delusion. He may call the delusion subjectivity, but the new name does not change the thing. Those who call a spade a spade will prefer to call the intuition a delusion, or a cheat, or a lie. There is no escape, on the theory in question, from absolute scepticism. One may think that he has detected the delusion, and thenceforth knows where he stands. But he cannot

detect it without assuming the trustworthiness of some *other* intuitions no better accredited than this; and so one finds himself in a bottomless quagmire of doubt. It is a comparatively easy matter to admit the inaccuracy of certain impressions derived from sense-perception, on the strength of more careful and complete observation. But we cannot become convinced of the inaccuracy unless we trust the fundamental intuition that there is an external world, and that we can *know* something about it. And this intuition is not more deep-seated and ineradicable than the necessity of thinking that time is a reality.

4. But, it may be said, here are, after all, the contradictions and absurdities which have been shown by Professor Bowne and others to be involved in the notion that time is an objective reality. What shall be done with them? It might be sufficient to reply that, inasmuch as we have found the denial of the reality of time to involve at least an equal amount of absurdity and self-contradiction, we cannot be much impressed with the conclusions of this argument against the reality of time. And inasmuch as on our part we have a positive and ineradicable law of thought, whereas on the other side there is an attempt—but an unsuccessful one—to escape this law, we might rest satisfied to leave the controversy where it is. But we may go further, and see whether, after all, these contradictions are so serious as they are made to seem. Professor Bowne's arguments are as follows: (1) The believers in time are accused of "sinning against the law of reason, which forbids all plurality of independent principles" (p. 219). It is not clear how this is to be understood. Is it meant that there is only *one* independent principle? Apparently; but if so, the proposition can be assented to only on the assumption that the meaning is that there can be but one Absolute Being—one God. This of course we will not deny. We may also admit the

At least, we can admit that, if there were no being, there could be no thought about being or about time; and in that case it would be impracticable to discuss the question whether time still existed; there would be no use to discuss it. But we need not be troubled by this argument. Reason—at least, most men's reason—is quite ready to admit the existence of any number of principles that are sufficiently vouched for. Professor Bowne apparently lays a good deal of stress on the word “independent” in this connection. But this is a diversion from the main point. Is time a *reality*? That is the question. Is it a reality out of the mind, or is it only a way of thinking? We affirm that it is an objective reality, and that in so doing we no more “sin against the law of reason” than Professor Bowne does when he affirms the objective reality of *change*. Some men, in their passion for reducing every thing to the utmost simplicity and unity, have denied the reality of change. Why not call change, too, a subjective aspect of things? So with regard to causality. Is that an objective reality, or not? Professor Bowne would not deny it, we are sure. We do not say that cause or change is an *independent* reality; but we do say that both causality and change are objective facts; they are not mere modes of thinking. How many such principles are to be admitted as true, depends wholly on mental experience—upon the careful interrogation of consciousness.

But we advance to our author's next argument. (2) He says, “The view which regards time as a real existence is hopelessly unclear and inconsistent in its assumptions and implications” (*ibid.*). And then he goes on to give the proof of this in the manner briefly indicated at the beginning of this article. Now when we narrowly examine this argument, what do we find it to be? We find it to be this: Time, whether considered as a “flow,” or as a space, or “channel,” through which events flow, is equally inconceivable; in the first case the flow needs

something to flow in; in the second case, time would be conceived as a stationary channel all parts of which, past, present, and future, are equally real. By ringing the changes on this representation many funny absurdities are evolved. What shall we say then? Is time a flow—something which moves along as a train moves on the rails? No. Is it then a sort of channel in which events move? No. It is neither the one nor the other. These are both figures borrowed from space-conception, which cannot be carried out without involving apparent absurdities. It is easy and natural to fall into the use of such phraseology. Indeed, it may be unavoidable. So all our language is originally borrowed from space-conceptions. *Right* means *straight*. But if a man insists on making the two conceptions identical or even parallel, he will only make a fool of himself. A murderer in shooting his victim may take a *straight* aim, and his bullet may go *straight* to the other man's heart; but in spite of the straightness of the action, we call it wrong, not right. So although we may speak of time under the figure of space, the phraseology must always be understood as only conditionally correct. What then, it may be asked, is time, if it is not something which flows, nor something in which events flow, and yet is an objective reality? We reply: Time is time. It is an ultimate conception. It cannot be defined in terms which do not involve the prior existence of the conception. We refuse to be dragged into the pitfalls which are laid for us by one who assumes that we really think that time is a form of space, and on the strength of that assumption prepares to entrap us. Professor Bowne himself, after having exhibited the inconsistencies of the above-mentioned representations of time, says: "Their exceeding clearness and self-evidence are due to the space-metaphors in which the doctrines are

"metaphors" must be perfectly accurate in every direction? When a man tries to "make a parable walk on all fours," who is to blame, the parable or the man? Or when, as in the present case, it is argued, as if against us, that the parable cannot be made to *run* on all four, we can only reply with the utmost cheerfulness, Very true. But when it is inferred that time, because not accurately described in terms borrowed from qualities of space, is therefore not a reality, we can only wonder at the logic.

But it is urged again, What is time? Is it a substance? Is it something that can be put side by side with material or spiritual realities as distinct from them, yet co-existent with them? Of course not. But what then? Is it a *quality* of substances, as form, color, hardness, etc. are predicated of objects of sight and touch? No. We certainly do not so conceive of time. Well then, it is triumphantly concluded, if time is neither a substance nor a quality of substances, then it must be *nothing*, it must be unreal; since there can be no object of thought which must not be classed either under the category of substances or of attributes. But we are not even yet dismayed—no, not even if it should have to be conceded that time cannot properly be called a *relation* of things. "Relation" is itself a word of very general and vague meaning. If any one should define time as a certain relation of things, the natural rejoinder would be, What *kind* of a relation? And the answer to this question would inevitably involve the conception of time as already existent. What Professor Bowne says of motion (p. 242) may certainly also be said of time; it "is indefinable, except in terms of itself." Consequently, though one should insist that time, not being a substance, nor an attribute of substance, nor a relation of substances, must be a nonentity—a mere figment or "form" of mental action, we need not be at all alarmed. We can only insist that we cannot think without assuming the reality of time, and that, if time cannot be defined by terms borrowed from other conceptions

and relations, that only proves that the conception is an ultimate and fundamental one; it is the conclusive proof of the validity of the conception. Probably a straight line has never yet been defined accurately in language which did not presuppose the previous conception of a straight line. But for that very reason we all the more believe in the validity of the conception.

But once more Professor Bowne argues against the common conception of time, that it cannot, as ordinarily supposed, "condition all change and activity." For, he says, in that case time would be "an agent" (p. 223). But time, he argues, cannot be regarded as a cause: "no one views time as causal. . . . Hence in inquiring for the causes of an effect, we leave time out of the question" (*ibid*). "It neither acts nor is acted upon, but remains a mere ghost outside of being, contributing nothing and determining nothing" (p. 224). Hence it is finally concluded that "the notion of time as a real existence must be given up" (*ibid*). But let us see. Is there no distinction between "condition" and "cause"? It is a condition of the possibility of opening a book that the book be shut. When now the book is opened, can it properly be said that its being shut is the *cause* of its being opened? Time, we are told, cannot condition change, unless it is an *agent*. Is the *shutness* of the book an *agent* in opening it? Is there not an unconscious logical jugglery in this argument against the reality of time? Let us see what, by a similar process, and even more legitimately, may be made out of Professor Bowne's own doctrine. "Change is real," he says (p. 237), and "time depends on change" (p. 227). Very good. Time, whatever it is, *depends* on change, i. e., in some sense is *caused* by it. But the cause being real, the effect must be real. Therefore time is real. Or let us take the notion of change itself. Is change a *thing*? or a *property* of things? No, clearly. Is it, then, a *relation* of things? Well, yes—or no, according as one chooses to look at it. But if yes, *what* relation?

Why, this; A' is related to A as having been "developed out of it." That is (for the phrase means nothing else), A is *changed* into A'. In other words, change is defined "in terms of itself." In short, we find that we have simply affirmed the reality of change, though it is not an independent thing, nor a quality of a thing, nor any relation of things which can be defined otherwise than by presupposing the conception to be defined. We are just as badly off as in regard to time itself. And yet "change is real," while time is "a ghost"!

There are many other reflections suggested by Professor Bowne's discussions. But all things must end; and it is time that this discussion should end, for the present at least.

ARTICLE II.

OUTCOMES OF THE BIBLE NOT FOUND IN THE BIBLE.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR I. E. DWINELL, D.D., OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA.

IN some fitting matrix in nature's laboratory, in a mountain gorge, suppose there are brought together carbon and a peculiar crystallizing force. It makes no difference for the present purpose whether this force is inherent in the carbon when in a certain state, or is a foreign principle. Suppose the two together in the same matrix and under favorable conditions. At first they are simply carbon and a crystallizing energy. If the pocket could be inspected, all that could be found would be these two; possibly all that could be *detected* would be the carbon, but the other is there also. Let the years or ages roll on, till the work in this laboratory is done, then

inspect the result. Now in the matrix is a beautiful crystal. Carbon and a crystallizing energy were put in: there comes out a diamond. Something like this takes place with the Bible. Certain elements and forces were put in which in the progress of ages enter into new combinations, and come forth in a higher product.

Friendly students and critics of the Bible confine their attention almost exclusively to finding out what was formally put in; and they differ widely in their judgments on this point. But they miss, by this process, many of the new creations into which the truths and forces, apparent in it or hiding between the lines, are at length slowly evolved in the sight of the world. Here is an interesting and curious phenomenon; and it may be well to inquire what actually comes out of the Bible which analysis does not detect in it; into what new and rare crystals its own elements and forces, however prominent or hidden and slumbering, have in the process of time really shaped themselves in the world's higher thought and faith. The inquiry does not relate to the way in which the book has lifted itself up in the sight of men by its effects. That is a very different subject, a very familiar and interesting one. But what new combinations have the new-creative forces and elements lurking in the Bible taken on and effected? We are looking, not at the contributions it has made to human welfare out in the world, but at the change which has taken place in its own forces and quality in the view of the world, making it practically a different Book. What larger, richer Bible and Bible-force have we from this transformation?

It may help us into this subject to call to mind that there are remarkable forces in reserve in this Book, in its original latent potencies. Many things are in it that are not discovered till they are needed, and then come forth to meet the emergency. It carries concealed tapers packed away in it, which are not lighted, and can not be lighted, till the world comes up to the fulness of time for

them : as the earth carried in its dark depths for ages the supplies of coal and petroleum to meet the future wants of man. In the Bible are many principles, ideas, spiritual forces, which are not revealed nakedly, but are interwoven with an historical process. They are of the divine warp of history, covered over and hidden or obscured by the woof of concrete facts. Now this composite web, having human and divine threads, is set up for the study and guidance of man ; and whenever the time comes when one of the divine threads, running darkly through it, is needed to influence the current affairs of the world, it strangely becomes visible, a thread of gold, and takes on divine authority and power. Other truths are in the Book which are seen, but remain unmeaning, unknown, mysterious, for long ages. They walk the sacred pages like veiled oriental women, no one knowing them or their object—practical mysteries. But when they are really needed, they throw off the veil, and speak and act as messengers from another world.

This is a familiar truth. John Robinson referred to it when he expressed his belief that more light was yet to break forth from God's word. Vinet hints the ground of this when he says, "The Bible includes many more truths than it expresses." (*Homiletics*, p. 98.) Even Daniel Webster assumes the role of a prophet. "There is more valuable truth," he says, "yet to be gleaned from the Sacred writings, that has thus far escaped the attention of commentators, than from all other sources of human knowledge combined." (*O. T. Student*, iv. 159.) But the bearing of this truth in practically changing the character of the Book seems to have been overlooked. It leads to a peculiar process of Biblical Evolution. The glory which thus comes out of the Book from time to time—which is all the time, in fact, coming out of it during the ages—forms a nimbus about it, and the nimbus imperceptibly blends with it and henceforth constitutes a part of it, in the popular conception.

We now turn to some of the different departments of truth in the Bible, and mark this process.

First, take the *Conception of God*. There is danger, in speaking of the barrenness of the biblical conception of God, as expressed in the literature of the Bible, of looking too much to an early period of Revelation, or to a dark age, or to persons of special blindness. It is no easy matter to collect and concentrate the scattered rays on this subject, shining from the letter of Revelation, and so contrast the original Scriptural idea of God with that which has since grown up in the world's faith from Scriptural germs. Certain parts of the conception, however, as of the *Natural Attributes*, it must be clear to every one, shine forth to our view in a much grander and juster form, than could have been possible in the biblical age. The universe was then a contracted universe. The endless reaches of worlds upon worlds above, and the unmeasured reaches of worlds beneath worlds below—each series revealing the perfect touches of the Creator's skill—were unknown. The conception of his almightiness, omnipresence, skill, drawn from the Bible at first, had no occasion to go beyond the demands of the known cosmos at that time. Since then the universe has expanded a thousand-fold in every direction, and a thousand times intensified at each point the signs of the Creator's wondrous presence. This has afforded an opportunity for the biblical conception to enlarge itself and it has improved it. It covers now the same attributes, but they are inconceivably grander and more wonderful. The Natural Characteristics have the same names still, but they compass the enlarged universe, play about it and through it, and are immanent in it, quite as completely as they did, to the biblical mind, about the contracted universe. The materials for the grander idea lay in the Bible all the time, but it was necessary for science to erect a scaffolding on which the thought of the world could go

out to see it. Science is the occasion, the Bible the source of the grander conception.

The *Moral Attributes* afford a fuller illustration of the process.

Go back to the biblical age. Step out of the atmosphere of modern thought into that of the letter of Revelation. Look at every thing in that light. Study the character of God, beginning at Genesis, and—shifting the point of view with each new writer, as more light comes in—come down to the end of the Bible. Now combine all the parts of this conception in one moral portrait. You have, by this process, a God of holiness and love, justice and pity, but amid confusing elements. These traits are in Scripture, but they are mingled, more or less, with a divine administration levelled down to the current needs of low and sinful natures, coarse and perverse subjects, and, so, obscuring at times the real glory of the divine character. But the spiritual conception insensibly rises, like an apparition, from the scriptural congeries. It takes time, long inspection sympathetic mind, cumulative insight from age to age, to see the transcendent Divine Ideal, issuing in all its spiritual glory from such fragmentary statements, and such hand-to-hand concrete dealings with mankind. It requires a moral training in the race to catch and retain it. The human soul, like the photographic plate, must be itself treated to have it take and hold the ethereal image whose elements have been thrown upon it.

Look at the process in the case of a single source,—the highest source of this conception,—the life of Christ. This has been for nearly nineteen centuries raying light into the thought of the world concerning the character of God. This light has not passed out into the regions of space and been lost, but has been slowly cumulating in the world's faith, furnishing a truer, grander, diviner idea of God. It was impossible for the world as it was in the time of Christ to see all the pure theistic

light there was radiating from him; impossible for him to give to that age all of it which he had to give to mankind. As the "effulgence of God's glory and the very image of his substance," (*Revision*, Heb. i. 2.), it required millennia of this shining on the world, before he could put mankind in possession of all he had to reveal of the nature of God. Has he done it yet?

Thus all the enrichment and transfiguration of the world's conception of God has come forth from elements in the Bible. It is an emanation from it coming to the race as it has travelled out on the scaffoldings of experience and progress. And if man should see a thousand times farther out into the universe, up and down, or have from his future training a spiritual insight as much keener into the glories of the divine character, the elements of this conception issuing from the Bible would throw their elastic folds about him and be ample for the new conditions. The biblical conception, expressed, is one thing; the spiritual conception, slowly emerging from the biblical elements,—from the sublime revelations, scattered statements, historical hints, condescensions to the disciplinary needs of rude ages, nebulous thought, *disjecta membra*, and especially from the person and life of Christ,—at last meeting, combining, and shining like a sun before the world in modern thought, is quite another thing.

If we pass to *Theology* in the broad sense, we find the same process going on. Theology, in the sense of a theological system, is not found in the Bible. The apostle Paul, if any one, is the scriptural theologian. He proclaims great truths; as, the sovereignty of God, the lost state of man, the sacrificial nature of Christ's death, pardon and peace or justification through faith in Christ, the inextinguishable love of God to those who are united to his Son, the equality of believers, the unity of the church; but he makes no attempt to give a full statement of doctrines, much less does he put them into a system. They are thrown out as great motives or powers of con-

viction, into hot argument. They are entangled with practical discussions and personal appeals. They are like the roots of a plant growing in a glass jar too small for them, and running in every direction, involved, and intertwined, in inextricable confusion. Besides, Saint Paul gave only one side of the great composite, many-sided scriptural truth. The other elements of Christian doctrine must be brought out from the other sources. They are widely scattered among the sacred writers. They lie, perhaps long buried, in widely separated realms of biblical thought. They are mixed with utterances relating to God, man, nature, the world, redemption. They hide behind masks of biblical history, ethics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, even scriptural secularism. All the elements must be found, brought out, collected into a system, each in its place, to have the latent biblical Theology. It is the work of the ages for the Book to give up all its secrets in this way. No one man can wrest them from it; no one school.

Men and schools have been engaged at this from the time of the making of the Apostle's Creed. What Milton says of truth is still more applicable to theology. He represents truth as having come into the world with her divine Master—a perfect shape most glorious to look on and subsequently having had her lovely form, like the good Osiris, hewed into a thousand pieces and scattered to the four winds. "From that time ever since," he says, "the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them." "We have not found them all," he adds, "nor ever shall do, till the Master's second coming." (*Unlicensed Printing*, Wks. v. i., p. 185.)

There are many reasons why the Bible gives out the fullness of its theological secret so slowly. Theology has, perhaps, kept pace with attempts in other departments to reach the ideal; and it may not be the Divine will that it

should outstrip the other sciences. As to the fundamental and central facts, theology is very clearly and firmly defined already; and is of priceless worth. But the grand reason why we are no further along towards the ideal theology is because the church, because Christians, have not yet come up where they can recognize, weigh, and combine in one vital system all the Scriptural elements. Many theologians have based their systems on one class of Scriptural truths and slighted those set over against that, reaching a logical but one-sided system; while others have written themselves upon their theology and clouded the divine radiance by their shadow.

Only of late has the idea of a biblical theology, free from human color, gathering up all the scattered rays from the Bible in one effulgent orb, dawned on the world. Its realization is in the future. This theology—the coming glory of the theological world, issuing from the Bible, but not put in—not put in as theology, but put in as elements and potencies—will unite the other theologies, based on half truths, or on one of a pair of truths, revolving about each other like double stars, or, worse still, based on subjective feelings—fitful, internal lights and shades—and will break them in pieces, as the image of gold, silver, brass, iron, and clay, in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, was broken in pieces, when the stone, cut out of the mountain without hands, smote it.

Another application of this tendency may be found in *Ethics*. The Bible, among other things, is the record of the ethical training of a primitive people. If we examine its moral teachings, we shall find they fall into two widely different classes. On the one hand, are those relating to

kingdom blinding to common human eyes. On the other hand, there is the far larger class of moral teachings which were wise divine adaptations to man's weakness. They were the actual rules prescribed from time to time to govern in business, domestic relations, social intercourse, civil affairs. They were the standard prevailing in society, which society recognized and by which it tried its members. The word *Ethics* I shall use to refer to this class of moral teachings. The other, or absolute, code is eternal, unchangeable, ideal: this, the ethical code, is flexible, local, temporary, adapted to the needs of those to whom from time to time it is shaped. Frederick W. Robertson has reference to this distinction when he says, "The standard of right and wrong is eternal in the heavens—unchangeably one and the same. But here on earth it is perpetually variable—it is one in one age and nation, another in another." (*Sermons*, First Series, p. 99.) The Great Lawgiver drives a quivering lance through this code of expediency, made necessary by the low moral condition of the people, when he says, "He gave them statutes that were not good" (Ezek. xx. 25.); "He gave them their request, but sent leanness into their soul" (Ps. cv. 15.); and where Christ informs us that certain social evils were tolerated in their laws for the "hardness of their hearts" (Matt. xix. 8.).

The Bible, viewed morally, is made up of these two kinds of moral teachings. But it contains elements of a far higher ethical code, in the sense in which we use the term, at length to have practical sway in the world, than we find anywhere embodied in it. True, the motive of the highest ethical living—supreme love to God, and love to man as to one's self, and the regulative principle by which to apply it, "Do as you would be done by"—are clearly stated. But this is very different from a system of Ethics drawn out in definite requisitions, and given over to society as practical rules of living.

Now out from this Book, having these mixed moral

and ethical teachings,—the outflashings of absolute morals, like gleams of lightning in a dark day, and the legal concessions to a rude people,—there has come to be enthroned over Christendom in our day a much higher ethical code, than we find recognized by society in any scriptural age, or any age between that and the present. This ethical code, in its source, not in its form, is biblical. It has come out of that generator,—from known precepts and from hiding-places, from history and biography, from parable, proverb, and song, from the lives, recorded in the Bible, of bad men and of good men, and, above all, from the teachings and example of Christ; and it has become now a recognized and pervasive power in the Christian world. It is a law for the business man, the scholar, the artist, the poet. It influences legislators and statesmen. It is an atmosphere in education. It sways those who trample on its source. It follows those who despise it, encompasses them in its meshes, entangles them, and makes them yield at last to its supremacy. Christian nations acknowledge its tests and standards.

True, the ethical light falling on the public conscience and recognized by it is not stationary, but is slowly moving across it, as a belt of sunshine in a dark day sometimes moves gradually over a landscape. It is moving now towards rights, the removal of social abuses, prescriptive evils, more equitable relations of capital and labor, higher tests of service and of manhood; and away from the sanctity of the home and the marriage-bond, away from the obligation of the Sabbath, away from reverence, simplicity of living, and caution in business adventures. Still, while the ethical light may be moving across the public conscience, it is, on the whole, broadening and brightening, and having more influence on public life.

It is interesting to observe this movement. We may catch it in the act in relation to the Woman question, the Wine question, the question of Prohibition, and the right

of the people to have a voice in the government. There can be no doubt that the ethical code in vogue at the close of the canon forbade women to speak in public, that it tolerated the moderate use of ordinary wine, and that it required obedience to civil rulers though tyrants. But from the various teachings of the Bible—from its ethical codes, and the deeper, broader, diviner moral principles in it—there is insensibly drifting out into public conviction a modern biblical ethical law—biblical, because formed out of biblical elements,—higher and more authoritative than the old ethical code, making way with it, and establishing itself in its place. We are in the midst of the travail. The eternal, ever life-imparting, sublime, moral ideas of the Bible, and the wonderful moral influences issuing in historical form from the rainbow life of Christ, have more generative power in the conscience of the world than the temporary and at length sterile ethical adaptations to the lower culture of former times. As the ethical sentiment of the age of the Patriarchs, under divine tuition, gave place to that of the period of Moses, and this to that under the prophets, and this to that in the time of the apostles; so, under the same tuition of the Divine Spirit bringing forth things new and old from the word, does the ethical code adapted to the age of the apostles in some particulars slowly change to the higher moral conditions and demands of our day. The Bible in the last analysis, reigns over the conscience of Christendom; and the deeper and more universal moral teachings at length carry the day over its temporary and local ethical rules.

Another illustration of the process we are considering may be found in *Civilization*. The question, what is the force that gives birth to modern civilization, is one that receives various answers. Is it an energy of human nature simply? Is it the genius of a particular branch of the race? Is it a germ from abroad, planted under favorable conditions? Philosophers are not agreed. But here is a fact. There is an energy of civilization wherever

the Bible goes and gets a living hold. Whatever other causes may exist, this certainly must be one. The source of this energy in the Bible is not at once apparent. It is not labelled on the passages. We look in vain for any confession or betrayal of this secret in any of its soliloquies or addresses. Nor do we overtake anywhere its exact germinal words. The Bible is not specifically a book of worldly wisdom, political economy, education, letters, or civil government. A part of it is, indeed, a record of an effort of divine legislation, for a brief and definite purpose, to regulate a body politic: but soon that effort was abandoned, and has never since been repeated under Divine sanctions. Its main object is to look after the character and conduct of individuals and the moral welfare of society. Yet from this Book, which thus mainly looks not at the earthly but the spiritual kingdom, there issues a power that fruits in civilization. It does not act in this line indirectly and slowly only, by producing effects on society through the changed condition of individuals, but it puts forth, as from an unknown magazine, an energy that at once awakens a demand for civil blessings, and hastens society to their attainment. It displays the tempting sight and creates a craving for them, before it has moved society to seek them in consequence of a general renovation of individual character. It is an original and separate cause of civilization. You no sooner put the Bible in a savage or barbarous land, and lodge it in the love of a portion of the people, than out fly schools, the press, literature, reforms, social thrift and happiness, in advance of a demand arising from the general regeneration of the people. That is, there is a civilizing energy in the Bible beyond the progress of its regenerating power. It creates appetite quickly for the good things of earth. Dr. Riggs presents an instance. More than three hundred Dakotas were in prison under condemnation of death—temporarily reprieved, but having the sentence hanging over them. While in this suspense, they became

interested in the truths of the Bible. All at once men who had hitherto resisted all efforts to teach them, became eager to learn to read. With almost no prospect of using this art, the key of civilization, they now had a passion for acquiring it. (*Mary and I, Forty Years among the Sioux*, p. 188.) A taste of the Bible fires human nature with the civilizing tendency. The savage cares nothing for knives and forks, civilized dress, the plow, the sewing-machine, the rail-road, the school-house, the press, no matter who brings them,—the merchant, the school-master, the colonist, the Catholic missionary,—till the influence of this wondrous Book, mysteriously packed with the potencies of higher things, is planted near him, and has begun to reveal its marvellous qualities.

Naturally, also, a further result follows. The seeds of a higher *Humanity* are concealed in this mysterious depository. The term *humanity* may refer either to the nature and quality of man, as we understand it, or to the principle of sympathy and devotion that turns to relieve those in sorrow and suffering. In either sense *humanity* has been greatly elevated and promoted by what has come out of the Book. While its main object has been to proclaim the great truths of immortality, the worth of the soul, God's interest in it, the coming of his Son and his death to redeem it, and above all, the ideal man and the character of God, both in one in the person of Christ, it has sent out along with this story, which emphasizes the estimate Heaven puts on mankind, an uplifting power which has raised the human estimate of man from a cheap, low being to one of stupendous stature and worth. It has placed him on an eminence. It has put royal blood in his veins. It has made him master of ceremonies in the affairs of state. Constitutions revolve around him. In the last analysis he is autocrat to-day,—not courts, not the aristocracy, not kings, not prescription, not custom, not wealth. Man in the Bible had no such position; he was in that age on the under side, beneath

the civil system, beneath tyranny, tradition, and beneath a hard, inflexible social order, stifling to freedom and individuality. But the Bible, along with its mighty revolutionary truths, has unfolded the unseen arms that were secretly packed up in it, reached them forth, and slowly lifted him up, put him on the top, and crowned him.

With this it has also put a higher principle of humanity into the world. It has taught us that nothing else on earth has such claims on us as man. No effort to unlock the mysteries of nature, to resolve the subtleties of philosophy, to revel among the ideals of art or song, to gain the high positions of power or honor, to achieve great deeds, or even to cultivate and adorn one's own manhood, rises to any such dignity, in the best thought of our age, as a life consecrated to humanity. Indeed these things themselves are mainly to be esteemed as they trend in this way. If man is king to-day, so the ubiquitous law, unconsciously born of the Bible, is that every person must serve the king. The beautiful fragrant blossoms of this high royal humanity are seen far and wide, in reforms, hospitals, orphanages, charities, seminaries, colleges; and the mysterious tree has buds not opened yet, and buds that have only begun to set.

Man, but a dwarf in the biblical age, is a giant now, and still growing; and concern for him, but an individual sentiment then, is a broadening conviction, still leavening the nations.

The process we are considering has also a broader reach. It extends to the change that takes place in *the Book itself*, in the faith of the world. A new Book, as it were, has gradually formed itself around the old book, though taking the old book up into its substance,—a

and go back to the Bible of the letter, the verses and the chapters, the narratives and treatises, just as they were given. Here, in the first Bible, in and with the obviously divine contents, are many very human things. We see human opinions, reasonings, methods of quotation and interpretation, limitations, weaknesses, and depravity, woven in with celestial truths and principles in one mixed and sometimes bewildering fabric. We try in vain in this literal search, with any critical tests at our command, to disentangle and arrange in separate groups the human and the divine, or what has been infelicitously called the inspired and the uninspired portions. We can find passages of which we say, "This is the work of man; it has his signs": and passages of which we say with equal confidence, "This is God's; only he could give this." But these two run into each other with mutual dependence and inextricable confusion, in the make-up of the volume.

The fact is, hidden in this Book of the letter, of mixed qualities, widely blended characteristics, having on it in one place God's superscription, and in another man's, there are elements which are ever disengaging from themselves and forming around it, in the world's thought, a corona of glory in which the literal Book disappears, transfigured. This is not the effect of imagination, book-worship, superstition, or prejudice. Nor is it merely because divine light when mixed with human rays is so much stronger that it overpowers them, and gives its own color to the union: as a little of the quality called genius, blended with ordinary human powers, is enough to give remarkable individuality to a man and distinguish him widely from his fellows. For, beyond this, the very human elements and qualities of the Bible have a divine use, furnishing the necessary basis, background and perspective, for its higher lessons. As there are portions of the body which are not made up of vital tissues, but are necessary to protect, express, and apply the vital parts, both united making the living body; so the human and

the divine in the Bible make one structural whole—always, of course, excepting the errors that have crept into the text since its original cast. The very things, then, which seem to make for a lower level have an upward trend.

Thus, from a Book so constituted there naturally rays forth the influence, the authority, the glory, of a supernatural production; and this outgoing glory comes at length to be regarded as a part of the Book itself. There are known to be spots on the surface of the sun; but the radiations from the bright portions form one grand brilliant photosphere, and this globe is what the world sees and rejoices in. So the secondary Book, the Book the Christian world now sees,—the object of its faith and love, embracing all the truth, principles, and substance of the original Book, and transfiguring it, covers the human spots in the volume as given.

There have been, indeed, times when previously unsuspected anthropomorphous elements of Scripture have suddenly been made so apparent,—thrown up as by a great upheaval, by the discovery of truth in other departments,—that individuals have been ready to think that the whole Book was about to swept away in the general convulsion. One of these volcanic eruptions took place when the Copernican system of astronomy was discovered; another, when it was ascertained that the earth was hundreds of thousands of years old; another, when the hypothesis of creation by evolution was thrown out; another, when it was held that sacred writers may have compiled from previous writers. These sudden uplifts of human or anthropomorphous elements where literal truth was supposed to exist, for the moment, to many minds, covered the whole Word with clouds of earthy smoke, scoriae, and falling stones. But soon the ceaseless radiance from the divine elements

to the now obvious anthropomorphism of the record, the glory of the volume shone forth with more than its previous brightness. Cold, analytic criticism, taking no thought of the structural and organic relations of the diverse elements, not recognizing the dependence of the divine on human forms and methods in a Book-revelation, not feeling the right of the divine to color the joint product, may tear apart the photosphere, push its intrusive analysis down to the elements, and try to separate them, in order to throw away the human and retain the divine. But such persons in this way miss the divine itself; just as, could we make the supposition, if salamanders, finding there are spots in the sun, should close their eyes, dive through the envelope of light, plunge down to the surface, and then make a critical examination to find and number the dark places, they would not perceive the brightness at all; and, so occupied, would miss the purpose and object as well as the glory of the sun. This would not be the verdict of science about the sun: for the photosphere is as much a part of the sun as the material orb beneath it. It is the part that gives light and warmth; and science, in forming its estimate of the sun, must take it for what it is in fact.

Thus the Bible, enriched and illumined by a glory that gathers about it from its own internal sources, becomes a marvellous sun in the moral and religious sphere to sympathetic and appreciative natures. Its light is the daylight in which the Christian world lives and does its work; all the other lights are to them but candles and lamps. Its last word,—the word that is uttered by the outcome and consensus of all its parts, is to them the supreme authority.

Thus the Bible, placed at first by the side of man, has accompanied him in the on-going of his experience and needs through the centuries, giving him a higher and juster conception of God, the suggestions and elements of a more perfect theology,—a theology that feels the breath

of the truth between the lines, as well as of that which is expressed,—a loftier and more authoritative ethical code, the incentives and forces of civilization, a higher and tenderer humanity, and, at last, a more ideal Bible itself. These things have come out of the Book, but were not put in. Yet they have come out of it because something was put in that made it possible for them to come out. The Book determined the quality of the evolution, was not merely the occasion of it.

If then we have such a Book,—a Book that, apart from its main purpose, lets out into the world, as they are needed, manifold and definite other blessings,—a Book carrying a secret cornucopia of good and emptying it along the centuries just at the right times,—is it not clear that there must have been a nice and exact adjustment of all the details, as well as of its central facts? Could anything be left at random? Must not all particulars be carefully looked after? In other words, must not the whole Book, the work of each writer, in some way have been dominated by a common influence, or purpose? How this could be,—how a superintending Will could have wrought through the free human wills, permitting them to carry their individuality over to the product and leave their human color on it, is not the question. That is the eternal question in connection with any Necessity that executes itself through free moral beings, and presents no peculiar difficulty here. These two elements or forces are here in the Book. That is a simple matter of fact. Now as the human elements in a book-revelation are quite as indispensable as the divine ones, the only practical question in giving it was, in what proportion and manner these should be blended and made to qualify and sustain each other in one structural whole. The entire

engaged in making a statue of Minerva to be the crowning glory of the Acropolis and the admiration of the world, concerns himself, not only about a few prominent features, but the whole grouping, arrangement, and form of the parts. The mutilations and corruptions of the sacred text in later times present, however, practical difficulties of another kind ; but they do not touch the question of original production, and so do not concern us.

Those who hold the theory of creation by evolution, without fresh infusion of creative energy at the borders of the higher kingdoms, must suppose the original elements, whether matter or force or both combined, were most carefully empowered and balanced in the primordial state, making them the precise potencies of what was to be the outcome. Or, if we take any subsequent stage of the grand unfolding,—e. g., the point where the mineral kingdom passes over into the vital, or the anthropoid into the human,—they must suppose that the uppermost reach of the lower development, had the precise combination of elements and forces to produce the next higher, else that higher stage would have been impossible. So that which caused the Bible to be, and to be for the ends which have come out of it, must have seen to it that just the elements, human and superhuman, entered into it that were adapted to produce the outcome: in other words, that the whole make-up of the Book was according to that plan. Now this continuous higher causality, which runs mysteriously or subtly under all its parts, even those that wear broadly the human stamp, is the *inspiration* of the Book, and gives it its specific character.

It is clear we should approach such a Book with peculiar feelings. It is a peculiar product, two intelligences all through acting freely, dynamically, mysteriously, in producing it. The result is an incarnation, as it were ; and here, as in other incarnations or theophanies, the external human values are more apparent, at first, than the fine, subtle, divine ones. The divine values, lurking and

flitting behind and among the human, are more likely to be overlooked or slighted; and many eyes are holden that they should not know them. Elect minds they find. Coleridge, in the "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," says, "I take up the work with the purpose to read it as I should read any other work—so far as I can and dare: for I neither can nor dare throw off strong and awful prepossession in its favor, certain as I am that a large part of the light and life in and by which I see, love, and embrace the truths and strengths organized into a living body of faith and knowledge, have been directly or indirectly derived to me from the sacred volume. . . . In the Bible there is more that *finds* me than I have experienced in all other books put together: the words of the Bible find me at greater depths of my being, and whatever finds me brings with it an irresistible evidence of having proceeded from the Holy Spirit."

We need, therefore, to put ourselves in a sympathetic mood, when we approach it,—to have that susceptibility and exaltation that is ready to welcome more coming out than we see put in. We should be in a condition to invite the singing of unexpected birds, and the stir of unseen life. When one walks carelessly through a forest in summer, he hears no sounds but his own thoughtless footsteps, and sees no play of life but what he frightens away. But let him in deep sympathy with nature go into the woods, sit down and invite confidence and approach, and soon the forest is alive with trustful song and frolic. So we should invite from their retreats in the Word the kindling suggestions, the great truths, the mighty influences, affecting not only our own welfare but that of society and nations.

So we leave this unique Book, emptying out into the centuries its pent-up treasures. There is nothing else like it in the realm of letters. From no other book do we

economy, social science, humanity, civilization. Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, in philosophy,—Augustine, Luther, Calvin, in theology,—Bacon, Tyndall, Spencer, in the interpretation of science,—have opened fountains to run through the centuries, penetrating many departments of thought. But these streams, each marked by its own individuality, are soon blended and lost in their union with other streams, and the resultant stream does not retain the essential qualities of the original source. Besides, the range of the outflow in the case of these individual authors, is through comparatively narrow fields. But from this Fountain diverse streams, in their essential qualities, issue directly and retain unchanged their divine peculiarities: as the Bible does not remain, like the books of men, fixed in the past, in its original historical setting, but comes down the ages with man, an ever fresh fountain, ever frequented, ever pouring out the water of life. And the new circumstances and the independent approaches furnish the occasions, not the source, of what it gives to the world.

ARTICLE III.

JEREMIAH, THE PROPHET OF PERSONAL GODLINESS: A STUDY IN HEBREW RELIGION.

BY ARCHIBALD DUFF, LL.D., AIREDALE COLLEGE, BRADFORD, ENGLAND.

TEN years ago Professor Park urged me to study the individual theology of each prophet. The keen-eyed veteran theologian foresaw that the Old Testament must soon be used historically, and therefore wished the quarrying of the individual stones for the new building to be in hand.

The place of Jeremiah is not indeed upon the foundation line of such a building, but far up in the wall; indeed he is even a keystone in a sub-arch, or a top-stone in the early stage. Quarrying, however, does not always seem to the outside beholder to follow the true order which the stones in the wall must follow; and quarry-men know that many stones are usually in hand together. A study of Jeremiah may prepare the way for studies of earlier men.

The excellent treatise of Professor Guthe, "*De Jeremi-ana Fœderis Notione*," discusses thoroughly one main feature of Jeremiah's teaching, but fails to present the whole, or to discover the centrally characteristic feature, as I think will presently appear. Indeed Guthe criticises himself adversely when he quotes Hosea as really the first prophet of the covenant. Jeremiah was the pupil of Hosea in this prophesying. And yet he was far more. Among the noble searchers after what the spirit in them

God's love, and only persons can express it. Since his day there has been ever a singularly wider recognition that this prophet touched, felt, proclaimed, the very rock whereon God and man stand together. Jeremiah was the prophet to whom men likened Jesus, and to whom Paul, and the writer to the Hebrews, turned for words that touch the soul to the quick. To Jew and Christian he has been among the prophets not the most brilliant, but the most human.

My task now is to explain this by showing that Jeremiah's characteristic proclamation was:—

God's love is altogether for persons; and personal love for God and his beloved is the only godliness.

As we enter the Prophet-preacher's audience-hall to listen, let us gather as preliminary a few notes that stand written on the threshold.

1. We need not throw aside the long-used popular epithet "Weeping Prophet." The title is no doubt inexact and incorrect; for, while these Hebrew seers are all "Weeping Prophets," just this man it is who often tells us, He would that he could weep, but he cannot. He knows how hard-hearted he must seem, as he speaks the often terrible, but always calm, judgment of God. He speaks out of a love too deep for tears, but deep as will, and deed, and sweat like drops of blood. Men who listen are shaken with strong feeling, and looking on the brother-like face of the man their own tears spring, and they call him not untruly "The Weeping Prophet."

2. Jeremiah preached personal godliness, yet not he alone. Every prophet knew much godliness in himself, and longed and labored that it might be in all men. Each of them was a personal friend of God, and as we read their words it is that personal friendship which we feel testifying of its own reality. The divine knowledge or authority of the prophets sprang from their personal godliness, and was its manifestation. Moreover they ever preached of sin, and that condemnation of sin implies in

the condemner at least some measure of personal godlikeness. To preach of sin is to demand personal godliness. Yet as we have said the prophets were a long series of searchers, each follower going deeper than his forerunner. Such has been from the first the Christian doctrine of the order of Divine love in revelation through men. And among all yonder noble miners, Jeremiah first saw and declared that the nation should rise to the godly level where stood the prophets of the past, not by a national establishment of their faiths, but by universal personal trust in the personal love of God. It is the business of the Old Testament theologians to trace Jeremiah's place and each prophet's place in the history of the gradual recognition and ever clearer declaration of the facts of personal life. Jeremiah laid the top-stone of an arch at which all the prophets builded.¹

3. We may not expect to find that Jeremiah revealed the full gospel of personal godliness. In our Lord Jesus came that life to the uttermost—in no other, before him, beside him, or since. I appeal with confidence to our heart's love and rest. These tell us that only the person of Jesus wins and saves us, and can win and save all men. Therefore *a priori* we may infer, as *a posteriori* it shall be ever more clearly affirmed, that the more we read the prophets, the more we shall recognize how they all say:—"Would that we could win and save! Would that we could give to all the place that God has given us! Would that the way of life were manifest!" When all had died and passed away, then at last Jesus came and said "Come unto Me." He has done more. He has done the great saving deed, for he has won men to himself, as a center of life for all.

We may not say that Jesus simply taught the sum of all that others have taught, else the positive essence of life were not distinctively in him. But as he was something different from all others, so by his manifestation of himself he declared his own utterly new and incompar-

able Gospel. Herein, therefore, he brought an essentially distinct doctrine. It is true that the personal godliness of Jeremiah corresponds in its measure to one of the great ground-lines of Christianity; but the personal godliness of Jesus has a far fuller meaning, as well as a far mightier reproductive power. I need not describe here that failure to conceive the motive power of Christianity which marks the Christology common to real Unitarianism, to modern Judaism, and to all Ritualism. I have here to use the Old Testament in sharp antithesis to the common fault of these three religions, by asking how the prophets acknowledged their own insufficiency, and thereby pointed forward to one greater than all.

4. This implies another preliminary truth. While Jeremiah's life-work was to preach personal godliness, that work predicted Jesus. He was a prophet in the double sense. Jeremiah spoke indeed with living voice to living ears, that by present love he might move to instant life. Yet when once he had kindled a desire for an ideal life, when once he had awakened love for an ideal love, where once was born a faith in a Godlike ideal man; then true hearts, in listeners and speaker, must have looked—not about them, not backward to a golden age, but forward, for some one yet to come. The doctrine of unconscious prophecy has a truth beneath it. He knows the prophet's predictive work truly and feels it deeply, who knows thoroughly what they did for their own times. We shall therefore look and listen whether, by all his life and all his word to his fellows, Jeremiah preached a great *prophecy of personal godliness*.

I. Let me first paint a picture of the man's own person. Look with me at the turn of his hand and the look of his eye, the trend of his heart's love and the intent of his toil, the fashion of his plans and the very manner of his book.

1. Watch him standing among other men in those centuries; how sharp the contrast with them, although they be far centuries away from us. Comparatively near

him were Isaiah of the century before him, and Ezekiel of the generation after.

a. How different is he from Isaiah, the peerless statesman, the brilliant orator at a nation's bar. Isaiah defends a whole nation as if it were one individual; he pleads with the court only, or the king as the seat of the one national conscience. His soul, uplifted toward God, amid despair beholds deliverance; but the revelation is "Jehovah chooseth Zion for his one earthly home. This house and will and way of God are inviolable; therefore secondarily, by corollary, the inhabitants thereof shall not be sick, and are forgiven." God's relation to individuals was to Isaiah almost a thought unborn. Isaiah's great talisman is "God is with us," "God with a nation," "The Lord with the Host."

But a century later when that oracle had become at once by law established and powerless; then Jeremiah's kindling faith heard the still, small voice whispering, "Lo, I am with thee." By this gentle seer came the oracle of personal salvation to replace or deepen the popular faith taught by the graceful seer of a century before. Henceforth, to Jeremiah, not Zion's temple of stone, but the soul of a man must be the abode of God. Jeremiah cares little for court and state and national life, but he loves dearly the separate lives in Judah. You read much of his care to nourish his own life—God's gift to him,—his anxiety to save the timid king Zedekiah's life, to honor a great-souled negro slave, to cheer the gentle scribe Baruch, to move God's mercy for famished children, or to plead forbearance for the poor street wanderers. When the land was desolated and the scribes were all gone, this Jeremiah chose to stay behind as companion and teacher for the feeble who had nothing and were too worthless to be exiled.

While Isaiah's prophecy is an exalted political document, the book of Jeremiah is a tale of every-day lives, and the note-book of an intensely loving pastor. Isaiah's

splendid eloquence makes his chapters favorites in the pulpit and the review ; but Jeremiah's tender broodings, wearisome as they are to the hasty eye, are untold treasures for the hidden, busy curate of souls. Jeremiah's words are to be seldom read aloud, but often read in the silence where the thinking soul lives nearest to its fellows.

b. Compare Jeremiah on the other hand with his disciple Ezekiel. The younger man was the pupil of the elder, and is ever echoing his teacher's words. It was Ezekiel's nature so to treasure precious forms. For he was a born priest, and he lived a true-souled expounder of the manners that become a high-born and a godly people. Such priests are God's ministers. A high-born man himself, Ezekiel received due, if sad, honor when he was carried away captive at the first deportation, among the 10,000 nobles and men of high rank. There is fitting dignity in his sorrows, even when they rise to haughty scorn of the remnant left behind in Jerusalem. For those left behind were poor and wretched ; and to Ezekiel, that was base. Yet Jeremiah was among them. He never went captive, but chose to be "left among the poor of the land who had nothing."

Ezekiel, after his long years of despair, saw glad days coming again ; and in the bloom of his joy he penned his vision of a future worthy ritual. That ritual was the esthetic of a godly and a very lovable heart. But Jeremiah's words concerning ritual and forms inherited from the past, are chiefly an utterance of terrible indignation against that holiness which is hollowness. He denies that God ever commanded national sacrifice, while in the name of God he demands personal obedience.

Ezekiel would limit the number of Jehovah's near ministers to the small family of the Zadokites, but Jeremiah prophesied and toiled to the end that not alone the whole tribe of Levi, but also every living soul might know the LORD, by having Jehovah's name and love written on his heart.

2. Turn from these comparisons with other men, to scan the man's own features closely. How clearly traceable is the divine character in him, and this just **because** it is so singularly human. To use a **phrase** of the schools, **his prophecy is remarkably subjective**, and God seems the less objective. In one simple word, the closer you study him, the nearer is God to him. For:—

a. He has been truly called "The Praying Prophet." Whole passages of the book are prayers. He who longs to pray well will find Jeremiah one of the few true teachers. I should quote half the book, were I to record how often there break forth from the man's soul words like these: "O Lord, thou knowest; remember me, and visit me,—take me not away in thy long-suffering" (ch. xv.). The book is a record of talks with God. At times the prophet feels even a divine check laid on his habit of prayer: "Jehovah said unto me, 'Pray not for this people.'" He thinks of the great saints of the past, Moses and Samuel, not as great leaders, but as great intercessors (Jer. ch. xv.; cf. Deut. ch. ix.). When he sits down to write to men, it is often a prayer he sends them; when he goes out to preach to them, his word often turns into prayer in their midst. A deeper fact lies behind all these. Chapters which are largely prayers are headed, "The words of Jehovah." The naïve simplicity of the claim marks the child-like utter faith. The inner secret of Jeremiah's character beams out in this unquestioning identification of his thoughts and words with the word and thought of God. Jeremiah believed that his own most personal utterances had divine value. This was personal faith and personal God-likeness.

b. But trace this feature more closely, and it will prove still more thoroughly characteristic. The title, "The words of Jehovah," stands at the head of the whole book. Examine the contents, and in the series of three books which make up the whole you shall find:—

(i.) A group of summaries of sayings and doings during the twenty years before he was recognized as a

mighty prophet. They date, roundly, from the last seventeen years of the reign of Josiah and three years thereafter, i. e., cir. 626-606 B. C., and they include, say, chapters i. to xxv. Reserve for a moment a remark on the summaries of sayings, and observe that some of their finest passages are narratives of events. Especially so is the tenderly sad yet sublime eleventh chapter, that reads like a commentary from personal experience on the theme of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. Yet all is entitled "Words of Jehovah." But pass to—

(ii.) The second great section or book, covering, say, chapters xxv. to xlv. You shall read there in page after page simply the autobiography of a friend of God, who watched the decline and the fall of Jerusalem, while he strove to save some souls from the ruin. Read again the title, "The words of Jehovah," and feel breathing on you the fragrant godlikeness of this man, whose simple faith called his own life "God's words." Jeremiah's life was an utterance of Jehovah's thoughts, and the man's own tale of himself was God's own story of his own affairs.

To this man even the story of Jerusalem, and its people, true and false together, was all a divine revelation. Here was realization of an immanent Presence, merciful, gracious, and beloved, and the realization became a revelation. Here may a theologian learn to construct a doctrine of "divine prophetic inspiration."

The nearer we draw to the man, the deeper is the depth of this godlike personality. For the expression which we translate "Words of Jehovah" meant really to the prophet and to his audience not "the words," but "the affairs of Jehovah." Then God's affairs were one with the affairs of Jeremiah. Jeremiah's personal interest in the soil and city of Judah, in the people high and low, children and fathers, his own anxious care to be delivered from a dismal dungeon, his loving care for the negro slave who saved him, his homesick cry as he goes driven out from his father's homestead, his keen interest in the free-hold

homes and farm-lands of the exiles whose return he foretells, his noble struggle for the jubilee-release of bond-servants,—all these affairs of simple men were, to Jeremiah's godlike thought, "Affairs of God." It is true that other prophets tell us something of their own personal story, and these others do also call all they write "Words of God," or "Affairs of God." Certainly to them also, and to every godly man, the affairs of earth are affairs of God. Yet there is no prophet like Jeremiah, who finds his inspired soul's chief delight and his pen's chief task in so picturing life that he may call it all "God's affairs." If it be correct to think that Jeremiah composed most of the Books of the Kings, as many scholars think on independent grounds, then there is overwhelming record of his affection for individual lives, and his simple faith in their unsurpassed value. And the divine seal has been set on these records and on that faith. The written record has become an everliving prophecy, whose voice now hastens on the fulfilment of Jeremiah's faith. For Jeremiah believed in a coming day when every man shall know Jehovah's character, and knowing it shall love it, and that day draws nearer. Note here further that—

c. Such a man would have been strangely incomplete had he cared only to think of the outward facts of individual life. But Jeremiah has left us a treasury of psychological notes, richer far than we find in any other Old Testament writings, save in some Psalms. And some of these Psalms may be his own or his pupils' songs. When to-day a preacher would probe the depths of character and trace the soul's subtle pathos, how often does he find a text in Jeremiah. This prophet first tracked to its hiding the deceitful heart: he wrote the oldest meditation on the continuity of the will. His parable of the potter suggested to Paul the vision of God's mysterious sovereign creation of a soul. Jeremiah caught up old Hosea's great test of inspiration, and handed it on to the apostle James as the eternally gracious declaration of man's

greatest dignity: "Who is the wise man, let him discern the truth of God's oracles. Yet let him not boast of his wisdom, but of his knowledge of Jehovah's righteous grace."—Jer. ix.; Hos. xiv.; Jas. iii.

Jeremiah's argumentation is full of faith in that dignity of man, and he wins by the impress of his own reasonableness. In the summaries of arguments in the first great section of the book, we have proof that to the writer his inspired reason was more precious than some of his inspired words. Thought cannot, indeed, be without form, and the dream of some past theologians that "the spirit of the teachings was inspired, but not the form," has been fain to vanish before a more logical, i. e., a more scientific theology. The prophet orator's glowing thought and firm word, fit to convict, or soothe, or woo, were all the outburst of God's own conceptions; yet, in Jeremiah's estimate, more worthy of undying record were the bare links of the reasoned chain. The former were the inspired effort to reach one peculiar set of hearers, the latter were the inspired evidence of God's estimation of every soul's reason. The concrete individuality of each original hearer was precious to the speaker, but therefore all the more precious was the reasoning thoughtfulness which is the vital breath of every concrete individuality. So Jeremiah wrote summaries of his arguments. They should not glorify to after-time his own rhetorical skill, but they should stir the reader to criticism and to reason, which is individual manliness. The summaries seem awkward, but they grow full of light and pathos, as they throw a Rembrandt light upon the eager writer, forging argument after argument, hasting on, unwearied, if by any means he may persuade the souls he loves. He seems to wrestle with his own heart, testing each argument's edge upon himself; for so keenly does he cut to the heartstrings as one only dare or can who has groped after these strings in his own breast. His strange knowledge of others is reached by a genuine, simple knowledge

of himself. His own deep, personal friendship with God brings forth the great message of his life and his book. Such was Jeremiah: this was the Prophet of Personal Godliness.

ARTICLE IV.

THE REVISION OF GENESIS.

BY THE REV. CHARLES R. BROWN, PROFESSOR IN NEWTON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

[Continued from page 527.]

xxvi. 7. Omit '*she is.*'

xxvi. 11. 'the' for '*his.*'

xxvi. 14. 'and' for 'For;' 'possessions' for 'possession' (twice); 'a great household' for 'great store of servants.'

xxvi. 15. 'Now' for 'For.'

xxvi. 21. Add 'they' (strove).

xxvi. 26. Omit 'chief.'

xxvi. 27. 'are ye come unto' for 'come ye to.'

xxvi. 28. Change of order.

xxvi. 34. 'When' has been carried back to first clause

xxvi. 3. It is plainer here than in the similar passages that a telic force is to be given to †. The Rev. have not been particular to restore this force where it was missed by A. V. Cf. Lev. ix. 6; Amos v. 14. They have likewise (cf. xxvii. 10) not been particular to restore the force of strong † with the perfect where the A. V. wrongly attributes an idea of purpose.

xxvi. 10. 'might easily have lain' or 'had almost lain' or 'would soon have lain' would be an improvement.

xxvi. 22. 'can' for 'shall' would avoid the appearance of grammatical inaccuracy.

xxvii. 1. 'too dim to see' is briefer and more accurate than Rev.

xxvii. 10. 'so' for 'and' (that).
 xxvii. 15. Add 'the' (goodly).
 xxvii. 20. 'sent me good speed' for
 'brought it to me.'

xxvii. 28. 'And' for 'Therefore ;'
 add 'of' (the fatness).

xxvii. 29. 'peoples' for 'people ;'
 'every one' (2d) for 'he.'

xxvii. 31. Omit 'had.'

xxvii. 33. 'who then' for 'who ?
 where.'

xxvii. 34. Omit 'And ;' 'an exceed-
 ing great and' for 'a great and ex-
 ceeding.'

xxvii. 37. 'what then shall I do
 unto thee' for 'what shall I do now
 unto thee.'

xxvii. 39. 'of the fatness of the
 earth shall be thy dwelling' for 'thy
 d. s. b. the fatness of the earth.'

xxvii. 42. 'the' for 'these.'

xxvii. 46. Omit '*which are*.'

xxviii. 4. 'of thy sojournings' for
 'wherein thou art a stranger.' A sim-
 ilar change xxxvi. 7; xxxvii. 1.

xxviii. 6. 'Now' for 'When.'

xxviii. 8. 'saw' for 'seeing.'

xxviii. 9. 'and Esau went' for 'Then
 went Esau.'

xxviii. 11. Add 'one ;' 'the place'
 for 'that place ;' 'it under his head' for
 'them for his pillows.'

xxviii. 15. 'whithersoever' for 'in
 all *places* whither.'

xxviii. 18. 'under his head' for 'for
 his pillows.'

xxviii. 19. 'the city was Luz' for
 'that city *was called* Luz.'

xxvii. 10. 'and he shall eat' for
 'that he may eat.' See under xxvi. 3.

xxvii. 20. 'How then' is to be pre-
 ferred; see also xxiv. 20.

xxvii. 21. הן 'then ;' so in vs. 24.

xxvii. 25. Hebrew syntax and Rev.
 treatment of vs. 4 require the use of
 the voluntative 'that I may eat.'

xxvii. 36. 'Is it that he was named
 Jacob, and so he has' (or 'must'), etc.,
 is necessary to bring out the Hebrew.
 Cf. 2 Sam. xxiii. 19.

xxvii. 37. 'what then can I do' is
 better.

xxvii. 39. הוּ is here used as in
 Num. xv. 24, hence adopt marg.

xxvii. 42. 'is comforting himself' is
 demanded by the Hebrew.

xxviii. 3. 'and mayest thou become'
 should replace 'that thou mayest be.'

xxviii. 8. 'and when Esau saw'
 would be better.

xxviii. 11. 'the *appropriate* place' is
 better than 'a certain place.'

xxviii. 12. 'whose top was reach-
 ing' would better render the circum-
 clause.

xxviii. 13. Adopt marg. 'beside him.'

xxviii. 14. See xii. 3.

xxviii. 20. 'am about to go' for 'go.'

xxviii. 21, 22. Adopt construction
 given in the margin.

- xxix. 9. Omit 'And.'
- xxix. 17. 'And Leah's eyes were tender' for 'L. was tender eyed.'
- xxix. 24. Change of order.
- xxix. 25. Change of order.
- xxix. 26. 'is not so done in our place' for 'must not be so done in our country.'
- xxix. 27. 'the week of this one' for 'her week;' 'the other' for 'this.'
- xxix. 28. Omit 'also.'
- xxix. 31. Omit 'when' and add 'and' below.
- xxix. 32. 'Because' for 'Surely;' add 'for.'
- xxix. 35. 'This time' for 'Now.'

xxx. 3. Heb. voluntative restored, slight change of order, and 'obtain' for 'have.'

xxx. 11. 'Fortunate!' for 'a troop cometh.'

xxx. 16. Change of order.

xxx. 17. 'a' for 'the.'

xxx. 18. 'gave' for 'have given.'

xxx. 19. 'a sixth son to Jacob' for 'Jacob the sixth son.'

xxx. 24. 'saying' for 'and said;' 'add' for 'shall add.'

xxx. 26. 'wherewith I have served thee' for 'which I have done thee.'

xxx. 27. 'If now I' for 'I pray thee, if I.'

xxx. 29. 'hath fared with me' for 'was with me.'

xxx. 30. 'hath increased' for 'is now increased;' 'whithersoever I turned' for 'since my coming.'

xxx. 31. Change of order.

xxx. 32. 'every' for 'all the' (twice);

xxix. 9. 'was speaking' for 'spake.'

xxx. 8. Adopt 'wrestlings of God.'

xxx. 13. 'daughters' for 'the d.'

xxx. 15. 'too small' for 'small.' See Josh. xxii. 17.

xxx. 28. Last clause is telic.

xxx. 30. 'every step I took' is nearer the original; 'can' or 'may' for 'shall.'

xxx. 32. 'Let me,' etc., is better;

they conceived' for 'that they should conceive.'

xxx. 39. Express second 'the flocks;' omit 'cattle.'

xxx. 41. 'of the flock' for 'cattle.'

xxx. 43. 'large flocks' for 'much cattle.'

xxxi. 11. 'the dream' for 'a dream;' omit '*saying*.'

xxxi. 13. 'a pillar' for 'the pillar;' omit '*and*.'

xxxi. 15. Change of order.

xxxi. 17. Add 'the' (camels).

xxxi. 19. 'Now L. was gone' for 'And L. went;' 'stole' for 'had stolen.'

xxxi. 21. 'mountain of Gilead' for 'mount Gilead.' So vs. 23.

xxxi. 23. 'he' for 'they.'

xxxi. 24. 'of the' for 'by;' add 'to thyself.'

xxxi. 25. 'And' for 'Then.'

xxxi. 26. 'of' for '*taken* with.'

xxxi. 28. Change of order; omit 'in *so* doing.'

xxxi. 31. 'lest' for 'peradventure;' 'shouldest' for 'wouldest;' change of order.

xxxi. 32. 'he shall not live' for 'let him not live.'

xxxi. 33. Change of order; 'And he went' for 'Then went he.'

xxxi. 35. 'not my lord be angry' for 'it not displease my lord.'

xxxi. 36. Omit 'so.'

xxxi. 38. 'flocks' for 'flock.'

xxxi. 41. 'These twenty years have I been' for 'Thus have I been twenty years.'

xxxi. 42. Change of order.

xxxi. 43. 'the' for '*these*' (3 times).

xxxi. 44. 'And now come' for 'Now, therefore, *come* thou.'

xxxi. 48. Omit 'a' (witness).

xxxi. 50. 'and' for 'or;' omit '*other*.'

xxxi. 42. 'would not put them in' preferable to 'put them not in.'

xxxi. 3. Last clause is telic.

xxxi. 12. 'is doing' for 'doeth.'

xxxi. 15. Adopt marg.

xxxi. 20. 'was about to flee' for 'fled.'

xxxi. 28. Use aorist in two instances.

(sacrifice); 'mountain' for 'mount' (twice).

xxxii. 2. Change of order.

xxxii. 4. Change of order; omit 'there.'

xxxii. 5. Add '*and*.'

xxxii. 6. 'moreover' for 'also.'

xxxii. 8. Omit 'other.'

xxxii. 9. 'O' for 'the.'

xxxii. 11. Omit 'will;' omit 'and' (the mother).

xxxii. 13. Omit 'same;' 'he had with him' for 'came to his hand.'

xxxii. 15. 'and' for 'with.'

xxxii. 18. Change of order.

xxxii. 19. 'he commanded also' for 'so commanded he.'

xxxii. 20. 'and ye shall say' for 'and say ye.'

xxxii. 21. 'the present passed' for 'went the present.'

xxxii. 22. Add 'of' (Jabbok).

xxxii. 28. 'for thou hast striven' for 'for as a prince hast thou power;' 'with' for 'with.'

xxxii. 30. Add '*said he*.'

xxxii. 31. Change of order.

xxxii. 32. Omit '*of*;' 'of the hip' for 'which shrank;' 'of the hip' for 'that shrank.'

xxxiii. 3. Add 'himself.'

xxxiii. 5. 'these' for 'those.'

xxxiii. 7. 'and' for 'with.'

xxxiii. 8. Omit '*These are*.'

xxxiii. 9. 'let that thou hast be thine' for 'keep that thou hast unto thyself.'

xxxiii. 10. 'forasmuch as' for 'for therefore;' 'as one seeth' for 'as though I had seen.'

xxxiii. 13. Add 'that;' 'they' for 'men;' 'flocks' for 'flock;' 'with me give suck' for 'with young are with me.'

xxxiii. 14. Literal rendering adopted.

xxxii. 55. Order should conform to xxii. 3, etc.

xxxii. 9. Last clause is telic; omit 'the least of.'

xxxii. 29. 'why then' is better.

xxxii. 31. 'when he had,' etc., is meaning of first clause.

xxxiii. 1. 'was coming' for 'came.'

xxxiii. 12. 'let me go' for 'I will go.'

xxxiii. 15. 'Why then' is literal.

xxxiii. 18. 'in peace to the city of Shechem' for 'to Shalem a city of Shechem.'

xxxiv. 2. Omit 'when;' add 'the' (prince); add 'and.'

xxxiv. 5. 'Now' for 'And;' 'and' for 'now;' 'came' for 'were come.'

xxxiv. 9. Omit 'and' (give).

xxxiv. 15. 'only on this condition' for 'but in this.' The same for 'herein' in vs. 22.

xxxiv. 21. Change of order.

xxxiv. 22. Omit 'for;' 'become' for 'be.'

xxxiv. 23. 'all their beasts' for 'every beast of theirs.'

xxxv. 2. 'purify yourselves' for 'be clean.'

xxxv. 4. 'and the rings' for 'all their earrings.'

xxxv. 5. 'a great terror' for 'the terror of God.'

xxxv. 6. '(the same is Bethel)' for 'that is Bethel.'

xxxv. 7. 'was revealed' for 'appeared.'

xxxv. 8. 'And' for 'But;' 'the' for 'an' (oak).

xxxv. 14. Omit 'even.'

xxxv. 16. 'still some way' for 'but a little way.'

xxxv. 17. Add 'for now;' add 'another;' omit 'this;' omit 'also.'

xxxv. 19. '(the same is Beth-lehem)' for 'which is Beth-lehem.'

xxxv. 20. 'the same' for 'that.'

xxxv. 22. 'while' for 'when.'

xxxv. 27. '(the same is Hebron)' for 'which is Hebron.'

xxxv. 29. Omit 'being;' change of order.

xxxiii. 18. Omit marg.

xxxiv. 3. Adopt marg.

xxxiv. 5. 'had heard while his sons,' etc., preserves the original.

xxxiv. 10. Omit 'shall;' change 'shall be' to 'is.'

xxxiv. 17. 'be gone' should become 'go' as much as 'were come,' 'came,' in vs. 5.

xxxiv. 19. Last part is circumstantial.

xxxiv. 23. Last clause is telic.

xxxv. 3. 'let me' or 'that I may' is more suitable.

xxxv. 5. 'a terror of God' is best of all.

xxxv. 17. 'for this one also is a son for thee' expresses the Hebrew.

xxxvi. 7. 'was too great for them to' for 'were more than that they might.'

xxxvi. 8. 'And E. dwelt' for 'Thus dwelt E.'

xxxvi. 15. 'are the' for 'were;' omit '*son*.'

xxxvi. 16. Omit '*and*;' '*are*' for '*were*.' So vs. 18.

xxxvi. 19. 'the same is Edom' for 'who *is* E.' and order changed. Why not conformed exactly to vs. 1?

xxxvi. 20. 'the inhabitants of' for 'who inhabited.'

xxxvi. 21. Add 'that came,' to conform to the A. V. in several other passages in the context. These supplied words might well have been left in italics.

xxxvi. 23. Change of order and tense of verb. So vs. 25.

xxxvi. 27. Change of order. So 18.

xxxvi. 30. 'the Horites' for 'Hori.'

xxxvi. 34. 'the Temanites' for 'Temani.'

xxxvi. 43. 'This is' for 'he *is*.'

xxxvii. 2. 'and he was a lad' for 'and the lad *was*;' 'the evil report of them unto their father' for 'unto his father their evil report.'

xxxvii. 4. Omit 'when;' add 'and.'

xxxvii. 9. Omit 'the' (eleven).

xxxvii. 14. 'now' for 'I pray thee;' 'flock' for 'flocks.'

xxxvii. 16. '*the flock*' for 'their flocks.' Why italics more than vs. 13?

xxxvii. 18. Omit 'When;' 'and' for 'even.'

xxxvii. 20. 'one of the pits' for 'some pit;' 'an' for 'some.'

xxxvii. 21. 'hand' for 'hands;' 'take his life' for 'kill him.'

xxxvi. 7. 'had become too great' is the original.

xxxvii. 13. 'Are . . . feeding' for 'Do . . . feed;' 'that I may' for 'and I will.'

xxxvii. 16. 'am seeking' for 'seek.'

xxxvii. 17. 'saying' for 'say.'

xxxvii. 19. 'is coming' for 'cometh.'

xxxvii. 20. 'and let us say, . . that we may see what his dreams become' more accurately expresses the Heb.

xxxvii. 21. Rev. should have adopted 'smite him mortally' here, making

xxxvii. 24. 'the' for 'a.'

xxxvii. 25. Add 'travelling.'

xxxvii. 27. Omit '*and*;' 'hearkened unto him' for 'were content.'

xxxvii. 28. 'And' for 'Then.'

xxxvii. 31. 'he-goat' for 'kid of the goats.'

xxxvii. 35. 'And' for 'Thus.'

xxxvii. 36. 'the' for '*and*.'

xxxviii. 5. Omit 'conceived *and*.'

xxxviii. 6. 'and her' for 'whose.'

This change looks like an oversight, for see vs. 1 and 2.

xxxviii. 9. Omit 'that.'

xxxviii. 10. 'was evil in the sight of' for 'displeased;' 'and' for 'wherefore.'

xxxviii. 11. 'he also die, like his brethren' for 'peradventure he die also, as his brethren *did*.'

xxxviii. 12. 'Timnah' for 'Timnath.' So vs. 13, 14.

xxxviii. 14. Change of order; 'her' for 'a;' 'the gate of Enaim' for 'an open place.'

xxxviii. 17. Add 'of the goats.' So vs. 20.

xxxviii. 18. 'them to' for '*it*.'

xxxviii. 20. 'the' for '*his*.'

xxxviii. 21. 'Then' for 'And;' 'her' for 'that;' 'at Enaim' for 'openly;' 'hath been' for '*was*;' 'here' for 'in this *place*.'

xxxviii. 22. 'have not found' for 'cannot find;' omit '*that*;' 'hath been' for 'was;' 'here' for 'in this place.'

xxxviii. 24. 'moreover' for 'also.'

xxxviii. 26. 'is' for 'hath been;' 'forasmuch as' for 'because that.'

xxxviii. 28. Omit 'the' (one); 'a' for 'his.'

xxxvii. 24. 'the pit being empty, without water'—circumstantial.

xxxvii. 25. 'was coming.' 'came' is used by Rev. for perfects, pluperfects, and participles; 'proceeding, to carry them down' would be less ambiguous.

xxxvii. 27. 'obeyed' or 'acquiesced' would be better.

xxxvii. 36. 'the officer of P., the chief of the body guard' is more exact.

xxxviii. 9. 'in order not to give' is more exact.

xxxviii. 16. 'if thou mayest' is more exact.

xxxviii. 17. 'was putting' for 'laid.'

xxxviii. 24. 'that she may be burned' is better.

xxxviii. 25. 'was being brought forth' is perhaps demanded for the participle.

xxxviii. 29. 'Wherefore hast thou made a breach for thyself?' for 'How hast thou broken forth? *this* breach *be* upon thee.'

xxxix. 1. Add 'the;' 'hand' for 'hands.'

xxxix. 5. Omit 'had.'

xxxix. 6. '*that was* with him' for 'he had.'

xxxix. 11. 'he' for 'Joseph.'

xxxix. 20. 'the' for 'a.'

xl. 1. Omit 'had.'

xl. 2. 'his two' for 'two of.'

xl. 7. 'ward in his master's house' for 'the ward of his lord's house.'

xl. 8. 'none that can interpret it' for 'no interpreter of it;' 'it me' for 'me *them*.'

xl. 10. 'its' for 'her.'

xl. 13. Change of order.' So vs. 19.

xl. 14. 'have me in thy remembrance' for 'think on me.'

xl. 16. 'three baskets of white bread were on my head' for '*I had* three w. baskets on my head.'

xl. 20. 'the head' is repeated, as in the original.

xli. 2. Change of order.

xli. 6. Change of order.

xli. 7. Omit first 'seven.'

xli. 10. Change of order; omit '*both*.'

xli. 12. Change of order.

xli. 15. 'when thou hearest a dream thou canst' for 'thou canst understand a dream to.'

xli. 20. Omit 'the' (ill).

xli. 25. Change of order.

xli. 27. Add 'also;' add ';' they.'

xli. 28. 'spake' for 'have spoken;' 'hath shewed' for 'sheweth.'

xli. 31. 'that famine which followeth' for 'that famine following.'

xxxix. 1. 'the' for 'an.'

xxxix. 3. 'was doing . . . was prospering' is demanded by the original. So vs. 23.

xxxix. 6. 'was eating' is exact; marg. needed in text to prevent ambiguity.

xxxix. 8. Adopt marg.

xxxix. 9. Marg. is the correct reading.

xxxix. 10. '*or*' is better omitted.

xxxix. 22. 'of all which they were doing there, he became doer' is nearer the original.

xl. 8. 'interpreter of it there is none' is better. So xli. 15.

xl. 10. 'and just as it was sprouting' or 'scarcely had it sprouted when' is more correct than Rev.

xl. 15. 'should have' for 'should.'

xl. 17. 'were eating' for 'did eat.'

xli. 1-3. The force of these principles should be expressed in the English. So vs. 5, 6, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 27, 29.

xli. 4. 'And' for 'So.'

xli. 9. 'I am about to make mention of' gives force of Hebrew.

xli. 15. 'although I have heard . . . in order to interpret it' is more exact.

xli. 21. 'And' or 'Then' for 'So.'

xli. 35. 'for' for 'and let them keep,' which is carried to end of vs.

xli. 36. 'the' for 'that;' add 'a' (store).

xli. 38, 39. Omit '*is*,' '*art*.'

xli. 45. Omit 'all.'

xli. 50. 'year' for 'years.'

xli. 51. Change of order.

xli. 56. 'was' for 'waxed' (sore).

xli. 57. Omit 'that;' omit '*so*' (sore); 'the earth' for 'lands.'

xlil. 1. Omit 'when;' add 'and.'

xlil. 6. Omit '*and*.'

xlil. 13. Add 'We.'

xlil. 16. 'bound' for 'kept in prison;' omit '*any*.'

xlil. 19. 'your prison house' for 'the house of your prison;' add 'but.'

xlil. 20. 'and' for 'But.'

xlil. 22. Change of order.

xlil. 23. 'for there was an interpreter between them' for 'for he spake unto them by an interpreter.'

xlil. 24. Omit 'again;' 'Simeon from among them' for 'from them S.'

xlil. 25. 'was it done' for 'did he.'

xlil. 26. 'their' for 'the.'

xlil. 27. 'and' for 'for;' change order.

xlil. 28. 'turned trembling' for 'were afraid;' 'one to another, saying' for 'saying one to another.'

xlil. 29. 'had befallen them' for 'befell unto them.'

xlil. 30. Omit '*who is*.'

xlil. 33. Omit '*here*;' 'houses' for 'households.'

xlil. 35. Omit '*both*;' 'their' for 'the.'

xlil. 38. 'only is left' for 'is left alone.'

xlil. 7. Omit 'as;' 'concerning ourselves' for 'of our state;' 'concerning' for 'of;' 'in any wise' for 'certainly.'

xli. 40. Adopt first margin.

xlil. 5. 'were coming' for second 'came.'

xlil. 6. Circumstantial clause.

xlil. 7. Use 'when' here; 'have ye come' for 'come.'

xlil. 16. 'that he may bring,' 'be ye bound,' are needed.

xlil. 20. 'that may be verified . . . and ye not die' is the Hebrew.

xlil. 21, 22. 'did not hear' for 'would not hear.'

xlil. 23. 'the interpreter was between them' is correct; 'was hearkening' is more literal.

xlil. 25. 'and they filled' is more exact.

xlil. 34. 'that I may know'—voluntative.

xlil. 36. 'would take' for 'will take.'

xlil. 37. 'Thou mayest slay' for 'Slay.'

xlil. 4. 'If thou art about [or 'ready'] to send' is to be preferred. The negative of this in vs. 5.

xlil. 8. The impfs. express purpose.

xlili. 10. Change of order; 'a' for 'this.'

xlili. 11. Omit '*must*.'

xlili. 16. 'the' for 'these' (twice).

xlili. 22. 'hand' for 'hands.'

xlili. 28. 'the' for 'their.'

xlili. 29. Change of order; 'young-est' for 'younger.'

xliv. 4. Add 'were.'

xliv. 5. Change of order.

xliv. 6. Omit '*same*.'

xliv. 7. 'such words as these' for 'these words;' 'such a thing' for 'according to this thing.'

xliv. 9. Omit 'both.'

xliv. 11. 'hasted, and' for 'speedily.'

xliv. 14. 'and' for 'for.'

xliv. 16. 'in whose hand' for 'with whom.'

xliv. 17. Omit 'but;' 'but' for 'and.'

xliv. 25. Omit '*and*.'

xliv. 28. 'have not seen' for 'saw.'

xliv. 29. Add 'one.'

xliv. 33. Change of order.

xliv. 34. Omit '*peradventure*.'

xliv. 2. Add first 'heard.'

xliv. 5. 'And' added and 'therefore' omitted.

xliv. 6. Changes of order.

xliv. 7. 'you alive' for 'your lives.'

xliv. 8. Omit 'a' (ruler).

xliv. 11. Changes of order.

xliv. 15. 'and' for 'moreover.'

xlili. 9. First two verbs express purpose; marg. should be adopted, or this, 'then I shall have become culpable before thee for my whole life.'

xlili. 10. 'gone back twice over' is the proper rendering.

xlili. 11. 'it be' is hardly needed.

xlili. 14. 'and let him release' is the proper rendering of this perfect with strong ḡ.

xlili. 18. 'in order to' or 'to' is better than 'that he may,' though the latter is not incorrect.

xlili. 21. 'had come' is preferable to 'came.'

xlili. 34. Adopt margins.

xliv. 3. 'The morning had dawned, when,' etc., as in xix. 23.

xliv. 4. 'They themselves (or These) had not gone out far from the city, when J. said . . . and overtake . . . and say,' etc., is needed here.

xliv. 5. Customary imperfects.

xliv. 12. Follow Heb. order and omit '*and*.'

xliv. 14. 'he being yet there'—circumstantial.

xliv. 16. 'can' (three times) better than 'shall;' 'was' for 'is.' So vs. 17.

xliv. 24. 'had come up' is better.

xliv. 30. Adopt margin, and thus conform to 1 Sam. xviii. 1.

xliv. 31. Change 'shall' to 'will.'

xliv. 34. 'can I . . . and the lad not with me?' is better.

xliv. 7. Marg. to be adopted.

xliv. 12. Two participles to be rendered as such.

xlvi. 24. 'a fifth' for 'the fifth part.'
 xlvii. 26. 'only' for 'except;' 'alone'
 for 'only, *which*.'

xlvi. 30. 'when I sleep' for 'I will
 lie;' omit 'and.'

xlvi. 4. 'peoples' for 'people.'

xlvi. 5. Change of order; add
 'even;' omit 'they.'

xlvi. 6. 'they' for '*and*.'

xlvi. 7. Omit 'yet;' 'still some
 way' for 'but a little way.'

xlvi. 15. Add 'the' (God); add
 'hath.'

xlvi. 16. Add 'hath.'

xlix. 5. 'weapons of violence are
 their swords' for 'instruments of cru-
 elty *are* in their habitations.'

xlix. 8. Change of order.

xlix. 10. 'the ruler's staff' for 'a
 lawgiver;' 'peoples' for 'people.'

xlix. 11. Add 'hath.'

xlix. 15. Change of order; 'resting
 place' for 'rest.'

xlix. 17. 'falleth' for 'shall fall.'

xlix. 22. Omit '*even*;' 'His' for
 'whose.'

xlix. 24. 'One' for '*God*.'

xlix. 27. 'is a wolf that ravineth'
 for 'shall ravin *as* a wolf.'

xlix. 32. Omit 'the purchase of;'
 omit 'of;' 'which was purchased' for
 'was.'

xlix. 33. Omit 'had.'

l. 3. 'embalming' for 'those which
 are embalmed.'

l. 4. 'weeping for him' for 'his
 mourning.'

xlvi. 30. 'I myself' for last 'I.'

xlvi. 2. 'is coming' for 'cometh.'

xlvi. 4. The force of the parti-
 ciple ought in some way to appear.

xlvi. 6. Adopt margin.

xlvi. 9. Last clause is telic.

xlvi. 14. '*that is*, he crossed his
 hands' is needed.

xlvi. 15. 'ever since I was born' is
 somewhat more accurate.

xlvi. 16. 'is redeeming' is better.

xlvi. 21. 'am about to die' for 'die.'

xlix. 4. ~~is~~ is confused with ~~is~~.

'thou mayest not have the excellency'
 or 'do not thou have the e.' is correct.

xlix. 8. 'must thy b. praise thee,
 thy hand being (or since thy hand
 will be) on ; thy father's sons
 will,' etc.

xlix. 10. The first of marg. ¹⁸ should
 be adopted as the text.

xlix. 12. Omit 'shall be.'

xlix. 24. 'active' or 'agile' for 'made
 strong.'

xlix. 25. The verbs are jussive. So
 vs. 26.

xlix. 27. Use the present tense.

xlix. 28. '*appropriate*' or '*fitting*'
 might be inserted before 'blessing.'

l. 5. 'about to die' for 'die;' 'and
 return'—cohortative.

portance must answer for an excuse for more. The Rev. show a hesitating policy in regard to this word which they can hardly justify. What, e. g., would they say to support their renderings in the sixth and seventh chapters of Exodus hereby cited?

Verse.	A. V.	Rev.	Remarks.
vi. 2.	the LORD	JEHOVAH	
vi. 3.	JEHOVAH	JEHOVAH	
vi. 6.	the LORD	Jehovah	
vi. 7.	the LORD	Jehovah	
vi. 8.	the LORD	Jehovah	cf. vi. 2
vi. 29.	the LORD	the LORD	cf. vi. 6
vii. 17.	the LORD	the LORD	cf. vi. 7

And, indeed, it being a proper name in all passages, nothing can be said anywhere in support of this solemn re-endorsement¹ of an erroneous view of God.

- ii. 13. 'Cush' for 'Ethiopia.'
- ii. 14. 'in front of A.' for 'toward the east of A.'

- ii. 12. Carry 'beryl' into the text.
- ii. 14. If 'Hiddekel' means 'Tigris' the latter should be in the text; omit marg.⁴

- ii. 18. Marg. should come into text and into vs. 20.

- ii. 23. Unless the reading of LXX., *Sam.*, *Onk.*, be adopted ('from her man'), 'a man' should here be substituted for 'Man.'

- iii. 4. 'Ye shall not die at all' is better.

- iii. 5. Omit 'then;' 'become like' for 'be as.'

- iii. 6. 'eating' might here have been used for 'food.'

- iii. 8. Adopt marg. 'sound' and 'breeze.'

- iii. 10. Receive marg.

- iii. 16. 'pain' would perhaps be better than 'sorrow.'

- iii. 21. 'tunics' or 'gowns' for 'coats.'

- iii. 17. 'toil' for 'sorrow.'

- iv. 1. 'with the help of' for 'from.'

¹ It amounts to that, though, of course, the Rev. would repudiate direct influence of that sort. The protest of Am. Rev. should be mentioned.

iv. 7. 'croucheth' for 'lieth.'
iv. 8. 'told' for 'talked with.' See under II.

iv. 12. 'wanderer' for 'vagabond.' So 14.

iv. 14. 'ground' for 'earth.' So vi. 1, 7; vii. 4, 8.

iv. 15. 'appointed a sign for' for 'set a mark upon;' 'smite' for 'kill.'

iv. 20. Omit '*of such as.*'

iv. 21. 'pipe' for 'organ.'

v. 29. 'for our work and for the toil' for 'concerning our work and toil.'

vi. 4. 'The Nephilim' for 'There were giants;' 'were the' for '*became.*'

vi. 5. 'the LORD' for 'GOD.'

vi. 9. 'righteous' for 'just.'

vi. 12. 'saw' for 'looked upon.'

vi. 16. 'light' for 'window;' 'to a cubit' for 'in a cubit.'

vii. 4. 'thing' for 'substance.'

vii. 19. 'mountains' for 'hills.'

vii. 23. 'was left' for 'remained *alive.*'

viii. 1. 'decreased' for 'abated.'

viii. 7. 'and it' for 'which.'

viii. 9. 'to the ark' for 'unto the a.;" 'and he' for 'then he;' 'brought' for 'pulled.'

viii. 11. 'at eventide' for 'in the evening.'

viii. 12. 'and she' for 'which.'

viii. 13. 'hundred' for 'hundredth.'

viii. 19. 'moveth' for 'creepeth;' 'families' for 'kinds.'

iv. 2. 'became a shepherd . . . became an agriculturist' would more nearly express the orig. There is as much reason for giving the true spelling of 'Abel' in the margin as of 'Eve' in iii. 20. The same criticism is true of 'Enoch,' v. 18, etc.

iv. 13. Carry 'iniquity' into the text and omit 'punishment.' Why this passage was not conformed to xix. 15 does not appear.

iv. 16. Carry marg. into text according to Rev. of ii. 14.

iv. 22. 'cutting instrument' is not an improvement upon 'artificer' unless the Rev. have here changed the vowels of the text. It is better to retain them and supply '*father of,*' protecting ourselves, if necessary, by italics—'a hammerer, *father of* every artificer,' etc.

iv. 23. Omit marg. ¹⁶

v. 2. Carry 'Man' into text.

v. 3. Why '*a son*' in italics, and 'children'—vi. 4; xvi. 1; xxx. 1—not?

vi. 7. Marg. ⁸ preserves the figure; 'beast' is here correct, as in vii. 2; viii. 20, but it should have replaced 'cattle' in vi. 20; vii. 23; viii. 17: Deut. xiv. 4 is significant here.

vii. 11. 'same' is ambiguous.

vii. 21. Receive marg.

viii. 21. 'for that the imag.' for 'for the imag.'

ix. 3. 'food' for 'meat;' omit 'even;' omit 'things.'

x. 5. 'of these' for 'by these.' So 32. 'nations' for 'Gentiles.'

x. 14. 'whence went forth the Philistines' for 'out of whom came Philistim.'

x. 22, 23. 'sons' for 'children' (2). So xlv. 21; xlix. 8.

xi. 2. 'east' for 'from the east.'

xi. 9. 'was' for 'is.'

xi. 28. 'in the presence of his f.' for 'before his f.'

xi. 30. 'And' for 'But.'

xii. 4. 'went' for 'departed.'

xii. 6. 'oak' for 'plain.'

xii. 10. 'sore' for 'grievous.'

xii. 15. 'And the p.' for 'The p. also;' 'praised her to P.' for 'commended her before P.'

xlii. 8. 'are brethren' for 'be b.'

xlii. 9. 'if thou take' for 'if thou depart to.'

xlii. 10. 'goest' for 'comest.'

xlii. 18. 'moved' for 'removed;' 'by the oaks' for 'in the plain;' 'are' for 'is.'

xiv. 1. 'Golim' for 'nations.'

xiv. 2. 'thy' for 'these.'

xiv. 8. 'they set the battle in array against' for 'they joined b. with.'

xiv. 9. 'against' for 'with,' and omit second 'with.'

xiv. 14. 'led forth his trained men' for 'armed his t. servants;' om. 'own;' omit 'them;' 'as far as' for 'unto.'

xiv. 17. 'vale' for 'valley;' 'Vale' for 'dale.'

viii. 21. 'to himself' better than 'in his heart.'

ix. 7. Use 'swarm.'

ix. 10. 'all the animals of the e.' would express the Hebrew.

x. 5. 'isles' should be 'maritime regions.'

x. 21. Omit marg.

xi. 4. 'asphalt' or 'bitumen' for 'slime,' and omit marg.

xii. 5. 'movable property' or 'possessions' or 'goods' (xiv. 11) for 'substance.' So xv. 14. 'persons' for 'souls,' as xiv. 21.

xii. 6. 'terebinth' should be in the text. A comparison with Jud. ix. 6 and with marg. of Gen. xxxv. 4 shows that Rev. understood תרנין = תרנין.

For תרנין they have substituted 'terebinth' in Isa. vi. 13; Hos. iv. 13; why not, then, for its equivalent in Gen. xii. 6; xlii. 18; xiv. 13; xviii. 1; xxxv. 4. Attention might have been called to the fact that תרנין may not be a proper name.

xii. 16. 'he received' for 'he had.' Similarly xlii. 5.

xlii. 3. 'by stages' or the like for 'on his journeys.'

xlii. 7. 'strife arose' for 'was a s.'

xlii. 12. 'led a tent life' or 'lived as a nomad' for 'moved his tent;' 'before' for 'against.'

xiv. 3. Adopt marg. 4. So vs. 5.

xiv. 7. For 'country,' marg. 'field,' place 'field country' in the text.

xiv. 11. 'food' for 'victuals.'

xiv. 14. 'mustered' is better than 'led forth,' 'tried' than 'trained.'

xiv. 15. Carry marg. into text.

xiv. 16. 'brought back' for 'brought again.'

xiv. 23. 'a thread nor a shoelatchet' for 'from a t. even to a s. ;' 'nor aught' for 'and that I will not take anything.'

xv. 2. Add O.' So vs. 8.

xv. 4. 'This man' for 'This.'

xv. 5. Second 'tell' for 'number.'

xv. 10. Omit 'unto;' 'half over against the other' for 'piece one against another.'

xv. 17. 'flaming torch' for 'burning lamp.'

xv. 18. 'that' for 'the same.'

xvi. 2. 'handmaid' for 'maid.' So vss. 3, 5, 6, 8; xxix. 24; xxx. 9, 10, 12, 18.

xvi. 10. 'greatly multiply' for 'm. exceedingly.'

xvi. 13. 'Thou art a God that seeth' for 'Thou God seest me;' 'even' for 'also.'

xvii. 7. 'throughout' for 'in.' So vss. 9, 12.

xvii. 10. 'male' for 'manchild.' So vss. 12, 14.

xvii. 1. 'by the oaks' for 'in the plains.'

xviii. 2. 'over against' for 'by.'

xviii. 5. 'forasmuch as ye are' for 'for therefore are ye.'

xviii. 14. 'at the set time' for 'at the time appointed.'

xviii. 23. 'consume' for 'destroy.' So vs. 24.

xix. 2. 'aside' for 'in.'

xix. 3. 'urged' for 'pressed upon.'

xv. 3. 'born' is hardly correct.

xv. 5. 'number' for 'tell.'

xv. 11. 'frightened' for 'drove.'

xvi. 2. Adopt margin, or perhaps substitute 'descendants' for 'children.'

xvi. 12. Substitute first margin.

xviii. 5. 'lean' or 'recline' for 'rest yourselves.'

xviii. 6. *וַיִּשְׁכַּב* should not be trans.

xviii. 7. 'prepare' is better than 'dress.' So vs. 8. The word is rendered 'make' in xxvii. 7; 'took' for 'fetched.'

xviii. 14. Adopt margin.

xviii. 20. 'has become' for 'is.'

xix. 11. 'labored in vain' for 'wearied themselves.'

xix. 14. 'a jester' for 'one that mocked.'

xxvi. 3, 4; xxxiv. 2; xlii. 33; xlvii. 27.

xix. 33. 'knew' for 'perceived.' So vs. 35.

xx. 3. 'because of' for 'for.'

xxi. 16. 'look upon' for 'see.'

xxi. 22. Omit 'chief.' So vs. 32.

xxi. 33. 'tam. tree' for 'grove.'

xxii. 1. 'prove' for 'tempt.'

xxii. 14. 'provided' for 'seen.'

xxiii. 1. Add 'the life of;' om. 'old.'

xxiii. 3. 'rose' for 'stood.' So vs. 7. 'children' for 'sons.' So vss. 16, 20;

xxv. 10.

xxiv. 3. 'for' for 'unto.' So vss. 4, 7.

xxiv. 7. 'nativity' for 'kindred.' So

xxi. 13.

xxiv. 13. 'fountain' for 'well.' So vss. 16, 29, 30, 42, 43, 45; xlix. 22.

xxiv. 20. Omit 'water.'

xxiv. 22. 'ring' for 'earring.' So vs. 30.

xxiv. 28. Omit 'them of;' 'words' for 'things.'

xxiv. 37. 'for' for 'to.'

xxiv. 38. 'for' for 'unto.' So vs. 48.

xxiv. 43. Omit 'water.' So vs. 45.

xxiv. 44. 'appointed' for 'pointed out.'

xxiv. 47. 'ring upon her nose' for 'earring upon her face.'

xxiv. 60. 'ten thousands' for 'millions.'

xxiv. 62. 'Beer-' for 'the well.' So xxv. 11.

xxv. 1. 'And' for 'Then again;' 'another' for 'a.'

xxv. 16. 'villages' for 'towns;' 'encampments' for 'castles.'

xxv. 18. 'he abode' for 'and he died.'

xxv. 19. Add 'in.'

xxvi. 3. 'establish' for 'perform.'

xxvi. 12. 'found' for 'received.'

xxvi. 17. 'encamped' for 'pitched his tent.' So xxxiii. 18.

xxvi. 20. 'contended' for 'strove.'

xxi. 9. Adopt margin.

xxi. 19. Adopt margin.

xxi. 23. Adopt margin.

xxii. 2. 'Say' or 'name' to thee' for 'tell thee of.'

xxiv. 10. Omit margin.

xxiv. 26. 'his head' for 'his head.'

xxiv. 33. 'something to eat' for 'meat.'

xxiv. 63. 'to weep' should at least be in marg.

xxv. 18. Adopt marginal readings.

xxv. 20. 'Syrian' should be 'Aramean.' So xxviii. 5.

xxv. 25. Adopt marg.

xxv. 27. 'mild' for 'plain.'

xxv. 29. 'cooked' for 'sod.'

xxv. 31. 'This day' means 'Now.'

xxvi. 26. 'host' for 'army.'
 xxvi. 28. 'plainly' for 'certainly.'

xxvii. 35. 'guile' for 'subtilty.'
 xxvii. 40. 'break loose' for 'have the dominion;' 'shake' for 'break.'
 xxvii. 45. 'bereaved' for 'deprived also.'

xxviii. 3. 'company' for 'multitude;' 'peoples' for 'people.'
 xxviii. 6. 'Now' for 'When.'
 xxviii. 22. 'set up' for 'set.' So xxxv. 20.
 xxix. 1. 'to' for 'into;' 'children' for 'people.'
 xxix. 6. 'Is it well with him' for 'Is he well;' 'it is' for 'he is.'
 xxix. 32. Add 'for.'
 xxx. 8. 'mighty' for 'great.'
 xxx. 13. 'happy' for 'blessed.'
 xxx. 16. 'from' for 'out of.'
 xxx. 27. 'divined' for 'learned by experience.'
 xxx. 32. 'brown' for 'black.' So vs. 33.
 xxx. 33. 'hereafter' for 'in time to come;' 'concerning' for 'for.'
 xxx. 35. 'black ones' for 'brown.'

xxx. 37. 'fresh' for 'green;' 'almond' for 'hazel;' 'of the plane' for 'chestnut.'
 xxx. 38. 'over against' for 'before.'
 xxx. 40. 'black' for 'brown;' 'flock' for 'cattle.' So vss. 41, 42; xxxi. 8, 10(2), 12, 41.
 xxxi. 8. 'wages' for 'hire.'
 xxxi. 10. 'he goats' for 'rams.' So vs. 12.
 xxxi. 11. 'said' for 'spake.'
 xxxi. 16. Add 'away.'
 xxxi. 18. 'substance' for 'goods,' why more than xiv. 16?; 'gathered' for 'gotten' (2); 'unto' for 'in.'

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xxvi. 8. 'through the w.' for 'at a w.' See Prov. vii. 6.

xxvii. 8. ה = 'in reference to.'

xxvii. 12. 'jester' for 'deceiver.'

xxvii. 28. 'fertile fields' for 'fatness.' So vs. 39.

xxvii. 40. 'struggle' or 'exert thyself' for 'break loose.'

xxix. 17. 'weak' or 'dull' for 'tender;' 'of good form and good looking' for 'beautiful and well favored.' So xxxix. 6.

xxx. 14. Adopt marg. So throughout the account.

xxx. 20. הָלַךְ probably means 'elevate,' not 'dwell.'

xxx. 33. 'rectitude' or 'honesty' is better than 'righteousness.'

xxx. 35. 'striped' for 'ringstraked.' So vss. 39, 40; xxxi. 8 (2), 10, 12.

xxx. 37. Adopt margin; 'by uncovering the white' would avoid tautology in the English.

xxxi. 1. 'made all this wealth' for 'gotten all this glory.'

xxx. 19. 'teraphim' for 'images.' So vss. 34, 35.

xxx. 25. 'came up with' for 'over-took.'

xxx. 34. 'felt about' for 'searched.' So vs. 37.

xxx. 35. 'manner' for 'custom.'

xxx. 37. 'two' for 'both.'

xxx. 40. 'fled' for 'departed.'

xxx. 42. 'Fear' for 'fear.' So vs. 53.

xxx. 43. 'flocks' for 'cattle' (2).

xxx. 46. 'by' for 'upon.'

xxx. 51. 'set' for 'cast.'

xxx. 54. 'in the mountain' for 'upon the mount.'

xxxii. 3. 'field' for 'country.'

xxxii. 7. Add second 'was;' 'companies' for 'bands.' So vs. 10.

xxxii. 9. 'do thee good' for 'deal well with thee.'

xxxii. 22. 'handmaids' for 'women-servants;' 'children' for 'sons.'

xxxii. 23. 'stream' for 'brook.'

xxxiii. 8. 'company' for 'drove.'

xxxiii. 11. 'gift' for 'blessing.'

xxxiv. 2. 'humbled' for 'defiled.'

xxxiv. 7. 'in' for 'out.'

xxxiv. 13. 'with guile' for 'deceitfully;' 'spake' for 'said.' So xli. 17.

xxxiv. 25. 'unawares' for 'boldly.'

xxxiv. 26. 'forth' for 'out.'

xxxiv. 28. 'flocks' for 'sheep;' 'herds' for 'oxen.'

xxxiv. 30. 'smite' for 'slay.'

xxxv. 9. 'from' for 'out of.'

xxxv. 13. 'spake' for 'talked.' So 14.

xxxvi. 6. 'souls' for 'persons,' why? 'possessions' for 'substance;' 'gathered' for 'got.'

xxx. 19. 'teraphim' are 'house gods.'

xxx. 20. Adopt 'Aramean;' 'deceived' or 'deluded' preferable to text. So in vss. 26, 27.

xxx. 34. 'saddle' for 'furniture.'

xxx. 40. 'heat' for 'drought.'

xxx. 49. 'hidden' for 'absent.'

xxxii. 6. 'have obtained' for 'have.'

xxxiii. 8. 'favor' preferable to 'grace.' So vs. 15; xxxiv. 11.

xxxiii. 14. 'softly' should be 'at my ease' or 'slowly.'

xxxvi. 15. 'chiefs' or 'chiliarchs'

xxxvii. 7. 'came' for second 'stood.'
xxxvii. 11. 'kept . . . in mind' for 'observed.'

xxxvii. 22. 'deliver' for 'rid;' 'restore' for 'deliver.'

xxxvii. 33. 'torn' for 'rent.'

xxxvii. 34. 'garments' for 'clothes.'

xxxvii. 35. 'to' for 'into;' 'to' for 'unto.' So xx. 16.

xxxviii. 8. 'perform t. d. of a h. b. u. her' for 'marry her.'

xxxviii. 11. 'grown up' for 'grown.' So vs. 14.

xxxviii. 15. 'for' for 'because.'

xxxviii. 18. 'cord' for 'bracelets.'

xxxviii. 19. 'put off' for 'laid by.'

xxxviii. 23. 'put to shame' for 'blamed.'

xxxviii. 25. 'cords' for 'bracelets.'

xxxix. 4. 'ministered unto' for 'served.' So xl. 4.

xxxix. 8. 'put' for 'committed;' 'into' for 'in.'

xxxix. 11. 'work' for 'business.'

xxxix. 15. 'by' for 'with.' So vs. 18.

xxxix. 16. 'master' for 'lord.'

xxxix. 21. 'kindness unto him' for 'him mercy.'

xl. 6. 'saw' for 'looked upon.'

xl. 8. 'it me' for 'me them.'

xl. 13. 'thine office' for 'thy place;' 'give' for 'deliver.'

xli. 2. 'reed-grass' for 'meadow.'

So vs. 18.

xli. 7. 'swallowed up' for 'devoured.' So vs. 24.

xxxvii. 7. 'surrounded' is better.

xxxvii. 18. 'sought to entrap him' seems more probable than Rev.

xxxvii. 25. Carry marg. ³ (1st), ⁴, ⁵ to text.

xxxvii. 35. 'Sheol' should be in the text. So wherever it occurs. Of the 65 instances of its use (rend. in A.V. 'the grave,' 'the pit,' or 'hell') Rev. have restored it in 30, placing 'the grave' in marg.; 'hell' has been retained 13 times, and changed to 'the pit' 3 times; 'the pit' has been retained twice; 'the grave' has been retained 15 times, and *actually changed to 'hell'* in 2 instances. Rev. should have left the renderings of A. V. untouched, rather than so mislead the people.³

xxxviii. 14. 'upon' or 'on' for 'by' (the way).

xxxviii. 16. 'turned aside' for 'turned.'

xxxviii. 21. 'upon the way' for 'by the way side.'

xxxviii. 25. 'discern,' and 'know' in xxxvii. 32 should be same.

xxxviii. 26. 'recognized' is better.

³ In their attitude toward *היה* and *למשל* the Am. Rev. contrast favorably with their English brethren. If in some other respects we are forced to leave them and follow the scholars across the water, let us be grateful for the plea they made for these words. It is difficult to see how any version can prove satisfactory which does not adopt their views in this direction.

- xli. 17. 'brink' for 'bank.'
- xli. 22. 'upon' for 'in.'
- xli. 25. 'declared' for 'shewed.'
- xli. 27. 'lean' for 'thin.'
- xli. 34. 'overseers' for 'officers.'
- xli. 42. Add 'signet.'
- xli. 43. 'set him' for 'made him ruler.'
- xli. 49. 'laid up' for 'gathered.'
- xli. 53. 'came to an end' for 'were ended.'
- xli. 54. 'famine' for 'dearth;' 'there was famine' for 'the dearth was.'
- xl. 3. 'from Egypt' for 'in Egypt.'
- xl. 6. 'to' for 'before.'
- xl. 21. 1st 'distress' for 'anguish.'
- xl. 27. 'lodging place' for 'inn.'
- So xliii. 21.
- xl. 30. 'with' for 'to' (us).
- xl. 33. 'corn' for 'food.'
- xl. 11. 'choice' for 'best;' 'of' for 'in.'
- xl. 14. 'release unto you' for 'send away.'
- xl. 16. 'steward' for 'ruler;' 'into the house' for 'home.'
- xl. 22. 'know not' for 'cannot tell.'
- xl. 26. Add 'down.'
- xl. 28. 'said' for 'answered;' 'well' for 'in good health;' omit 'down.'
- xl. 33. 'with' for 'at.'
- xl. 10. 'bondman' for 'servant.'
- So vss. 16, 17.
- xl. 15. 'indeed' for 'certainly.'
- xl. 7. 'remnant' for 'posterity.'
- xl. 8. 'over' for 'throughout.'
- xl. 23. 'victual' for 'meat.'
- xl. 26. 'ruler' for 'governor.'
- xl. 31. 'tell' for 'shew.'
- xl. 1. 'went in' for 'came.'
- xl. 20. 'was sore upon' for 'prevailed over.'
- xl. 24. 'at' for 'in.'
- xl. 26. 'statute' for 'law;' 'concerning' for 'over.'

- xli. 8. Adopt marg. So 24.
- xli. 13. 'turned out' for 'was;' marg.
or a similar change is needed.

xl. 11. The variation from vs. 34 may be expressed in English. So vs. 31.

xl. 22. 'Did I not say to you as follows' (or 'this') would avoid inaccuracy. So xliii. 3; xlvii. 5.

xl. 36. 'all these things have come upon me' is correct.

xl. 38. See xxxvii. 35.

xl. 11. Omit 'choice.'

xl. 12. 'into' for 'in;' 'perhaps it was a mistake' is more suitable.

xl. 18. 'rush upon us' would perhaps represent the Heb.

xl. 29. Adopt margins; 'harm' for 'mischief.'

xl. 31. See xxxvii. 35.

xl. 7. Adopt marg.

xl. 20. 'utensils' or 'implements' for 'stuff.'

xlvi. 27. 'gat them' for 'had;' 'were fruitful' for 'grew.'

xlvi. 1. 'said to' for 'told.'

xlvi. 4. 'company' for 'multitude.'

xlvi. 9. 'here' for 'in this place.'

xlvi. 11. 'let me see thy seed also' for 'shewed me also thy seed.'

xlvi. 19. 'howbeit' for 'but truly.'

xlix. 2. 'assemble yourselves' for 'gather yourselves together.'

xlix. 6. 'council' for 'secret;' 'my glory' for 'mine honor;' 'houghed an ox' for 'dugged down a wall.'

xlix. 8. 'on' for 'in.'

xlix. 9. 'a lioness' for 'an old lion.'

xlix. 10. 'obedience' for 'gathering.'

xlix. 11. 'vesture' for 'clothes.'

xlix. 13. 'upon' for 'into.'

xlix. 14. 'the sheepfolds' for 'two burdens.'

xlix. 15. 'task-work' for 'tribute.'

xlix. 17. 'in' for 'by.'

xlix. 19. 'press upon' for 'overcome;' 'press upon their heel' for 'overcome at the last.'

xlix. 23. 'persecuted' for 'hated.'

xlix. 25. 'coucheth beneath' for 'lieth under.'

xlix. 27. 'even' for 'night.'

xlix. 30. 'from' (E.) for 'of.'

xlix. 33. 'charging' for 'commanding.'

l. 3. 'wept' for 'mourned.'

l. 10. 'lamented' for 'mourned.'

l. 15. 'fully' for 'certainly.'

l. 16. 'message' for 'messenger.'

l. 17. 'trans.' for 'trespass' (2).

l. 20. 'meant' for 'thought;' 'for' for 'unto.'

l. 23. 'born' for 'brought up.'

xlix. 3. 'firstling' for 'beginning.'

xlix. 4. 'overflowing' or marg.⁸ for 'unstable.'

xlix. 5. 'sickles' better than 'swords.'

xlix. 6. Adopt marg.¹⁹ and ¹⁸.

xlix. 10. Omit marg.¹⁴.

xlix. 12. 'dark' for 'red.'

xlix. 13. 'shore' for 'haven.'

xlix. 17. Adopt marg.⁴.

xlix. 22. 'young fruit-bearing vine' for 'fruitful bow;' 'whose shoots run up the wall' is correct.

xlix. 23. 'treated him bitterly' for 'have sorely grieved him.'

xlix. 26. Adopt margins.

IV. THE ENGLISH OF THE REVISION.

This is too much like the A. V. not to be good. Omitting details of arrangement, changes of pronouns, the use of capitals, omission of italics, and unimportant variations in punctuation, the following will represent our fourth head.

(a) *Changes of Translation.*

In a few cases "shall" and "will," "should," "would," "could," "might," etc., have been exchanged, but there are many more where this should have been done. See, e. g., xlii. 16; xxiv. 3, 7; xxxviii. 9; xl. 13; xliii. 16. To enumerate would require too much space.

The preferences of the American Revisers for modern English words and spelling will here be presupposed.

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> iii. 1. 'subtil' for 'subtle.' v. 18. 'begat' for 'he begat.' vi. 11. 'and the earth' for 'the e. also.' vi. 17. Change of order, and omit 'even.' viii. 1. 'were' for 'was.' viii. 8. 'and' for 'also.' viii. 11. Omit 'was.' viii. 13. 'dried' for 'dry.' viii. 14. 'dry' for 'dried.' ix. 24. 'youngest' for 'younger.' x. 9. 'like N.' for 'even as N.' Sim. in xlii. 10. xiv. 17. Omit 'of.' So xxxii. 20. xiv. 22. Omit 'the' (pos.) xv. 17. 'these' for 'those.' So xli. 35. xvi. 11. Add 'then.' So xxvii. 40. xvii. 27. Add 'these' (2). xviii. 19. 'judgement' for 'judgment.' xix. 9. 'drew' for 'came.' xx. 5. Add 'the.' So xxxii. 7. xxi. 7. 'borne' for 'born.' So vs. 9; xxii. 20; xxx. 20, 25; xxxi. 43. xxi. 20. Add 'he.' So xxii. 3; xxiv. 32; xxv. 6; xxvii. 31; xxix. 18; xxxii. 8, 21; xlii. 24; xliii. 31; xlv. 29; xlix. 15. xxi. 26. 'know' for 'wot.' So xxiv. 21. xxi. 34. Change of order. xxii. 23. Change of order. xxiii. 1. Add 'the life of;' om. 'old.' xxiii. 12. Change of order. xxiv. 7. 'that' for 'which' (2). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> iv. 4. 'Abel himself.' v. A different arrangement of the numerals. v. 24. 'was no more.' vi. 6. 'Jehovah repented' for 'it repented . . . and he grieved in his heart.' vi. 22. 'and N. did it.' viii. 1. 'sank' or 'subsided' for 'as-suaged.' viii. 13. 'had dried.' viii. 16. 'from' (the ark). So vs. 18. viii. 20. 'built.' viii. 21. 'smelled the agreeable odor.' xi. 3. 'Go to' might be improved. xlii. 14. 'had' for 'was.' xiv. 20. 'who' for 'which.' xv. 10. 'in two' or 'in the middle;' 'opposite' (the other). xviii. 2. 'lifted;' 'opposite.' xviii. 4. 'brought.' xviii. 12. 'worn out.' xix. 27. 'gat' should be 'rose,' according to Rev. custom. xxi. 14. 'rose up early' is in both here and elsewhere; 'rose early' in both xx. 8; in xx. 3 Rev. have omitted 'up' of A. V. Why were the passages treated variably? xxi. 15. 'gone.' xxi. 30. 'from' for 'of.' |
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xxiv. 8. 'be not' for 'will not be.'
 xxiv. 9. 'this' for 'that.'
 xxiv. 26. Omit 'down.' So vs. 48.
 xxiv. 60. Omit 'thou *art*.'
 xxv. 25. 'forth' for 'out.' So vs. 26.
 xxv. 34. 'lentils' for 'lentiles.'
 xxvi. 4. 'mul. thy s.' for 'make t. s. to mul.'
 xxvi. 13. 'and grew more and more' for 'and went forward and grew.'
 xxvi. 20. 'strove' for 'did strive.'
 xxvi. 35. 'and they' for 'which.'
 xxvii. 1. 'elder' for 'eldest;' omit 'behold.'
 xxvii. 3. Omit '*some*.'
 xxix. 2. Omit 'there *were*.'
 xxix. 8. Omit '*till*.'
 xxix. 33. 'am' for '*was*;' add 'she.'
 So xxx. 1,
 xxx. 8. Omit 'I.'
 xxx. 9. Add 'to.' So xxxvii. 5, 9;
 xlvi. 27.
 xxx. 37. 'peeled' for 'pilled.'
 xxx. 40. 'sep.' for 'did s.'; 'droves apart' for 'flocks by themselves.'
 xxxi. 2. 'beforetime' for 'before.'
 So vs. 5.
 xxxi. 24. Add 'to thyself.'
 xxxi. 25. Add '-ain' to 'mount' (2).
 xxxi. 29. 'take heed to t.' for 't. then h.'
 xxxi. 50. Omit '*other*.'
 xxxii. 5. 'maids' for 'womens.'
 xxxii. 16. 'itself' for 'themselves.'
 xxxii. 22. Add 'of.' So xxxv. 22.
 xxxiii. 6. 'handmaids' for 'hand-maidens.'
 xxxiv. 8. Add 'unto.' So xxxv. 12.
 xxxiv. 14. Omit 'they.'
 xxxv. 1. 'who' for 'that.' So xxxvi. 24.
 xxxv. 14. Omit 'he.' So xlvi. 29; add 'out.'

xxiv. 22. 'when' for 'as.'
 xxiv. 55. 'she may go.'
 xxv. 8. 'expired.'

xxvi. 15. Omit 'them' (2).

xxvii. 30. 'had scarcely gone out.'
 xxviii. 11. 'had gone down'(or 'set').
 xxviii. 15. 'shall have done.'

xxx. 13. 'made a vow.'
 xxxi. 15. 'by' better than 'of.'
 xxxi. 18. 'in order to go.'
 xxxi. 19. 'had gone.'
 xxxi. 22. 'had fled.'
 xxxi. 42. 'unless' for 'except.'
 xxxi. 44. 'I and thou' not good English.
 xxxi. 50. 'between' better than 'betwixt,' as elsewhere.
 xxxii. 11. 'have become.'
 xxxii. 23. 'that he had' might be improved.
 xxxii. 32. 'limped' better.
 xxxiii. 10. 'wast' is wrong.
 xxxv. 29. 'expired.' So xlix. 33.

- xxxvii. 32. 'not' for 'no.'
- xxxviii. 12. Change of order.
- xxxviii. 14. 'herself' for 'her.'
- xxxviii. 25. Add 'the' (2).
- xxxix. 1. 'Pharaoh's' for 'Pharaoh.'
- xxxix. 6. 'comely' for 'a goodly person'; 'aught' for 'ought.'
- xxxix. 8. 'knoweth' for 'wotteth.'
- xli. 24. 'it' for '*this*.'
- xli. 28. 'that' for 'this.'
- xli. 44. Add 'his.'
- xli. 52. 'made me fruitful' for 'caused me to be fruitful.'
- xli. 53. 'plenty' for 'plenteousness.'
- xliv. 5. Omit '*corn*.'
- xliv. 24. 'spake to' for 'communed with'; 'spake unto' for same, xliii. 19.
- xliv. 33. 'go your way' for 'be gone.'
- xliv. 11. 'spicery' for 'spices.'
- xliv. 12. 'returned' for 'brought again'; omit '*it*.'
- xliv. 20. 'my lord' for 'sir.'
- xliv. 31. 'came' for 'went.'
- xliv. 7. 'speaketh' for 'saith.'
- xliv. 15. 'know' for 'wot.'
- xliv. 32. 'shall I' for 'I shall.'
- xliv. 6. 'plowing' for 'earring.'
- xliv. 26. Add 'they.' So xlvii. 9.
- xlvi. 18. 'which' for 'whom.' Why?
- xlvi. 21. Omit '*were*.'
- xlvi. 31. Add 'will.'
- xlvi. 9. Change of order.
- xlvi. 10. 'the presence of' for 'before.'
- xlvi. 18. 'nought' for 'not ought.'
- xlvi. 19. 'should' for 'shall.'
- xlvi. 24. 'ingathering' for 'increase'
- xxxvii. 17. 'they have gone away' or the like.
- xxxvii. 23. 'had come.'
- xxxvii. 33. 'has been' for 'is.' So xlii. 28; xlv. 28.
- xxxviii. 14. 'had not been given.'
- xxxviii. 16. 'Go to' might be changed.
- xxxix. 12. 'went forth without' for 'got him out.' So vs. 15.
- xl. 17. 'baker's food' for 'bake-meats.'
- xl. 23. 'forgot' for 'forgot.'
- xliv. 4. 'harm' for 'mischief.' So xlii. 38.
- xliv. 7. 'spoke' for 'spake.' So vs. 14.
- xliv. 9, 10, 12. 'have come' for 'are come.' So xlv. 16; xlvii. 1, 5.
- xliv. 21. 'has . . . unto' for 'is . . . upon.'
- xliv. 1. 'severe' for 'sore.'
- xliv. 10. 'unless' for 'except.'
- xliv. 25. 'for the coming of J.' better.
- xliv. 7. Use 'far be it from,' etc. So vs. 17.
- xliv. 12. 'ended' for 'left.'
- xlvi. 15. 'bore' for 'bare.'

(b) Changes in the Transliteration of Proper Names.

Only a general remark can be made. Quite a number of slight changes have been introduced, most of them good ones, if it be considered desirable to apply their principle of change to all the list, which Rev. have not done. In a few instances the reason is difficult to detect. In some, there seems reason against Rev. These views will appear plainer by a few examples :—

Salah becomes Shelah, and an unimportant (to us) individual Shaul receives his correct name, while the names of the first prophet and the first monarch of Israel are still pronounced according to the Ephraimitic method, with no marginal indication of the real nature of the sibilant which Rev. have furnished in the case of Seth and other names. Methuselah remains, but Enosh has replaced Enos. We have both Enoch and Hanoah, as in A. V. Tahash has replaced Thahash, but Thummim remains. Zarah becomes Zerah, but many such vowels are retained. Job (Gen. xlv. 13) is changed to Iob, which is nearer to the pronunciation of the more familiar Hebrew name than to it.

V. THE MARGIN.

In regard to the marginal readings and notes, it is sufficient to refer to the statements of Rev. and of their critics. It is already manifest that we have a mass of valuable material collected, in such a shape, however, as not to prove of the highest value to the unfamiliar English reader; e. g., the readings from the LXX. there quoted are of no greater value than many which are not alluded to; and there is no outward indication distinguishing alternative renderings of great value from the discarded ones of A. V. Cross references are sometimes given and sometimes not.

CONCLUSION.

A careful consideration of these facts leads the writer to the following opinions :—

1. The Revisers show that they have been most painstaking in their effort, and have given us a multitude of minute changes, almost all of which improve the old version. The R. V. is a very great advance upon the A. V., except in regard to the Hebrew text employed.

2. The Revisers have been over conservative in their attachment for the A. V.; and this, too, when the more progressive policy of the New Testament Committee had in a measure prepared the public mind to expect *serious* changes. Not simply the young, but the old and gray-headed, have been astonished by this exhibition of conservatism.

3. In several respects the rules observed in revising the Old Testament were not those of the New Testament Company. It is desirable that editions for the people be conformed in both Testaments to the same treatment. The difference is, for the most part, to the disadvantage of the Old Testament Company, notably in regard to the choice of an original text.

4. Notwithstanding the great excellencies of the R. V., it is still so marred by inaccuracies as to make it probable that it will itself have to be revised before it can prove acceptable to American Christians.

5. The value of the Revisers' work does not depend upon the adoption of its results. For their unselfish labors of fifteen years the church is profoundly grateful, and the publication of these results, with the discussion thereupon, must surely awaken an additional interest in, and impart a more intelligent knowledge of, that most transcendent of books, the Bible.

ARTICLE V.

ANCIENT BOOK-MAKING.

BY THE REV. HENRY PRESERVED SMITH, D.D., PROFESSOR IN LANE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE large place books have in modern society is evident to the most unthinking. We are so accustomed to dilate upon the advantages of the printing press, that we sometimes think of books as the peculiar possession of our own day, or at least of the modern age. But books were in existence long before printing was thought of. The newspaper, indeed, is a result of the printing press, and we may claim it as our own—our advantage over the ancients is evidently not so clear as we had imagined. And even in this respect, we may say that the private correspondence of the ancients took the place of the public press. The letters of Jerome or of Augustine give us a running chronicle of affairs in their time, briefer indeed than the newspaper accounts, but not less perspicu-

ous, and certainly more elegant. In any case, if we are to make literature a characteristic (might we not say *the* characteristic) of civilization, this mark will put us into one class, not only with the nations of modern Europe, but with the Greeks and the Romans and the Hebrews. At the same time it will run a broad line between us and our own ancestors in the forests of Germany. The history of the book as an instrument of civilization must possess for us a very distinct interest.

The art of writing alone does not produce books. That art may be widely used and yet books may be unknown. We may conceive the extended monumental and mural inscriptions of Egypt and Assyria, without the papyri of the one country or the clay tablets of the other. Whether suitable book material will not always be invented when writing becomes fully developed, is a question we need not stop to discuss. It is generally supposed that the Phenician alphabet, at least, was for a long time used by the lapidary before it came to the hands of the scribe—before ink and calamus were thought of, in fact. Even the extended epitaph of an Eshmunazer, however, or the long inscription which accompanies the bas-relief of an Assyrian king, could not be called a book. An essential thing about a book is that it is portable, so that it can become the private property of an individual, enabling him to study in his own home the thoughts of his fellow-men. Literature can retain its high place in the esteem of men only so far as it furthers this communion of spirits. The most rudimentary portable book seems to be the clay tablets to which allusion has already been made. The progress of Assyrian discovery has made every one acquainted with the existence of these. The writing was impressed while the clay was soft and the plate was then baked. Many thousand of these primitive books or leaves were stored in the great library at Nineveh, and it has been stated that each plate is marked with a number or device to indicate its place in the shelves. Some marks, of

course, must have been used to prevent confusion in so large a collection. The public librarian of our own day will probably concede some advantages to the tablets. They could not be carried off surreptitiously, on account of their bulk. They would stand a great deal of wear. Interesting passages could not be cut out by readers devoid of conscience, nor the page marred by impertinent exclamation points or by would-be witty comments. Nevertheless a bundle of clay tablets must have been a cumbrous and unsatisfactory substitute for a real book. At the present day we should deny it the name of book.

The book, although it does not come into existence at once on the invention of writing, cannot exist without writing. Nearly the whole history of writing precedes the history of the book. Our first chapter ought, perhaps, to be devoted to the rise of the alphabet—and a very interesting story we should find it. No art illustrates more clearly than does this one how slowly great inventions are brought to perfection. Finding its origin in the rude totem mark of the savage, we trace it through the picture writing of the early Egyptians to the rebus-like combinations which suggested syllabic division of words. As we follow this development we wonder not less at the ingenuity of the inventors than at the patience of those who had to use so complicated an instrument. We do not find it strange that reading and writing, instead of "coming by nature" to the many, were the serious vocation of the few—and they a privileged or sacred caste. We are no less surprised at the obtuseness which could not make the analysis (to us the simplest in the world) of words not into syllables only, but into the final elements, really so few in number, which we call letters. Perhaps the learned class did not desire to have

good stage of perfection before the book came into existence at all. We may therefore assume this history as already behind us, and start with the early book, leaving the clay tablet as only a rudiment. Besides the art of writing, we must have for a book suitable material. Tradition and philology give us the bark of trees as the earliest book material. But it is so early as not to come within the range of historic inquiry. In eastern Asia palm leaves have been written upon from very early times to the present. These nations, however, lie outside the stream of progress which most nearly concerns us. Passing these by, we find the materials at the disposal of the ancient book-maker to be two—papyrus and leather. Of these, papyrus was by far the most prominent in classic times.

The papyrus plant, it need not be said, is a reed or rush (*Cyperus Papyrus*) member of a widespread family of plants, represented in our own country by a number of species, which however attain no great size. The papyrus is among others what our Indian corn is among the true grasses, conspicuous for size and usefulness. Its original home was upper Egypt or Nubia, but it was introduced by cultivation into the Delta and (in the time of the Arab dominion) into Sicily where it is still found. We are told by Dr. Thomson that it is found also in the marshes of the Huleh, and that it is still known as *Babeer*, evidently the ancient name only slightly modified. Like most sedges, it grows in damp places, and seems to have thriven in shallow ponds or lagoons. It had, when cultivated, a running rootstock as thick as a man's arm, which grew to be twelve or fifteen feet long. This bore the triangular stems, each of which was seven or eight feet in length, and terminated in a broom-like head or panicle. All parts of the plant had their uses. The roots were cut for fire-wood, the pith was eaten by the poorer classes, the bark made excellent tow for caulking ships, and was twisted into ropes and even cables. A ship's

cable of papyrus is said to be mentioned by Homer.

But the most prominent reason for the cultivation of this remarkable sedge was that it furnished the paper of the ancient world. The process of manufacture is described by Pliny. The pith, which is probably not very unlike that of the American cornstalk was taken and split into thin strips, the thinner (we may suppose) the better. The strips might be as long as the pith from which they were made. As the business of manufacture was extended it had to be systematized, and it was found of advantage to work by fixed patterns. The strips were therefore made about the length of the leaf of paper required—in no case more than twenty inches, probably. The strips, when made in sufficient quantity, were laid side by side in a single layer on a wet board. Over this layer another layer was placed, the strips running at right angles with the former. It is yet a question among scholars¹ whether the material was made to cohere by paste of some kind, whether the Nile water had some glutinous property (which is generally supposed to be Pliny's view), or whether the natural mucilage of the plant was by wetting sufficiently developed to hold the two layers together. In some cases it seems quite certain that paste was used, and it is natural to suppose that it was used regularly. Occasionally more than two layers of the fibre were taken. While yet wet, the sheet (as we may call it by anticipation) was pressed between boards until it held firmly together, and was then dried in the sun. The rough edges were trimmed with shears and the paper was ready. In case the surface was not made smooth enough by simple pressure it was rubbed down with shell or ivory. If the leaf were of uneven thickness, or if it were

poor quality, rougher at its best than the most fashionable linen paper of to-day, loose in texture, easily torn, and especially subject to injury by the damp. Such as it was, it was the paper of antiquity, and its manufacture was a lucrative monopoly of the Egyptian crown. But we have as yet only single sheets of paper—not a book. Natural as it may seem to us to fold the sheets in sections and bind these together, the ancients did not at first employ this process. The most natural way, as it seemed to them, was to paste or glue one to the other, making a strip long enough for the particular occasion. To dispose of such a strip easily, rolling was found simpler than folding—papyrus, being infirm in texture, would be injured by folding. In the roll we have the characteristic book of the ancients. The difference in form between classic literature and that of our own day cannot better be given than by describing theirs as a literature of rolls; while ours is a literature of folded sheets.

It may be profitable to delay a little longer on the roll, in order to clear up some matters of detail. In the first place the contents were arranged in columns or pages across the roll, the lines of the writing being parallel with the length. Very rarely, it would seem from allusions in classic writers, the lines extended across so that the whole formed a continuous page. Generally the pages were made to accord with the original sheets, so that they were separated by the seams. The reason for writing across is obviously that it is more convenient to hold a roll with the hands at the same level than to hold it with one hand above the other. The end of the writing was marked by the word *explicit* (in Latin writers), and when this point was reached the book was rolled up again its entire length. In reading, the left hand loosely rolled what the right unrolled. In some cases the writing was on the outside as well as the inside, and we remember that the Apostle John saw a book written on the back (i. e., on the outside) as well as within. In practice it was found that the out-

side was soiled and the writing was defaced by constant handling. It became customary, therefore, to write on the inside only.

It is obvious that a roll may easily become cumbrous, and ancient authors allude to the perplexities of those whose works were literally too *voluminous*. In too large a roll, the part already read (naturally more loosely rolled than the other) becomes unmanageable. A classic writer makes merry over a would-be orator who steps forward and begins to read from an immense roll. But the unruly corpus slips from his hand and unrolls itself on the floor as it glides many yards away from him. On account of this inconvenience, custom early fixed the convenient size of a single book, and book-makers adopted this as the standard size, and furnished blanks of the regulation length, all ready for the scribe. Each of these was fitted with a staff or roller in the centre. As the earlier leaves had much the most wear, it was customary to make the first leaves of the stoutest and best paper, and to grade from that downward to the last, which was of decidedly inferior quality. How much of this custom may be attributed to the tendency of human nature which even in our own day causes the best apples to appear at the top of the barrel, is difficult to decide. The breadth of the roll also was regulated according to a fixed scheme. The broadest in common use measured about ten English inches. So the pages of a classic book were not far from the size of these now before the reader's eye. Larger sizes are occasionally mentioned. After the book was written it was provided with a title and index of contents, which was pasted on the outside of the first leaf. A covering of cloth or leather was also made to preserve it from dust and wear. Rolls were often tied up, in order to make them more compact, and the string might be furnished with a seal at the owner's pleasure.

The fact that books of a regulation size were supplied to the publisher or author, is interesting to us, because its

influence on the form of literary works may be traced quite to our own day. The size of the book had to be considered in the composition of a work. It is impracticable to carry a work right on through a number of rolls, regardless of the break which comes at the end of each one. The process of rolling up one part and then uncovering another (perhaps with the added necessity of picking it out from a number and then untying it) makes a serious interruption in the thread of interest. It would be a shock to the reader to come to the end of a roll while in the full tide of the narrative or of the argument. Really ingenious authors kept this in mind. They provided for it by laying out their works in "books" of the required size. They grouped their material so as to finish a single topic within the limits of a single *volume*. In case of a narrative poem, for example, the book is made to end with the coming on of night, or with the conclusion of a truce, so that the enforced pause may seem to be a natural one. For the same reason the first paragraph of a book is often made a recapitulation of what has gone before, so that the interrupted thread may be readily taken up again by the reader. Sometimes, however, the writer himself is surprised by the end of the book coming upon him before he is through with the subject, so that he frankly confesses he had intended to say more, but he has reached the end of the book, or space forbids, or he is compelled to postpone what he has further to say to another book. Now the amount of writing that can be put into a convenient roll is much less than the amount of printing contained in a modern book. The twenty-four *books* of the Iliad filled originally as many rolls. We possess them in a single modest volume. The books of the Old Testament are in our hands in one volume in Hebrew; with the addition of the Apocrypha, they are in one or two volumes of Greek printed text. They were written in twenty-two rolls, as it would seem, and even then Alexandrian scribes, under the influence of classic models, di-

vided each of the books Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, into two, to bring them to the standard size. It follows from all this that every work larger than a pamphlet had to be published in several volumes, and we need no longer wonder at the common form of titles exemplified by Augustine's "On the City of God, Twenty-four books." Classic tradition has in this respect powerfully affected subsequent literature. That we should divide our books (as, indeed, the ancients did also) into chapters and paragraphs, according to the natural suggestions of the subject, is to be expected. There is no outward coercion on an author to do anything more unless his work fills more than one volume. Yet many of our great literary works are divided after classic models into "books" whose extent is not that of the modern volume at all. The fashion is now dying out, but into the last century it maintained itself all over Europe.

When the material for books became abundant and cheap (comparatively speaking, of course), the Greek and Roman world blossomed out into a literary society. The increase of wealth gave men of cultivated tastes an opportunity to possess themselves of the thought of Plato and the rhythm of Homer. These set the fashion, and the fashion was followed by the mere bibliophile—a character satirized by Roman writers. They represent him as the man who collects books for the sake of having them, not for the sake of reading them; one who knew their pecuniary value, who was able to expatiate on the fineness of the material or the antiquity of the copy, who furnished his library in the most expensive manner, but who never perused more than the titles of his treasures. But the result of ostentatious as well as of genuine interest in books was to make the commodity popular, and the trade of publisher became a distinct vocation and a lucrative one.

are puzzled to know how such a business could be carried on in the absence of printing, a moment's reflection will help us. Of Roman methods, at least, we are tolerably well informed. Let us suppose Cicero to have a work just ready for the public. He first has a fair copy made by a scribe under his own eye (this often seems to have been made the dedication copy). He next sends it to the publisher, receiving in some cases at least an honorarium in return. The publisher has a number of slaves,—*librarii*,—probably Greeks by birth or education, whom the fortunes of war have thrown into the power of the barbarian. Fifty or a hundred or more of these scribes are seated in the work-room, each provided with a blank roll of the required size, and, of course, with *calamus* and ink. The foreman takes the author's copy and reads it aloud, the penmen writing at his dictation. A half day sees the fifty or the hundred copies finished, and in a short time an edition of any ordinary size could be ready. The cost, moreover, is not necessarily very great. There are on record cases of a book sold for a little over a dollar of our money. Money was, of course, many times more valuable than with us, and the book was in size no more than a pamphlet. Still, with these allowances made, it is evident that books were not extravagant luxuries, certainly not at all periods of the Empire. This is implied, moreover, in the further fact that an edition often (perhaps generally) consisted of a thousand copies, and that publishers were accustomed to ship their wares in considerable amounts to the colonies. On the other hand, it is not often that we hear of a second edition.

Just here is the place to speak of a subject which has called forth some discussion of late—*stichometry*. The discussion was started by the fact that a large number of manuscripts have come down to us with a note at the end saying that the work now completed contains so many *stichoi*. At the same time the actual lines of the manuscript do not generally tally with the particular datum.

Careful computation and averaging of the data, however, makes it probable (nearly certain) that the *stichos* was a fixed amount of writing, applied as a standard of measurement to all books. This standard line contained thirty-six letters or sixteen syllables. It would be easy, of course, to have the first copy written in lines of this length, or it would be easy to estimate the number of such lines in any book, as our own printers constantly estimate the size of a manuscript in pages or columns after counting a few words and lines. The reason for the size of the standard *stichos* was probably that the hexameter verse in poetry is of this length, hexameter being the meter most commonly employed. The system once applied to poetry was easily transferred to prose. Instead of a numeration of pages we have this calculation of *stichoi*. So Josephus speaks of his great work, the Antiquities, as containing so many thousand *stichoi*, where a modern author would have said so many hundred pages. The computation of *stichoi*, once made, remained the same for the same book, no matter what the form in which it was written, and the statement which was true in form only for the first copy was copied in subsequent ones. The reason was its convenience as a means of estimating the work done by the scribe, and so his earnings in case he were a paid laborer. In fact, we have a regulation (in the *Corpus Juris*) of one of the emperors fixing a scale of prices by the hundred lines for scriveners, much as the writing and copying of legal documents has usually been paid for in modern times by the hundred words. By the number of *stichoi* the buyer could judge of the size of a book and decide whether he was paying a fair price. Such data, copied from manuscripts

and Hort's edition, differing in the Epistles by not more than one-fourth of one per cent.

We are now able to form an approximate idea of the ancient book, as it was in circulation from the time of Alexander the Great till near the fall of the Western Empire. Indeed, it lingered on considerably later. But for seven centuries at least it held undisputed sway. The question will be asked, how did the roll come to be supplanted by the *codex*, as we may call the book of leaves made after our fashion? The question may well interest us, for it seems altogether likely that if the older book form and book material had continued in use we should have had much less of Greek and Roman literature than has actually come down to us. Papyrus is notoriously perishable. The ancients themselves complain of its frailty. It suffered from wear as much as our poor qualities of unsized paper. It was peculiarly affected by dampness and mould, as we may judge when we consider the process of manufacture. A peculiar species of book-worm infested it, and it was the favorite nesting place of moths and of mice. Books left long rolled up stuck together and could not be unrolled without damage. As compared with parchment, or even with paper, this material was short-lived. It might last a hundred years with care. Rolls of a greater age were occasionally seen, but they were rare. If, now, our knowledge of ancient authors depended upon manuscripts written within a hundred years of the invention of printing, it is obvious that our body of Latin and Greek literature would not only be meagre but it would be inaccurate. This conclusion is not sensibly affected by the fact that in the exceptional climate of Egypt papyrus rolls have lasted till our own day.

The perishable nature of classic books would not itself have prompted a change of form. If a book will last a hundred years, the buyer is generally content. He gets it for his own use and enjoyment, and is not much con-

cerned that it should serve beyond his life-time. No one of us, probably, would refuse to buy a book because it would not outlast the year 1986. The same is true of the book-sellers. On the whole it would be rather a gain to them to have the more perishable material in use. The change from papyrus and the roll to parchment and the *codex* cannot be attributed to any general conviction that the old material and form would no longer serve. It must be accounted for partly by the improvements in the manufacture of parchment, partly and in much greater degree by the introduction of a new social force, namely, Christianity.

The skins of animals had been used as writing material from very early times in the East, and even when papyrus was most in favor we hear occasionally of *membrane*. The mode of preparation, however, was not such as to make this substance sightly or convenient. In one respect only had it the advantage over its rival; once used, the writing could be washed off or scraped off and the skin used over again. Where lamp-black ink was used (as it was very commonly) the erasure was easy and complete. As we know from the palimpsests of our great libraries, the process was less effective where gall inks had been used. But the same documents show that it was often used even in these cases, and with practical results. On this account membrane was used for temporary composition, first drafts, rough notes, any thing intended to serve for the moment. The sponge is mentioned, indeed, by ancient writers almost as often as the calamus. This may give us a clue to Paul's language, where, besides the books (*βιβλία*—*papyri*), he makes special mention of the parchments (*μεμβράνας*); the latter contained private and personal memoranda or notes (for sermons?). As the less popular material, leather was probably also the cheaper. When a man was too poor to buy a book he would borrow it and make himself a copy, and this was likely to be on leather. This relation of the two substances continued

till a natural or artificial dearth of papyrus caused more attention to be paid to the hitherto despised material. Tradition has it that King Eumenes of Pergamum founded a library designed to rival the celebrated collection of the Ptolemies at Alexandria. The latter potentates therefore prohibited the export of papyrus, and the Asiatics directed their efforts to the improvement of leather. Their success was such that the new article (for such it was in the fineness of its finish) was carried over the civilized world. It bore with it the name of its native place in its designation as *pergament*, which we have corrupted to parchment. However much of this account is legendary, it is probably right in attributing the manufacture to Asia Minor, where, as we have seen, leather had been in use for writing purposes from a very early time.

Let us note in passing that the general use of parchment favored a change in the form of the book. Leather can, indeed, be made into rolls of any length by sewing together a sufficient number of skins. The continued habit of the synagogue is evidence enough on this point. The toughness of leather, however, must early have called the attention of its users to the advantage of folding the leaves together. Three or four or five leaves folded and sewed at the back make of themselves a small book of convenient form,* and it was soon discovered that any number of such sections could be strung together at the back, forming the *codex* in distinction from the *volume*. It only remained to protect the sides with boards to have the modern book complete. When once perfected it must have shown distinct advantages over the roll. Both sides of the material could be used, for one thing. For the public reader with a desk before him, a book of this sort would lie open and leave his hands free. To find a par-

* Four leaves or sheets usually make up the quire in codices that have

ticular paragraph is much easier if leaves are to be turned over than if a roll is to be undone, and it is more expeditious to shut a book than to roll up a roll. Finally, such a book would hold considerably more than the roll without becoming unwieldy. As we have seen, an extended work was necessarily distributed among several rolls, and this necessity must constantly be kept in mind by the author. This division was a serious disadvantage. A great work like Livy's Roman History (142 books, so many separate rolls, of course) filled a whole library in itself. It became a serious problem to arrange such a work in any manageable shape, so that any desired number could be found at once. This problem was never really solved. The best that could be done was to tie the rolls in bundles of ten each, like so many fascies of umbrellas. Even then the bundles must be untied and the labels examined before the right book was found. But a codex would easily contain a decade or two decades of rolls. The work would thus be reduced to a small number of parts, and these could easily be labelled on the back. We are not surprised, therefore, to find the codex form preferred for certain books (notably the *Corpus Juris*) before it became the prevailing one.

In spite of these undeniable advantages, the conservatism of mankind and of the book trade still adhered to the old form a long time after the improvement in parchment. The change from the roll to the codex was only accomplished by the new force which changed the face of society—Christianity. A moment's reflection will enable us to realize this. In the first place, Christianity is the religion of a book. Mohammed did credit to his own clearness of vision when he put Jews and Christians under the head of "book people," in contrast with the rest of the world, and we can hardly wonder that he aspired first of all to provide his followers with a "Book of God" as a means to make their religion consistent and persistent. The emphasis laid by Christianity upon the Scriptures

made it natural for every Christian to desire a copy for himself. The custom of reading aloud from the Old Testament came to the Church from the Synagogue, and the New Testament was soon added to the volume. It needs no more to show that the demand for these books among Christians would be large. But books were expensive, and the Christians were poor. What more natural than that they should seek to supply themselves in the ordinary method of the poor man? Instead of going to a book-seller, who would, moreover, not have the book that was wanted, the Christian would borrow the church Bible and according to his ability make his own copy. Such copies were generally made on leather, as we have seen. They would naturally be made in codex form, because, among other things, the codex could be made to contain all the writings of the Old Testament, or of the New, or even of both. We see how this came to be the familiar form to Christians. As Christians became more numerous, rolls would grow less and less familiar, and as time went on the perishable nature of papyrus would become more and more apparent. Measures taken to preserve the contents of the now decaying rolls would first of all look to the introduction of a more enduring substance.

The demand for books among Christians, and the poverty in which they were generally found, are not the only causes which contributed to the change. We have already noticed the importance of service books in Christian ritual; we have noticed also the peculiar advantage of the codex form for this class of books. Still another thing must be borne in mind. In the clergy the church has a class of men whose especial care is the sacred volume. To the regular clergy was added, in the third century, a large body of monks. It was natural that these should give a part of their time to copying the Scriptures, and copying them in such a form as to be useful in the services of the church. It is altogether likely that we owe the earliest codices which have come down to us to this labor of the

monks. The fifty copies of the Bible prepared by Constantine's order as presents for the principal churches of the Empire were made under the direction of a bishop (Eusebius), and probably written by monks or students of theology. From this time literary men were found in the monastic orders. The codex in their hands took the place of the roll, and as the danger became obvious that ancient literature would perish in the decay of the material on which it was recorded, these conservators of letters rescued what came into their hands by transferring it from the ephemeral papyrus to the more durable parchment.

Beginning with the rude tablet of clay, we have now followed the book through the elegant roll, in which Cicero's essays met the eyes of his contemporaries, to the substantial vellum codex of the mediaeval monk. The reflections suggested by such a development are those suggested by all historical study, for this sketch is in a manner a type of all human history. First is the distinct confirmation of what has often been said: that intellectually we are akin not to our direct ancestors, the Gauls or the Germans, but to the nations of classic antiquity. We inherit from these our conception of literature. We have not greatly modified the forms of literature cultivated by them; and even the mold in which any single work is cast by the author of to-day shows the influence of classic models. Nowhere is this more strikingly shown than in our language. The word *book*, indeed, is said to belong to the main stock of our language, but almost every other which has to do with literature has a Greek or Roman parentage. A number of these are technical, as *corpus* (applied to a collected body of writings), *codex*, *palimpsest*. But others are of our every-day vocabulary. A *volume* was originally a book in roll form. A *tome* was a roll containing part of a

papyrus plant. *Paper* is the Egyptian or Arabic name for the same plant, coming through the Latin *papyrus*. Many other words more or less intimately connected with literature — *chart*, *schedule*, *page*, *manuscript*, *literature* itself — testify that we are the descendants (intellectually) of the Greeks and Romans.

A second reflection is, that intellectual and material progress influence each other. Of the instruments of culture none approaches the book in importance. While we may abstractly conceive of a considerable degree of mental training where there are no books, yet practically civilization, as we know it, is a life of books. But the creation of books, as we have seen, is dependent upon the discovery of a suitable book material. This material once found, literature in the proper sense came into being, and the miracle was performed of conveying a man's thoughts not only to his contemporaries in distant lands, but to remote generations of races whose name he had never heard. This dependence of the intellectual life upon material conditions is strikingly seen in the later stage of book-making — a stage which we have not yet considered. This stage is characterized, of course, as the era of printed books. We are familiar with the immense multiplication of books by this process, which now puts a library within the reach of the day-laborer. It cannot be doubted that this process will powerfully influence the intellectual development of mankind. But the multiplication of books is dependent not alone upon the mechanical invention which we call the printing-press: the art of printing itself would never have been perfected without the prior introduction of a cheap, durable, available material on which the types could make their impression. This material was found in what we call paper — invented by the Chinese and introduced to Europe by the Moham-medans. This fabric (first made from cotton fibre) was so evidently superior, especially in cheapness, to all its rivals that it quickly displaced them all. Humanly speaking,

we may say that the Reformation of the sixteenth century, the creeds of the seventeenth, the revolutions of the eighteenth, and the material progress of the nineteenth, could not have been, had not the Arabs made Europe acquainted with the cotton paper of the Chinese. If something similar to these had taken place, it would have been different in many points from the history we actually know.

But if this side of the case is brought out by the train of thought we have followed, so is the other—the influence of intellectual forces upon material conditions. We have seen that early in the Middle Age a great transformation was wrought in the form of the existing literature. Slowly but surely the *volume* gave way to the hitherto despised *codex*, papyrus disappeared and was succeeded by parchment. This change was wrought by no one's set purpose. Probably no considerations of expediency would have effected it. It was the unconscious working of a new social and intellectual force. This force, working under the guidance of divine providence, but involving no human foresight or intention, became the conservator of what was most valuable in ancient civilization, stored it safely during the period of barbarian aggression, and brought it to light to be appropriated and diffused by a new culture. If Christianity, in one of its unconscious and minor influences, can change—has changed—the form of the world's literature, what may it not yet have in store for the race? Christianity is eager to make literature its ally. It avails itself of the printing-press as one of its most efficient missionaries. Under the influence of gospel ministers nations are now receiving books and letters who have hitherto been ignorant of any literature except the myths and legends which pass from father to son by oral tradition. Even nations which have a litera-

pect that the intellectual activity involved in these movements will influence to a marked degree the material and the moral welfare of mankind.

It will not be deemed presumptuous to find further in this study an illustration of the words of inspiration, "Other men have labored and ye have entered into their labors." Our Lord uses these words of his disciples who went into fields already ripe for the spiritual harvest. But they are equally true of any single generation in the line of civilization. We inherit the accumulated experiences of the past. The forms of our present life are the result of wise adaptation by our fathers. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the case we have been considering. I take up a book, an ordinary book—certainly not an object of pretending appearance. To the savage it would seem a worthless thing. In fact it is an engine at which myriads of men have been at work through long ages. Further back than we can see, even with the latest investigations, Egyptian priests and scribes thought out a means of communicating thought by signs. The complicated tool was borrowed and simplified by the sea-faring Phenicians, who needed it for their commercial transactions. The Greeks, receiving it from them, made it the more complete vehicle of European speech, and the Romans (whether receiving it through the Greeks or not) made similar adaptations and passed it on to the nations of modern Europe—one of their most precious heir-looms. At the same time experiment was going on which had for its aim to discover a material on which this alphabet could be used to record a connected and extended narrative or train of thought. The bark of trees, wooden or waxed tablets, were tried with but moderate success. The Egyptians discovered papyrus and profited by its manufacture, and so the early book was formed. But this was only the first stage. For the trying time when literature was to be stored up in almost unknown recesses, parchment was brought into use. In the far East another race

was experimenting, and when the day dawned in which literature was to come out of its hiding and become a part of the world's daily life, they were ready with paper. Paper is good to write upon, but in this respect it did not advance the book beyond its second stage. Gutenberg and Faust must come with their movable types, and Watts with his steam engine, and the countless inventors who in these later times have made the engine use the types with such marvellous rapidity. All these—Egyptians, Phenicians, Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Arabs, inventors, paper-makers, book-binders—all have wrought that we may enjoy the little copy of Pilgrim's Progress, which costs us but a trifle, which we take up without a thought of its history, and which we perhaps throw aside after reading, as carelessly as though it were but a piece of wood. Other men have labored and we have entered into their labors. Intellectually, as well as spiritually, we reap the harvest which others have sown.

ARTICLE VI.

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE NEW ENGLAND DIVINES.

BY THE REV. FRANK H. FOSTER, PH.D. (LEIPZIG), PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY, OBERLIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

III.

THE first generation of the New England divines, Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins, worked in close co-operation with one another, and, though independent thinkers, agreed with one another to a remarkable extent. The younger Edwards, the pupil of Bellamy, was also a pupil, and later the friend and co-laborer, of Hopkins. He might well be called a "Hopkinsian;" but, inasmuch as Hopkins' "System" was published after Dr. Edwards had become well known as an independent thinker, I have chosen to regard ^{him} as the founder of another branch of the school, for a time parallel with Hopkins and those who took their ideas more immediately from him. Certainly in the department of eschatology Hopkins has worked out the subject in its speculative aspects more thoroughly than Dr. Edwards. The simple fact that we possess his theological views in the form of a system, and are thus able to study his eschatology in its bearings upon the related doctrines, enables us to conceive and state it more perfectly. Were the two men in all other respects to be regarded as contemporaries, this fact alone would locate Hopkins at a later point in the history of our doctrine. We come, then, for our next study to—

must be Edwards

V. SAMUEL HOPKINS.

A word or two of preface as to the man himself is necessary before we pass to his doctrines. He was a good man. His own phrase to express the sum total of virtue was "disinterested benevolence," and he lived it as faith-

fully as he preached it. He secured the personal esteem and love of those of his neighbors who differed most widely from him in his theological views. His great mental trait was that which was so clearly marked upon his daily life that he received the nick-name Old Honesty. He was humble, and honest in expressing a depreciatory opinion of his own services. He was honest in his theological convictions, and thorough in carrying them out into their manifold ramifications. So honest was he, that he did not stop always to select language not likely unnecessarily to offend. He expected men to study his books till they got the great sweep and purpose of the whole, and interpret single expressions by his general meaning. If one will read him thus, and do him the justice now and then to re-state his thought in modern styles of expression, the grandeur of his fearless consistency will impress, as much as the deep solicitude and heart-searching faithfulness of this preacher-theologian will move and profit in the reading.

Hopkins' views are briefly stated in his *System*.¹ The older Calvinism is not friendly to the idea of a true probation for every man, but Hopkins set out from this idea. Adam himself, after the fall, was put under a "new constitution," and into a "new state of probation."² "The only time of probation allotted to man is that of this life, to which the death of the body puts an end; so that every one will be happy or miserable in the future, endless state according to his character, which is formed before the soul is separated from the body."³ "The soul does not die with the body, but exists in a separate state till the general resurrection of all the bodies of men which have died."⁴ "The souls of the redeemed are delivered from all sinful imperfection," "are set at liberty," "rise into

among men.”⁶ “The spirits of those who die in their sins pass into a state of darkness, despair, and tormenting wickedness. . . . These are the *spirits in prison* of which the Apostle Peter speaks, who are reserved to the general judgment, when each one shall receive according to what he has done in the body.”⁷ Then comes the general resurrection, in which the bodies of all who have died shall be united with their souls.⁸ Hereupon will follow the general judgment, at a fixed time, not limited to the space of a natural day, but continuing perhaps “during the term of many thousand years,”⁹ in which the whole history of the universe, comprehending both the plans and conduct of God, and the thoughts and actions of all men, will be reviewed. Thus the whole universe will be prepared for the righteous judgment of the judge. Hopkins now enlarges upon the nature of heaven, and the joyous activity and progressive development of the redeemed in the presence and society of God.¹⁰ He touches briefly “on the miseries of hell, on the bodily sufferings of the lost, on the mental pain and suffering which will be “the chief part of their punishment.” Their sense of the greatness of God; their own disposition, and the wicked exercises of their hearts; their enmity, rage, and jealousy; their absolute friendlessness; their company; their reflections on the past and their prospects for the future,—will constitute some of the elements of this.

A more thorough discussion of the subject is given in the special treatise entitled *An Inquiry concerning the Future State of those who die in their sins, or Endless Punishment consistent with divine Justice, Wisdom, and Goodness.*¹¹

The introduction shows us the views which Hopkins endeavored to meet in this work. They were annihilation, either immediate upon death, or after conscious punishment for a proper period; and final universal salvation,

⁶ pp. 43, 44.⁶ p. 44.⁷ p. 45.⁸ p. 49.⁹ pp. 55-64.¹⁰ pp. 64-68.¹¹ Works, vol. ii. pp. 365-489.

either after a period of punishment terminating at the judgment or even subsequently, or following immediately upon death." The antithesis of the work is for the most part between those who hold to a doctrine of probation, and believe that man may finally bring upon himself an adverse and unchangeable sentence, and those who deny this possibility, and so deny the doctrine of probation. It is not between a probation limited to this life, and some other. The discussion of the issue between conscious eternal punishment and annihilation is comparatively brief. Like the other works of Hopkins, this book was written for the times (1783). Chauncy's work had not yet appeared, but similar arguments to his were had in mind in the preparation of this treatise." Jeremiah White is mentioned by name." Murray was already preaching in New England, and advocating Relly's doctrine of Union. The first signs of the approaching Universalist controversy were in the air. But Murray is never mentioned. In general the argument is strictly impersonal, and the work is without references to other writers. The cause was to stand on its merits.

We may divide our review of this book into several convenient divisions.

1. *The Limit of Probation.*

This is not assumed without argument, but proved, though briefly." The arguments are two: (1) There is not in the Scripture "a word, or the least hint of another state of trial after the death of the body." (2) Positively, this life is the time of sowing for the future reaping (Gal. vi. 7, 8); of laying up treasure in heaven; of making to ourselves friends in the eternal habitations; of making our peace with God (Matt. v. 25, 26). The state of Laza-

their going out of this world." Heb. ix. 27, and particularly 2 Cor. x. 10, are also cited.¹⁶

As already stated, we find no discussion of any other kind of probation. But incidentally certain recent arguments are touched upon. The famous text, 1 Pet. iii. 19, was quoted in Hopkins' day as favoring universal salvation. He replies to this, but his reply is equally applicable to the modern use of the text.¹⁷ The argument is not grammatical, but logical, and contextual. Granting that Christ did preach the gospel to these spirits while in prison, "it does not follow that all the rest of mankind who die in their sins, *or that so much as one*, will be saved, but the contrary may be very strongly inferred. For if all that had died in their sins [and by parity of reasoning Hopkins might have added, if any class of men, like the unevangelized heathen,] were to be saved, why are those who perished by the flood singled out from all the rest, and the preaching of Christ confined to them? This looks as if they were to be distinguished from all others, who are left in prison without hope of deliverance." But the true understanding of the text, according to Hopkins, is that Noah was the preacher, who, inspired by Christ to foretell the flood, was a preacher of righteousness for one hundred and twenty years. The men who heard were disobedient, and they have been confined in prison, where they are now, awaiting the judgment of the great day. "That this is the true sense of this passage is confirmed by the apostle's evident design. It is introduced to encourage and animate Christians to faithfulness, patience, constancy, and cheerful resolution in following Christ under all opposition and suffering from wicked men. He mentions the sufferings of Christ, and his triumphant resurrection and deliverance; and then introduces this instance of Noah, and those with whom he lived before the flood, who opposed him and the spirit of Christ

¹⁶ Comp. p. 393, end, and 394, for an additional argument.

¹⁷ pp. 432-434. Comp. p. 391.

preaching to them by him. God waited on them with long-suffering, and Noah went through his suffering and work with patience and resolution, till at length the time of vengeance came, when Noah and his family were saved; but the disobedient were shut up in the prison of hell, where they now were . . . not as prisoners of hope, but of justice, reserved unto judgment and final, eternal condemnation. This representation is suited to support and encourage Christians” For a final argument Hopkins adduces the parallel passage, in which the destiny of these spirits is clearly stated: “For if God spared not the old world, but saved Noah, the eighth person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing in the flood upon the world of the ungodly; . . . the Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptations, and *to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment, to be punished*” (2 Pet. ii. 5, 9).

As to the peculiar condition of the heathen, we do not find any special discussion in Hopkins. Doubtless he agreed with his two friends and constant correspondents, Drs. Bellamy and Edwards.¹⁸ He was exceedingly clear

¹⁸ I may introduce here a reference, inadvertently omitted in its proper place, to Dr. Edwards' views of the state of the heathen (Works, vol. ii. pp. 465, 466). He says: “In favor of the salvation of the heathen, it is sometimes said, if a heathen be truly virtuous, what will become of him? Will he be cast off *merely because he is ignorant of Christ*; though, if he had known him, he would most cheerfully have received him as his Saviour? On this I observe, no doubt if any heathen be truly virtuous and holy; if he love God supremely as an infinitely great, wise, holy, and good God, and his neighbor as himself, he will be saved.” It will be noted that this is a distinct statement and rejection of the necessity of a knowledge of the historical Christ to constitute saving faith. Edwards continues: “But the question is, *whether any such persons can be found among the heathen.*” The

and positive in his statements of that doctrine of human ability which was the basis of Bellamy's as it has been of the later New England theory. There is a marked advance in Hopkins upon President Edwards in his forms of statement. Though he constantly refers to the "Freedom of the Will" with the most commendatory language, his own theory, so far as it can be gathered from his System, which was written with studious suppression of the philosophical element, was more radical than that of this treatise. Edwards defines freedom as ability to execute our volitions. The freedom is that of the *man*, not of the faculty of the will." Hopkins says, on the contrary: "Every exercise of the will in choosing or refusing *is* the exercise of freedom: and it is impossible for a man to will and choose without exercising moral liberty." And most emphatically: A man "may not be able to accomplish the thing . . . which is the object of his choice; . . . but this is not inconsistent with his exercising perfect freedom in his choice . . . And in these exercises of will and choice his moral character does wholly consist." "Hence in his system ability constituted responsibility. The theory is more radical, perhaps, than any other in the theologies of Christendom. Man's ability to repent is not *lost* in the fall of Adam, as some maintain; it is not *regained* by a special gift of grace, as the Arminians teach in their "gracious ability;" it *inheres in the nature of free choice*. A man, to be a man, must be free. Freedom is ability to repent. Ability constitutes responsibility. So that a man, *in that he is* a man, is responsible for his moral position towards God, and will be judged for it.

Whether, now, Hopkins ever considered the point made by the advocates of continued probation in our own day or not, he had settled on the principles which will always be held to be decisive in respect to it. It is advo-

cated to-day on the ground of the *inability of the heathen to repent*," which is a doctrine disowned utterly by Hopkins. In fact, if, as Hopkins taught, all men, as such, are fully responsible, there is no occasion for a theory of continued probation.

We are led from this topic, by a natural transition, to the next division of our theme.

2. Hopkins' central Idea controlling his Eschatology.

This is his lofty conception of the government of God. It is not peculiar to Hopkins, for here is another example of the perfect harmony existing between the three choir-leaders of New England. But in Hopkins it comes to its fullest and most consistent expression. It comprises peculiar views of the being governed, Man, of the Being governing, and of the character of that government. As to man, Hopkins exalted him to a very lofty position. Not only did he give great scope to man's natural ability, and emphasize his responsibility, but he viewed him as clothed with the most exalted intellectual powers. He was totally depraved, that is, he was totally turned away from God and engaged in his own pursuits. But, though thus morally fallen, his intellectual powers were unimpaired," and he was capable of piercing by their exertion even into the counsels of eternity, and certainly of knowing fully, and with the most absolute clearness and distinctness, his duty towards God and man. Thus there was never any disposition on Hopkins' part to *excuse*

²¹ See *Progressive Orthodoxy*, passim. E. g.: "Man's sinful state is such that he has no power of deliverance from it." This is explained a sentence or two further on: "All men are so under the control of sinful propensity and sinful character that they have not in themselves the power of renewal," i. e., *repentance* (p. 241.). Compare pp. 54-56. Note such forms as: "If man would, could become truly repentant." "Man of himself cannot

sin. He emphasized the evil of sin as strongly as Edwards. He shrunk from it, not so much like a pure man repelled from that which is vile, as like the loyal subject shocked by wicked, deliberate, ungrateful, and persistent rebellion against a beloved sovereign. His expressions against it are very strong, as we shall see, and have doubtless led to the common opinion of Hopkinsianism that it degraded man. On the contrary, as no other system, it exalts man, and then holds him strictly responsible for the right use of his exalted powers.

In respect to God, Hopkins' new ideas may be compendiously expressed in the single phrase, that he viewed him more constantly than others had done as a Governor. Under this conception it was his intention to make his readers feel the infinitely lofty and amiable character of the divine government as the reflection of the divine character, which, in accord with his teacher Edwards, he summarized in the word love. Hopkins does not differ from Edwards in the great features of the theory of virtue. He himself edited the first edition of Edwards' treatise. His own work on Holiness" makes a great improvement on the original in point of form. He applies the theory to the atonement in much the same sense as Dr. Edwards, ordinarily called the founder of the New England (Edwardean) theory of the atonement;" and in respect to eschatology far surpasses him in comprehensiveness. Holiness is the loftiest thing in the universe. A God of love, who chooses the well-being of the universe, must choose its holiness first of all. Love of holiness is the same as hatred of sin. God hates it for what it is towards himself, who is the chief being in the universe. He hates it as a governor for its harmful tendency to his government. He hates it *in that* he loves holiness, for this hate and love are as inseparable as the

righteousness. The one motive extending through all his actions is love.

3. *The general Course of Hopkins' Argument.*

The first section of the work is entitled: The holy Scriptures teach that the wicked will be punished in the future state. It comprises twenty-eight pages of almost continuous quotation. The next section advances to the proof that the punishment will be endless. The argument here is the same as that found in Dr. Edwards. *Αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* are treated in the same way. Next the passages quoted by Universalists and others are examined. Then comes, after sixty-eight pages in all of biblical discussion, the rational argument. Many particulars of this are common to Hopkins' predecessors. The argument for the justice of eternal punishment because sin is an infinite evil, is substantially that of Edwards. It is Hopkins who adds the thought already mentioned," that the infinite evil of sin is seen in the evil which it aims at and tends to produce." "It tends to dishonor and dethrone the Almighty; to destroy all his happiness, and to ruin his whole interest and kingdom; to introduce the most dreadful confusion and infinite misery, and render the whole universe infinitely worse than nothing, to all eternity. Nothing short of an endless punishment can be its proper reward." But all this never happens! "Why then," asks Hopkins for the objector, "should the sinner be punished as if he had actually effected infinite evil?" It is a principle of government, he replies, to judge of a crime by its tendency, and not its actual effect. He continues: "God, in punishing the wicked forever, *will do no more to them than they would have done to him*, had it been in their power. If they have cast God behind their back, and cared nothing for his honor, interest, or happiness, do they not deserve to be cast off by God, and that he should take no care of their interest or happiness."

²⁶ See above, p. 9.

²⁶p. 443.

And then he proceeds, in a strain fully characteristic of him, to say:—"

"As God and his kingdom are infinitely distinguished from every thing else in their infinite greatness, excellence, and importance, so rebellion against him, and opposition to his interest and kingdom, and an attempt to destroy the whole, must be equally distinguished from any other possible or supposable crime, and, therefore, it is right and proper that it should have an equally distinguished punishment, that is, an endless one. A temporary punishment, which is infinitely less than this, and infinitely less than the evil of sin, cannot answer the end of punishment; it will neither express the evil or crime of injuring the infinitely great JEHOVAH, nor serve in the least degree to show his infinite worth, grandeur, and greatness, but speak a contrary language, viz., that this being, character, and kingdom are of infinitely less worth than they really are, and so would be a real dishonor to him. . . . And if God should punish rebels against him, who have defamed him, and highly injured his character, with a temporary punishment only, this would be as far from answering to his infinitely superior, excellent, and important character, and properly vindicating it, as if no punishment at all were inflicted; yea, it would be infinitely worse than none, and really degrade his character, and be a reproach to him."

With such thoughts in mind, he will not hear any thing of the various excuses as if man were too insignificant or ignorant to commit an infinite evil. "If a finite being can affront and abuse his Creator," if he can desire to dethrone his Maker and destroy his kingdom, he can commit an infinite evil."

Another striking argument in the same line is from the atonement. "One end of the atonement which Christ made for sin was to show what evil there is in sin and its ill desert. But this is every way sufficient to atone for sin which has infinite ill desert; therefore this declares sin to be an infinite evil, or to deserve infinite or endless punishment." In modern phrase, God will not put forth more force in the atonement than the occasion demands. He continues: "To deny that there is infinite evil in sin, is, in effect, to deny the divinity of our Saviour." To understand this last sentence we must remember that Hopkins lived in the shadow of two great coming con-

²¹ pp. 445, 446.

²⁸ pp. 446-448.

²⁹ p. 449.

troversies, the Unitarian and Universalist, which he thus recognizes as closely allied.

But we must pass on now to Hopkins' more important contributions to the progress of thought upon this subject.

4. *The Relation of the Goodness of God to Eternal Punishment.*

The contribution here is not to the essential thought, but consists only in the greater fullness of statement, and certain applications. He dwells first upon the necessity of proper punishments to the maintenance of government, and upon the demand of goodness that it shall be maintained. Punishment performs a further good office in promoting the perfect display of God's character. It displays his terrible majesty, his displeasure and anger with sin, and thus his righteousness and goodness, to which anger and displeasure against sin are essential.

And now we come to the peculiarly Hopkinsian passage. It is all intelligible to one who has the eagle's eye and can look upon the sun. If one does indeed prize holiness above all things, and think pain of little account in comparison with sin, and has true disinterested benevolence such as this old divine preached and lived, he will understand and profit spiritually, while he trembles. But let not the weak, or the superficial, or he who does not believe sin to be truly inexcusable guilt, read either our author or this exposition of him.

Hopkins advances the proposition that "the eternal punishment of the wicked will many ways promote the highest good of the blessed, especially the redeemed from among men, and is the most proper and necessary means of their unspeakably greater degree of holiness and happiness than could otherwise take place; and therefore

displeasure against their enemies by condemning and punishing them as they deserve, exercises and displays his righteousness; and, at the same time, this righteousness is nothing but kindness and mercy to his church and people." Two pages of Scripture quotations follow in defence of this doctrine, among them many from the imprecatory psalms, but many also from Revelation and the other Scriptures. He continues:—"

"It has been already observed and shown how well suited and necessary endless punishment is, to make a full and most glorious display of the divine character, in the view of the blessed. In this will be seen, as could not be seen so clearly and to such advantage by any other medium, or without this, the infinite greatness, power, and terrible majesty of JEHOVAH; and also his infinite excellence and worthiness, and his hatred and displeasure, his indignation and wrath against sin, and his infinite benevolence and goodness, to which sin is opposed. The smoke of their torture shall ascend up in the sight of the blessed forever and ever, and serve, as a most clear glass, always before their eyes, to give them a constant, bright, and most affecting view of all these. And all this display of the divine character and glory will be in favor of the redeemed, and most entertaining, and give the highest pleasure to all that love God, and raise their happiness to ineffable heights, whose felicity consists summarily in the knowledge and enjoyment of God. This eternal punishment must therefore be unspeakably to their advantage, and will add such immense degrees of glory and happiness to the kingdom of God, as inconceivably to over-balance all they will suffer who shall fall under this righteous punishment, and render it all, in this view and connection, an infinite good."

It was upon this passage that the caricature of Hopkins was issued, representing him as "entertained" at the sufferings of the lost. Yet the passage reads: "*This display of the divine character will be most entertaining.*" Hopkins was not insensible of the dreadful character of the sufferings of the lost in themselves." If sin were not, a happy universe, without trace of suffering, would be the only one consistent with the perfections of God. But sin having entered by man's free choice, punishment increases the glory of God.

serve to manifest the excellence of holiness by the painful contrast it presents to it. In this sense he even goes so far as to say that it is "necessary to the highest happiness and glory of heaven." " It will also serve to keep ever vividly before the minds of the redeemed their own "infinite ill-desert." " The feelings inspired by the punishment of the lost are not those of selfish exultation, but of deep humility. Thus the saints will be led to see the greatness of the grace which has rescued them from their deserved fate, "and their enjoyment and happiness, their love, gratitude, and praise, will rise in proportion to their view and sense of God's infinite, astonishing goodness, and distinguishing sovereign grace to them, and all the redeemed." " Their sense of the greatness of the Redeemer's sacrifice will be enhanced in like manner, and with this their enjoyment and delight in him.

In our view this is the apex of the defence of the doctrine of eternal punishment. Unless continued punishment serves some continued good end, benevolence does not call for its infliction. But when it serves not only as a safeguard against sin, but as a positive means of promoting holiness among the redeemed, its continuance is justified by benevolence. This is the meaning of Hopkins' argument.

We pass over the reply now given to several objections, and, for want of space properly to consider it, we must pass for the present also over his slight allusions to the connection of election with this subject. Certain expressions are employed which cannot be understood without a prolonged study of the principal ideas of Hopkins' system, and of his manner of expressing himself. Unexplained, we must confess, they shock modern sensibilities,

nence to human freedom. In closing we must, however, consider his view of—

5. *The Relative Number of the Lost.*

Hopkins does not regard this as a vital question. If there be any insoluble speculative difficulty as to future punishment, it will not be removed if very few are punished, or if only a single soul. If there be injustice in it, that militates against the character of God if only one suffers, as truly as if millions suffer. We are dealing with an infinite and perfect being. Hopkins says, speaking of the matter speculatively, "To suppose that the less number of those that shall be punished is so much the better, seems to suppose it would be, on the whole, best to have none lost." Still, when we contemplate the sufferings of the lost, it is a legitimate source of relief to believe that comparatively few are lost. This is Hopkins' doctrine. He denies that the Scriptures, properly understood, teach that few are saved, for the passages which seem to imply this are of temporary application, whereas the general scope of prophecy points forward to a time of final triumph for the church. Even should the greater part of those who shall have lived before the millennium perish, in that glorious time so many shall be saved, that, as compared to the lost, they may be "many thousands to one."²⁴

The thought here presented was introduced by Edwards, enlarged upon by Bellamy²⁵ in a sermon upon the

²⁴ pp. 470-473.

²⁵ Bellamy employs arithmetic to show that the number of the saved will be greater than the lost (Works, i. 457). If the population doubles every fifty years during the millennium, and has stood during each of the six preceding thousand years at the same number as at the beginning of the millennium, the ratio of the saved to the lost will be more than seventeen thousand to one. Edwards had thought it "*very moderate* if we say it is probable that there will be an *hundred thousand* times more that will actually be redeemed to God by Christ's blood, during that period of the church's prosperity, than ever had been before, from the beginning of the world to that time" (Works, iii. 473).

"Millennium," but first fully developed by Hopkins. The latter appended to his System a Treatise on the Millennium, occupying 143 pages, large octavo. It is dedicated "to the people who shall live in the days of the Millennium"! The doctrine of the treatise is that after a great struggle with the powers of evil, a happy period will be ushered in when the church shall be greatly prospered for a thousand years. Then there shall be another period of trial, and then the Lord shall come in person, and the resurrection and judgment shall take place. The argument in favor of the doctrine is purely scriptural, and very extended. One section of the work enters, on the basis of the biblical statements and suggestions, upon a "particular description" of the state of the world during the millennium. It is to be a time when most probably "every individual person who shall then live will be a real Christian," and Hopkins' entire conception of the world is of one in which perfect holiness shall produce the greatest conceivable prosperity of every kind. There will be the greatest progress in knowledge; universal peace and positive love will prevail; there will be the greatest conceivable outward prosperity produced by great advance in agriculture and the mechanic arts; the numbers of men will greatly increase, and, on account of the greater prosperity, be supported more easily than now; one language will prevail over the earth; and then religion will appear in its true light, and God be glorified.

Scientific men in our own day have looked with gloomy eye on the present condition and future prospects of the world. It is now but a struggle for existence, which is to be intensified with the progress of time and the increase of population, till the finer arts and pursuits all disappear

had nothing but condemnation, and for the rebels he foresaw a terrible fate. Yet even their destruction should contribute to the glory of God. And finally the rebellion was to be overcome, and the earth filled with the loyal subjects of the King. Then, sin having largely ceased, the evils now afflicting the world would also cease.

Thus Hopkins' eschatology, stern with the sternness of facts, and ruggedly expressed through the rugged honesty of his mind, ends nevertheless in a prophecy of unutterable glory, in attempts to outline which the hidden poetry of his heart appears. Says Channing: "Whilst to the multitude he seemed a hard, dry theologian, feeding on the thorns of controversy, he was living in a region of imagination, feeding on visions of a holiness and a happiness which are to make earth all but heaven."

TO BE CONTINUED.

ARTICLE VII.

THE BOOK OF JUBILEES.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ETHIOPIC BY PROFESSOR GEO. H. SCHODDE, PH.D.,
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY, COLUMBUS, O.

CHAP. XXIV. 1. And it happened after the death of Abraham that the Lord blessed Isaac, his son, and he arose from Hebron and went and dwelt at the fountain of the vision, in the first year of the third week of this jubilee, seven years. 2. And in the first year of the fourth week a famine began in the land, in addition to the first famine which was in the days of Abraham. 3. And Jacob cooked a mess of lentils, and Esau came from the field hungry. 4. And he said to Jacob, his brother, "Give me of thy mess of pulse;" and Jacob said to him, "Give up to me thy right of first birth, and I will give thee bread

and also from this mess of pulse." 5. And Esau said in his heart, "I shall die; what is it to me to be born first?" 6. And he said to Jacob, "I will give it to you." 7. And Jacob said, "Swear to me this day," and he swore to him. 8. And Jacob gave to his brother Esau bread and the mess, and he ate and was satisfied, and Esau despised his right of first birth; and from this was Esau called Edom,¹ on account of the mess of grain which Jacob gave him for his right of first birth. 9. And Jacob became the older, but Esau diminished from his greatness. 10. And the famine was over the land, and Isaac went to go down to Egypt in the second year of this week, and he went to the king of the Philistines at Gêrârâ, to Abimelech. 11. And the Lord appeared to him and said to him: "Do not go down to Egypt; dwell in the land which I tell thee of: be a stranger in this land, and I will be with thee and will bless thee. 12. For to thee and to thy seed I will give all this land, and I will confirm my oath which I swore to Abraham, thy father, and I will increase thy seed like the stars of the heavens, and I will give to thy seed all this land. 13. And in thy seed shall be blessed all the nations of the earth, because thy father hearkened unto my voice and observed my words and my commandments and my law and my ordinances and my covenant; and now hear my voice and dwell in this land." 14. And he dwelt at Gerar three weeks of years. 15. And Abimelech commanded on his account and on account of all that was his, saying: "Every man that touches him or any thing that is his, shall surely die." 16. And Isaac increased in Philistia, and he secured many possessions, oxen and sheep and camels and asses and many possessions. 17. And he sowed in the land of Philistia and he raised a

Abraham the Philistines covered after the death of Abraham and filled them with earth. 18. And Abimelech said to Isaac: "Go from me, for thou art exceedingly greater than I;" and Isaac went in the first year of this seventh week from there, and migrated to valleys of Gêrânôn. 19. And they returned and dug open the wells of water, which the servants of Abraham, his father, had dug, and which the Philistines had covered over after the death of Abraham, his father, and he called their names as Abraham, his father, had named them. 20. And the young men of Isaac dug wells in the valley, and found living water; and the shepherds of Gêrânôn quarrelled with the shepherds of Isaac, saying, "This is our water," and Isaac called the name of this well Contention, "because ye have contended with us." 21. And they dug another well, and quarrelled on its account, and Isaac called its name Narrowness. 22. And he arose from there, and they dug another well, and did not quarrel on its account, and he called its name Extension, and Isaac said, "Now the Lord has extended us;" and he increased in the land. 23. And he ascended from there to the well of the oath in the first year of the first week in the forty-third jubilee. 24. And the Lord appeared to him in this night, at the new moon of the first month, and said to him: "I am the God of Abraham, thy father: fear not, for I am with thee, and I will bless thee and increase thy seed like the sand of the sea, on account of Abraham, my servant." 25. And he built an altar there where Abraham, his father, had first built one, and he called upon the name of the Lord, and offered sacrifices to the God of Abraham, his father. And they dug a well and found living water. 26. And the young men of Isaac dug another well, and did not find water, and they went and told Isaac that they had not found water, and Isaac said: "I have sworn this day to the Philistines, and this is to us the affair." 27. And Isaac called the name of this place The Well of the Oath, for there had he sworn to Abimelech and Akôsât, his friend, and Phikôl

his companion. 28. And Isaac knew on that day that in injustice they had sworn to them to keep the peace with them. 29. And Isaac on that day cursed the Philistines, and he said: "Cursed be the Philistines to the day of wrath and rage above all the nations: may the Lord make them an ignominy and a curse and anger and rage in the hands of sinful nations, and by the hands of the Hittites let him root them out. 30. And whoever escapes from the sword of the enemy and from the Hittites, may the people of the just root them out in judgment from under heaven, for they will be enemies and haters to my children in their days over the earth. 31. And may no remnant of them be left nor may any be saved on the day of the judgment of wrath, for to destruction and rooting out and being destroyed from the land are all the seed of the Philistines, and no remnant or name shall be left of *their* seed over the earth. 32. For even if he had ascended to heaven, they would bring him down from there; and if he is fortified upon the earth they will tear him from there; and if he hides himself among the Gentiles, they will destroy him from there; and even if he descends into Sheôl, there too shall his judgment be great, and no peace shall be to him; and if he go into captivity, by the hand of those that seek his soul on the way he shall be killed, and no name or seed shall be left him on the whole earth, for he shall go into the curse of eternity." 33. And thus is it written and engraved concerning him on the tablets of heaven, to do to him on the day of judgment, that he may be rooted out of the earth.

CHAP. XXV. 1. And in the second year of this week in this jubilee Rebecca called Jacob her son, and spake to him, saying: "My son, do not take to thyself a wife from

son, love thee exceedingly, and my mercy, my son, blesses thee at every hour and watch of the night; and now, my son, hear my voice, and do the will of thy mother, and do not take to thyself a wife from among the daughters of this land, except from the house of thy father and except from the family of thy father: take to thyself a wife from the house of my father, and the Most High God will bless thee, and thy children will be a generation of righteousness and thy seed holy." 3. And then spake Jacob with his mother Rebecca, and said to her: "Behold, I am now nine weeks of years old and know no woman: I have touched none nor betrothed myself to any, nor do I think of taking to myself a wife from all the seed of the daughters of Canaan. 4. For I remember, O mother, the words of Abraham, our father, that he commanded me not to take my wife from among all the seed of the house of Canaan, but from the seed of my father's house I should take to myself a wife and from my relationship. 5. I have heard before that daughters have been born to Laban, thy brother, and upon them is my heart set to take a wife of them. 6. On this account I have preserved myself in my spirit not to sin nor defile myself in all my ways all the days of my life, for with reference to lust and fornication my father Abraham gave me many commands. 7. And with all that he has commanded me these twenty-two years my brother contends with me and continually converses, saying: My brother, take to wife one of the sisters of my two wives; but I am not willing to do as my brother has done. 8. I swear before thee, my mother, that all the days of my life I will not take to myself a wife from the seed of all the daughters of Canaan, and will not act wickedly as my brother has done. 9. And do not fear, mother; trust me that I will do thy will, and will walk in rectitude, and my paths will not be destroyed in eternity." 10. And then she lifted up her face to heaven and extended the fingers of her hand toward heaven, and opened her mouth and blessed the Most High God, who had created heaven and

earth, and she gave him thanks and praise. 11. And she said: "Blessed be the Lord God and blessed be his name for ever and ever, who has given to me Jacob as a pure son and a holy seed; for thine he is and thine shall be his seed unto all the days and in all the generations of the world. 12. Bless him, O Lord, and place the blessing of righteousness in my mouth that I may bless him." 13. And at that hour the Holy Spirit descended into her mouth, and she placed her two hands upon the head of Jacob, and she said: "Blessed art thou, Lord of righteousness and God of the worlds, and thee do all the generations of men praise: may he give thee, my son, the path of righteousness, and reveal to thy seed righteousness. 14. And may thy sons increase in thy life, and stand to the number of the months of the year, and may thy sons increase and grow more than the stars of the heavens, and more than the sand of the sea increase their numbers. 15. And may he give them this fruitful land, as he said he would give it to Abraham and his seed after him in all the days, and may they possess it to eternity. 16. And may I see for thee, my son, blessed children in this life, and may holy seed be all thy seed. 17. And as the spirit of thy mother in her life caused thee to rest in her womb to give thee birth, thus my affection blesses thee, and my breasts bless thee and my mouth and my tongue praise thee. 18. Increase and be poured over the earth, and thy seed be perfect in all the earth in the joy of heaven and earth, and may thy seed rejoice, and on the great day of peace may the peace of thy name be theirs. 19. And may thy seed abide to all the worlds, and may the Most High God be their God, and may the Most High God dwell with them and his sanctuary be built to all the eternities. 20. He that blesses thee be blessed, and all flesh that curses thee in lies, may it be cursed." 21. And she kissed him and

CHAP. XXVI. 1. And in the seventh year of this week Isaac called Esau, his elder son, and said to him: "My son, I am old, and behold my eyes are dull of seeing, and I do not know the day of my death. 2. And now take thy hunting weapon and thy bow and thy quiver, and go to the field and hunt and catch something for me, my son, and prepare me a meal such as my soul loves, and bring it to me, so that I may eat and my soul bless thee before I die." 3. But Rebecca heard Isaac speaking to Esau. 4. And Esau went early to the field to hunt and catch something and bring it to his father. 5. And Rebecca called Jacob, her son, and said to him: "Behold, I have heard thy father Isaac speaking with thy brother Esau, saying, 'Hunt me something and prepare a meal and bring it in to me, and I will bless thee before the Lord before I die.' 6. But now hear, my son, my words which I command thee: Go to thy flocks and bring me two good young kids, and I will make a meal out of them such as he loves, and thou shalt bring it in to thy father and he shall eat, that he may bless thee before the Lord before he dies, and thou become blessed." 7. And Jacob said to his mother Rebecca: "O mother, I will not hold back any thing that my father may eat and is pleasing to him; only I fear, my mother, that he will know my voice and will desire to touch me; and thou knowest that I am smooth, but my brother Esau is rough, and I may be before his eyes like an evil-doer, and I should do a deed which he has not commanded me, and he might become angry with me and I should bring a curse upon myself and not a blessing." 8. And Rebecca, his mother, said to him: "Upon me, my son, be thy curse; and again listen to my voice." 9. And Jacob obeyed the words of his mother Rebecca, and he went and took two good and fat young kids and brought them in to his mother, and his mother made a meal out of them as he liked it. 10. And Rebecca took the clothing of her elder son Esau, the most precious with her in the house, and clothed Jacob with them, and the skins of the kids she

placed over his hands and upon the exposed parts of his body; and she gave the meat and the bread which she had made into the hands of her son Jacob. 11. And he went in to his father and said: "Behold, I am thy son; I have done as thou hast said to me: arise and sit up and eat of what I have hunted, my father, that thy soul may bless me." 12. And Isaac said to his son, "What is this, that thou hast so suddenly found it, my son?" 13. And Jacob said to him: "He who has caused me to find it, thy God, is before me." 14. And Isaac said: "Come hither to me, that I may touch thee, my son, if thou art my son Esau, or if not." 15. And Jacob came near to Isaac his father, and he touched him. 16. And he said: "The voice is the voice of Jacob, but the hand is the hand of Esau;" and he did not know him, for it was a fate from heaven to remove his spirit; and Isaac did not know him, for his hands were like his [i. e., Esau's] hands, and hairy like the hands of Esau, so that he should bless him. 17. And he said, "Art thou my son Esau?" And he said, "I am thy son." And he said: "Bring hither to me, and I will eat of what thou hast hunted, my son, that my soul may bless thee." 18. And he brought to him the meal, and he ate; and he brought in wine, and he drank. 19. And Isaac, his father, said to him: "Approach and kiss me, my son;" and he approached and kissed him. 20. And he smelt the smell of his clothes, and he blessed him, and said: "Behold, the smell of my son is like the smell of the field which the Lord has blessed; and may the Lord give to thee and increase thee like the dew of the heaven and the dew of earth, and may grain increase and oil be plenty to thee, and may the nations serve thee and the peoples bow down to thee. 21. Be the lord of thy brother, and may the sons of thy mother bow down to thee, and may all the blessings with which the Lord has blessed me and has blessed my father Abra-

Jacob, then Jacob went out from Isaac his father to hide himself. 23. But Esau, his brother, came in from hunting, and he too prepared a meal and brought it in to his father, and said to his father, "Arise, my father, and eat of my prey, that thy soul may bless me." 24. And Isaac, his father, said to him, "Who art thou?" 25. And he said to him, "I am thy first-born son Esau; I have done as thou hast commanded me." 26. And Isaac was very much astounded, and said: "Who was he that hunted and caught something for me, and brought it in, and I ate of all before thou camest in, and I blessed him?" 27. Blessed shall he be and his seed to eternity." 28. And when Esau heard the words of his father Isaac he cried with a loud and very bitter voice, and said to his father: "Bless me too, father!" 29. And he said to him, "Thy brother came and took thy blessing." 30. [And Esau said:] "And now I know why his name is called Jacob; behold he has ensnared me twice; the first time he took my birth-right, and now he takes my blessing. 31. And he said, "Hast thou not a blessing left for me, my father?" 32. And Isaac answered and said to Esau: "Behold, I have set him as lord over thee and all his brothers, and have given them to be his servants, and with much grain and oil and wine I have strengthened him, and what shall I do to thee, my son?" 33. And Esau said to his father Isaac: "Hast thou but one blessing, father? Bless also me, father." 34. And Esau raised his voice and wept. And Isaac answered and said to him: "Behold, from the fatness of the earth shall be thy substance and from the dew of heaven above; and thou shalt live by thy sword and thou shalt serve thy brother. 35. And it will happen when thou art great and shalt break his yoke off thy neck, thou shalt commit a sin unto death, and all thy seed shall be rooted out from under heaven." 36. And Esau was wroth at Jacob on account of the blessing with which his father had blessed him; and he said in his heart, "Now the days of grief may come for my father, that I may kill my brother Jacob."

CHAP. XXVII. 1. And the words of Esau, her elder son, were told to Rebecca in a dream, and Rebecca, sending, called for Jacob, her younger son. 2. And she said to him: "Behold, thy brother Esau is making his plans to kill thee; and now hear my words: arise and flee to my brother Laban and dwell with him a number of days, until the anger of thy brother has turned and his anger has departed from thee and he forget every thing that thou hast done him, and I will send to bring thee from there." 3. And Jacob said: "I have no fear: if he desires to kill me, I will kill him." 4. And she said to him, "Then should I be deprived of both my sons in one day." 5. And Jacob said to his mother Rebecca: "Behold, thou knowest that my father is old, and I see that his eyes have become dull, and if I leave him it will be evil in his eyes that I leave him and go away from thee, and my father will be angry and will curse me. I will not go; only if he sends me will I go from here." 6. And Rebecca said to Jacob: "I will go in and will speak to him, and he will send thee." 7. And Rebecca went in and spake to Isaac: "I am aggrieved in my life on account of the two daughters of Heth which Esau has taken to himself as wives from among the daughters of Canaan: why should I yet live? for the daughters of the land of Canaan are evil." 8. And Isaac called his son Jacob, and blessed him, and admonished him, and said to him: "Do not take to thee a wife from among all the daughters of Canaan; arise and go to Mesopotamia, to the house of the father of thy mother, to the house of Bethuel, and take to thee from there a wife from among the daughters of Laban, the brother of thy mother. And may the God of heaven bless thee and increase and enlarge thee, and become thou a collection of nations, and may he give the blessings of thy father Abraham to thee and thy seed after thee, that thou mayest inherit the land of thy pilgrimage and all the land which the Lord

the son of Bethuel, the Syrian, the brother of Rebecca, the mother of Jacob. 10. And it happened when Jacob had arisen to go to Mesopotamia, the spirit of Rebecca was sad after her son had gone, and she wept. 11. And Isaac said to Rebecca: "My sister, weep not on account of Jacob, my son, for he is going in peace, and in peace he will return. 12. The Most High God will preserve him from all evil and will be with him, for he will not desert him any day of his life, for I perceive that the Lord will prosper his path wherever he goes, until he returns, in peace to us and we see him in peace. 13. Do not fear on his account, my sister, for right is his path and he is a perfect and faithful man and will not be destroyed: do not weep!" 14. And Isaac comforted Rebecca on account of Jacob her son, and blessed him. 15. And Jacob went from The Well of the Oath that he might come to Haran in the first year of the second week in the forty-fourth jubilee, and came to Lôzâ among the mountains, that is, Bethel, in the beginning of the first month of this week, and he came to the place at eve, and he turned off from the way toward the west from the highway in this night, and slept there, for the sun had set. 16. And he took one from among the stones of that place and laid it under a tree, and he was travelling alone, and he slept. 17. And he dreamed in that night a dream, and behold, a ladder was planted upon the earth, and its head reached to the heaven, and behold, the angels of the Lord ascended and descended on it, and behold, the Lord stood upon it. 18. And the Lord spake unto Jacob and said: "I am the Lord God of Abraham, thy father, and the God of Isaac: the land upon which thou art sleeping I will give to thee and to thy seed after thee, and thy seed shall be like the sand of the sea, and thou shalt increase to the west and east and south and north; and all the countries of the nations shall be blessed in thee and in thy seed. 19. And behold, I will be with thee and still watch over thee in all things wherever thou goest, and will bring thee back into this

land in peace; for I will not leave thee until I do all that I have said to thee." 20. And Jacob finished his sleep, and said: "Truly this place is the house of the Lord, and I did not know it." 21. And he was afraid, and said: "Dreadful is this place, which is nothing but the house of the Lord, and this is the portal of heaven." 22. And Jacob awoke early in the morning and took the stone from under his head and placed it up as a pillar, as a sign of this place; and he poured oil upon its head, and called the name of this place Bethel; but its first name was Lôzâ, like the land. 23. And Jacob prayed a prayer to the Lord, saying: "If the Lord will be with me and guard me on this path upon which I walk, and if the Lord give me bread to eat and clothes to clothe myself, and I return in peace to the house of my father, then the Lord shall be my God, and this stone, which I have set up as a pillar, as a sign in this place, shall be a house of the Lord. 24. And all things that thou givest me, of that I will give the tenth to thee, my God."

CHAP. XXVIII. 1. And he lifted up his feet and went to the land of the east, to-Laban, the brother of his mother Rebecca, and he was with him and served him for Rachel, his daughter one week. And in the first year of the third week he said to him: "Give me my wife, for whom I have served thee seven years. 2. And Laban said to Jacob, "I will give thee thy wife." And Laban made a feast, and took Leah, his older daughter, and gave her to Jacob as a wife, and gave her Zalapha as a maid to serve her; and Jacob did not know it, for he thought she was Rachel. 3. And he went in to her, and behold, it was Leah; and Jacob was angry at Laban and said to him: "Why hast thou done thus? 4. Have I not served thee for Rachel and not for Leah? Why hast thou injured me? Take thy daughter and I will go; for thou hast done evil to me." 5. For Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah, for the eyes

tractive form. 6. And Laban said to Jacob: "It is not the custom in our land to give the younger before the elder." 7. And it is not right to do this, for thus is it ordained and written on the tablets of heaven, that no one shall give his younger daughter before the older, but shall give the younger after her. 8. And the man that does this loads sin upon himself on this account in heaven, and no one who does this is just, for it is an evil deed before the Lord. 9. And thou command the children of Israel that they do not this thing, and neither take nor give the younger before the older has been established, for it is very wicked. 10. And Laban said to Jacob: "Let the seven days of this feast pass by, and I will give thee Rachel that thou mayest serve me another seven years, that thou mayest herd my sheep, as thou hast done in the first week." 11. And on the day when the seven days of the feast of Leah were passed, Laban gave Rachel to Jacob, that he might serve him a second seven years, and he gave Rachel Balla, the sister of Zalapha, as a maid to serve her. 12. And he served seven years again for Rachel, for Leah had been given to him. 13. And the Lord opened the womb of Leah, and she became pregnant and bore Jacob a son, and he called his name Reuben, on the fourteenth of the ninth month of the first year of the third week. 14. But the womb of Rachel was closed, for the Lord saw that Leah was hated but Rachel was beloved. 15. And again Jacob went in to Leah, and she conceived and bore Jacob a second son, and he called his name Simeon, on the twenty-first of the tenth month and the third year of this week. 16. And again Jacob went in to Leah, and she became pregnant and bore him a third son, and he called his name Levi, in the beginning of the third month, in the sixth year of this week. 17. And again Jacob went in to Leah, and she became pregnant and bore him a fourth son, and he called his name Judah, on the fifteenth of the third month in the first year of the fourth week. 18. And in all this Rachel was jealous of Leah, for she did not

bear; and she said to Jacob, "Give me a son!" 19. And Jacob said to her, "Am I preventing fruit of the womb from thee: have I left thee?" 20. And when Rachel saw that Leah had borne Jacob four sons, Reuben, Simeon, Levi, and Judah, then she said to him, "Go in to Balla, my maid, and she will conceive and bear a son for me." 21. And he went in to her, and she became pregnant and bore him a son, and she called his name Dan, on the ninth of the sixth month, in the sixth year of the third week. 22. And again a second time he went in to Balla, and she became pregnant and bore Jacob another son, and Rachel called his name Naphtalim, in the fifth of the seventh month of the second year of the fourth week. 23. And when Leah saw that she had become sterile and did not bear, she became jealous of Rachel, and she gave Zalapha, her maid, to Jacob as a wife, and she became pregnant and bore him a son, and she called his name Gad, on the twelfth of the eighth month in the third year of the fourth week. 24. And again he went in to her, and she became pregnant and bore him another son, and Leah called his name Asher, on the second of the eleventh month in the fifth year of the fourth week. 25. And Jacob went in to Leah, and she became pregnant and bore Jacob a son, and she called his name Issachar, on the fourth of the fifth month in the fourth year of the fourth week, and she gave him to a nurse. 26. And Jacob again went in to her, and she became pregnant and she bore him two [children], a son and a daughter, and she called his name Zebulon and the name of the daughter Dinah, on the seventh of the seventh month in the sixth year of the fourth week. 27. And the Lord was gracious to Rachel and opened her womb, and she became pregnant and bore a son, and she called his name Joseph, in the beginning of the fourth month of the sixth year of this fourth week. 28. And in the days when Joseph was born Jacob said to Laban: "Give me my wives and my children, and I will go to my father Isaac, and I will make for myself a house, for I

have completed the years which I have served thee for thy two daughters, and I will go to the house of my father." 29. And Laban said to Jacob: "Remain with me for wages, and herd my folds again and receive thy wages." 30. And they agreed with each other, that he would give him as wages all the young sheep and goats should be his wages. And the possessions of Jacob increased very much, and he possessed oxen and sheep and asses and camels and sons and daughters. 31. And Laban and his sons were jealous of Jacob, and Laban gathered his sheep away from him, and thought out evil.

CHAP. XXIX. 1. And it happened when Rachel had given birth to Joseph that Laban went out to shear his sheep, for they were distant from him a journey of three days. 2. And Jacob saw that Laban had gone to shear his sheep, and he called Leah and Rachel, and spake unto their hearts, that they should go with him to the land of Canaan, for he told them all that he had seen in the dream, and all that he [God] had spoken to him, that he should return to the house of his father; and they said to him: "We will go everywhere thou goest, with thee we will go." 3. And Jacob blessed the God of his father Isaac, and the God of Abraham, the father of his father, and he arose and prepared his wives and children, and took all his possessions and crossed the river and came to the land of Gilead, and Jacob hid his heart from Laban and did not tell him. 4. And in the seventh year of the fourth week Jacob returned to Gilead in the first month, on the twenty-first; and Laban followed after him, and found Jacob in the mountains of Gilead, in the third month, on the twelfth thereof. 5. And the Lord did not permit him to injure Jacob, for he appeared to him in a dream by night; and Laban spake to Jacob. 6. And on the fifteenth thereof, on that day, Jacob made a feast to Laban and all who had come with him, and Jacob swore to Laban on this day and Laban to Jacob, that they would not cross for evil to one another the mountains of Gilead. 7. And he made

there a large stone heap as a testimony; on this account the name of this place is called "The Stone Heap of Testimony;" such is the heap. 8. But before they had called the land of Gilead the land of Raphaim, for it was the land of the Raphaim, and the Raphaim, or giants, were born there, whose length is ten, nine, eight, and seven ells, and their dwellings were from the land of the sons of Ammon to Mount Hermon, and the seats of their kingdom were Kôrônâêm and Adrâ and Misûr and Bêôn. 9. And the Lord slew them on account of the wickedness of their deeds, for they were most terrible, and the Amorites inhabit it in their place, evil and sinful, and there is no nation to-day that has completed all their sin, and therefore they have no length of life upon the earth. 10. And Jacob sent Laban away, and he came into the land of Mesopotamia, the land of the east, but Jacob returned to the land of Gilead and crossed over the Jabbok in the ninth month on the eleventh thereof. 11. And on that day Esau, his brother, came to him, and they settled their troubles; and they went from here into the land of Seir, but Jacob dwelt in tents. 12. And in the first year of the fifth week of this jubilee he crossed the Jordan and lived opposite the Jordan, that he might pasture his sheep from the land of Stone Heap to Betâ-Zôn and to Dôtâêm and to Akrâbil. 13. And he sent to his father Isaac of all his possessions clothing and food and meat and drink and milk and oil and bread of milk and of the palms of the valley; and to his mother Rebecca he also sent four times a year, between the times of the months, between the plowing and the harvest, between the spring and the rain, and between winter and summer, to the tower of Abraham, for Isaac had returned from The Well of the Oath and had gone up to the tower of his father Abraham, and he dwelt there apart from his son Esau. 14. For in the days

dwelt in the mountains of Seir, and left Isaac, his father, at The Well of the Oath alone; and Isaac went up from The Well of the Oath, and dwelt in the tower of Abraham, his father, on the mountains of Hebron. 15. And from here Jacob sent all things which he sent to his father Isaac and to his mother from time to time all their sorrows; and they blessed Jacob with all their heart and all their souls.

CHAP. XXX. 1. And in the first year of the sixth week he went up to Salem, which is opposite the east of Shechem, in peace, in the fourth month; and there they brought by force Dinah, the daughter of Jacob, into the house of Shechem, the son of Hamor, the Hivite prince of the land, and he slept with her and defiled her, and she was a small girl twelve years of age. 2. And he begged her father and her brothers for her, that she should be given to him as wife; and Jacob and his sons were angry on account of the men of Shechem, because they had defiled their sister Dinah; and they spoke with them for evil, and intrigued against and deceived them. 3. And Simeon and Levi secretly came to Shechem and inflicted punishment upon all the men of Shechem, and slew all the men they found in it, and did not leave a single one in it. 4. They killed all in torments, because they had dishonored their sister Dinah. 5. And thus ye shall not do from now on and to eternity to defile a daughter of Israel, for in heaven it was ordained over them as a punishment that they should root out all the men of Shechem, because they committed a shame on a daughter of Israel, and the Lord turned them over into the hands of the sons of Jacob, that they should root them out with the sword, and that they should inflict punishment upon them; and never again shall it be thus in Israel, that a daughter of Israel be defiled. 6. And if there is any man in Israel who desires to give his daughter or his sister to any man who is of the seed of the Gentiles, he shall surely die, and they shall slay him with stones, for he has committed a sin and a

shame in Israel; and his wife they shall burn with fire, for she has defiled the name of the house of her father, and she shall be rooted out of Israel. 7. And no fornication or defilement shall be found in Israel all the generations of the earth; for Israel is holy to the Lord, and every man that defiles must surely die, and they shall slay him with stones. 8. For thus is it ordained and written on the tablets of heaven concerning all the seed of Israel, that he who defiles must surely die, and they shall slay him with stones. 9. And to this law there is no limit of days and no ceasing and no forgiveness, but he shall be rooted out who defiles his daughter, among all Israel, because he has given of his seed to Moloch and has sinned by defiling. 10. And thou, Moses, command the children of Israel and testify over them that they shall not give any of their daughters to the Gentiles and that they shall not take any of the daughters of the Gentiles; for this is accursed before the Lord. 11. And on this account I have written for thee in the words of the law all the deeds of Shechem which they did against Dinah, and how the children of Jacob conversed saying: "We will not give our daughter to an uncircumcised man, for this is disgraceful to us." 12. And it is disgraceful to Israel to those that give and to those that receive from the Gentiles any daughters, for it is unclean and accursed to Israel; and Israel will not be clean of this uncleanness of him who has of the daughters of the Gentiles for a wife, or who has given of his daughters to a man who is of any of the seed of the Gentiles; for there will be plagues upon plagues, curse upon curse, and all punishment and plagues and curses will come. 13. And if they do this thing, and if they blind their eyes to those that commit uncleanness and to those that defile the

and fruit offering and burnt offering and fat and incense offering as a sweet savour, that it may be acceptable. 14. And every man and woman in Israel who defiles the sanctuary shall be thus. 15. And on account of this I have commanded thee, saying: "Testify this testimony over Israel: see how it happened to the Shechemites and their sons, how they were given into the hands of the two sons of Jacob, and they slew them in torments, and it was justice to them, and it is written down for justice concerning them."

ARTICLE VIII.

THE SANCTION OF THE DECALOGUE.

BY THE REV. TALBOT W. CHAMBERS, D.D., NEW YORK CITY.

LAW is usually defined as a rule of action prescribed by competent authority and enforced by a penalty. The last mentioned feature is indispensable, for without it any statute, however weighty in itself or in the source from which it proceeds, is merely the expression of an opinion. It may have great moral dignity and worth but it has no legal force. Whereas the essence of law is that it commands obedience and cannot be disregarded with impunity.

What now is the sanction of the law contained in the Ten Words? Something in the nature of reward and punishment is found in the third precept and in the fifth.

In the former the prohibition of the profane use of Jehovah's name is fortified by the assurance that such use contracts guilt, an assurance that is needed because the general tendency of men is to doubt whether profaneness

be a sin at all, or at least to consider it a trivial and insignificant transgression.¹ In the latter due respect to one's parents is strengthened by the implied promise that this will secure length of days. The quotation of this promise by the Apostle Paul (Ephes. vi. 3), with the omission of the words "which the Lord thy God giveth thee," shows that no part of the precept is local or national but that the whole is applicable to children of all nations and in all ages. It is true that some obedient children die early and others are not particularly prosperous; but as a general rule of the divine administration it is the members of well-ordered households who succeed in life. Filial piety brings a reward in the present world, quite as truly as "the hand of the diligent maketh rich." Now in both of these cases the sanction is specific and limited to the precept in connection with which it is given. The fact is otherwise with the reason annexed to the Second Commandment. "For I Jehovah thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me; and shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments." (Revised Version). The closest scrutiny of these words detects in them nothing that limits them to the prohibition of idolatry, but on the contrary they would be perfectly suitable to be placed at

¹ Thus Lord Macaulay, insisting that Bunyan exaggerated the misdeeds of his youth, says that he "was at eighteen, what, in any but the most austere puritanical circles, would have been considered as a young man of singular gravity and excellence." Yet some considerable time after Bunyan was married, he was, as we read in *Grace Abounding*, standing at a neighbor's shop window, and there cursing and swearing after his wonted manner, when the woman of the house heard him. She, he says, "though she was a very loose and ungodly wretch, yet protested that I swore and cursed at that most fearful rate that she was made to tremble to hear me; and told me fur-

the close of the decalogue as a sanction of the entire series of precepts.

We may therefore rightly regard them as such. It may be added that this course has the example of Luther. In his small catechism, after reciting the ten precepts, he adds, "What does God say about all these commandments?" To which the answer is, "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, &c." Then comes the question, "What does this mean?" Answer: "God threatens to punish all who transgress these commandments; we should therefore fear his anger and do nothing against such commands. But he promises grace and every blessing to all who keep them; we should therefore love and trust in him and gladly obey his commandments."

To the question why the sanction was placed here and not elsewhere we are not bound to furnish an answer. This may be one of those peculiarities of Scripture which every earnest student has noticed, peculiarities by which it is distinguished from all merely human books, in that it takes on a form which the wisest of men if left to themselves would never have suggested, yet which when carefully considered challenges their admiration.

To cite one example, the great variety of the book of divine revelation, history, memoirs, poems, songs, proverbs, epistles, arguments, and prophecies. No man, no set of men, however acute or far-seeing, would ever have dreamed of setting forth a norm of faith and duty in such a fashion, yet the experience of centuries has shown that the book is exactly adapted to its purpose. But, besides this, it may be said that if there is one of the Ten Words which needed to be emphasized by attaching to it the sanction of the whole, it is the second command. Of all sins against God, idolatry is the most wide-spread and lasting. Atheists have always been comparatively few, but worshippers of idols almost innumerable. There has never been a period within historic time when they did not constitute a decided, and sometimes overwhelming, ma-

jority of the human race. To this day they prevail throughout almost the whole heathen world, and what inroads the veneration of images and pictures has made in a large part of Christendom it is not necessary to detail. Nor is the evil a slight one. Sentimental theologians of our day sometimes apologize for it, as for instance when they convert Malachi's brilliant prophecy (i. 2), that "in every place incense and a pure offering shall be presented to Jehovah's name," into an assertion that such service was actually rendered among the heathen in the prophet's day, and by consequence is so rendered everywhere now. But the sacred writers with one consent repudiate such a monstrous confusion of right and wrong. In his epistle to the Romans the Apostle Paul distinctly } attributes the gross immorality of the Pagan world to their impiety, the impiety shown in exchanging the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds, etc. Having by this fearful apostasy become estranged from the true conception of God men fell a prey to the powers of nature and human life, and ran into the wildest excesses. If men will leave the spiritual they must sink into the sensual. There are those now who seek to construct an ethics without religion, but in so doing they shut their eyes to all the teachings of philosophy and history as well as to those of the divine word. If this be the case we can see the reason why the sanction of the decalogue was put where it is. It was annexed to that precept which men are most generally tempted to violate, and which when violated most surely and speedily draws with it the violation of all other obligations.

What now is the sanction? The first element is its description of the divine nature. *I, Jehovah thy God, am a*

passions. Hence we read in the Proverbs (xxvii. 4), "Wrath is cruel, and anger is outrageous; but who is able to stand before jealousy?" And again in the song of Solomon:—

"Jealousy is cruel as the grave;
The flashes thereof are flashes of fire,
A very flame of the Lord."

And this is very properly applied to Jehovah, for he stands in the most intimate relation to the soul, just as the husband stands in the most intimate earthly relation to his wife. The violation of the latter relation is a true and lively image of the violation of the former. Man owes everything to his Maker and depends upon Him for all he is or hopes to be. His highest duty therefore is to him. And when he withholds the obedience that is due he awakens a feeling of injury and outrage which cannot be exceeded. But of course this does not mean, as is sometimes said, a sense of personal wrong on the part of God, as in the human passion of anger. It is rather the energy of the divine holiness, as appears in the words of Joshua (xxiv. 19), "He is a holy God, he is a jealous God." Holiness in Him is not derived, as it is in all other beings, but is original and essential. The magnificat of Hannah expressed the exact truth when it said, "There is none holy as Jehovah." In no other being is moral excellence absolutely pure and free from all limitation. Hence the cry of the Seraphim as they bow day and night around the throne is, "Holy, holy, holy is Jehovah of Hosts;" and they who standing by the glassy sea sing the song of Moses and the song of the Lamb, exclaim, "Who shall not fear, O Lord, and glorify thy name? for thou only art holy." Now this supreme and regnant perfection cannot but manifest itself against whatever sets itself in opposition to it. And the manifestation is most intense. "Jehovah thy God is a devouring fire, a jealous God" (Deut. iv. 24). The fire of his wrath burns down to the depths of Sheol. The holy will of God, roused into

vehement activity by the sinful self-determination of the creature, displays itself in awful forms, but never are these due to a capricious divine humor or to natural malignity, as the gods of the heathen fall into a passion, but simply to the ill-desert of the wrong-doer. God would cease to be God were he not "of purer eyes than to behold evil." His jealousy is but the expression of his immaculate holiness.

The ten words of the decalogue then are not statements of opinion or pieces of advice, but are LAW. They come with authority. They bind the conscience. They bring the human will into immediate contact with the will of the supreme and rightful lawgiver. They tell man what he ought to do, and what he must do if he would secure his own well-being. They are not only right in themselves, but have a Power behind them which enforces obedience. This is done in a way suited to man as made in the image of God and endowed with a self-determining will. He is left master of his own acts, but is accountable for those acts. And these, however multiform and varied they may be, are all traced back to the one primal affection from which they proceed. The subjects of reward and penalty are on the one hand they that love God and therefore keep his commandments, and on the other they that hate him and therefore commit sin. The decalogue by its own terms is just as much a law of love as the wonderful summary of its contents given by the Master (Matthew xxii. 34-40). It is not outward, nor formal, nor partial, nor limited, but pierces at once to the essence of things. It lays hold upon the heart and demands its governing affection as the spring of all true obedience, while it passes beyond all specific forms of transgression and denounces them in their root, the mournful aversion of the soul from God. This is wholly overlooked by those

formalism of the Pharisees which our Lord so severely rebuked was as much opposed to their own law as it was to his teachings. The code written upon tables and lodged in the ark of the covenant as the core of the entire economy, was anything but an unspiritual yoke, subversive of moral freedom. What it requires is indeed obedience, but not the submission of a slave. The submission is to be unhesitating, unreluctant and joyous, such as arises from a clear preception of the intrinsic reasonableness of the command and the claims of its gracious and beneficent author. Men obey because they love. They delight in the law of God after the inward man. They make its statutes songs of rejoicing in the house of their pilgrimage.

When any withhold obedience and especially when they deliberately transgress the precepts it is because they hate the lawgiver. Hence the subjects of the penalty are described as "them that hate me." This is the doctrine of the New Testament as well as of the Old. "The mind of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God neither indeed can be" (Rom. viii. 7). Many object to the statement as extravagant and unreasonable. But it is neither. The law is the expression of the divine nature, and opposition to it is opposition to its author. Men are not conscious of the fact, because they put out of view the claims of God and his law, just as no one has bitter feelings towards one whom he considers his worst enemy, so long as that enemy is out of sight and out of mind. Many years ago two young men in the City of New York set out for a pleasure drive on Sunday morning, feeling no sort of trouble from the fact that God had made that day one of rest and worship. But soon they came to a street across which chains were stretched (in pursuance of a municipal ordinance to that effect) to ensure quiet during the hours of worship. Then they broke out into violent oaths and curses. Why? The law was just the same as it had been. The difference was that

they were distinctly reminded of its existence, and this brought out the latent animosity of their hearts. This is the root of all sin, the aversion of the soul from the infinitely holy God. And however dormant this may at any time seem to be, all that is needed is to bring the thought of God as he is before the mind, and the sinner feels the risings of a deep and passionate hatred. He is an enemy of God, and he would dethrone him if he could. To many this seems a harsh and unreasonable charge, but it is the plain statement of Scripture, and enforced by the repeated utterances of our Lord who himself experienced this hatred and declared that it was without a cause (John xv. 25). There is no neutral ground. If any do not love God they fall of necessity into the number of those that hate him.

What now is the penalty pronounced upon such? It is simply punishment, with one significant specification. "Visiting the iniquities" means, according to the well defined usage of Scripture, visiting with retribution, i. e., punishing. The precise nature and degree and duration of the punishment upon the sinners themselves is not stated, perhaps because it could be inferred from other parts of the divine revelation or from the character of Him against whom sin is committed, or perhaps because it was enough to make a general statement like that appended to the third commandment (Jehovah will not hold him guiltless), leaving the transgressor confronted with the general assurance that there would be retribution, without entering into any details. But one feature is added of very great significance, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me." The natural meaning of these words, that which occurs to every reader when he first sees or hears them, is that the penal suffering incurred by the parents is extended to

violent terms, as a gross violation of natural justice in making the innocent suffer what is due the guilty. An obvious way of escape is found by supposing that the menace is directed only against those children who tread in their fathers' footsteps. The earliest occurrence of this evasion is found in the Chaldee Paraphrase of Onkelos, the oldest of the Targumists, who adds to the text, *Quando filii sequuntur peccata patrum*. This has been followed by most of the modern expositors (Gerhard, Stendel, Hengstenberg, *et al.*), and by Oehler² is claimed as the fair interpretation of the original, which, he says, requires the phrase "them that hate me" to be considered as *referring to fathers and sons together*. But it is far more natural to view that phrase as co-ordinate with "fathers," so that the whole clause simply states how far the punishment of the haters of God extends (*viz.*, to the fourth generation), just as the next clause shows how far his loving kindness extends to those that love him (*viz.*, to the thousandth generation. Cf. Deut. vii. 9). And this may fairly be deduced from the nature of the case. If, on one hand, the threatening to the descendants of the wicked means only that they if wicked themselves shall be punished, there can be no meaning in the limitation to the third and fourth generation, for the statement is equally true of all generations, and the words are mere surplusage. If, on the other hand, it means that wicked children shall be punished both for their own sins and those of their fathers, this leaves the original objection in all its force, *viz.*, that one man bears the punishment of another's sin.

Again, reference is made to the passage Deut. xxiv. 16. "The fathers shall not be put to death for their children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin." But this is a rule for the administration of criminal justice by man. Among ancient oriental nations the family of a criminal was commonly involved in his punishment, as in

² Old Testament Theology. Amer. Ed. p. 163.

the case of Haman's sons recorded in Esther (ix. 13, 14), but the superior humanity of the Mosaic institute is shown by the prohibition here recorded. And that the statute was not without effect is seen in the proceeding of Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 6), who slew the murderers of his father, but not their children. But this wise rule in regard to earthly judges has no application to Him who is Sovereign over all mankind, and deals with them not only as individuals but as members of a race and sharers of a common responsibility. God as God may do what man as man may not do. This is seen in the case of human sacrifices. Such sacrifices were forbidden and denounced in the law, yet the Lord commanded Abraham to offer up Isaac, and though he was not suffered to do the act, his readiness to do it showed that the command was not inherently wrong.

Reference again is made to the assertions made by Jeremiah and Ezekiel. In the former (xxx. 29, 30) we read, "In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity." In the latter (xviii. 1-4) the same proverb is quoted, and set aside with the assertion, "Behold all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth it shall die." Now what both prophets mean to deny is the shifting of responsibility from the contemporary race to their ancestors. In one real and important sense the proverb was exactly true. The people were suffering the natural consequences of their father's sins, so that as a matter of fact their teeth were set on edge by the sour grapes their fathers had eaten. But they were walking in the footsteps of those fathers, and hence over-

God : wherefore turn yourselves, and live." No entail of guilt, however ancient, did or could cut the penitent sinner off from the hope of restoration. Nor can any one justly charge upon God his own criminality. He may suffer indeed from the misdoings of former generations, as in fact was the case with Ezekiel's contemporaries, but this does not interfere with his responsibility for his present course of feeling and action, nor prevent the consciousness of guilt in view of his own shortcomings.

What then is the conclusion? That the penal consequences of sin are visited in this life upon the third generation and the fourth of those who commit the sin. Thus understood the words simply take up and repeat the common experience of the race, and show that the author of nature and the author of revelation are one and the same. As a matter of fact children and remote descendants inherit the results of their fathers' transgressions in many ways, e. g., in specific disease, a shattered constitution, a dishonored name, abject poverty, or a weakened intellect, together with all the influences of bad example and evil communications. Such things are matters of common, of universal observation, and need not to be illustrated by example. Now the command informs us that this is not the result of accident or caprice, but of a judicial determination. It is the solemn appointment of the supreme ruler. Witness the case of ancient Israel. In Leviticus (xxvi. 39) God said to his people in case they were disobedient, "They that are left of you shall pine away in your enemies' lands; and also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them." And accordingly in Lam. v. 7, the cry of the captive exiles is,

"Our fathers have sinned, and are not ;
And we have borne their iniquities."

That this truth forced itself on the minds of the thoughtful heathen is well known. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles, the *Phenissae* of Euripides and in the *Septem*

contra Thebas of Aeschylus it is constantly assumed that an act of wilful disobedience to the divine command involves not only the first guilty individual, but also his offspring to the third generation, together with his kindred and his country, in a train of the most calamitous consequences, sin ever begetting sin, and that nothing can stay the plague but the direct interposition of heaven. Sometimes the inherited curse seems to fall most heavily upon the least guilty persons, as it still does. Yet in such cases the sufferer is free from the sting of conscience, for that belongs only to personal guilt. The pain, the privation, the loss of advantages, may be severe, but they do not involve remorse.

The consolation of the sufferer is, first, that he suffers under a great law of universal and immemorial prevalence, one that is inseparably bound up with the constitution of our nature. We are not like the angels, each of whom is a distinct and independent creation of God, but are a race springing from a common ancestor, and hence are linked together in a variety of ways. The human family is a living organism, every part of which is in vital connection with every other. Each angel, so far as we know, stands for himself, nor is there any necessary bond between his conduct and the condition of his fellows. But among men there is a continuity of existence and of interest, so that it is true in many ways that no man liveth unto himself and no man dieth unto himself. The principle of representation runs through all human society, in the family, the church, the state. Men may object to the federal theology, but even if they succeed in convincing themselves or others that the Scripture covenants do not mean what they are commonly understood to mean, the underlying principle of those covenants remains unaffected, viz., that men are powerfully affected for good or evil by the acts of other men over whom they have no control. Now the peculiarity of the sanction of the second commandment is that it seizes this feature of the human constitution in its

most direct and obvious form and converts it into a motive for obedience to the divine law. It says to every man, "You do not stand alone. Your posterity is sure to be affected by your course. You will transmit to them an entail of evil or of good according to the course you pursue. If you open your eyes you can see this law in operation all around you, and I tell you that it is not because of blind fate or any irresistible and unaccountable necessity, but the definite decree of a just and holy God who has thus constituted human society, and who puts this barrier before men to hinder them from the commission of sin." If, however, men do not heed the caution, and by transgression bring sore evil upon their children's children, there is a further relief open to sufferers in the thought that the entail is not everlasting nor total. It extends only to the present life. As to the future world we know that decisions there are based upon man's own deeds done in the body, and not upon those of his forefathers. But while a man both by nature and by God's appointment may enter upon life handicapped by the results of what took place before he was born, still he has encouragement to carry on the struggle against his disadvantages with the assurance that his efforts shall not be in vain. To him are open all the inducements and provisions and promises that are contained in the divine word. No bond of fate hems him in. He has a harder lot than others, but he may achieve a victory over his drawbacks, or even turn them into a means of self-discipline and progress. His self-conscious freedom remains unimpaired, and if he refuse the evil and choose the good he may regain the forfeited blessing and see good days in the land of the living. His embarrassments in mind or body or estate or reputation or connections are serious, and it is of no use to deny this; but they are not irrevocable. They do not bind him over to failure, but they do make success harder to be won. At the same time they are a perpetual stimulus to him to make all possible effort to

stop the entail with himself, and not send it down in an aggravated form to those who come after him.

But the sanction contains not only penalty but reward. This is "mercy unto thousands." The first word is not properly rendered, for neither by etymology nor usage does it mean favor shown to the ill-deserving as such, which is what is meant by *mercy*; but it rather means goodness or favor shown to any creatures without reference to the question of merit or demerit. It therefore points to the tender love of the Most High in providing for the needs of his intelligent creatures in all their relations. Hence it is well expressed in the old-fashioned word *loving-kindness*. God shows this in relation to those that love him not simply to thousands, but, as the word undoubtedly means, to a thousand generations. This is fully given in the parallel passage (Deut. vii. 9), "The faithful God which keepeth covenant and mercy [*loving-kindness*] with them that love him and keep his commandments to a thousand generations." And so grace rejoices over judgment. God visits iniquity to the fourth generation; he shows favor to the thousandth. Thus early in the Scripture, in the law of commandments, under the thunders and lightnings of Sinai, appears the blessed truth that "not as the trespass so also is the free gift." God by no means clears the guilty, yet is he a God full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger and plenteous in loving-kindness and truth. For as high as the heaven is above the earth, so great is his loving-kindness toward them that fear him. Time and again the descendants of the man after God's own heart sinned grossly and incurred the forfeiture of their royal prerogatives, yet were they spared for the same reason as the wicked Jehoram, of whom it is said that "Jehovah would not destroy the

was said to him, "To-day is salvation come to this house, forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham." Twenty centuries after Abraham was laid in his tomb in Macpelah the promise to his seed after him was fulfilled in the person of a despised publican. Such is the goodness of the Lord.

The loving-kindness of Jehovah is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto children's children. And this was shown even to the heathen world, as the Apostle reminded the men of Lystra, saying, "And yet he left not himself without witness in that he did good, and gave you rains from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling your hearts with food and gladness." The promise like the menace is general, and as some would say vague, but it is rather comprehensive. In one case the Lord says he will punish, leaving the nature of that punishment to be deduced from his lofty perfections, and in the other he assures us of loving kindness, which in like manner is to be interpreted according to his boundless riches in glory. The disobedient has everything to fear, the obedient has everything to hope. No man can set a limit in either direction.

In contemplating the sanction of the decalogue and the terms in which it is stated one is irresistibly reminded of the words of the Apostle in view of the divine treatment of ancient Israel. *Behold the goodness and severity of God.* Both are displayed here in their fullness. The goodness of Jehovah appears not only in the natural results of obedience, every command being adapted to insure the highest well-being of those who obey it, but in its central principle and in its temporal rewards. That principle is love. The enactment does not come like a harsh taskmaster. The words of the poet are true:

"Stern lawgiver ! Yet thou dost wear
The Godhead's most benignant grace ;
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upoh thy face ;
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,

And fragrance in thy footing treads,
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through thee
are fresh and strong."

What is required is the willing, grateful service of true affection, nor will anything else be accepted in place of this. The intelligent scribe whom our Lord commended, said the simple truth when he declared that supreme love to God and to love one's neighbor as himself was more than all whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices (Mark xii. 33). Thousands of rams and ten thousands of rivers of oil are of less worth than a single gracious affection. Empty forms are of no account. Man looketh upon the outward appearance, but God looketh upon the heart. It is vain to cleanse the outside of the cup and the platter, so long as that within is untouched. The text runs, "them that love me and keep my commandments." The two things go together, and are inseparable. A love which does not issue in obedience and an obedience which does not spring from love, are alike worthless. But true love is always realized in speech and act. It cannot lie dormant and inactive any more than the north wind can hide itself.

Nor is the requisition unreasonable, for God is the most lovable of all beings. Whatever can properly attract the affection of man exists in him in the highest degree. His own nature, his perfections and his relations to men concur to give him the strongest claim upon human desire. The utterance of the devout Psalmist, "I have no good beyond thee," is as reasonable as it is pious. If men do not see this, that is their fault. The masterpieces of painting and sculpture do not sink in excellence because they who have no eye for form or color see no beauty in them. When Bunyan abandoned his evil courses and commenced an outward reformation he was satisfied with himself, but happening to hear some poor women holding godly talk

and with what words and promises they had been refreshed. They "spake as if joy did make them speak," with "such pleasantness of Scripture language and with such appearance of grace in all they said," that they seemed to have found a world to which he was altogether a stranger. He was humbled yet fascinated, and though he had many struggles and fierce temptations, he was led into such an apprehension of the glory of the grace of God that long years of bonds and imprisonment could not shake his steadfast faith, and even in jail with a heart almost broken in anxiety for his poor blind child, he yet had such experience of God's goodness as he was persuaded he would never in this world be able to express. So the great President Edwards once said that even in converse with outward nature, when looking upon the sky and clouds, "there came into my mind so sweet a sense of the glorious majesty and grace of God as I know not how to express." And again, the holiness of God, he says, "appeared to be of a sweet, pleasant, charming, serene, calm nature, which brought an inexpressible purity, brightness, peacefulness and rapture to the soul."

Now men may complain that any such experience is impossible for them as being sold under sin and having a carnal mind which is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be, but this fact, solemn and painful as it is, does not subvert the truth that the revealed God of the Scriptures is worthy of all admiration and regard. He rightfully demands the adoring love of his creatures, not only because of his manifold relations to them, but also and chiefly because of his inherent and unchanging excellence. That excellence has no element of harshness and none of weakness. It commands respect and at the same time wins confidence. It fills, nay it surpasses, the ideal of the best human thought. The study of it never wearies, the enjoyment of it never palls. Indeed what has been poetically said of the stirrings of our nature in relation to a human and earthly affection, may be truly said of the

varied experiences of the soul in its communion with God:—

" All are but ministers of love,
And feed his sacred flame."

What has been said may be summed up in the following: 1. God himself in the perfections of his being is the fountain and standard of all truth and duty. 2. As such he is entitled to the complete and cheerful obedience of all his intelligent creatures. 3. The normal condition of those to whom his word comes is determined by the state of their affections toward him. 4. If they love him they will obey him, and so will attain his favor; if on the other hand they hate him, they will disobey his precepts and receive a just recompense for their misdeeds. 5. In the nature of the case there can be no third or intermediate class—all men being either the friends or the enemies of God. 6. Men's conduct does not terminate with themselves, but its consequences pass on to their children; if evil, to the fourth generation, if good, to an indefinite posterity. 7. The precise nature of the recompense in either case is not stated, nor is mention made of a future state, reticence upon this point being a feature of the Mosaic Economy. 8. But the essence of the recompense, viz., the loving-kindness or the wrath of the Most High, is such that it may and must apply to all worlds and to all stages of being.

ARTICLE IX.

THE NEW DEPARTURE AND MISSIONS.

BY THE REV. CYRUS HAMLIN, D.D., LL.D., FORMERLY MISSIONARY TO TURKEY,
AND FIRST PRESIDENT OF ROBERT COLLEGE.

A WORKING theory of missions must be the result of long experience. The missionary comes into the field with new forces, and with a message strange and new to the people, and he has to meet difficulties, embarrassments, and oppositions entirely unforeseen. The people conceal from him their real thoughts and intentions. They sometimes feign beliefs in order to deceive and lead him astray. It is months, and sometimes years, before he can feel sure that he thoroughly understands his environment and has fathomed all the resources of deception.

One thing alone secures him. He comes with a divine message, clear and simple, and he is to deliver it with the authority given him in the word of God. "All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye, *therefore*, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you: and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." This is the solid foundation of the missionary's work, and it gives him calmness and assurance and direction in all his dangers and embarrassments. He knows that his work shall not be in vain in the Lord.

But then he is not alone in the work. It is a work of co-operation. He has associates whom he must consult. He must work in harmony with them. No appearance of dissension should ever be allowed among the brethren and co-workers. They have numerous, ever present, crafty, watchful enemies, who, however ignorant, know well how to make the most of the least disagreement of the teachers among themselves. The converts will also take sides, and with special eagerness will say, "I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ."

The missions of the American Board are so organized that mutual consultation and comparing of notes come in as a regular part of their work. Members of the same station, when not away on tours, meet once a week and as often as special occasions may require.

An annual meeting brings all the different parts of the same mission field together for consultation and advice. All plans for enlargement are discussed and decided upon by vote, and the whole work is kept unified and harmonious to the utmost possible degree.

So essential is harmony in plan, organization, and teaching, that different evangelical sects have agreed not to enter each other's fields. The Ameri-

can Board does not send its missionaries into a field pre-occupied by Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Wesleyan, or Baptist missionaries. The field is the world, and wide enough to give to all the largest scope they can desire without any danger of contact.

This principle of government in the organization of missions has been confirmed by long experience. Nearly all mission "Boards" conform to it. About forty or forty-five years ago the Episcopal Board of Missions established a mission to the Armenians at Constantinople and elsewhere. The course of their missionary bishop, Southgate, was often in conflict with the missionaries of the American Board. A correspondence between Professor Greenleaf (Dane Professor of Law in Harvard College) and myself ensued, in consequence of which I translated for him very copious extracts from the standard books of the Armenian Church, presenting clearly its chief departures from gospel truth. He had two hundred copies printed for circulation among influential members of the church. It became so apparent that Bishop Southgate's apologetic work would always conflict with ours, that the mission, after thorough trial, was withdrawn. This non-interference comity of missions now governs evangelical missionary societies throughout the world. Occasional departures from it meet with the strongest condemnation of all good men of all denominations.

The most atrocious modern case of utter disregard of all comity and of all the decencies of Christian denominational intercourse, is the thrusting of certain Baptists into the work of the American Board among the Armenians in Turkey. The effort is fed and sustained by funds from this country, although, we are glad to say, the Baptist Board of Missions refuses to have any thing to do with it. It is an effort to thrust in the question of exclusive adult baptism among the evangelical Armenian churches. Such a movement, supported by money, will always attract a certain number of Adulterers who are skillful to do mischief, to stir up strife, to divert the mind and heart from true Christian work. We cannot but regard this as a foul blot upon the page of Baptist missions, too full of glorious triumphs over heathenism to tolerate such an atrocity upon Christian churches.

When different denominations are found in possession of a common field great prudence and Christian forbearance have been found necessary in order to avoid the evils and dangers of conflict. So far as possible they have divided their fields, and in every way have emphasized their points of union rather than of division.

But the case becomes entirely different when members of the same mission, under the same society, and working in the same field, have im-

themselves have hoped for a great reward in heaven. But their differences of belief lead them to difference of teaching. This is inevitable. Nothing but shameful dishonesty and hypocrisy could prevent it. Nor would that for a long time be successful. Thus the work begun in high and holy purpose is marred and ruined. It ends in strife, debate, and "evil surmisings," and better have never been begun. Two pernicious parties have been formed, and many lives made barren and wretched.

It is therefore one of the most solemn and responsible duties of those who, on behalf of the churches, select men for the missionary life, to choose those who can work harmoniously together. It is the most delicate and perplexing work a man can do. He must ask many questions which the candidate may think obtrusive. I knew an excellent, earnest young man so offended at the list of questions sent him that he turned away from the work in anger. I replied to his appeal to me that I had frankly answered the same questions, and if I had the responsibility of choosing a man for the same work, I should want him to answer them with the utmost frankness, and after that I should wish a personal interview and a free conversation. All this would not be a safe ground of choice without consulting teachers, classmates, and other friends. With all these precautions a mistaken choice is sometimes made, and the young man spends a year or two in the demonstration of his unfitness for the work, and returns with nothing to report but wasted time and money. We suppose that a certain percentage of such results is inevitable. It belongs to the imperfection of human instrumentality. All that human wisdom and caution can do must be done to reduce the number to a minimum.

Very honorable instances could be named in which the missionary, finding himself out of harmony with his associates on points of doctrine, has quietly retired from the work, because he could not suppress nor conceal his views, and he would not advance what he knew would displease his associates. Other cases of a very different character have occurred. How can two walk together except they be agreed? There is sufficient liberty of action, of following one's personal judgment, in the missionary work, but it must always be based upon that harmony of belief which shall give unity to the work all over the field.

What, now, would be the probable effect upon the missionary work should the secretaries disregard the antecedents of seventy-five years and send into the field missionaries of the New Theology?

The candidates might, and probably would, declare themselves in perfect harmony with the general preaching of the missionaries. They would preach the doctrines of repentance, of a new birth, and of salvation through faith in Christ. But they would not conceal, and could not if they would, their belief in a probation after death, in the fallibility of the Scriptures, in the supremacy of the ethical judgment in matters of faith, in the fallibility and ignorance of Christ with regard to the Old Testament, and many other peculiarities of the New Theology. Would this conduce to harmony in the missionary body itself? The *Andover Review* has brought forward two

missionaries who favor the New Theology. There are probably others. Have they avowed their beliefs and received the assurance of their brethren that they are in harmony with them? If any such event had taken place the *Andover Review* would not have failed to make it known. The Andover Theology has apparently made very little impression upon the missionaries of the American Board. It is simply imported German theology. It is the speculative spirit displacing the practical and spiritual religion in which our missions had their origin. It weakens the authority of the Bible, and even of the reported words of our Lord, and adjourns, in some cases, the make-up of man's character and destiny to another state of existence after death. I feel confident, from more than fifty years of personal acquaintance with missionaries of various fields of labor, that there is among them very little sympathy with this foreign product. How far the younger missionaries may be infected from Andover I cannot say, but the *Review* gives no evidence that the infection is extensive. The missionaries have given themselves to the preaching of the word of God without any exaltation of "the ethical judgment" or any wrong search for contradictions and inaccuracies in the Bible. And they have taken the Bible and translated it as being the word of God, and not as simply a rough shell containing the divine word somewhere, nobody can tell where—every man must hunt for himself. The missionaries do not believe in universal salvation. They believe that the "everlasting" and "eternal" of the Scriptures are terms of duration, and are to be taken in their obvious and natural meaning.

The missionaries believe in a probation confined to this life. The New Theology believes in a probation not confined to this life at all, and for by far the greater number hardly begun in this life. What is revealed of God in his works and providence and in man's moral nature is not sufficient to constitute a trial. God is under positive obligation to do something more for man. As the chances go against him in this world, God must give him a better chance in the other. And he must have "the historic Christ" clearly presented to him. What that probation is to be in the world to come, under what circumstances, is a matter of sheer conjecture, only it must be very favorable and inviting.

On such a momentous question as the fundamental nature of God's government over us, it would be fatal to all missionary success if the missionaries should have opposing views and one should pull down what the other builds up. This would be the inevitable result, to divide the mission force, to make it two instead of one. It would make those who should work in utmost harmony conscientious opposers of each other's course. They would

coming victories. If any one can contemplate the inevitable results with satisfaction he can hardly be considered a wise friend of missions. The conflict must range over the whole area of theology,—the nature of the divine government; the limits, if any, of probation; the authority of the Holy Scriptures; the place and authority of Christian consciousness and of ethical judgment; the work of the Holy Spirit; conversion and regeneration; the final judgment; the awards to those on the right hand and to those on the left,—all these and kindred subjects must be considered and settled by the conversion of one party or the other before there can be any harmony of teaching. Mentally and spiritually the two parties stand at opposite poles and look up to different guiding stars.

The missionaries are earnest, practical men, reverent and constant students of the Bible, proclaiming its truths as of infinite importance to this present life, this one only time of probation, in which "he that believeth shall be saved and he that believeth not shall be damned." The Bible has objective authority to them. It decides all questions of faith and practice for them. They bow to it as of supreme authority, "and teach men so." Now a young man from Andover comes to them and tells them the Bible is full of errors, mistakes, contradictions; that our Lord himself is of no authority in what he says of the Old Testament; that the Bible, the true Bible, or, if you please, what is to you the word of God, is to be determined subjectively in your "Christian consciousness;" that the ethical judgment is supreme over the word, and is competent to decide what God ought to do and must do, whether found in the Bible or not. In support of all this and much more, he quotes a long list of German authors, men of profound learning, at least nominally Christian, to whose authority all men should at once bow without having the audacity to quote against them any of the sayings of Jesus of Nazareth or of his apostles and prophets.

There is, however, one passage in the Bible which gentlemen of the New Departure often quote as of supreme, even divine, authority. They will allow no criticism. In vain you point them to the assertion that Christ did not go to the spirits in prison in person, but by the quickening Spirit, which, according to Paul (Eph. i. 19, 20), was specifically the Holy Spirit, and that the preaching was in the days of Noah and only seven persons were converted and all the rest are now "spirits in prison." In vain you adduce high authority and the analogy of faith and the belief of the Protestant church. No consideration will be listened to with the least respect. It is their forlorn hope, and they will stand by it to the last.

Such being the position of the two parties, can there be any reasonable hope of a speedy reconciliation? We take them both to be equally conscientious and determined, ready to make any sacrifices rather than even appear to yield an honest conviction. Is it wisdom to set them in array against each other, or to place them in circumstances where they cannot but contravene each other's work and influence?

The private views of missionaries would be of little comparative importance to the churches sending them forth and supporting them, but for the

effect of those views upon the peoples to be evangelized. Now it must be admitted that the New Theology verges towards a harmony, not only with the lapsed oriental churches, but with Moslems, Jews, and pagans. "All Asia" in some way or form believes in a continuance of man's probation without any definite time-limit like death. This is evident from the universal prevalence of prayers for the dead. The devout Mohammedans pray even for their Prophet—"Bestow thy mercy upon Mohammed and the race of Mohammed, as thou didst upon Abraham and the race of Abraham." This supplication is in the formal prayer which is to be repeated five times a day by every Moslem,—man, woman, and child; and as it is repeated three times at each prayer, and by the very devout nine times, the prophet and his descendants, living and dead, are very much prayed for. It is easy to see that about fifteen hundred millions of petitions are offered to Allah for them every day. The Moslems believe in a long trial after death and the judgment for Jews and Christians, but none will suffer eternal punishment except idolaters. The Moslem prayers for the dead are borrowed from the Jewish. The oriental Christians adopted, after the corruption of the faith, the unscriptural and heathenish notions of the Jews with regard to departed souls, and expanded them into a system. All believe in a state after death, not fixed and irrevocable, but admitting of alleviation and final deliverance. Prayers and offerings are as legitimate for the dead as for the living. It is true the New Theology does not tell us much about that trial, now going on beyond the gates of death, but it is assumed to be a very favorable one, much more so than the Moslems and Christians have supposed. There is all the more encouragement for prayer on their behalf. We pray for friends on a voyage round the world, although we may know nothing of their latitude, longitude, and weather, or whether they are moving by sail or steam-boat or rail. If we believe, with Andover, that souls are still on trial after death, if we believe that Asia is right and that her millions on the other side are struggling up towards holiness and blessedness, then we ought to "exhort that first of all supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men, for kings, and for all that are in authority," and also for unknown millions of souls still on trial. Undoubtedly Andover prays for them in secret. But she has not yet the courage of her opinions to pray for them openly. This will come by and by.

Whether Germany absorbed this pure orientalism, and, straining out some of the more repulsive elements, transmitted it to the West, we cannot say. It will be hailed with delight on its return to the East with the sanction of the West.

But if this new theology be true, missions in Asia are a cruel impertinence. The Asiatics—Moslem, heathen, Christian—are doing very well as

do, has made the whole missionary work a pernicious waste which cannot too soon be abandoned.

But if the New Departure is resolved to have its neophytes tried as missionaries, then, in all decency and common sense, let not the two theologies be mixed up in one place. Do not mix them at all anywhere in mission work. The result must be disastrous.

Let the dissatisfied form a new mission, select a new field, and have the work all to themselves. There would then be perfect harmony. And if the proclamation of an unlimited probation, of a Bible suspiciously full of errors, of the inerrancy of the ethical judgment, and its authority to prescribe what God must do, should be followed by sinners being converted to God, the system would then gain that kind of credibility which success gives.

We would propose, as a most favorable field for such an experiment, some unoccupied territory of Africa. It offers more inviting fields than Asia. Africa was my first love. I fully intended to go there, but was suddenly sent off in another direction. Patient and fearless souls will find a grand work to do without interference with any one. The enterprise would have unity and simplicity. A single secretary with a good prudential committee could manage it for some years. The organization might be called "The Dissenters' Board of Missions for Congo." Those who should prefer it to the American Board could send in their contributions accordingly. This measure would be attended with many advantages. It would offer a legitimate way for dissent to manifest itself, and to act without factious opposition to an existing institution. It would also open a door to all enthusiastic young men to go into Africa, and, "with a large-hearted and generous spirit," tell the heathen how happy have been their ancestors in knowing nothing of Christ, for their trial has been in far more favorable circumstances, and before this they are probably all in heaven. True, it is a misfortune to a heathen people to have the gospel presented to them in this life, but they must make the best of it. They must not think they are to enjoy their blessed heathenism any longer.

If, in response to this message, "Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God;" the church will reply with loud acclaim, "Sing unto God, ye kingdoms of the earth; O sing praises unto the Lord; Selah."

The New Departure desires nothing but peace and love. As to doctrines it desires to be let alone. Missions should be conducted in such a large-hearted and large-minded spirit that young men should be attracted to them by the grandeur of the aim without any scrutiny of their theological opinions,¹ etc., etc.

But, let me tell the New Departure, there will be a scrutiny into theological opinions which no missionary can avoid, which will be minute and

¹ There is a perpetual recurrence of certain phrases in the New Departure literature that is a little monotonous,—*"large-minded," "large-hearted," "a free and generous spirit," "grandeur of aim," "a larger hope,"* etc., etc., as though there had been no largeness of mind or heart, no generosity, no grandeur, no freedom of spirit, till the New Departure began to issue forth in print.

searching, sometimes in public, sometimes in private, with an open Bible and with sharp, irrepressible questioners, which will finally draw out your inmost thought; and your answers will be remembered and will perhaps be repeated to you decades of years afterwards, reminding you of time and place so minutely that your memory is brought forward to testify.

These critical examiners are the people to whom you preach the gospel. To escape it you must avoid giving them the Bible, or you must declare frankly that it is of no authority. At that sacrifice alone can you escape. When you have given them the word of God as of divine authority, as the infallible rule of faith and practice, you have put yourself into their hands for life. There will be no part of the Old or New Testament that you will not be asked to explain, or to declare your belief with regard to. If you have no belief, it will be noted and remembered. If you give or decline to give an opinion, it will be remembered. Your views will be compared with the views of your associates. There will be hardly a religious rite, ceremony, dogma, or proof-text of doctrine that you will not be examined upon. All facts of science and history will be mixed up in this perpetual encyclopaedic scrutiny. When I opened a Seminary at Bebek in 1840, a village never before occupied by a foreigner, one of the first callers was a Greek recluse with a difficult equation in algebra for solution. We could neither of us speak the other's language with fluency, but algebra was a clear and common language and cemented our acquaintance and friendship for life. Another, a beautiful youth, of eighteen, perhaps, came with a difficult question in chemical analysis, and we formed a friendship over that which still endures. One after another came with 1 Peter iii. 19, etc. It was for a time *the passage* of all others to discuss. The discussion generally resulted in the abandonment of their confident views. In the *System of Christian Theology*, by Henry B. Smith, page 605, there is a very brief statement in general harmony with the views of all the missionaries of our station, so far as I can recall them. Another came with a plan for a perpetual motion, and many others with questions of grave and spiritual import. Going to a neighboring city with an associate, we were called to a neighbor's house to meet him and his friends early in the morning before breakfast. A dozen or so were there, every one with a Bible in Armenian or Turkish, and for five mortal hours we answered as best we could their inquiries, ranging through the Old and New Testaments, involving prophecy, doctrines, morals, religious rites and ceremonies, arguments against the Jews, Moslems, Catholics, etc. Before an Andover missionary could thoroughly learn the language, the natives of the land, friends and foes, would have his measure, intellectually, theologically, socially. Hundreds of idle, curious souls have nothing else to do. A missionary who dissents from his associates with regard to the Bible, the divine government, human probation, the loss of the soul, inflicts a loss and ruin which cannot be measured. The proposal to ignore theological differences such as the New Departure has copied from Germany, involving the whole of theology, is a weak and foolish thing.

A little common sense and a slight knowledge of the actual working of

missions are sufficient to show the utter absurdity of trying to mix the New Departure with the Old Truth.

I return to Africa. Let the dissenters form a new society, and call it The Dissenting Board of Missions for Congo or for some other more definite field. They are charmed with grandeur: there is a grand opportunity for showing what stuff the New Theology is made of. If it be of gold, it will have honor and glory; if it be of wood, hay, stubble, it will take fire by spontaneous combustion and burn up.

The dissenters seem to feel alarm for the fate of the old Board, if it pursue its present policy, as though the weight of Congregational sentiment and conviction were with them against the Board. Let them not be too much troubled. There are some who will still rally 'round the old flag. It has saintly and glorious memories, clustering around it, of sufferings patiently endured, of victories nobly won. If God be for it, who can be against it?

ARTICLE X.

CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

I. AMERICAN.

THE NEW ENGLANDER is issued now in monthly numbers. It pays considerable attention to educational topics, having in most of the numbers this special department, and also discussing allied subjects in the body of the magazine. In January appeared an interesting article by Professor Samuel Harris, entitled, *Have we a Theology?* The current opinion that "theology is somehow antagonistic to the gospel, to the Bible, and to religion," and the common demand that it be banished from the pulpit, leads him to say: "The demand of these objectors is equivalent to the demand that men cease to think about God, immortality, or any spiritual reality. But compliance with the demand is simply impossible. From the nature of the human mind man must think of realities which concern and interest him, and must seek to attain a definite and true knowledge of them. He will think of God, and his own relations to him. Therefore he will have a theology. The question is not between religion without a theology and religion with it. It is the question between religion with a crude, narrow, confused, or erroneous theology, and religion with a theology drawn, with prayerful, earnest, and rational thought, from the Bible and the religious experience of man. This declamation against theology legitimately issues either in irreligion and unbelief, or in what the Dean of Norwich called 'maudlin sentimentalism with its disparagement of any definite doctrine, a nerveless religion without the sinew and bone of doctrine.' Thus it opens the way for a false religion of hysterical fanaticism."

The March number contains an article by Professor L. L. Paine, of Bangor Theological Seminary, on the book *Progressive Orthodoxy*. It is an excellent review. Perhaps its author would not now say that the indications are "that the recent development of the controversial spirit in our Congregational Zion is subsiding." We venture to prophesy that it will not subside till Andover either conquers or is conquered. Dr. Paine's understanding of the book agrees with ours. He says:—

"Its fundamental assumption is that direct knowledge of Christ in his incarnate condition is essential to full moral responsibility and probation, and therefore the only basis of divine judgment. Christianity, by which is meant the historical manifestation of Christ in his incarnate person and gospel, is the absolute universal religion, that is, embraces within itself all morally decisive religious truth and power, and the relation of men to it, through personal acceptance or rejection, is the absolute and universal principle of final judgment; so that all the issues of heaven and hell hang sim-

ply on that relation. Acceptance of the historic Christ is the only ground of salvation, and rejection of him is the only ground of retribution. This is the major premise. The minor premise is: A large fraction of the human race have no direct knowledge of the historic Christ, and therefore have had no true probation in this life, and are not morally fitted to be the subjects of the divine judgment. Hence the conclusion: A righteous and merciful God cannot and will not bring such to judgment until a full probation is allowed them; and hence the 'probability' that the historic Christ will be proclaimed to them in all his saving power in another life, as an essential preliminary to their standing before him for final award. Such is the plain syllogism of the book. And we are ready to concede at once that, if the major premise is to be accepted, the conclusion is not only 'probable,' but even inexorable. That it is 'new theology' is frankly declared, and is readily conceded. It surely has no connection with the earlier theology of New England. The claim put forth that it has such a connection seems to us without foundation. The New England doctrine of the atonement as having a relation to the whole race, is entirely different in stand-point and principle from the universalism of this book. New England theology was essentially Calvinistic. It held firmly to a doctrine of divine decree which was exclusive as well as inclusive, and while it allowed that the atonement was sufficient as a mediatorial work and embraced all mankind in its historic range, yet it practically and intentionally limited that range by its doctrines of election and grace which made the atonement operative only for the elect. In fact, the *particularism* of original Calvinism had full force in the 'consistent Calvinism' of the New England school. Professor Park, in his Introductory Essay to The Atonement, says: 'Their *doctrine* of the atonement is essentially the same with that of the elder Calvinists, but their *theory* of the atonement is more harmonious with itself, and with other parts of the evangelical faith; and their mode of expressing this theory is more precise, unequivocal, scientific. In the *substance* they are Calvinistic; in the *form*, they are Edwardian; hence they have been called Edwardian Calvinists.' And Dr. Griffin, comparing the views of old school and new school on the question whether the atonement is limited or general, says, 'The dispute turns out to be chiefly about words.' The only element of universalism to be found in the New England theology, is its philosophical doctrine that, by reason of 'natural ability,' there is a possibility that all men may be saved through Christ's atonement. But it does not allow that the possibility will be realized in the case of the non-elect, much less does it allow that possibility to continue into the future life. How the doctrine of this book is 'a necessary implication of our fathers' faith in the extent and intent of the atonement,' we are at an utter loss to see. . . .

"The truth is that the theological parentage of this book is recent and German. We do not know how far the writers of it would acknowledge their obligations to Dr. Dorner. But so close is the likeness of its peculiar views (and even phraseology) to those of Dr. Dorner's System of Christian Doctrine, that it may be said of them as was said of Philo in his relation to

Plato, 'Either Plato Philonizes or Philo Platonizes.' We say this, not as joining in any outcry against German theology. The indebtedness of Christendom to the Germans in all departments of theological science is simply incalculable. For Dorner as a theological thinker we have the greatest respect. He should be read by those who can read him aright. But he is an unsafe theological guide. His method is metaphysical and speculative. He builds on abstract *a priori* principles, and so strong is his metaphysical *tendenz*, that church history and Scripture alike are colored and distorted in its theological system."

The reviewer now approaches the heart of his subject.

"But the important question in regard to these views is not whether they are *new*, but whether they are *true*. Let us, then, examine the fundamental premise a little more closely, and note what are its implications. The premise is that historical Christianity, being the absolute and universal religion, affords the only adequate basis of a full probation; and that knowledge of the historic Christ, and the relations growing out of it, are the only tests of final judgment. Here it is implied that before Christ's coming the world was without a *salvable* knowledge of God; that the divine method of redemption did not properly begin to act among men until after the Incarnation; that the only religious light accessible to pre-Christian times, the Abrahamic covenant excepted, was that of reason and conscience; that apart from the Christian revelation the world has always been and still is under a legal, not a gracious, dispensation; that God's relation to all who are without the knowledge of Christ, at least in manifestation, is one of mere justice, and not one of mercy, though holding itself in an attitude of forbearance; that a true moral probation for such is impossible, since no motives nor influences can reach them from the light of nature or conscience sufficiently powerful to move to any successful moral endeavor, or to bring them into a loving and saving relation with God; the inference from all which would seem to be, that the heathen are not complete free moral and responsible agents, and that the present life is not for such a place of probation at all, but merely a stage of developing moral consciousness, to be completed in some later stage of being when probation shall properly begin. These implications are not simply our own deductions. They are the staple of the volume before us, reiterated with varying language, but in substantial unison. What now shall be said of these positions? Are they to be accepted as valid and true? For ourselves, it would seem that the mere statement of them is enough to convict them."

Once again :—

there is such a thing as an *unconscious* rationalism—a rationalism of method rather than of spirit. The whole argument of this book runs on rationalistic lines. We believe in the rights of the reason. We are Protestants of Protestants. We accept much of what is said in these days about the 'Christian consciousness.' But we believe also in the rights of faith. God has chosen to hide a part of his redemptive methods and purposes in mystery. To attempt to *force God's hand* is the essence of rationalism. That is just what this book does. It is not content with 'seeing through a glass darkly.' It has no patience with what it calls agnosticism. If the light needed cannot be wrung from Scripture, then let reason have play. But how about the announcement in the introduction, that all inquiries are to be made 'under the full and constant acceptance of the authority of Scripture. Whatever new light may break forth, it will come from this source'? Take the question of probation in another life for the heathen. Does Scripture sustain it? Even this book, after an heroic wrestle with a few Scripture passages, allows that the result reached is only 'probable' and falls back on a syllogism which is a pure work of human reasoning. Then as to the affirmation of scriptural probability, is not the evidence of Scripture strongly the other way? There are a few obscure passages, we grant, which, taken by themselves, may look to a continuance of probation into another life. But the exegetical canon of Irenaeus is a sound one, to interpret enigmatical portions of Scripture by those which are plain and consistent with each other. The general drift of the Bible on this question is too clear for doubt. The Old Testament is full of present probation, while the very existence of a future life is in the dim background. It is remarkable that no words of Christ can be quoted as directly favoring a future probation for any class of men. Surely, if his coming in the flesh was to mark a new era in the history of human probation, and if knowledge of him as the historic Saviour was to be the absolute test of the question whether men should have their probation in this life or in another, it would have formed a prominent part of his gospel message. Paul had received no such revelation, or he would have proclaimed it on the house tops. He was the Apostle to the Gentiles. The problem of heathenism faced him in all its appalling magnitude. Yet he gives no sign. 'To-day is the accepted time,' 'The Lord is at hand,' are the watchwords and inspiration of his missionary labors. The Book of Revelation is eschatological, and its burden throughout is the *finality of destiny* which is to characterize the close of this temporal life and scene, in the case both of individuals and of this world's history as a whole. The distinction between the present probationary dispensation and the fixed state of the world to come is sharply drawn. Nor is the judgment postponed into a far-off eternity, with vacant spaces left for new probations. 'The time is at hand.' 'He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still. And, behold, I come *quickly*.' The *argumentum e silentio* is sometimes of great weight. Even if it were true that the probation of the heathen is to be continued, the silence of Scripture concerning it shows that it is not wise

for men to know it, and if this be so, then it is equally unwise to hold it up as speculatively probable."

II. ENGLISH.

The EXPOSITOR for January contains a very interesting discussion, by Principal Sir J. W. Dawson, of the Probable Physical Causes of the Destruction of the Cities of the Plain.

"With reference to the causes of the destruction of the cities, these are so clearly stated in a perfectly unconscious and incidental manner in Genesis xix., that I think no geologist, on comparing the narrative with the structure of the district, can hesitate as to the nature of the phenomena which were presented to the observation of the narrator. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the history is compounded of two narratives giving different views as to the cause of the catastrophe. On the contrary, the story has all the internal evidence of being a record of the observations of intelligent eye-witnesses who reported the appearances observed without concerning themselves as to their proximate causes or natural probability.

"We learn from the narrative that the destruction was sudden and unexpected, that it was caused by 'brimstone and fire,' that these were rained down from the sky, that a dense column of smoke ascended to a great height like the smoke of a furnace or lime-kiln, and that along with or immediately after the fire, there was an emission of brine or saline mud, capable of encrusting bodies (as that of Lot's wife), so that they appeared as mounds (not pillars) of salt. The only point in the statements in regard to which there can be doubt, is the substance intended by the Hebrew word translated 'brimstone.' It may mean sulphur, of which there is abundance in some of the Dead Sea depths; but there is reason to suspect that, as used here, it may rather denote pitch, since it is derived from the same root with Gopher, the Hebrew name apparently of the cypress and other resinous woods (p. 72).

"The description is that of a bitumen or petroleum eruption, similar to those which on a small scale have been so destructive in the regions of Canada and the United States of America. They arise from the existence of reservoirs of compressed inflammable gas along with petroleum and water, existing at considerable depths below the surface. When these are penetrated, as by a well or bore-hole, the gas escapes with explosive force carrying petroleum with it, and when both have been ignited the petroleum rains down in burning showers and floats in flames over the ejected water, while a dense smoke towers high into the air, and the intruding draft may produce a vortex, carrying it upward to a still greater height, and distributing still more widely the burning material, which is almost inextinguishable and most destructive to life and to buildings.

"In the valley of the Euphrates, according to Lavard, the Arabs can

"Now the valley of the Dead Sea is an 'oil district,' and from the incidental mention of its slime pits, or literally asphalt pits, in Genesis xiv., was apparently more productive in mineral pitch in ancient times. It is interesting in connexion with this to notice that Conder found layers of asphalt in the mound which marks the site of ancient Jericho, showing that the substance was used in primitive times for roofs and floors or as a cement to protect brick structures from damp, and it is well known that petroleum exudes from the rocks both on the sides and in the bottom of the Dead Sea, and, being hardened by evaporation and oxygelation, forms the asphaltum referred to by so many travellers (pp. 74, 75).

"It seems difficult to imagine that anything except the real occurrence of such an event could have given origin to the narrative. No one unacquainted with the structure of the district and the probability of bitumen eruptions in connexion with this structure, would be likely to imagine the raining of burning pitch from the sky, with the attendant phenomena stated so simply and without any appearance of exaggeration, and with the evident intention to dwell on the spiritual and moral significance of the event, while giving just as much of the physical features as was essential to this purpose. It may be added here that in Isaiah xxxiv. 9 and 10 there is a graphic description of a bitumen eruption, which may possibly be based on the history now under consideration, though used figuratively to illustrate the doom of Idumea.

"In thus directing attention to the physical phenomena attendant on the destruction of the Cities of the Plain, I do not desire to detract from the providential character of the catastrophe, or from the lessons which it teaches, and which have pervaded the religion and literature of the world ever since it occurred. I merely wish to show that there is nothing in the narrative comparable with the wild myths and fanciful conjectures sometimes associated with it, and that its author has described in an intelligent manner, appearances which he must have seen or which were described to him by competent witnesses. I wish also to indicate that the statements made are in accordance with the structure and possibilities of the district as now understood after its scientific exploration. From a scientific point of view it is an almost vague description of a natural phenomenon of much interest and of very rare occurrence (pp. 76, 77)."

In the April number of the *Expositor* the same eminent authority renews the discussion of the first chapter of Genesis, the following extract from which is specially instructive and significant (pp. 287, 294).

"A second point on which I would insist, as essential to the interpretation of Genesis i. is, that its writer intended, and his successors in Hebrew literature understood, that the creative days are days of God, or Divine ages—*Olamim* as they are elsewhere called—or, which amounts to the same thing, that they represent such periods of time. It may be worth while shortly to mention the evidence of this, as I find it is doubted or denied by Huxley and Réville.¹ The writer of Genesis i. obviously sees no incongru-

¹ "Nineteenth Century, December, 1885, and January 1886."

ity in those early days which passed before there were any arrangements for natural days ; ' dies ineffabiles,' as Augustine calls them ; nor in the fact that the day in which the Creator rests goes on until now without any termination ; nor in the statement that the whole work could be comprehended in one day, ' the day when Jahveh-Elohim made the earth and the heavens ;' and if this be called later and Jahvistic, it will have the additional value of being the comment of an editor who may be supposed to have understood the documents he had to do with.

" If we are to attribute the decalogue to a later period than Genesis, which even M. Réville seems to admit, the argument is rendered conclusive by the position of the fourth commandment in the midst of the ' ten words,' and by the reason attached to it, the whole of which would otherwise be inexplicable and even trifling.² A later writer in the Epistle to the Hebrews (chap. iv.) explains this. When God entered into His rest He gave that rest also as an immortal rest to man in Eden. But man fell and lost the perpetual or olamic sabbatism. There remained to him in the weekly sabbath a memento of the lost rest and an anticipation of its recovery by a Redeemer in the future. Hence the Sabbath was not only the central point of the moral law, but of all religion, the pledge and the commemoration of the Divine promise, and the means of keeping it before men's minds from age to age till the promised Redeemer should come. It is this that causes the Sabbath to be insisted on as the most essential point of religion by the Hebrew prophets, and this is the reason of its connexion with the days of creation. This also caused the necessity of its change by Christians to the Lord's day without any new enactment, for on this day Christ arose to enter on His sabbatism ' as God did into His.' The Lord's Day now has the same significance to Christians as the type of the rest into which the Saviour has entered, and which has continued for 1800 years, and of that eternal Sabbath which remains to the people of God. In truth, independently of all considerations of cosmogony, the long seventh day of Creation and the long heavenly rest of the Saviour constitute the only valid reasons either for the Jewish or Christian Sabbath. That Jesus himself held this view we learn from his answer to the Pharisees who accused him of breaking the Sabbath. ' My Father worketh until now and I work.'³ That the apostolic church had the same view of the creative days and the Creator's rest we learn from the Pauline use of the words *aion* and *aionios* with reference to God's ages of working, and from the passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews already referred to.⁴

" The creative days are the ' antiquities of the earth ' spoken of in Prov-

erbs viii. They are the *Olamim* or ages noticed as equal to God's creative days in Psalm xc., for which even the Revised Version retains the unmeaning 'from everlasting to everlasting.' This Psalm too is a very archaic one, resembling in its diction the songs attributed to Moses in Deuteronomy. Psalm civ. is a poetical version of Genesis i., and in it the work marches on in slow and solemn grandeur without any reference to days. Again, there is not anywhere in the Bible a hint that the work of creation was remarkable as being done in a short time. Some of us have no doubt been taught in childhood that God's power was wonderfully shown by his creating the world in the short space of six days, but there is nothing of this in the Old or New Testament.

"Lastly, the idea of long prehuman periods exists in nearly all the traditions of ancient nations, and is contained in the Chaldean record, though it wants the division into days. Yet the Chaldeans had a week of seven days, and regarded the seventh as unlucky with reference to work, and as a day of rest.

"I have insisted on this point, because though essential to the understanding of the record, it has been so much overlooked in popular religious teaching that even men of education may be excused for ignorance of it.

"I propose now, without waiting to examine the physical cosmogony of the earlier days of creation, to notice shortly the actual statements of the author of Genesis respecting the introduction of plants and animals, taking these statements in their most literal sense.

"Here at the outset we are met by an apparent discrepancy between the record in Genesis and what we have learned of the history of creation from the study of the earth's crust. Our author informs us that vegetation was introduced on the day preceding the final arrangements of the solar system, and two days before the inswarming of animals on the fifth day. This vegetation also included the higher kinds of plants, for while it was first *Deshe*, or seedless plants (not grass as in the Authorized version), it also contained herbs bearing seed, and trees bearing fruit. In so far as geological discovery has yet reached into the older layers of the earth's crust, it has found abundant remains of animals as low as the Lower Cambrian; but below this there is a vast thickness of both crystalline and fragmental rock, in which Eozoon of the Laurentian stands out as the sole representative of animal life; and its claim to be an animal is still in question. But land plants are not known to reach so far back. None are known so old as the Lower Cambrian, so that marine animals, and probably marine plants, appear to have existed long before land plants. Yet the geologist cannot safely deny the existence of land vegetation even in the old Laurentian pe-

while the quantity of Laurentian carbon which it would seem must owe its accumulation to the deoxidizing agency of plants, is enormous. Whether we shall ever find Laurentian rocks in a condition to yield up the actual forms and structures of this old vegetation is uncertain: but we know, as certainly as we can know anything inferentially, that it existed. Of its character and quality we have no information except the record in Genesis. If it was given to the primitive prophet of creation to see in his vision the forms of Laurentian vegetation, he saw what no geologist has yet seen, but what some geologist of the future may possibly see. In any case, he has to thank the discoveries of Sir William Logan and his *confrères* in Canada, for establishing at least a probability on scientific grounds that he was right; and until these discoveries were made, the fact of pre-Cambrian vegetation rested on his sole authority. It may be said that such vegetation would be useless; but the same remark may be made as to the lower animals which existed so long before man, or as to the exuberant vegetation of some oceanic islands untenanted by the higher animals.

"In the geological record the lower animals swarm upon the stage in countless multitudes and vast variety of form and organization, in the Cambrian age; and it is on this, and the subsequent succession of life, that discussion has centred in the recent controversies. Here, fortunately, we have ample material for comparison of the two records, and if they do not agree, it is here that their divergence must appear. But to give fair play to the old historian, it will be necessary to examine his method and to weigh well his words.

"The method of the writer of Genesis in describing the work of the fifth and sixth days is similar to that employed in reference to the previous periods, but in some respects more complex, as befits the higher theme. He states first the divine purpose or decree under the formula 'God said'; next the actual production of the objects intended—'God created'; next the contemplation of the work and its subsequent development—'God saw.' Let us put down these stages in order, as given for the fifth day.

"(1) 'God said, "Let the waters swarm swarms having life (animal life), and let fowl⁵ fly over the earth on the surface of the expanse of heaven.'"

"(2) 'God created great reptiles,⁶ and every living moving animal with which the waters swarmed after their kind, and every winged animal after its kind.'

"(3) 'God saw that it was good, and God blessed them, saying, "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the waters of the sea, and let fowl multiply in the earth.'"

"This is, I think, a sufficiently literal rendering of the record as it stands in the Hebrew text, so far as the English tongue suffices to represent its meaning, but some of these terms require explanation. The word 'fowl' is

There it is used as a comprehensive term, to include all the lower animals of the waters with the fishes and batrachians, as well as certain animals of the land, viz. the land snails, insects, spiders and scorpions, along with small reptiles, and perhaps, though this last is not quite certain, some small quadrupeds usually regarded as vermin. The precise definition given in the law respecting unclean animals leaves no doubt as to the meaning of the word. We thus learn that the creation of the fifth day included all the marine invertebrates, and the fishes and batrachians, with the insects and their allies, or at least all such as could be held to be produced from the waters. The link of connexion which binds all these creatures under this comprehensive word is their teeming oviparous reproduction, which entitles them to be called swarming animals, in connexion with their habitat or origin in the waters. Thus this one word covers all the animals known in the Palaeozoic and Mesozoic periods of geology, with three notable exceptions—the birds, the true reptiles, and the marsupial mammals. But singularly, and as if to complete his record, this old narrator adds two of these groups, as if they had specially attracted his attention. The word *oph*, 'fowl, bird, or winged animal,' is the usual word for birds in general, though in Leviticus it includes the winged insects, and the bats, which are winged mammals. As it is a very primitive and widely diffused word, and probably onomatopoeic and derived from the sound of wings, it may in early times have served to denote all things that fly, though applied to birds chiefly. The second group specially singled out is designated by the word *tannin*, which, like *oph* is a very old and generally diffused word,¹ denoting primitively any animal long and extended. In the Hebrew Bible it is, however, used in almost every place where it occurs, either for the crocodile² or for the larger serpents. In Exod. vii. 9, the next place where it appears, it represents the great serpent produced from the rod of Moses. There is no warrant for the rendering 'great whales,' borrowed from the Septuagint, and still less for the 'great sea monsters' of the Revised Version.³ If we ask what animals the writer can have meant by *tanninim*, the answer must be either crocodiles or large serpents or creatures resembling them. Thus our author does not, as both Mr. Gladstone and Professor Huxley seem to suppose, overlook altogether the 'age of reptiles.' There are, however, known to us in the Mesozoic period a few small marsupial mammals, humble and insignificant precursors of the age of mammalia. These our author has apparently overlooked; but he has an excuse for this in the fact that such creatures do not occur in modern times, except in Australia or America,

¹ "Sansc., *Tan* : Greek, *Teino* : Latin, *Tendo*, etc."

² "See, for example, Ezek. xxix. 3 and xxxii. 2. Jeremiah compares the king of Babylon to a *tannin*, and may refer to a Euphratean crocodile, now apparently extinct (Jer. li. 34)."

and even if known to him, he had no special word by which they could be designated.

"Even with the above deduction, it must be confessed that this history of the fifth creative day presents a marvellous approximation to the two earlier periods of animal life as known to geologists, the ages of invertebrates and fishes and the age of reptiles. With the above explanation, which is in no respect forced, but quite literal, I think Professor Huxley should be ready frankly to accept this, and all the more that he has been specially distinguished for the advocacy of views of animal classification akin to those of Genesis. No one has more insisted on the affinity of the batrachians with the fishes and that of the birds with the true reptiles. In like manner this ancient writer, if he had the batrachians before his mind, includes them with the fishes, and singles out the birds and the higher reptiles as companion groups, at the summit of the animal kingdom in their day. It may be somewhat unfair to test so popular and general a statement by such details; but if an author who lived so long before the dawn of modern science is to be tested at all by our present systems, it is proper at least to give him the benefit of the consummate skill which he shows in avoiding all inaccuracy in the few bold touches with which he sketches the introduction of animal life."

ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE MOSAIC ORIGIN OF THE PENTATEUCH CODES. By Gurhardus Vos, Fellow of Princeton Theological Seminary. With an Introduction by Professor William Henry Green. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1886.

This little work is significant of a new advance in Old Testament scholarship in America. The author, who received his literary training in the gymnasium at Amsterdam, after graduating from the Seminary of the Reformed Church of Holland, at Grand Rapids, Mich., spent two years at Princeton Seminary, where he received the Hebrew fellowship. The book in question is the thesis which he presented as a competitor for this honor. It is a very creditable performance, and augurs well for the author's future literary activity. It is interesting to notice, however, that it can hardly be called an original investigation. It is not a monograph, such as a German scholar would present for the doctorate of philosophy or the licentiate of theology. It is a more ambitious book than a young scholar in Germany would attempt to write, for it seeks to cover the whole ground of the origin of the Pentateuch, with all the intricate critical questions involved. This it does compactly in a 12mo volume of 263 pages.

The discussion is clear and well arranged. There are, however, two grave defects. The book has no index, and is almost without references to authorities. There are only four foot-notes in the entire volume; two of these simply state that the author is under special obligations to certain writers for the substance of two chapters. An index should never be wanting in a book of this character, and references should be given to the sources used, in order that the student and critic may verify the accuracy of the statements made. Otherwise the work of looking up the writer's authorities is entirely neglected or becomes very laborious. Foot-notes may seem to savor of pedantry, but they sometimes help very materially in judging of the accuracy of the author's criticisms and conclusions.

There is, too, at times something in the tone of the book which seems to indicate a misapprehension of the aims of biblical criticism as represented by the critics of the advanced school, as if they were conspiring to overthrow the authority of the Scriptures and were unscrupulous as to the means which they used to establish their positions. He several times uses the word "pretended" with reference to the evidence, etc., of the critics (pp. 42, 49, 95, 108, 151, 164, 183).

The second chapter, on *The Linguistic Argument of the Critics*, is unsatisfactory and incomplete. Thus, as he states, he has derived his knowl-

says that even Ewald held with others that "the materials were not distinct and conspicuous enough to justify the inference of the diversity of authorship and sources," but he fails to state that Ewald subsequently withdrew this view and apologetically spoke of the book in which it is set forth as the work of one who was only nineteen years old (see *Studien und Kritiken*, Hamburg, 1831, p. 596; cf. Bleek, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Berlin, 1878, p. 39). There is another case where Mr. Vos quotes F. W. Schultz (pp. 172, 181) (*Das Deuteronomium*, Berlin, 1859), as though he still maintained the same critical views as those set forth in his commentary on Deuteronomy, but this is not the case (*Allgemeine Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, Elberfeld, 1866, p. 633; cf. *Studien und Kritiken*, Gotha, 1866, pp. 547-551).

It is evident that he has not read the works by Stähelin, to which in each case he gives the wrong date (*Kritische Untersuchungen über die Genesis* was published in 1830, instead of 1831, and *Kritische Untersuchungen über den Pentateuch*, etc., in 1843, instead of 1844). Nor does he state the case fairly when he speaks of the critics as creating their own criteria for the literary analysis. There are certain catchwords which seem to characterize the Elohist as distinguished from the Jehovist. But the linguistic argument to which Mr. Vos devotes especial attention is not the only one which the critics advance in support of their theory of different documents in the Pentateuch. Schrader, in the eighth edition of De Wette's *Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung*, Berlin, 1869, p. 271, says: "The characteristic marks, through which the previously named groups of paragraphs, aside from the different use of the divine names, are distinguished, are (1) a peculiar idiom which extends throughout, (2) a striking difference in the mode of representation, (3) a diversity in the religious conceptions as well as in the other views," etc. These other arguments should have been examined.

Barring these and similar criticisms, the work is deserving of much praise. Chapter v., on System or Disorder, is good; so too, is the discussion on the Unity, or Plurality, of Sanctuary? It is well shown that "the Covenant-law positively presupposes unity of worship and cultus" (p. 88). The discussion concerning Priests and Levites is thorough and satisfactory.

In speaking of the Unity of Deuteronomy and the Laws of the Intermediate Books, he claims that more than forty years fall between the Sinaitic legislation and Deuteronomy, hence that we are to seek unity of authorship, of spirit and aim, and of underlying ideas. He holds that a relative unity exists between Deuteronomy and the middle books, and that to the former we must assign the priority. He brings out the important idea that prophecy presupposes the law and grows out of it. The internal evidence which he adduces for the Mosaic origin of the Deuteronomic code is weighty. There is one case, however, in this chapter, where he deals in

proof or by reference to some good authority. As it appears here, it rests unsupported on the author's dictum. The objections to the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy are briefly answered in chapter fifteen. Not to speak of other parts of the book, his criticism of the view of the critics as to the post-exilic origin of the books of the Pentateuch is very satisfactory.

Taken as a whole, the book is to be commended as a succinct and judicious statement of arguments which may be urged with force against many of the positions of the advanced critics.

THE EVOLUTION OF REVELATION, A Critique of conflicting opinions concerning the Old Testament. By James M. Whiton, Ph.D. Putnams: N.Y. (pp. 34.)

This is pamphlet xxvii. in the series "Questions of the Day." It answers the questions: Is Revelation itself a process of human experience? Is Inspiration the outcome of man's moral energy? in the affirmative. The former is described as "not descending from above upon the world, but growing up within the world." The latter is described as resulting from the Divine Guidance in "enlightening and redeeming men," "a moral energy of mind and heart," in place of supernatural instruction. The writer takes the position described by Dr. Geo. E. Ellis, at the beginning of the present Andover movement, as the Unitarian position of two generations ago, as opposed to the Orthodox position. "The theory," he says, "that these books [the Pentateuch] are strictly a Revelation by document in the very word of the Lord to Moses, has already given way; so far as the Mosaic books are concerned, the question has now been switched on to the line of the other theory, of Revelation by development." By this last word is meant, not the old and established meaning of the word, which it still retains outside the lines of scientific hypothesis, but the newer idea of evolution. Dr. Whiton once said: "The moral and ritual code grew from age to age." This would not mean evolution, unless something connected with it so limited it.

On the other hand, when this writer denies that there are in Scripture, as composing it, "documents of verified authorship and date and accuracy of statement," he substitutes therefor an unfolding of "the people of the book," or the people among whom each book of Scripture appears, *into* documents to be every way ascribed to them. The "divineness" there may be in such a book is "demonstrated by the advance of moral life" in them, in place of any signs of divinity in the book as such. Better moral life would have produced better Scriptures than any we have; he asserts a self-corrective process in the volume, the end of which we know not. To go a little into detail the pamphlet has these peculiarities:—

1. A good many times it is asserted that the object of the Bible is to reveal God's grace, every other object being ignored. This is the Universalist position. Twice expressions are used, indeed, that conflict with this. "The Hebrew prophets discussed a gracious purpose of God as 'a just God and a Saviour.'" "Had this revelation [O. T.] been only of Divine truth and the law for the conscience," etc.,—seems to recognize the rest of moral

government—something more than mere grace. But the discussion proceeds throughout upon the narrow basis of nothing more in God's revealed character than this.

2. The Bible is affirmed to differ from other ancient religious books only in degree. Revelation is found "in the sacred books of China, of India, of Persia," also, "The essential distinction between the various revelations of truth that other ancient nations had in the select minds among them, and the Revelation which the nation of Israel possessed, was in the point of progressive and productive power." "Comparing the truths which Christianity has inherited from Judaism with many which we find scattered through the writings of the heathen sages, we find that the essential difference is *not in the substance* of them, but in the *power* to utilize them and work them into actual life." Then if the subject matter of all revelation is grace, the old heathen religions were revelations of God's grace!

3. Bunsen, Maurice, and Robertson Smith are quoted to the effect that nothing is revealed save through personality. Life, experience alone can teach. Then the didactic portions of both Old and New Testaments go for nothing. But what becomes also of the major part of the heathen sacred books—so predominantly, not to say dreadfully didactic, and often without one element of personal unfolding of the Divine life? Cannot God instruct, command, do more than mere human biography, in giving truth to the world? We recognize the Divine leading in human experience and social institutions. But are we to throw away the mass of precious, impressive, indispensable teachings, which are sealed to us not by human action or production but by a "Thus saith the Lord"?

4. Several times it is admitted that Christ had "more" of God in Him than others, in a way that falls far short of the impression that Scripture makes. "That life appears, in which more of God is apparent than is elsewhere discoverable on earth." "Jesus Christ is the historical fruit of the Old Testament process." "Recognizing in him more of God than elsewhere." "Both in the world and the Bible the transcendent personality is Christ." Dr. Geo. E. Ellis and Theodore Parker could unite on these statements. But they fall far, far below the idea of the one and only manifestation of God in man. They even fail utterly to differentiate Christ essentially from all developments of Judaism and humanity.

5. Dr. Whiton's theory is asserted to be a mere modification of what has long been held as to the normal development *in* Scripture, which is a very different thing from the origin of Scripture *by* development. "The evolutionary theory," he says, "is simply a new direction of the now generally admitted doctrine of the progressiveness of Revelation." It is not possible for one who is familiar with Bernard's instructive volume on the "Progress of New Testament doctrine" to accept this statement. Bernard expressly distinguishes "the communication of truth by God" from "the apprehension of truth by man," a distinction confused by Dr. Whiton. "By doctrine is meant divine teaching"—"words given to men," says Bernard, "separate, articulate, definite communications, spoken of in old time as 'coming to'

particular persons." And "the course of divine teaching *coincides in extent* with the Scriptures of the New Testament," no place being left for any "parasite to be cut away by the critic's knife," for "ignorance or superstition that [the writers] fancied was truth," or for earlier words to be contradicted by later ones. Evolution has some of these things ; development has not. Evolution does not stumble at the coming forth of something entirely unlike that from which it comes forth.—It asserts "conceptions of the character of God in the earlier parts of the Old Testament" contrary to those given in the New—statements of fact and precepts and commandments contrary to each other. These and such like things those who with Bernard believe in development, do not find in Scripture ; those who accept evolution do. They see evolved what was not involved. To them the later teachings of Christ and Paul are as hostile to some of Moses, as the full-blown Romish doctrine of Cardinal Newman is to the primitive simple faith from which—a theological evolutionist before evolution—he professed to derive it in his work issued just after he apostatized to Rome. This is not progress, it is contradiction and corruption. It violates consistency of thought.—It is consistent enough with the notion of the Bible as a rule of man, but not as a revelation from God. True progress is "a systematic advance in communications from God," not an evolution by man from certain of his ideas about God of others unlike them.—The claim of a "power to create new doctrine" was in Newman's case "necessary to the controversial position of Rome ;" and it may now be necessary to sustain new departures from the truth, but it is not necessary to Revelation, or to a real progress in it. Nor does this last require at all that later Scripture writers should contradict earlier ones, as Dr. Whiton asserts that they do.

BASKERVILL'S ANDREAS. Edited from MS. Boston : Ginn & Co.

This edition forms the third publication of the library of Anglo-Saxon poetry as established by Professor Harrison of Lexington. Beowulf and Caedmon's Exodus and Daniel have already passed to their second edition. Andreas is part of the Codex Vercellensis discovered in 1832 by Dr. Blume at Vercelli, Italy. It has been edited by Thorpe (1836), by Jacob Grimm (1840), by Kemble (1843), and in 1858 by Grein. Professor Baskervill's edition, in common with Thorpe's and as distinguished from the others, is based, as he tells us, on the MS. It is superior even to Thorpe's in that the editor had sent him that collation of the MS. with the printed text which his German preceptor, Professor Wülker, had personally made at Vercelli in 1854. It is not unjust to the older editors, therefore, to say that the edition before us gives to the scholar the most satisfactory text. The authorship of the poem is still an open question, it having generally been assigned to Cynewulf. It is, as Grimm maintains, among the oldest and most instruct-

tory. From his departure to Mermedonia on to his return to Achaia the narrative is given with graphic skill, while all along the course of the record timely suggestions are interspersed for the spiritual profit of the reader. In addition to the text, the editor is yet to give sufficiently extended critical notes, as also a brief and carefully prepared glossary for the practical convenience of the student. The use of the circumflex accent throughout is to be commended, while the citation on every page of divergent readings from the MS. and the earlier editors is in the line of clearer exposition. In this volume as in his special work as a lexicographer Professor Baskervill has put us all under marked indebtedness. By such labors as these our vernacular is fast becoming understood in all its forms and periods. The editions of Cynewulf's *Elene*, of Caedmon's *Genesis* and of Alfred's *Metres* soon to follow this of *Andreas* will fairly place the study of First English Poetry upon a plane of academic equality with that of the poetry of any other tongue.

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